



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 08179455 8

CIVIL WAR TIMES



DANIEL WAIT HOWE



Presented to the
New York Public Library
by the Union
of American Trade Unions
May 15th 1903.

115-2

1-2

CIVIL WAR TIMES

1861-1865

BY

DANIEL WAIT HOWE

Author of The Puritan Republic

"The broken soldier, kindly bade to stay,
Sate by his fire and talk'd the night away,
Wept o'er his wounds or tales of sorrow done,
Shoulder'd his crutch and show'd how fields were won."

—*Goldsmith.*

INDIANAPOLIS
THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY
PUBLISHERS

1902

Checked
May 1948

COPYRIGHT 1902
THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY

TO
THE SOLDIERS
FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE
OF THE CIVIL WAR
THIS VOLUME IS
INSCRIBED

PREFACE

In an address to the New England Society of New York, Oliver Wendell Holmes said: "The story of the Pilgrims may be told for a thousand anniversaries and the next year it will be fresh again." So it is with the story of the Civil War. Notwithstanding the passing years, it retains all its interest, especially for those who bore arms on either side. The surviving veterans never tire of telling the story or of hearing it told, and its fascination is such as to lend a charm to even the most unpretentious narrative of the conflict in which they took part.

Macaulay said that he intended to write a history of England that would make the lady in her drawing-room lay down the latest novel and take up his book, and he accomplished his purpose. The time has not yet come, nor has the historian appeared, for writing a history of the Civil War. No man now living can write it with the impartiality that should characterize the historian, and no historian could now write such a history without rekindling the embers of passion and prejudice still smoldering beneath the ashes of the conflict that once glowed with such fierce heat.

When the time comes for writing the history of the

Civil War the historian will find a wealth of materials from which to construct a history far more fascinating than Macaulay's and infinitely more interesting than the distorted history conveyed in diluted doses through the pages of so-called historical novels. It will be sufficient honor for the author of a volume like this if he has contributed even a little to the history that is to be written.

The general scope of this volume is indicated by the table of contents and a very full index. The statements in the text are supported by a liberal citation of authorities, a table of which precedes the general index. The military operations described are chiefly those of the Army of the Cumberland, and in describing them I have avoided, as far as possible, the use of technical military terms not generally understood by civilians. In the appendix will be found tables showing the organization of that army during the most important battles and campaigns in which it participated.

I claim no credit for discovering such facts relating to the Civil War as any one may find by an industrious examination of official records and histories open to all. Nor do I pretend to knowledge of facts, outside the official records, such as officers of high rank and those intimately associated with them may have acquired. The highest rank I attained was that of captain, and my associates in the army were chiefly among the line officers and enlisted men. My relations to these, however, were such as gave me greater familiarity than that generally possessed by officers of

higher rank with the daily life and thoughts of a private soldier and with his views of military life and events. Moreover, the knowledge that I acquired of the battles and campaigns in which I participated, limited as were my means of knowing anything about them at the time beyond what I saw and heard, has given me clearer ideas of many matters in connection with them than I could have acquired by any amount of reading. I fully realize, however, that I am quite as liable as others to make mistakes in attempting to record personal observations of events that occurred so long ago, and I claim such indulgence on this account as I would freely accord to those whose recollection of the same events may not coincide with mine.

The political conditions and the military movements of the Civil War period were intimately connected, and the questions growing out of them have given rise to great diversity of opinion—some of them to acrimonious controversy. A colorless narrative of that period, ignoring these questions, would be of little value or interest. On the other hand, a mere partisan discussion of them would be equally unprofitable and uninteresting. Therefore, when expressing my opinion on any of these controverted questions, I have done so without reserve, endeavoring, however, to write as fairly and impartially as is possible for one who took an active part in either war or politics during the Civil War times, and who has intelligence enough to ripen into a conviction.

We wish to forget the animosities of the Civil War

period, but not the heroism of those who bore arms on either side of the bloody conflict. That is now the common inheritance of all Americans. The soldiers, Federal and Confederate, to whom I have inscribed this volume, first learned on the field of battle to respect their adversaries. No eulogy can do justice to those of either side which ignores the heroic achievements of those who fought against them. I trust that the soldiers of the South who may chance to see this book will read it with the same generous feelings that inspired a soldier of the North in writing it.

In the preparation of this volume I have been greatly aided by General Henry V. Boynton, Colonel William F. Fox, Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, and Mr. Jacob Piatt Dunn of the Indianapolis Sentinel, and especially by Mr. Charles R. Williams of the Indianapolis News, who has already placed me under great obligations by assisting me in preparing *The Puritan Republic*. All these well-known writers hold decided views that probably do not coincide throughout with mine, and, therefore, I deem it justice to exonerate them from any responsibility for my own conclusions. My daughter, Lucy Howe, has helped me very much in revising the manuscript for publication.

DANIEL WAIT HOWE.

Indianapolis, Ind., October, 1902.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

	PAGE
The Three Months' Picnic,	1-14

CHAPTER II

Further Development of the Great Conflict,	15-55
--	-------

CHAPTER III

Camp, March and Battle,	56-96
-------------------------	-------

CHAPTER IV

Seeing Real War; the March from Louisville to Nashville,	97-105
--	--------

CHAPTER V

The Battle of Stone's River,	106-122
------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER VI

Six Months in Camp at Murfreesboro,	123-155
-------------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER VII

The Chattanooga Campaign and the Battle of Chickamauga,	156-209
---	---------

CHAPTER VIII

The Siege and the Battles of Chattanooga,	PAGE 210-241
---	-----------------

CHAPTER IX

The East Tennessee Campaign,	242-267
------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER X

Negro Soldiers in the Civil War,	268-282
----------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER XI

The Atlanta Campaign,	283-304
-----------------------	---------

CHAPTER XII

Hood's Invasion of Tennessee,	305-329
-------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER XIII

The End of an Unimportant Military Career,	330-334
--	---------

CHAPTER XIV

The Story Told by the Statistics,	335-355
-----------------------------------	---------

CHAPTER XV

Revisiting Chattanooga and Chickamauga,	356-367
---	---------

Appendix,	369-390
Index to Citations,	391-393
General Index,	395-421

CIVIL WAR TIMES

CHAPTER ONE

THE THREE MONTHS' PICNIC

I come of a family always loyal to country. One of my ancestors, Colonel Thomas Howe, of Marlborough, Mass., was prominent in King Philip's War; two others, Captain Eliakim Howe and his son Otis were in the New Hampshire militia in the Revolutionary War, and my grandfather, Captain Nathan Howe, served in a New York regiment in the War of 1812. When the Mexican War broke out my father was dead and I, his only child, was about five years old.

From the time it was known that Lincoln had been elected President, the nation was in a ferment of excitement. The papers were full of rumors of the secession of the southern states and of the warlike preparations already begun. Among the citizens of Indiana were many whose ancestors had come from Kentucky, Virginia, and other southern states, and who were bitterly hostile to Lincoln. Nor was there entire unanimity among those who had supported him as to the proper course to be pursued in the event of the

secession of the southern states, and many, influenced by the early opinions of Horace Greeley, were in favor of letting them go in peace. A great many others thought that the talk of war was but the vainglorious boasting of southern fire-eaters. Few suspected that such a bloody contest as that which followed was so near at hand.

In the early months of 1861 I was in Indianapolis attending a course of law lectures given to a small class by Judge Samuel E. Perkins, then one of the judges of the Indiana Supreme Court. It was during this time that Lincoln passed through that city on his way to Washington to be inaugurated. A great crowd assembled and listened to him as he spoke from the balcony of the Bates House. I remember, as if it were yesterday, his tall, lank form towering above those about him while he delivered his brief address. It was but little more than four years until the funeral train passed through the city bearing his body back to his old home.

After the conclusion of the lecture course, I returned to my home in Franklin, the county seat of Johnson county, and I had been there only a few days when the whole country was startled, as if by the shock of an earthquake at midnight, by the news of the firing on Fort Sumter. This was followed at once by the proclamation of the President calling for 75,000 volunteers. Those who do not remember the situation can form some idea of it from the contemporaneous accounts in the newspapers. Lincoln had received a majority of

the electoral, but not of the popular, vote, and would not have been elected at all but for the split between the Breckinridge and Douglas wings of the Democracy. If the bombardment of Fort Sumter "fired the southern heart," it fired the northern heart as well. There was at once a shifting of position and a new alignment of political parties. There were few left among the Republicans of the North who advocated letting the southern states go their way. Conspicuous among the great papers that helped to mold public opinion in the North was *Harper's Weekly*, which had not favored the election of Lincoln. Its issue of April 27, 1861, contained President Lincoln's proclamation and an editorial in which it said:

"War is declared. President Lincoln's proclamation, which we publish above, is an absolute proclamation of war against the Gulf states. The die is now cast, and men must take their sides, and hold to them. No one who knows anything of the southern people supposes for a moment that, having gone so far as to bombard a United States fort and capture it, they will now succumb without a fight. No one who has seen the recent manifestations of popular sentiment in the North can doubt that the northern blood is up, and that they will listen no more to talk of compromise, truce, or treaty, until they are fairly beaten.

"Let us then forbear puling, and look the situation in the face. There are some among us still who whine about the evils of civil war. These are they who, with a burglar in their house, his hand on the throat of their wife or daughter, would quote texts on the loveliness of Christian forbearance and charity. Nobody

—outside of lunatic asylums—doubts that civil war is an enormous calamity. On this point all are agreed. But as it has actually begun, and exists, what is the use of deprecating it? What should we think of a doctor who, summoned to visit a half-dying patient, should wring his hands hopelessly and bewail the malignancy of disease?"

Its next issue of May 4, 1861, contained another editorial in which it said:

"It is not now a question of slavery or anti-slavery. It is not even a question of Union or disunion. The question simply is whether northern men will fight. Southerners have rebelled and dragged our flag in the dirt, in the belief that, because we won't fight duels or engage in street brawls, therefore we are cowards. The question now is whether or no they are right."

These utterances exactly sounded the keynote of northern sentiment. No paper was more loyal to the Federal government or more zealous for a vigorous prosecution of the war, and its able editorials and the striking illustrations of Thomas Nast exercised a powerful influence in shaping northern sentiment.

At the outbreak of the war the attitude of Kentucky was uncertain. The sympathies of the governor, Beriah Magoffin, were wholly with the seceding states, and to President Lincoln's call for troops he had answered that "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister southern states." It was Magoffin's purpose to force Kentucky to secede,

or, failing in that, to assume the position of "armed neutrality." The farce planned by Magoffin was not successful in the land of Henry Clay and soon ran its course, but, while it lasted, Indiana was practically a border state. It was fortunate for the state and for the Union cause that at this time there was in the office of governor a man of unquestioned loyalty, of tremendous energy, and of indomitable will. In the four years that followed, the name of Oliver P. Morton became a household word throughout the United States. No governor in any northern state met with more bitter opposition; none worked for the success of the Union cause with more untiring energy, or looked after the welfare of the soldiers of his own state with more watchful and careful solicitude.

Morton was then in the prime of vigorous manhood—a man of far-seeing sagacity, of great endurance, of dauntless courage; a man who could have taken Cromwell's place in England, and who needed all of Cromwell's force of character to fill the place of governor of Indiana. Clearly foreseeing from the beginning the magnitude of the Rebellion and the tremendous efforts that must be made to suppress it, he often chafed under what he thought to be the puny and tardy measures of the Federal government. When the Federal authorities were too slow in supplying arms for the Indiana troops, he bought them on his own responsibility. When the government became short of ammunition, he established at Indianapolis an arsenal for its manufacture, soon having 600 men employed,

and ammunition enough for the Indiana troops and some to spare to the government. When the legislature in 1863 adjourned, after refusing to make any appropriation to carry on the state government, he borrowed money sufficient for two years without closing a single state institution and without stopping the organization of a single regiment.

The President's proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers was issued April 15 and six three-months' regiments with 4,683 men were required of the state of Indiana. Within a week 12,000 men had responded—twice as many as could then be armed. The four three-year regiments required under the President's call of May 3 were raised at once, and ten more besides in advance of the call in July, and before January 1, 1862, Indiana had 60,000 troops in the field.

The Morgan raid found Indiana almost destitute of armed soldiers, but within twenty-four hours after Morgan had touched her borders 15,000 men were hastening to Indianapolis; and before two days had passed Morton had 30,000 assembled to repel the invaders.

No orator ever lived in Indiana whose speeches had such weight as those of Morton. He never attempted to be funny; he never indulged in the "spread-eagle" style of oratory; he never resorted to the tricks practised by the modern professional "spell-binder." But under his sledge-hammer logic all opposition went down as the gates of Torquillstone went down under the blows of Richard the Lion-hearted. Probably no

one speech ever delivered in America left such a deep impress upon the public mind as Morton's Masonic Hall speech in 1866. I once heard a prominent Democrat say that this one speech determined the election in the state for that year. No Republican could add strength to it; no Democrat could answer it.

Morton's care for the Indiana troops in the field was proverbial throughout all the armies. Surgeons and nurses were sent by him to every battle-field. Often he went himself to give his personal attention to the care of the wounded. His strong hand was the chief support of the Indiana Sanitary Commission, whose special business it was to care for the sick and wounded soldiers in the hospitals. No regiment passed through Indianapolis, either going to or returning from the front, that did not enjoy the fruits of his provident hospitality. His kind and sympathetic feeling for his suffering fellow men was not limited to soldiers of the Union armies. It extended to the Confederate prisoners confined at Indianapolis, and nowhere in the North were they more humanely treated.

His vigilance was marvelous. Nothing escaped his keen watchfulness. Not a plot against the government was concocted in Indiana that he did not ferret out; hardly a meeting of the Knights of the Golden Circle or Sons of Liberty was held of whose proceedings he did not know. On one occasion a prominent citizen of Indianapolis called on him to assure him that the reports of an alleged treasonable meeting held the night before were exaggerated, and that he, the visitor,

would certainly have heard of the proceedings if they were such as had been reported; whereupon Morton almost paralyzed him by at once pulling out of a pigeon-hole a stenographic account of the proceedings, including a full report of the visitor's own treasonable speech.

He was omnipresent; now buried in the details of the work of carrying on the state government, or preparing troops for the field; now going about the state making speeches and infusing into the people some of his own enthusiasm; now visiting battle-fields and camps at the front—wherever he was most needed during the war he was always to be found. It was chiefly to his untiring efforts that Indiana enjoys the distinction of having furnished to the Federal armies over seventy-four per cent. of the entire fighting population of the state. No obstacles stopped him; his tremendous energy overcame them all; no disasters dismayed him—they only strengthened his courage and inspired him with renewed determination. He will live in history as the greatest war governor of his time.

Morton's response to the President's proclamation was instantaneous, and the call to arms was heard in every town and village in Indiana. At once old party affiliations were broken and the question no longer was whether a man were a Republican or a Democrat, but whether he stood for or against the Union. A great meeting was called at Franklin, patriotic addresses were made, and preparations were at once begun to enlist a company of volunteers. I was then

living at home with my mother and my stepfather, Samuel P. Oyler. There were only three of us. It was felt that either my stepfather or I should enlist; my mother would not decide between us, so we both enlisted.

The quota of the company was filled almost as fast as the men could write their names. We did not wait for uniforms, but were all rigged out in red shirts. The loyal ladies of the town presented us with a beautiful silk banner and we were ready to march. My stepfather was elected captain and I was elected private, a rank which I retained throughout the three-months' service. Another little fellow and I, being the two smallest men in the company, were assigned to the position of rear guard—which I think we filled with due regard to the responsibility and the honor attached to it. The fashion was then to dignify each local company with some distinctive appellation indicating the warlike character of its members, and I have an indistinct recollection that we were known as "The Franklin Tigers."

When the day arrived for us to take the train to Indianapolis, our company was marshaled in the public square, and, preceded by fife and drum, we marched through the streets to the railroad station. It was a great day for the staid old town. All the people were out, and thousands gathered from the country roundabout. In the crowds that thronged the sidewalks along the line of march were some tender-hearted women who wept, but most of the spectators and the

volunteers wore smiling faces. It was generally thought that the flurry would soon blow over. Seward, in whose sagacity we had unbounded confidence, predicted that the war would end in sixty days.

Arriving at Indianapolis we went into camp, and the Franklin company became Co. H of the 7th Ind. Vols., of which Ebenezer Dumont was commissioned colonel and Captain Oyler, major. We remained in Indianapolis only long enough to receive arms and uniforms, diligently employing the interval before our departure in drilling; and then the regiment was sent to what is now West Virginia, crossing the Ohio at Bellaire and going into camp near Webster. From there we marched in a few days to Philippi, which was captured with a great flourish. The "Battle of Philippi" was described in bombastic style by the northern press, and Lander's ride down the hill was supposed to rank next to the mad plunge of General Israel Putnam in Revolutionary times. The truth is that, to quote from the old nursery rhyme, describing the fierce assault of the youthful soldiers upon a flock of geese, "we routed them, we scouted them, nor lost a single man." Not a man was killed on either side. Colonel Kelly of the Federal forces was wounded; one unfortunate Confederate had his leg taken off by a stray cannon-ball; two or three others were slightly wounded and all the rest precipitately fled—in army phrase they "skedaddled"—and probably lived to fight another day.

There were many incidents of the three-months'

campaign that, at the time, made a deep impression upon my mind, but most of them have been obliterated by the more significant events of the three-years' service. My first experience on picket was at Webster. I was stationed in a dense wood, and it poured down rain all night. It was so dark that I could scarcely see my hand before me. About midnight a vivid flash of lightning suddenly revealed a man approaching within ten feet of me. This was a trying ordeal for a boy who had not been in service a month, and who had not been in the enemy's country more than a week, and I am not ashamed to say now that I was nearly frightened out of my wits. But I had enough courage left to call out "Halt! who goes there?" and I do not recall anything in my life that was such a relief to me as the quick response, "A friend with the countersign." It was at Philippi that I first heard the "long roll," a peculiar rolling beat of the drum betokening imminent danger, and calling instantly to arms every soldier that hears it. Its effect upon an army is more startling than the cry of "fire" at midnight. In this instance it turned out to be a false alarm.

While at Philippi another incident occurred which I have never forgotten. Co. H had been totally stripped one night of all its cooking utensils by marauders from another company. There was not a skillet nor a frying-pan nor a coffee-pot left in the whole company. The next day the captain's son and I obtained a pass permitting us to visit Philippi. There was not much to be seen—the most prominent

public buildings being the court-house and the county jail which had been used by the Confederates as a guard-house while they occupied the town. Nearly all the inhabitants, most of whom were known to be violent "secesh," had fled. Passing a deserted house it occurred to us that here was a good chance to repair the losses of Co. H; so we entered the house and filled an empty sack with cooking utensils. But we had no sooner passed through the gate than we were seized by a provost guard, stripped of our booty and hurried off to jail where we were kept in durance vile until night, and then dismissed with a severe reprimand and an admonition that if ever detected committing a similar offense we were liable to be instantly shot. This was during the period when McClellan and other Union generals seemed to be far more solicitous to protect the property of Confederates than they were to protect the property of those loyal to the government. It is but justice to them to add that this policy seemed for a time to meet the approval of the authorities at Washington, who still clung to the hope that some compromise could be patched up by which their erring southern brethren might be coaxed back into the Union.

The summer was spent chiefly in camp on a hill overlooking Philippi. The weather was hot, and when not drilling we sought the friendly shade of the great chestnut trees that were so abundant in that locality. The regiment was engaged in a few insignificant skirmishes, then dignified by the press in grandiloquent

descriptions as "battles"; but the only real battle of any consequence in which it was engaged was that at Carrick's Ford. That was my first battle. Before reaching the ford we had repeatedly crossed Cheat river, a mountain stream with a very swift current and about waist deep, the bottom of which was covered with slimy boulders. I had twice slipped and fallen, and I had gone clean under and rolled over on the bottom, gun and all. On getting to shore I had tried in vain, by putting dry powder in the tube, to make my musket go off. I also tried to pull the load, but the attempt was equally vain. Probably it made little difference, for my gun was an old Harper's Ferry musket that nearly dislocated my shoulder every time I fired it, and was almost as dangerous to the man behind as to the man in front of it. But I remained in the ranks and went through the battle, feeling as proud as anybody when it was over. General Garnett, the Confederate commander, was killed there. I passed by the place where he lay dead and thought he was one of the finest looking officers I had ever seen.

Our term of enlistment expired the latter part of July and we started home. On our return we stopped for a night at Bellaire, Ohio, and there I first heard the dismal tidings of the disaster that had overtaken the Union army at the first battle of Bull Run. Young and inexperienced as I was, I understood its significance. It meant that going to war was no longer like going to a picnic, as we thought when we volunteered, but that a mighty effort must be made by the

North or the Union would be shattered and broken forever. I had not yet learned, nor had the nation yet learned, the truth of the saying of General Sherman, that "War is hell."

The three-months' service, though somewhat of a picnic when compared with the three-years' service, nevertheless produced very important results not at once apparent. One of the most important was that the three-months' men gained a fair knowledge of the manual of arms and of company and regimental evolutions, and learned some of the rudiments of a soldier's education. A great many again enlisted for three years; many who did so became officers, and the military experience, limited as it was, acquired in the three-months' service, was of great value in enabling them to drill and discipline the troops over whom they were placed in command.

CHAPTER TWO

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREAT CONFLICT

The disaster of Bull Run occurred on July 21, 1861. Its effect was to throw the North into a panic. The venerable General Scott, then seventy-five years of age, was general-in-chief. The next day General George B. McClellan was called to Washington to take charge of the defense of the city and he arrived there July 26. The Confederates, as much elated as the people of the North were depressed, at once moved up to the Potomac, stopped navigation, and virtually blockaded the national capital.

At Washington the authorities, civil and military, were in constant dread of an attack that might result in the capture of the capital and an invasion of the country north of it. Still the mass of people of the North did not yet fully appreciate the magnitude of the preparations necessary to suppress the Rebellion. Even the Secretary of War, as late as October, 1861, had no conception of the stupendous proportions into which the conflict, then scarce six months old, was destined to expand.

"About this time," says Mr. Foulke,¹ "Secretary

¹ *Life of Morton*, vol. 1, p. 147.

Cameron stopped at Indianapolis, on his way from St. Louis to Washington, and in company with Senator Chandler, took supper with Morton at the governor's mansion. He was quite talkative and laughed heartily at Sherman's idea that it would take two hundred thousand men to recover the Mississippi states. He made no secret of his belief that Sherman was crazy, and unfit for any military command. He derided Sherman's notions of the need of cavalry and artillery as old-fashioned and silly, and was boyish in his fun over the 'Minie rifle,' and over improved arms generally. The old smooth-bore musket, in the hands of well-disciplined infantry, he regarded as the best kind of arms. Morton listened to this talk in silence."

We can well understand why Morton listened in silence, and no doubt in amazement, to such twaddle at such a time from the Secretary of War.

Moreover the slavery question continued to be a disturbing element, and military operations were interfered with by political considerations and by the jealousies of generals. The senseless clamor expressed in the cry of "On to Richmond," which led to the disastrous defeat at Bull Run, again urged an advance of the Union armies and led to another defeat on October 21st at Ball's Bluff, and soon after, on November 1, 1861, General Scott was succeeded as general-in-chief by General McClellan.

The disasters at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff only deepened the conviction, long before entertained by Morton and others of far-seeing sagacity, that the Rebellion would not blow over in sixty days as Seward

had predicted. It also became apparent that it was not wise policy to enlist men for a term so short that their period of service would expire before they had acquired more than the rudiments of a military education, and that the regular army could not be depended upon, as General Scott had supposed, to suppress the Rebellion. Many of its officers sympathized with the South, and those who resided there, with a few notable exceptions, accepted commissions in the Confederate army. There were not enough left of those loyal to the Federal government to officer the new regiments. It was useless to expect to fill the regiments necessary to be raised by recruiting for the regular army. The men of the North were eager to enlist but they preferred to serve with their neighbors and under officers whom they knew. I doubt whether ten men in my company in the three-years' service could have been induced to enlist in the regular army. It was upon the volunteers that the Federal government was forced to rely for the material with which to make up the rank and file.

Therefore on May 3, 1861, President Lincoln issued another call for volunteers, and under this call, and the acts of Congress confirming and supplementing it, 500,000 men were required. There was not much difficulty in getting the men. Indeed, under this call and the acts of Congress supplementing it, over 700,000 volunteered, of whom over 657,000 enlisted for three years. The first serious trouble arose in equipping

them for active service. It had been difficult to arm and equip the 75,000 three-months' troops, and it was only by almost superhuman exertions that Governor Morton had been able to send to the front the six three-months' regiments contributed by Indiana. No preparations had been made by the Federal government or by any state for such a war as had now burst forth. Long before the outbreak of the war the militia organizations in most of the northern states had been practically abandoned. Governor Chase of Ohio had made vigorous efforts to reorganize the militia system of that state. Whitelaw Reid says:²

"In this, as in his political views, he was in advance of his times. In every state west of the Alleghanies the militia had fallen into undisguised contempt. The old-fashioned militia musters had been given up; the subject had been abandoned as fit only to be the fertile theme for the ridicule of rising writers and witty stump orators. The cannon issued by the government were left for the uses of political parties on the occasion of mass meetings or victories at the polls. The small arms were scattered, rusty, and become worthless. In Chicago a novel drill had been an inducement for the organization of the Ellsworth Zouaves; and here and there through the West the young men of a city kept up a military company; but these were the exceptions. Popular prejudice against doing military duty was insurmountable, and no name for these exceptional organizations so struck the popular fancy as that of "the Cornstalk Militia."

² *Ohio in the War*, vol. 1, p. 19.

An effort was made by Chase's successor to continue the policy inaugurated by the former, but with little success. "And yet," quoting again from Reid, "the organization of Ohio militia was far superior to that existing in any of the states to the westward. All of them combined did not possess so large a militia force as the First Ohio Regiment, then under the command of Colonel King, of Dayton."

General Cox^{*} has given a graphic account of the military condition of the great state of Ohio at the outbreak of the Rebellion. Governor Dennison on the first call for troops summoned to his aid Captain George B. McClellan, then a railway superintendent. General Cox says :

"The next morning McClellan requested me to accompany him to the state arsenal, to see what arms and material might be there. We found a few boxes of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued to militia companies and had been returned rusted and damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other accoutrements were with them. There were two or three smooth-bore brass field-pieces, 6-pounders, which had been honey-combed by firing salutes, and of which the vents had been worn out, bushed and worn out again. In a heap in one corner lay a confused pile of mildewed harness which had been once used for artillery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There had for many years been no money appropriated to buy military material or even to protect the little

^{*} Article on *War Preparations in the North; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 1, p. 84.

the state had. The Federal government had occasionally distributed some arms which were in the hands of the independent uniformed militia, and the arsenal was simply an empty store-house. It did not take long to complete our inspection. At the door, as we were leaving the building, McClellan turned, and, looking back into its emptiness, remarked, half humorously and half sadly, 'A fine stock of munitions on which to begin a great war!'

Scanty as were Ohio's military supplies they far surpassed those of Indiana and of most of the northern states. In Indiana there was not the semblance of a state militia organization. Even the "cornstalk" musters had almost passed out of mind. There were not muskets enough in the whole state to arm a single regiment, to say nothing of uniforms, tents, knapsacks and the other equipments essential to actual military service. Now 500,000 men were not only to be raised but equipped. Not only were they to be equipped but they were to be drilled and disciplined, to be organized in regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies, and officers were to be found competent to command all these military organizations. The work to be done was of stupendous magnitude. The first of the great armies organized in the North was that for the defense of Washington, and, whatever may be said of General McClellan, it must be conceded that the country owes to him a great debt for his untiring labor in fashioning from the crude material with which he was supplied that great army afterward known as the Army of the

Potomac. Looking back over the history of the Civil War, nothing in it is so wonderful as the transformation in so short a time of the men taken from the fields, the shops and other civil pursuits, wholly inexperienced in war, into trained soldiers, and the creation in both North and South of armies such as were never before known in the history of the world.

The most difficult task of all was not, as had been expected, to find the men and the arms and equipments for them, but to find the generals able to lead these great armies to victory. As in many professions, other than that of arms, the education acquired in the schools, indispensable as it may be to success, must be supplemented by the experience acquired in actual practice, and not infrequently it turns out that the bright man at recitations utterly fails to fulfil the expectations raised by his success as a scholar. And so it was with many of the West Point generals. Moreover, the best of the generals developed by the war had much to learn in the field. It is no discredit to them that all made some mistakes. Marshal Turenne once said: "When a man boasts that he has never made mistakes in war, he convinces me that he has not been long at it." The weeding out of political generals, the failure of one after another of those appointed to command the great armies, went on during four years and cost the North heavily in money and in lives; in the end, however, generals were found "fit to stand by the side of Cæsar and give direction."

Shortly after the Ball's Bluff disaster another

event of great importance occurred. Captain Wilkes, commander of the San Jacinto of the United States Navy, had seized the Trent, a British mail steamer, in the Bahama channel, and forcibly taken from her Mason and Slidell, Confederate commissioners on their way to Europe. They were brought to the United States and imprisoned in Fort Warren, near Boston. There were some mitigating circumstances, but it is now generally conceded that the seizure was a plain violation of international law. It immediately stirred up a great ferment both in England and in America. It very nearly caused Great Britain to declare war against the Federal government, or at least to recognize the Southern Confederacy. Either course at that time would have been fatal to the Union cause. There was nothing to do but promptly return the Confederate commissioners. This was done, and upon Secretary Seward devolved the delicate task of pacifying the English government and at the same time mollifying the wrath of those in the North who have never got beyond the idea that twisting the tail of the British lion is the acme of American statesmanship. It is needless to say that Seward accomplished his task with consummate diplomatic skill.

When Congress met in December, 1861, one of its first acts was the appointment of a joint committee consisting of three members of the Senate and four of the House, thereafter known as the Committee on the Conduct of the War, of which Senator Wade of Ohio was made chairman. He continued to serve as such

during the war. We are told by eminent historians⁴ that this committee

“was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the government; it called soldiers and statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory school-boys. It claimed to speak for the loyal people of the United States, and this claim generally met with the sympathy and support of a majority of the people’s representatives in Congress assembled. It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments, but always earnest, patriotic and honest; it was assailed with furious denunciation and defended with headlong and indiscriminating eulogy; and on the whole it must be said to have merited more praise than blame.”

One of the first matters investigated by the committee was the humiliating affair at Ball’s Bluff. The investigation is a fair illustration of the difficulties under which the Federal generals labored in the early part of the war. The country was smarting under the disaster and, as is usual in such cases, a scapegoat was demanded and General Stone was the unfortunate victim selected. He was suspected of having held treasonable correspondence with the enemy and, by an order issued from the office of the Secretary of War, he was arrested and imprisoned for six months in Fort Lafayette. No formal charges were filed, but a

⁴ Nicolay and Hay: *Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 5, pp. 150-1.

secret investigation was held by the Committee on the Conduct of the War. He was not permitted to confront the witnesses against him, nor was he informed what testimony they had given; in vain he demanded a hearing; in vain he demanded a copy of the charges against him. At last such a commotion was raised over the arbitrary proceedings by which he was deprived of his liberty that the authorities were compelled to release him. No one now doubts his loyalty and it has since been shown that the evidence upon which he was imprisoned was totally unworthy of credit. The case stands as a striking illustration of the necessity, even in time of war, of jealously guarding the individual liberty of the citizen.⁵

Before the meeting of Congress in December, 1861, General McClellan had gathered together the greatest army ever known in America. It is true that it was not made up of veteran soldiers, but neither was the Confederate army under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston confronting Washington. McClellan's troops were as well disciplined and as well equipped as Johnston's, and numbered twice as many. But McClellan's army had been in camp for five months and had made no advance nor any sign of an advance. The whole country was impatient at this delay and the demand in the North was loud and emphatic for a

⁵ A full account of this remarkable case will be found in Blaine's *Twenty Years of Congress*, vol. 1, pp. 381-395. See also Lt.-Col. Richard B. Irwin, article on *Ball's Bluff*, etc., in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 2, p. 123.

more vigorous prosecution of the war. One of the first changes made in response to this demand was the resignation of Simon Cameron as Secretary of War and the appointment of Edwin M. Stanton as his successor. All efforts to induce McClellan to move had so far proved unavailing. Even Lincoln's patience had been exhausted, and in an interview with Generals McDowell and Franklin, January 10, 1862, he said in his homely way that "if something was not soon done the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something."⁶

Under the constitution Lincoln, by virtue of his office, was commander-in-chief of the armies and navies of the United States. He was, however, totally destitute of military education. Appreciating his deficiencies in this respect he diligently studied books of strategy, pored over the reports of the department commanders, familiarized himself with maps, and in every way sought to understand the military situation. The generals with whom he consulted were surprised, or pretended to be surprised, at his familiarity with technical military learning and with the acuteness of his suggestions. He discussed with McClellan and other generals not only their own plans for the advance to Richmond, but some which he himself had conceived. At a later date he undertook to unfold a fa-

⁶ Swinton: *Campaigns of Army of Potomac*, p. 80.

vorite plan to Grant. Grant tells us that he "listened respectfully." He did not tell Lincoln, but he tells the readers of his *Memoirs*,⁷ why Lincoln's scheme was impracticable, and adds this brief and characteristic sentence: "I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck."

The chief need now of the Union cause was the want of a competent, responsible head with intelligence to direct, and power to enforce the conduct of military operations conformably to some general systematic plan. After the appointment of the Committee on the Conduct of the War and of Stanton as Secretary of War, McClellan was general-in-chief in name only. All his plans were subjected to the scrutiny not only of the President but of the Committee on the Conduct of the War and of Stanton, whose influence in military operations was now more powerful than that of President, committee, and general-in-chief combined. The difficulties incident to such divided responsibility and conflicting counsels were intensified when, on March 12, 1862, McClellan was deprived of authority as general-in-chief and his command was limited to that of the Army of the Potomac. For four months after that date there was no general-in-chief of the Federal armies and each department commander was left to work out his own plans without reference to those of other commanders, modified only

⁷ Vol. 2, p. 123.

by such orders as came from Washington. It was not until July 11, 1862, when General Henry W. Halleck was appointed general-in-chief, that there was a responsible head of the Federal armies.

Three of the men already mentioned became very prominent in the Civil War—Stanton, Halleck, and McClellan. Stanton, the new Secretary of War, was a man of great intellectual strength, of sterling honesty, of boundless energy, and of vast executive ability. Though of Quaker descent he was a man of the type of Oliver Cromwell. Men of this type are necessary in great emergencies, but the very qualities that make them valuable are also apt to make them at times arbitrary and tyrannical. Stanton had been Attorney-general under President Buchanan and, according to McClellan, was wont, before he became Secretary of War, to speak of Lincoln as the "original gorilla," shocking McClellan by the virulence with which he abused the President, his administration, and the Republican party. But, after becoming Secretary of War, he speedily developed into the most radical of the Radicals. He favored the policy of emancipation long before the proclamation was issued and was one of the earliest advocates of the arming of the negroes. He was a man who brooked no opposition and whose dislikes were relentless and enduring. He assumed toward Lincoln the attitude of a self-constituted guardian rather than that of a subordinate officer, and there is no doubt that he was often exas-

perated by Lincoln's seeming irresolution and disgusted with his jests.⁸

It is probable that Halleck while general-in-chief was little more than Stanton's scribe. The latter soon became hostile to McClellan and to Rosecrans. His injustice to Thomas before the battle of Nashville has never been satisfactorily explained, nor has it ever been forgotten by the friends of that illustrious commander. In Grant Stanton at last found a general whose iron will and stubborn tenacity of purpose were superior to his own. Grant's opinion of Stanton is expressed without any circumlocution. He says:⁹

"Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and

⁸ Stanton's virulent hostility to Lincoln before entering the cabinet and his subsequent relations to him are clearly shown by McClure in his chapter on *Lincoln and Stanton* in *Lincoln and Men of War Times*. In his *Ohio in the War*, vol. 1, p. 1029, Whitelaw Reid says of Stanton: "He was, throughout Mr. Lincoln's administration, all-powerful. It was with reference to some strong-willed action of Mr. Stanton's, in opposition to his own wishes, that Mr. Lincoln, in reply to a personal appeal for aid, made the jocosely remark, so often quoted, that he (Lincoln) had very little influence with this administration."

⁹ *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 105.

given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before."

And again, comparing Stanton with Lincoln, Grant says of the former:¹⁰

"Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others. In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, he would change it—if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so."

Throughout Grant's *Memoirs* it is easy to perceive the trouble he experienced with both Stanton and Halleck. Probably no enemy in front ever caused him so much annoyance as did these two Federal officials in the rear. During the four months, from March 12 to July 11, 1862, when the Union armies were without a general-in-chief, Stanton was virtually military dictator, for his imperious will was too strong to be curbed by Lincoln. Whatever his abilities in other di-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 536.

rections, he did not have the military education qualifying him to direct the operations of the armies in the field, and McClellan maintains, and with some reason, that the disasters following the Peninsular campaign were in no small part due to Stanton's ignorant and arbitrary interference.

Consistently with the policy of inconsistency, which seemed at the time to govern the military plans of the Federal authorities at Washington, Halleck, who had demonstrated his utter incompetence to accomplish anything with an army of 100,000 men in his own department, had been appointed general-in-chief of all the Federal armies. Only two excuses have ever been offered for his appointment: That General Scott favored him as his successor, and that it was desired to give General Grant full command of Halleck's department where it was thought the latter's jealousy of Grant's rising fame was keeping him in the background. Whatever were the motives for Halleck's appointment as general-in-chief, there is now almost entire unanimity respecting his unfitness for the place. McClellan says of him:¹¹

"Of all men whom I have encountered in high position, Halleck was the most hopelessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by any who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end."

¹¹ *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 137.

Swinton,¹² a less prejudiced witness than McClellan, speaks of Halleck as "the incalculable obstruction of the conduct of the war, and the intolerable annoyance of every general commanding the Army of the Potomac." Halleck's jealousy of Grant became apparent at an early period. Soon after the surrender of Fort Donelson, Grant went to Nashville to consult with General Buell, whereupon Halleck sent to McClellan, then general-in-chief, a dispatch containing this outrageous charge:

"I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency."

Afterward, Halleck wrote Grant that his conduct had occasioned "very serious complaint at Washington," and tried to make him believe that it was his own interference in his behalf that saved him from the disgrace of an arrest. Halleck's downright duplicity in

¹² *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 170.

this affair is very clearly exposed by both Grant and McClellan.

Sherman was even more incensed than Grant against both Stanton and Halleck. His preliminary negotiations with General Joseph E. Johnston just at the end of the war have since been fully explained, but at the time, largely through the distorted construction of them by Stanton, they excited great indignation in the North against Sherman, causing that great soldier much mortification. Shortly before that time Halleck had been appointed to the command of the Department of Virginia with headquarters at Richmond, and he took it on himself to send a dispatch to Stanton containing this extraordinary suggestion :

"The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff Davis' specie is moving South from Goldsborough in wagons as fast as possible. I suggest that orders be telegraphed through General Thomas that Wilson obey no orders from Sherman," etc.

Thereupon Stanton sent a dispatch to Thomas, April 27, 1865, reciting Halleck's dispatch and adding this :

"You were some days ago notified that the President disapproved Sherman's proceedings and were directed to disregard them. If you have not already done so, you will issue immediate orders to all officers in your command, *directing them to pay no attention to any orders but your own or from General Grant,*" etc.¹⁸

¹⁸ *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 104, pp. 483-4.

The insulting character of this order conveying, as it did, a scandalous insinuation against Sherman's loyalty, will be better understood when it is remembered that Generals Thomas and Wilson were at that time subordinate officers under General Sherman, and that he and his victorious army, after the conspicuous services they had rendered the Union cause, were then on their way to Washington. Grant tells how Sherman resented Halleck's insult:¹⁴

"It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received."

Grant also says¹⁵ that at the grand review in Washington after the close of the war, Sherman "showed

¹⁴ *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 529.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 534.

his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand." At that time Halleck, at least, who had just emerged from a year's obscurity at Washington, had become a very insignificant figure in comparison with the illustrious soldier who had completed a triumphant march through the heart of the Confederacy, and Stanton was no longer the military dictator that he had been for over three years.

As general-in-chief Halleck conducted military operations at long range from Washington—never appearing on a field of battle, but sending telegraph dispatches and voluminous letters, planning on paper vast campaigns utterly impossible of execution in the field, and so hampering all the generals in front as to make it impossible for them to execute any plans of their own.

Of McClellan it is safe to say that there are few at this day that question his loyalty, of which there was, during the war, a widespread suspicion. Of his military abilities and operations it is perhaps not possible, even at this day, to form a just and impartial estimate. There is no doubt, however, that he was constantly embarrassed and thwarted by the orders that he received from Washington and by the relentless hostility of Stanton. This is clear from the evidence that he himself has furnished.¹⁶ In view of the con-

¹⁶ See *McClellan's Own Story*.

stant interference with his plans, the wonder now is that he accomplished as much as he did. That he himself felt stung to desperation by what he believed to be the persecution of Stanton is indicated by his remarkable dispatch to the latter June 28, 1862, in which he said:

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

When McClellan took command of the troops at Washington immediately after the first battle of Bull Run, he found the city full of stragglers and round about it regiments camped indiscriminately here and there without even a brigade organization, or general organization of any kind; without any systematic fortifications or defenses, and even without pickets on some of the roads leading to the capital. McClellan took these unorganized troops, together with the raw recruits that were afterward added, organized, trained, and disciplined them, and out of them fashioned the magnificent Army of the Potomac. He took that army again and with it won a great victory at Antietam; he had never shown so much vigor and generalship as he exhibited immediately before and during this battle, and at the time when he was finally removed from the command of the Army of the Potomac he had the unbounded confidence of all the officers and men under his command.

But McClellan's great faults as a general were that he never ceased preparing for a forward movement, and that he was perpetually exaggerating the strength of the enemy in his front. The chief drawback, however, to his success as a general was a delusion of which he was possessed that he had been predestined from all eternity to be a Moses and Washington combined and to go down to posterity as the savior of his country, his memory surrounded with a halo of glory and his fame forever growing more resplendent. Therefore he undertook not only to conduct the military operations entrusted to him, but to advise Lincoln how to discharge his duties as President. In a long letter to the latter, dated July 7, 1862, he said:

"Neither confiscation of property, political execution of persons, territorial organization of states, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. . . . Military arrests should not be tolerated except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. . . . Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases."¹⁷

In the same letter he assured Lincoln: "A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies."

¹⁷ *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 497.

Such sentiments ill suited the radical element then in control of the Republican party, but greatly elated those in the North who were denouncing the prosecution of the war as an Abolition crusade and who were loudly complaining of arbitrary arrests. The radical leaders of the Republican party could not believe that a man with such sentiments as those advocated by McClellan was fit to lead the armies of the Union to victory, and their conviction of his unfitness was strengthened by his acceptance in 1864 of the nomination for President on a "Peace at any price" platform.

It is probable, however, that future generations, uninfluenced by the intense political prejudices that swayed McClellan's contemporaries, will judge him more leniently. The spirit of justice that, after many years, brought about the vindication of General Fitz-John Porter may be depended upon to correct, as far as it is possible to correct the errors of the past, whatever injustice may have been done to McClellan. In *McClellan's Own Story* he has made a strong defense against many of the aspersions that at an early period were accepted by his political opponents as undoubted facts. His admirers, however, will probably never succeed in convincing the American people that if he had been given all the men and all the opportunities that Grant had, he would ever have accomplished what Grant accomplished.

The wonder is that under such conflicting and incompetent management the Union cause did not speed-

ily fall to pieces. It did not, because military operations in the South were conducted under still greater difficulties. The South, from the beginning, was inferior to the North in men, in munitions of war, and in material resources. It excelled the North, however, in its abundant yield of political generals, but this proved to be a constant source of weakness. Moreover, if the generals of the North were perplexed with the interference of Stanton and the Committee on the Conduct of the War, the southern generals were still more harassed by the perpetual interference of Jefferson Davis, who affords a striking illustration of the truth of the saying that "a little learning is a dangerous thing." Priding himself on being a West Point graduate and puffed up with exaggerated notions of his military acquirements, he imagined himself profoundly versed in the art of war. Acting on this assumption, he constantly thwarted the plans of all the Confederate generals, addling the weaker and confusing the stronger, by suggestions and advice springing from his conceited superiority as a military strategist.

With the extraordinary vanity of Davis was combined an uncontrollable propensity to boast of the anticipated results of his military schemes, thus betraying to the enemy in advance plans which a careful general would have taken all pains to conceal. On several occasions the Federal generals gained the first and most reliable information of proposed movements of the Confederate armies from the boastful speeches of Davis as reported in the southern newspapers. It was

in this way that Grant was advised of the purpose of Longstreet's advance against Burnside, and Sherman of Hood's proposed invasion of Tennessee. A southern historian, speaking of the withdrawal of Longstreet's corps during the siege of Chattanooga, says :

"This extraordinary military movement was the work of President Davis, who seems, indeed, to have had a singular fondness for erratic campaigns. His visits to every battle-field of the Confederacy were ominous. He disturbed the plans of his generals; his military conceit led him into the wildest schemes; and so much did he fear that the public would not ascribe to him the hoped-for results of the visionary project, that his vanity invariably divulged it, and successes were foretold in public speeches with such boastful plainness, as to put the enemy on his guard and inform him of the general nature of the enterprise."¹⁸

The same author, in speaking of Davis's visit to Hood's army after the capture of Atlanta, says :

"The catastrophe moved President Davis in Richmond, and mortified the vanity that had so recently proclaimed the security of Atlanta under the command of Hood. He determined to visit Hood's new lines, to plan with him a new campaign, to compensate for the loss of Atlanta, and to take every possible occasion to raise the hopes and confidence of the people. It is remarkable that the visits of the Confederate President to the armies were always the occasions of some far-fetched and empirical plan of operations, and were al-

¹⁸ Pollard: *The Lost Cause*, p. 456.

ways accompanied with vapors and boasts that unduly exalted the public mind. Mr. Davis never spoke of military matters without a certain ludicrous boastfulness, which he maintained to the last event of the war. It was not swagger or affectation; it was the sincere vagary of a mind intoxicated with conceit when occupied with a subject where it imagined it found its *forte*, but where in fact it had least aptitude. Mr. Davis, as a military commander or adviser, was weak, fanciful to excess, and much too vain to keep his own counsels. As he traveled toward Hood's lines, he made excited speeches in South Carolina and Georgia. At Macon he declared that Atlanta would be recovered; that Sherman would be brought to grief; and that this Federal commander 'would meet the fate that befell Napoleon in the retreat from Moscow.' These swollen assertions, so out of character, were open advertisements to the enemy of a new plan of operations."¹⁹

If Davis had ever heard it, he evidently did not appreciate the pith of the witty saying attributed to John Adams who is reported to have added, after commenting on a portrait of George Washington: "And that old wooden-head made his fortune by keeping his mouth shut."

Notwithstanding the unfavorable conditions, great success attended the Union cause during the first four months of the year 1862. At the beginning of the year the national capital was deemed secure. Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and West Virginia had

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 581.

been kept in the Union. On January 19 General Thomas defeated the Confederates in an engagement at Mill Spring, in which the Confederate General Zollicoffer was killed. General Grant, aided by flag officer Foote and his gunboats, captured Fort Henry February 7 and Fort Donelson February 16, with over 10,000 prisoners, forty cannon, and immense stores. The day after the surrender of Fort Henry a permanent footing on the coast of North Carolina was gained at the battle of Roanoke Island by General Burnside and the navy under Commodore Goldsborough. On March 8 General Curtis defeated General Price at Pea Ridge, and the next day the *Monitor* practically destroyed the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads. In the month of April a great battle, resulting in a Union victory, had been fought at Shiloh, in which General Albert Sidney Johnston, regarded as the greatest of Confederate generals, had lost his life, and in the same month Farragut captured New Orleans. In some portions of nearly all the Confederate states the Federal land or naval forces had gained a foothold.

The importance of these victories, coming at this time, can hardly be overestimated. For nearly its entire length above and below Vicksburg the Mississippi was now open to Federal gunboats, and the territory west of that river was practically cut off from the Confederacy, while the possession of New Orleans was of vast importance in many ways to the Union cause. The drooping spirits of the North revived, President

Lincoln issued a proclamation for a special Thanksgiving, and so clearly did events point to a speedy termination of the war, that, for a time, further recruiting was stopped by order of the Federal government, and Governor Morton was requested to cease purchasing arms.²⁰

Before the year was half gone the northern skies were again overcast with the shadow of disasters that came thick and fast. While the western armies and the navy were achieving splendid victories, the great Army of the Potomac was resting idly in camp. The fall and winter of 1861 had passed and the spring of 1862 was far advanced, and still that magnificent army had done nothing. The daily dispatch "All quiet on the Potomac," at first conveying a cheering assurance of the safety of the national capital, now excited only derision, and was accepted as further proof of the inefficiency of McClellan and his army.

McClellan should have moved on February 22—indeed long before that time. The northern press, the leading members of Congress, and Stanton and Chase,

²⁰ This order for the discontinuance of recruiting is given in full in *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 258. It was issued from the Adjutant-General's office April 3, 1862, and directed that "The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued in every state from this date," and that "The superintendents of the Volunteer Recruiting Service will disband their parties *and close their offices*, after having taken the necessary steps to carry out these orders." The extraordinary character of the order will be more fully apparent when it is considered that it was issued just after McClellan had started on his Peninsular campaign and only three days before the beginning of the battle of Shiloh.

the two most influential members of the cabinet, were urgently, almost furiously demanding that McClellan be forced to advance or be removed from command. Stanton was already bitterly hostile to McClellan. Chase was equally so, and at one of the cabinet meetings, to which McClellan had been invited for a discussion of his plans, bluntly asked him whether he intended to move at all and, if so, when. Lincoln still clung to McClellan, but was continually urging him to advance. To all his appeals McClellan pleaded for more reenforcements, though it was then generally believed, and is now known to be the fact, that McClellan had twice as many men as the Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston, who was in his front. Finally, after many cabinet meetings and councils of war, interviews, and consultations, the Army of the Potomac started March 17 on what is known as the Peninsular campaign. The story of it is sorrowful reading. It lasted about three months. In that time the Federal army had been in sight of Richmond. At the end of it, after seven days of battle, it had retreated to the river James, arriving at Harrison's Landing July 3 with a loss of over 15,000 men. McClellan laid the blame for his failure upon Stanton and Halleck, while they charged it to him. On August 3 Halleck ordered McClellan to abandon the Peninsula altogether and to withdraw his army to Acquia Creek. Against this order McClellan earnestly protested, but his protest was not heeded. The change of base by the Army of the Potomac exposed Washington to an attack by the Con-

federate armies, and, to avert this danger, the troops scattered over northern Virginia, under the commands of Fremont, McDowell, and Banks, about 50,000 in all, were hastily patched together and called the Army of Virginia, over which General Pope, suddenly called from the West, was placed in command. McClellan was ordered to Washington and the Army of the Potomac was for a time virtually without a commander. Pope, the young Lochinvar who had so unexpectedly come out of the West, signalized his assumption of command by an address characterized by Ropes as one of the most "extraordinary in military annals,"²¹ extraordinary alike for its bombast and for its tone of insult to the eastern soldiers over whom he had taken command. In this address, together with much like stuff, Pope said :

"Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West *where we have always seen the backs of our enemies*; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. . . . Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them—of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. *Let us discard such ideas.*"

The woeful outcome of Pope's boasts made them all the more ridiculous. The Army of Virginia lasted

²¹ The address in full will be found in *The Army Under Pope*, p. 173.

only about two months, long enough, however, to be demolished at the second battle of Bull Run. Pope afterward complained that the remnants of his army had been so scattered by McClellan that he (Pope) could not tell what had become of them. The Army of Virginia had vanished forever, and never again appeared in the list of Union armies. The fragments of it which escaped, together with the portions of the Army of the Potomac that had been sent to reenforce it, found their way back to Washington September 2. Again the Army of the Potomac was in the trenches about Washington, confronted by the army of Lee; the cabinet was in a panic; the North was in dread of invasion; Halleck was helpless; and Lincoln, in utter despair, was obliged to appeal to McClellan to save the national capital.

On March 11, 1862, the departments formerly commanded by Generals Halleck, Hunter and Buell were merged into the Department of the Mississippi in order to give Halleck control of all the armies that took part in the battle of Shiloh, and after the battle these armies were all consolidated into one, divided into the right wing, left wing, center, reserve, and cavalry, under the respective commands of Generals George H. Thomas, Don Carlos Buell, John Pope, John A. McClernand, and Andrew J. Smith. Halleck assumed chief command and Grant was announced as second. By this contrivance Grant was made a fifth wheel and was temporarily shelved.

No other Federal general in the Civil War ever had

such an opportunity as that now afforded Halleck. Had Grant been in his place it is possible that the war might have been brought to a speedy termination; it is at least highly probable that its duration would have been greatly shortened. But, unfortunately for the country, Halleck was unequal to the opportunity. Although he had a great army of over 100,000 men, more than twice that of the Confederate army under Beauregard confronting him, he avoided bringing on a general engagement, proceeded to advance against Corinth, about twenty miles distant, after the old fashion of gradual approaches by parallels, and going along at a snail's pace arrived there May 30 to find that the Confederate army had safely retreated.

For a few days the North was fed on bombastic dispatches from Halleck to the effect that "General Pope with 40,000 men is thirty miles south of Corinth pushing the enemy hard," and that "he already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy and 15,000 stand of arms captured." The country was chagrined to find a few days later that the pleasing story told in Halleck's dispatches was a hoax. All the blame, however, was laid on Pope. We know now, moreover, that Halleck's orders to Pope were not to press the Confederates so hard as to bring on a battle.

Halleck next proceeded to break up his army and to scatter over the country the various parts of which it had been composed, Buell being ordered to advance into east Tennessee. The movement which Buell was

ordered to make, a very important one if pushed with energy and celerity, was neutralized by the condition imposed upon him that, as he marched, he should repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Buell strongly protested against frittering away precious time by repairing a railroad that ran parallel to the enemy's lines, which, when repaired, could not be depended upon as a safe line of communication, but his protests were overruled by Halleck.

The Confederates had now determined to make another effort to regain Tennessee and Kentucky, and, while it was yet uncertain what would be the line of advance, it soon became apparent that the Confederate Army of the Tennessee intended to take the offensive. The forerunners of the projected Confederate advance were the forces under General John Morgan and General Forrest, which soon began to play havoc with Buell's communications, destroying railroad bridges, capturing garrisons and creating widespread consternation in Kentucky. Before the middle of August it became apparent that Kentucky was to be invaded by General Kirby Smith through Cumberland Gap and by General Bragg, who had succeeded to the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, marching north toward Louisville.

Long before the removal of either McClellan or Buell, the commanders of the two great armies in the East and in the West, the people of the North had begun to distrust both. It was suspected that they were lacking in the earnest devotion to the Union essential

to the general who would lead its armies to victory. The great commanders who were to do this were yet in the background. After the surrender of Fort Donelson the people of the North had begun to talk of "Unconditional Surrender" Grant, who was beginning to be famous; but Halleck was jealous of him as were other generals; he was assailed in Congress and in portions of the northern press for his conduct of the battle of Shiloh, and his former victories had already been overshadowed by his repeated failures to take Vicksburg. The newspapers of the North were ridiculing his attempts to dig a channel that would allow the passage of vessels around Vicksburg and were bitterly complaining of his retention in command of his army.

Referring to these failures of Grant, and to Sherman, his most trusted subordinate, one of the coarsest and most reckless of the newspapers said that "the army was being ruined in mud-turtle expeditions under the leadership of a drunkard, whose confidential adviser was a lunatic."²²

Senator Ben Wade, the bluff, honest, but impulsive chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, a man of powerful influence in Congress and in the national councils, vehemently urged the removal of Grant, at the same time giving the President the cheerful assurance that he was leading the government to hell, which at that minute was not a mile off.²³

²² Reid: *Ohio in the War*, vol. 1, p. 385.

²³ Lincoln is said to have retorted: "That is just about the distance between the Capitol and the White House."

But for the strong support of Representative Elihu B. Washburne and the steadfast friendship of Lincoln, Grant probably would have been relegated during the remainder of the war to some obscure position in which it would have been impossible for him to display the soldierly qualities that afterward placed him in the front rank of the world's great commanders.

Alexander K. McClure, an active and influential Republican politician of Pennsylvania, was one of those who urged upon Lincoln the removal of Grant and he has given us an interesting account of it.²⁴ He labored with Lincoln from 11 o'clock one night until 1 o'clock the next morning. He says:

"I pressed upon him, with all the earnestness I could command, the immediate removal of Grant as an imperious necessity to sustain himself. As was his custom, he said but little, only enough to make me continue the discussion until it was exhausted. He sat before the open fire in the old Cabinet room, most of the time with his feet up on the high marble mantel, and exhibited unusual distress at the complicated condition of military affairs. Nearly every day brought some new and perplexing military complication. He had gone through a long winter of terrible strain with McClellan and the Army of the Potomac; and from the day that Grant started on his southern expedition until the battle of Shiloh he had had little else than jarring and confusion among his generals in the West. He knew that I had no ends to serve in urging Grant's

²⁴ *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, pp. 179-80.

removal, beyond the single desire to make him be just to himself, and he listened patiently.

"I appealed to Lincoln for his own sake to remove Grant at once, and in giving my reasons for it I simply voiced the admittedly overwhelming protest from the loyal people of the land against Grant's continuance in command. I could form no judgment during the conversation as to what effect my arguments had upon him beyond the fact that he was greatly distressed at this new complication. When I had said everything that could be said from my standpoint, we lapsed into silence. Lincoln remained silent for what seemed a very long time. He then gathered himself up in his chair and said in a tone of earnestness that I shall never forget: '*I can't spare this man; he fights.*' That was all he said, but I knew that it was enough, and that Grant was safe in Lincoln's hands against his countless host of enemies."

Sherman had ventured to predict that it would require an army of 200,000 to put down the Rebellion in the Mississippi Valley, but people thought he was crazy.

The situation in Kentucky was alarming and boded ill for Indiana. Beriah Magoffin was still governor of that state and it was well known that he would gladly throw open the gates of Kentucky to the Confederate armies, and that he would rejoice to see them cross the Ohio and carry war and desolation into the states north of it. In Indiana the situation was critical. Lincoln had received of the total vote cast by the state 139,033. Douglas 115,509, Breckinridge 12,295, and Bell 5,306. Many had voted for Douglas because he was regarded

as the regular nominee of the party, but their sympathies were with Breckinridge and his political doctrines. The great body of Douglas Democrats, however, following the example of their distinguished and patriotic leader, remained loyal to the Union cause and were thereafter known as War Democrats. Many of them enlisted in the Union armies and in 1862 were at the front. But of the Democrats that remained at home, a number of influential leaders were bitterly hostile to the administration and to the further prosecution of the war, and they had a large following. At a great mass meeting held at Indianapolis January 8, 1862, Thomas A. Hendricks openly advocated the idea of a northwestern Confederacy which should cut loose from New England and ally itself with the South. He said:

"The first and highest interest of the Northwest is in the restoration and preservation of the Union upon the basis of the constitution, and the deep devotion of her Democracy to the cause of the Union is shown by its fidelity in the past; but if the failure and folly and wickedness of the party in power render a Union impossible, then the mighty Northwest must take care of herself and her own interests. She must not allow the arts and finesse of New England to despoil her of her richest commerce and trade by a sectional and selfish policy—eastern lust of power, commerce and gain."²⁵

²⁵ Foulke's *Life of Morton*, vol. 1, p. 176.

It is pleasant to contrast with this the report of the proceedings of the Union convention held at Indianapolis June 18, 1862. One of the speakers was Martin M. Ray, a well-known Democrat. In the course of a patriotic address, he said:

"Yes, war could have been avoided by a cowardly surrender of the government to rebel arms. What difference does it make whether it costs one or four millions per day to save the government, since it must be saved at any price? . . . We will prosecute the war to re-establish the supremacy of the Federal constitution under Mr. Crittenden's resolution at the extra session of Congress, and, if slavery must perish in the conflict, let it perish."

The Confederate plan was that General Bragg should invade Kentucky, march on Louisville, destroy Buell's communications, and force his army back to the Ohio river. This meant that the invasion of Kentucky, if successful, would be speedily followed by the invasion of Indiana and Ohio. Indiana had gained some idea of what was involved in an invasion by a hostile army, when in July a band of Confederates crossed the Ohio and sacked the town of Newburg, situated on the river a few miles below Evansville.

The loyal citizens of Kentucky were appealing to Governor Morton for aid. The people of Indiana were apprehensive for their own homes. Not a moment was to be lost. The President had called for 300,000 more volunteers. The emergency was pressing. The difficulty of raising the troops required, and the greater

difficulty of equipping them, were apparently insurmountable. But nothing daunted Morton. He at once began the work. On July 12th he addressed a great war meeting at Indianapolis, and all over the state similar meetings were held. Volunteers came forward faster than they could be mustered into service; a new mustering officer was called and all the energies of the state government were taxed to the utmost. The result is briefly told in some of Morton's telegrams as given by Foulke:²⁶

"Aug. 26. The Seventy-ninth leaves Tuesday; will hurry others. Indiana has put 14,480 men in Kentucky up to Friday last; this will make it 19,296 by Thursday this week. This includes two batteries."

"Aug. 27. Another regiment can leave to-morrow, one leaves this evening."

"Aug. 30. The Eighty-ninth leaves this afternoon. The Eighty-first and Eighty-second will be armed to-day. Two regiments will start to-morrow, and five more will be ready next week."

"Aug. 31. The Eighty-eighth is at the depot. The Eighty-seventh will be in Louisville to-morrow morning. Two regiments leave to-day and two more to-night."

Since my return from the three-months' service I had been in the law office of my stepfather. But there was little law business and my heart was not in it. *Inter arma leges silent.* On August 14 my stepfather and I closed our law office and again enlisted, this time

²⁶ *Life of Morton*, vol. 1, p. 187.

“for three years or during the war, unless sooner discharged.” The company in which we enlisted started in a few days for Indianapolis, where it became Co. I of the 79th Indiana. I was commissioned first lieutenant of the company, my stepfather, lieut.-colonel of the regiment, and Frederick Knefler, colonel.

My company was recruited chiefly from Johnson county and the adjoining county of Brown and was composed in large part of men who had come from the farm; probably twenty-five were from Franklin and smaller towns; a few were college students, school teachers, and professional men. Most of the company were twenty-one years old or younger and only a few of them were married. We were mustered into service August 26, and on the 27th six companies, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Oyler, left for Louisville, followed September 2 by Colonel Knefler and the remaining four companies.

The 79th Indiana, though its losses were not so great as those of many other regiments in the Civil War, nevertheless gained an honorable record. It was in reserve at the battles of Perryville and Franklin and took an active part in the battles of Stone's River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge and Nashville, and participated in the various battles of the Atlanta campaign and in numerous skirmishes in east Tennessee in the winter of 1863. Its total losses, as given in Fox's *Regimental Losses*, were 53 killed and died of wounds, and 149 died of disease, in prison, etc. It went into the battle of Stone's River with only 341

men and lost 121 killed, wounded, and captured. At Chickamauga it participated in the charge and capture of a Confederate battery, and it was in the first line of Wood's division in the storming of Missionary Ridge.

I commanded the company in all the battles in which the regiment was engaged until June 23, 1864, when I was severely wounded at Kenesaw Mountain, on account of which I was honorably discharged November 10, 1864. While in the three-years' service I never had a furlough, never was absent from duty, and never was in a hospital until after I was wounded.

CHAPTER THREE

CAMP, MARCH AND BATTLE

In the general histories of the Civil War, and in the histories of great campaigns and battles, we get much information about noted generals, military strategy, and tactical maneuvers, but we gain a very imperfect idea of a soldier's daily life. Some phases of it, as seen in camp, on the march, and in battle, deserve fuller attention before going further in this narrative.

When it was expected that a regiment would remain in one locality for a considerable period, camp was regularly laid out according to prescribed military regulations, with narrow lanes, on each side of which were the tents of the enlisted men. At the head of each lane were the tents of the line officers, the captains and lieutenants, and in rear of them were those of the regimental officers. In the first year of the war, tents in the shape of a letter A were furnished for the enlisted men, and wall tents for the line officers. The former were secured by ropes fastened to pegs driven into the ground. Small trenches were dug around them to keep out the water in rainy weather. If boards could be found they were floored; otherwise beds were made on the ground. There was no way of heating them and in

cold weather the fire was made in front, the men sleeping with their feet to the fire. The tents of the officers were provided with flies which were erected in the rear and were generally used as a sort of kitchen in which the officers ate their meals. The tents of the regimental officers were similar to those of the line officers but were larger and better.

The enlisted men's tents were found to require too many wagons to haul them and, in 1862, what were familiarly known in the western army as "dog-tents" were introduced, the 79th getting its first supply while in camp at Murfreesboro. Each man was furnished with a piece of canvas about five and one-half feet square with buttons and button-holes so placed that three pieces could be buttoned together, two of them making the sides and one the back of the tent. They were held in place by being stretched over a ridge pole laid on top of two forked stakes, and fastened at the bottom with wooden pins. In an emergency two muskets with fixed bayonets, stuck in the ground, served for temporary stakes. When so put together these pieces of canvas made what were at once nicknamed "dog-tents." As they were not more than four feet high, a man could not stand in them nor could he sit in them with much comfort. But when lumber sufficient could be found, and the regiment was in camp long enough, sides and rear walls were constructed of boards or logs and the dog-tent was used as a roof. Then the structure was dignified by the title "shebang," and bunks were made similar in size and shape to

those in the state-rooms of vessels. Regiments which were fortunate enough to remain in winter quarters and to have access to timber, constructed miniature log houses, eight or ten feet square, in shape much like those of the early western pioneers, having stick chimneys—the interstices between the logs being filled with clay. These were palatial structures compared with the dog-tents. The 79th built them several times while in east Tennessee, but invariably, as soon as completed, the regiment was ordered to march and was obliged to abandon them. Into these contracted quarters five or six men could manage to stow themselves and all their baggage, arms, and cooking utensils and to live in them with a reasonable degree of comfort, incredible as this may seem to people in good circumstances who now want houses of eight or ten or more rooms, and think they can not live comfortably with less.

The daily routine of camp life began with the sounding of the reveille. Then the men rose, dressed, and responded to company roll-call, at which the names of those assigned from the company for police, camp guard, picket, or other special duty were announced. Next came the drawing of rations, which were obtained from the regimental commissary sergeant by the company orderly sergeants and distributed by them to the men. When it was possible to furnish full supplies, they were generally abundant and good, consisting usually of side-meat, always in the army called “sow-belly,” crackers, always called “hardtack,” coffee,

and sugar. To these were sometimes added beans, potatoes, and a vile compound known as "desiccated vegetables." But such princely provisions were rarely distributed unless the regiment remained in camp for a considerable time and there was easy communication with the base of supplies.

Cooking in camp was sometimes done by a company cook, but usually the men were divided into messes of six or eight, and the labor of getting wood and water and preparing the meals was apportioned among them as they might agree. Occasionally a company officer messed with some of the men, but usually, when in camp, two or three officers united and employed a colored man to do the cooking. Those who could afford to pay the prices, which were usually very high, could at times buy of regimental sutlers canned peaches, jellies, and a few other delicacies. Boxes of dainties were sometimes sent from home and were generously shared by the recipients with their comrades. When the country people were allowed to approach the picket stations, these became trading posts for the purchase or exchange of pies, cakes, and other eatables. One day while on picket duty near McMinnville, Tennessee, I purchased of a very long and gaunt country woman a mince pie. I had not tasted one since I left home and could hardly await my return to camp in anticipation of the feast to which I had invited some of my comrades. I was not more amazed when a boy, reading for the first time in the old nursery rhyme the wonderful story of the "four and twenty blackbirds

baked in a pie" which, when the pie was opened, at once began to sing, than I was when I opened the pie I had bought and discovered that its sole contents were two pieces of fat pork from which the woman had not even removed the bristles. My disgust at finding myself such a victim of misplaced confidence was not relieved by the merriment and the sallies of my comrades, who seemed to relish the joke more than they would have enjoyed a good mince pie.

It is needless to say that cooking in the army was not done according to the rules prescribed in approved cook books. Cooking utensils were scarce; the mess that had a camp kettle, a coffee-pot, a frying-pan, and a few tin plates and cups, was well provided. Occasionally we procured at some country house an old-fashioned "Dutch oven"—a large iron skillet with a lid—and the services of a "contraband" who knew how to bake beans and corn pone, and then we enjoyed a feast that could not be surpassed.

We fared best in summer when young corn and berries were in season. No soldier that was in the vicinity of Pikeville, Tennessee, in the summer of 1863, will ever forget the delicious roasting ears and blackberry cobbles with which the memory of the place will always be associated. The recipe for making a blackberry cobbler was very simple. The six or eight men in a mess put all their blackberries, all their crackers, and all their sugar into a camp kettle, filled it with water, and let it come to a boil, then stirred

the contents with a bayonet or stick, and it was ready to serve. I do not recall that any of it was ever left.

Drills and inspections occurred with more or less frequency, as the necessity for them required. Usually there was a company drill in the forenoon and a regimental drill in the afternoon. In the intervals between drills and inspections the men were required to put their arms and quarters in good condition. The chief military display during the day was the dress parade. This took place a little before sundown. The whole regiment was formed in line; the buglers, or the regimental band, if there was one, marched up and down in front of the regiment playing a lively tune, generally "The girl I left behind me." Then the adjutant gave the order, "Present arms"; the colonel or commanding officer of the regiment acknowledged the salute and perhaps put the regiment through a brief exercise in the manual of arms; orders intended for the regiment, if there were any, were read; and then the regiment was dismissed and the companies marched back to their respective quarters.

After supper the men spent the time as they pleased, writing letters, playing cards, or telling stories, until tattoo was sounded, when they were required to go to their quarters and attend evening roll-call. The last bugle call was taps or "lights-out," after which every one, unless assigned to some special night duty, was expected to be in bed. Then the soldier lay down to sleep—"to sleep! perchance to dream" of his home in the far distant North; to dream that he was again

one of the cheery circle gathered about the family fire-side, or that he was again clasping in his arms the fond wife and the prattling children he had left; to awake in the morning and find that it was all a dream and that he was far away from the home and the loved ones that he might never see again.

All did not sleep. The camp guards, under the command of an officer detailed as officer of the day, were stationed near the camp and divided into three reliefs, serving alternately four hours at a time, and these walked the beats assigned them and allowed none to pass without halting and giving the countersign over the point of a bayonet.

It was on the vigilance of the pickets, however, that the security of the army at night depended, especially when the enemy was in the near vicinity. They were posted far enough from camp to give timely warning in case of a sudden attack. They also were divided into three reliefs, each relief serving four hours at a time. Sometimes the picket walked over a beat varying in length, but if in close proximity to the enemy he was usually stationed by a tree or in some spot which would serve at once to conceal him from the view, and to shelter him from the bullets, of the enemy. However tired, he was not permitted to sleep. Next to desertion, the greatest offense of which a soldier could be guilty was that of sleeping on his post. No matter how cold it might be, no matter how pitiless the blast, no matter if the rain came down in torrents, he must stand at his post until relieved. To stand alone

anywhere for four hours on a dark night, in a lonely spot, would try the nerves of most men, but to stand there in momentary expectation of being fired on by an enemy known to be near by is an experience the full meaning of which none but soldiers can appreciate. On one occasion in the three-years' service, when I was acting as officer of the day and had command of a picket station, I narrowly escaped being shot. I did not hear the first challenge and a frightened picket aimed at me, but his gun snapped. Fortunately, before he could aim again, I succeeded in making myself known to him.

Pay-day was of course an important day in the army. In anticipation of it the muster-rolls were prepared, showing the amount due to each man, and when the paymaster arrived the money was speedily distributed. Most of it was sent home by the men for the use of their families, or to be invested or kept until their return. It was usually sent by some one going North on furlough, or by some visitor or sutler; but after the first year's service much of it was sent by what was known as the "allotment roll" plan. During the last year that I was in the service there was little opportunity to spend money, if I had had ever so much, for we were on the march most of the time, sutlers were scarce, and there was little to buy in the country through which we passed; so I invested most of my pay in government 5-20 bonds, which proved to be a very good investment, for with the proceeds of them

I paid my way through the Albany Law School and had enough left to buy a very good law library.

The first pay I received in the three-years' service was in government paper money. I do not remember ever having seen a piece of gold or silver after leaving Louisville in the fall of 1862. The small scrip, the ten and twenty-five and fifty cent bills issued by the government, were looked on with suspicion, and it was difficult to pass them among the people of the South with whom I came in contact. Long before the close of the war they refused to receive Confederate bills at almost any discount, but I never knew a "green-back" to be refused. This was a silent but significant proof of the belief of the great mass of the southern people, at least in the regions through which I traveled, that the North, if it did not succeed in the contest of arms, would at least redeem its financial obligations. The great medium of exchange was coffee. A grain of coffee was next in value to a grain of gold, and the soldiers could exchange coffee for almost everything that the people of the South had to sell.

Next to the arrival of the paymaster, the event most eagerly anticipated was the arrival of the mail. When in camp for a considerable time the mails came with something like regularity. Occasionally some one who had been home on furlough returned, bringing letters and papers. The letters were, of course, read with the most eager interest, for they brought news directly from home and from those nearest and dearest to the soldier. After the letters the papers were read and

passed around. The local papers were of greatest interest to those from the town or county where they were published, and usually contained letters from soldiers in the various regiments having representatives from the place. Of the newspapers most highly appreciated in the Army of the Cumberland, composed largely of troops from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the *Cincinnati Gazette* and the *Cincinnati Commercial* were the most popular. Whitelaw Reid, now editor of the New York *Tribune*, was one of the war correspondents of the *Gazette*. He wrote under the nom de plume "Agate." I had seen him in the three-months' campaign in West Virginia, a young, handsome, daring-looking man. He was one of the best, if not the best, of the war correspondents during the Civil War. "Mack" (J. B. McCullagh), the correspondent of the *Commercial*, was also a popular writer.

This leads me to say something of reading in the army. I do not recall that Hamerton in his delightful book on *Intellectual Life* says anything of the cultivation of literary tastes in the army. Certainly the facilities for literary studies were not numerous; still, some books, generally novels, were obtainable. I read the *Wandering Jew* while in the hospital on Lookout Mountain, and I account for the deep impression it made on the theory that I was so thirsty for something to read that I absorbed every word of it. I have often thought of Lowell's remark about books "suitable to a desolate island," in connection with a copy of *Blair's*

Rhetoric which I picked up in the road. It had probably been pillaged from some farm house and thrown away. A great many people nowadays have never heard of *Blair's Rhetoric*. A few old and wrinkled pedagogues may remember it, but it is safe to say that no one at this day could be coaxed into reading it for amusement. I had not seen a book or even a newspaper for weeks, and I positively affirm that I took the book with me on picket and read it entirely through with absorbing interest, just as a starving man would devour a dry crust.

One of the prominent characters of camp life was the army sutler. He took a great many risks and was obliged to charge high prices. I doubt if many sutlers in the Army of the Cumberland made a fortune. The sutler carried in stock some clothing, combs and brushes, playing cards, some canned goods, and a general but small assortment of such articles as the soldiers would be likely to need most. Sometimes he kept wines and liquors, but the regulations were generally such as made it difficult for the enlisted men to purchase intoxicants.

It must not be supposed that the soldier's life in camp was an endless monotony of work and drill. When not on duty the men amused themselves in pitching quoits, playing ball or cards, in reading, in visiting their friends and acquaintances in other regiments, and in various other ways. There was considerable gambling in the army, but not a great deal in the regiment to which I belonged. There was also considera-

ble drunkenness, but it prevailed to a greater extent, in proportion to the numbers, among the officers than among the men, because it was much more difficult for the latter to procure liquor. The "canteen," so much discussed in connection with the Spanish and Philippine wars, was unknown in the Civil War.

The hospital service in the army was as good as could have been expected under the circumstances, especially in the general hospitals such as those at Nashville, Louisville, and Washington. But even in these the accommodations for the sick and wounded would have been totally inadequate without the aid of the loyal people, and especially the loyal women, in the North. In nearly every town and village in the North there were local organizations of the Sanitary Commission or the Christian Commission, in which noble women met and prepared bedclothing and bandages for the sick and wounded and such delicacies as would tempt their appetites and forwarded them to the hospitals. Moreover, great numbers of patriotic women volunteered their services as nurses, soothing with woman's gentle touch and cheering with woman's gentle presence the suffering soldier lying helpless on his cot. I have before me a little pamphlet written by one of these nurses, Mrs. Francena Howe Brock, of Lowell, Mass., recounting her three-months' experience in the Campbell Hospital at Washington. She says:

"The heroic attempts of women to supplement the supplies of the government and afford kindly help to the sick and wounded, through the Christian and Sani-

tary Commissions, will ever stand out in history as one of the brightest pages of our Civil War.

"Their gifts were poured out with lavish generosity, and their services in the front were given with unselfish heroism.

"On many a hospital bed, the fever-scorched patient had on the clean, white garment, made by the loyal women of the North, while on the beds of the convalescents, quilts covered with mottoes and texts of Scripture gave comfort and words of cheer."

Every soldier will endorse the truth of this statement. Nor should we forget the noble work of the Catholic Sisters of Mercy. In nearly every hospital their sweet faces were seen as they moved quietly about, ministering with equal fidelity to those of their own or of another faith. But in the field hospitals the facilities for taking care of the sick were limited, and a rugged constitution was the main dependence upon which the patients could rely for recovery.

Two diseases that at home rarely leave permanent bad results were, from the impossibility of proper diet and treatment, productive of dangerous consequences in the army. One was diarrhea which, when it assumed a chronic form, as it frequently did, was almost as fatal and became as much dreaded as consumption. The other was measles, a simple disease under proper medical treatment, but one which in the army often left the victim with impaired eyesight or other permanent disability. Another disease, common in the army, was nostalgia or home-sickness. There it assumed a well-defined form and undoubtedly caused

or greatly aggravated other diseases. Malingering, or the feigning of disease in order to shirk duty or to avoid danger, is common in all armies, and in the British army is severely punished. It was undoubtedly largely practised in the Federal and Confederate armies.

In noting the features of life in camp, the "contrabands" must not be forgotten. This was the term always applied to the negroes. Some came from the North but most of them were picked up in the South. They were generally employed as cooks and servants for the officers. In a subsequent chapter,¹ the employment of negroes as soldiers will be considered.

Life in camp and life on the march were quite different. Generally the order to break camp and prepare to march came very unexpectedly to the line officers and enlisted men and there was not much time for preparation. If it came in the night it was usually to prepare to march the next morning at daybreak. Sometimes the order came to break camp and prepare to march at once, and it was astonishing how soon a regiment could pack up and get into line ready to move.

If it was expected merely to go on some short expedition and to return to the same camp the tents were left standing in charge of a guard, and the men carried with them only such baggage as was indispensable. But when it was not expected to return to the same

¹ Chap. X.

camp the preparations involved the abandonment of everything that could not be taken. The officers' valises, company kettles, extra ammunition, and whatever could be so disposed of were put into wagons. When the 79th started on its first march each company had a wagon; as the war progressed only one wagon was allotted to a regiment and into this was put everything that was to be hauled. Those who were too sick to march were sent to the hospital or put into ambulances.

The soldier on the march carried his arms and ammunition. These consisted of musket and bayonet, a belt to which was attached a leather ammunition-box, containing generally forty-two rounds of cartridges, and a leather scabbard holding his bayonet. His provisions were carried in a canvas or oil-cloth haversack suspended over his shoulder by straps; in like manner he carried a canteen holding about three pints of water. Each soldier was provided with a piece of oil-cloth, a blanket, and, later on, a piece of dog-tent. Generally these were all rolled together and the ends tied, making a roll in the shape of a horse collar, and this was thrown over the neck in such a way as to be carried on one side. Into their knapsacks the men crowded all they felt able or inclined to carry. Those of new recruits were always stuffed with enough to start a small store, but soldiers speedily learned that they could do without much which, at first, had been thought indispensable, and the contents of a veteran's knapsack were usually very scanty—a change of un-

derclothing, a house-wife with some pins, needles, and buttons, a small supply of writing-paper and a photograph or two, being about all that he carried.

In the last two years of the three-years' service, the line officers on the march fared little better than the men. Every captain was obliged to carry his own oil-cloth, blanket, piece of dog-tent, haversack, and canteen, and also his own knapsack if he wished to take any extras.

When everything was in readiness to move the bugle sounded the assembly and the regiment took its place in the column. In a long column consisting of several divisions, it was very much easier to march in front, and for this reason, on a march of several days' duration, the regiment at the head of the column dropped the next day to the rear. There are few more picturesque sights than a considerable body of troops—a corps or a division—on the march over a good road on a clear day. Stretched along the road you see a moving column, with waving banners and gleaming guns, the general and regimental officers in brilliant uniforms mounted on spirited steeds, the artillery rolling along, cavalymen occasionally dashing by—all indicative of the strength and grandeur of the death-dealing powers of an army when loosed in battle.

The men always marched in columns of fours and no attempt was made to step in unison, but all speedily adopted what was known as the route step. The distance traveled was usually fifteen to twenty miles a day, according to the weather and the roads, but much

longer distances were covered on forced marches. The weather and the condition of the roads determined the character of the march, not only as to distance traveled, but as to the comfort of the men. When the weather was fine and the roads were good the men enjoyed the march. But nearly all our marching in east Tennessee in the winter of 1863 was done in cold, rainy weather and over miserable roads. To march all day in the rain over a muddy road and then to pass the night on the damp ground was not a pleasant experience. More than once I laid two rails together so as to make a sort of trough, elevating one end of the trough in order to keep it off the ground, and slept in it all night with my oil-cloth over me and my hat over my face to protect me from a drizzling rain.

One of the most common incidents of a march over a muddy road was the stalling of a baggage or an ammunition wagon. On such occasions the drivers were apt to indulge in profanity. Indeed, it was commonly believed that in a very bad case an expert swearer was absolutely indispensable to start an obstinate team of mules. There was one man in the 79th who was sent for by all the drivers in the brigade when all other attempts to get a wagon out of a mud-hole had failed. This man would at once take the lines, crack his whip, and fire off a volley of profane expletives sufficient to make one's hair stand on end and to scare any mule ever hitched to an army wagon. I advance no scientific theory on the subject, but simply record the fact

that he always succeeded in starting the mules and getting the wagon out of the hole.

The monotony of a long march was relieved in various ways. New scenery was opening at every step. No house was passed that did not excite some comment; no rustic appeared by the roadside that was not plied with questions or jocularly, though not unkindly, bantered. Often a song was started and taken up, company by company, until the whole regiment joined in it. The 79th picked up near Louisville a venerable contraband familiarly known as "Uncle John." If he had any other name I have forgotten it. He remained with the regiment until its return, was elected an honorary member of the reunion organization, and died in Indianapolis. He had a great repertory of old plantation songs, one of them ending with this refrain:

"God'y he delivered Daniel, Daniel, Daniel,
God'y he delivered Daniel,
Why not deliver me."

I do not remember the rest of the song, but I recall that often when we were on the march, and so fagged that we could hardly drag one foot after the other, some one would start the song and it would be taken up by companies and regiments until the whole brigade was singing it, and we would forget that we were tired.

Foraging by individual soldiers on the march was strictly prohibited, but the prohibition was construed with more or less leniency, according to the disposition of the commanding officers, and there were usually

some opportunities on the march for the men to replenish their scanty supply of provisions. Guards were generally stationed at the farmhouses along the line of march, but a friendly guard over a smoke-house rarely observed his comrades in the rear of it dexterously poking the shoulders and jowls off the hooks with their bayonets. The temptation to pick up a stray turkey or chicken was one too strong to be resisted by the most conscientious soldier. Moreover, the law of self-defense received a very liberal construction in the army; it was universally allowed to be lawful to kill a hog or a sheep that manifested a disposition to bite, and, strange to say, all the hogs and sheep in the South exhibited such a belligerent disposition.

The cavalymen and the artillerymen always had the advantage of the infantrymen in foraging. When, as often happened, nothing to eat could be picked up on the line of march, the soldier was reduced to the supplies in his haversack. It did not take long for him to cook a meal. There were no tedious courses. A pot of coffee was soon boiled, and a piece of side-meat, stuck on the end of a ramrod and held over the coals, was soon broiled. I never relished the most sumptuous banquet as I did the cup of coffee, the slice of side-meat and the piece of cracker that I used to eat on the march.

The stragglers were familiar figures on the march. Some were not strong enough to keep up, especially on a hard march, but most of them were men that purposely lagged behind to do a little foraging on their

own account or for plunder. They were not all skulkers, but the skulkers were always among the stragglers if a battle was imminent. Straggling prevailed in all the armies, Federal and Confederate, but more in some regiments than in others. There was comparatively little in regiments whose officers enforced attendance at roll-call and other regulations designed to prevent it.

Care was usually taken to stop the day's march at some spot convenient to water and wood. Sometimes the commanding officers were so considerate as to halt the troops near a rail fence and then the command to stack arms and break ranks was hardly repeated before the entire fence around a twenty-acre field had disappeared as if by magic and almost in an instant thousands of camp-fires were brightly burning. Then was heard the sound, so familiar to all old soldiers, of pounding coffee. The coffee issued to the soldiers in the Army of the Cumberland was browned but not ground, and coffee-mills were unknown. So the coffee was put into tin cups, placed on a smooth stump or stone, and beaten with the butt end of a bayonet, as a druggist pulverizes drugs in a mortar. Supper being ready it was speedily dispatched and then the soldiers gathered about the camp-fires. These were the real camp-fires. The incidents of the day were recalled; former battles and skirmishes were discussed; story after story went round; sometimes a song was started in which all joined; and thus the tired soldiers tried to forget the hardships of the past and the dangers of the future. Is it cause for wonder that the friendships

formed about these camp-fires knit together more strongly than iron bands those who have survived?

The 79th Ind. was many times under fire and took an active part in several memorable battles, and it so happened that I participated in three of the most noted—Stone's River, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge. I have attempted a general description of them in the following pages and many such descriptions have already been written, but I doubt whether, from these, a reader that never saw a battle would get a very distinct idea of how it appeared to those engaged. It may not be amiss, therefore, to attempt a more specific description.

No two battles of the Civil War were alike, yet there were many features common to all. Various circumstances combined to determine just when and where a general engagement should be brought on by one or the other of the opposing forces, and which should take the initiative.

In nearly all the battles that I witnessed it was impossible to see the greater part of either of the opposing armies from one point. At Stone's River the greatest number of the Confederates that I could see at any time were those in Breckinridge's division on Friday afternoon; at Chickamauga the greatest number I saw together were the forces of Longstreet as they came up toward Snodgrass Hill; at the storming of Missionary Ridge, however, I could see all the Federal troops that participated in the assault. During the Atlanta campaign, the whole country in which it

was conducted was covered with such a heavy growth of timber and underbrush that, from any particular point in the lines, only a small portion of either army could be seen.

Usually for some days before a great battle there was considerable maneuvering for position, always conducted in such a way as to secure the most available positions for attack or defense, and, on the part of the attacking army, to deceive the enemy concerning the point where it was intended to strike the hardest blow. The duty of "developing the enemy," as it was called, fell chiefly upon the cavalry, but sometimes a reconnaissance in force was made by advancing considerable bodies of infantry until the position of the main body of the enemy could be ascertained. The character of the ground, and the disposition of troops during the night often made it difficult or impossible to ascertain the exact position of the enemy, or to determine when and where the first attack would be made. A striking illustration of this was seen in the battle of Chickamauga, each army on Friday night having been ignorant of the precise location of the other.

It would seem hardly possible for an army to be surprised by an attack from an enemy known to be in the vicinity, yet such surprises sometimes occurred, as at Shiloh and at Stone's River. In each case the surprise very nearly resulted in the total rout of the Federal army. Night attacks were rare because in the dark there was so much danger that the attacking

party would fire on troops of its own side or be fired on by them.

No troops will stand a flanking fire and, when exposed thereto, they must retreat or speedily change front. This is very apt to throw them into confusion, as it is difficult to make new formations under the galling fire of an advancing enemy; therefore it is the object of every general to post and maneuver his troops in such a way, if possible, as to turn the right or the left flank of the enemy.

When neither a surprise nor a flank movement is practicable, another device is to mass a heavy body of troops, make a sudden dash and break through some weak point in the enemy's lines, thus throwing them into confusion, at the same time concealing, as far as possible, the strength of the assaulting force and diverting attention from the point where the attack is to be made by feint movements in other quarters.

The private soldier had little to do to prepare for battle. He stripped himself of his knapsack and all superfluous baggage, saw that his gun was in order and that his ammunition-box was filled. The main attacking columns were generally preceded by a line of skirmishers posted a short distance in front. The skirmishers advanced, followed by the men in the main columns, until they were checked by a superior force of the enemy, when they fell back or halted until their own main lines came up and then took their places in them.

The army anticipating an attack generally fortified

its position as much as possible. The value of breastworks was speedily recognized. Those constructed by General Joseph E. Johnston to oppose the advance of General Sherman were so strong that the forces behind them would have been able to resist successfully a direct assault by four or five times their own number. Even temporary breastworks, such as could be erected in a night, composed of logs and rails two or three feet high, with a trench behind them one or two feet deep, or even without a trench, gave the troops behind them a great advantage, especially against a column compelled to travel a considerable distance over an open field in front in order to reach them. Behind such breastworks a line of men, armed with modern Mauser rifles, could probably resist a direct attack in front by an army ten times their own in number.

When breastworks were to be charged, the charge was usually preceded by a brisk cannonading, followed by a rapid advance of the attacking force in such numbers as to exhaust the fire of those behind the works, before reinforcements could reach them. Such charges were usually very destructive to the attacking party, especially when exposed to the fire, at short range, of the men behind the breastworks and also to the fire of cannon loaded with grape-shot and canister.

Next to charging breastworks, the duty requiring the greatest bravery was that of charging a battery. If infantry could advance within musket range of the artillerymen and horses, the charge, especially if

against a single battery, was usually successful in either capturing the battery or compelling it to retreat, because, unless well supported by infantry, the men and horses were soon killed or disabled. But dreadful loss of life usually resulted when a charging column was forced to advance over a considerable space before coming within musket range of the enemy's artillery. The general reader who sees accounts of men "marching up to the cannon's mouth" is apt to believe that this is a poetic stretch of imagination. But it is not. Such scenes were often witnessed during the Civil War. Time and again there were charges by both Federal and Confederate troops in which men marched straight up to the cannon's mouth and bayoneted the artillerymen.

Perhaps the most trying position in which a soldier can be placed is to be exposed to artillery fire when so situated that he can neither advance nor fire in return. In a charge he is carried forward by the very momentum of the column and is inspired by the enthusiasm kindled by the charge itself; when he is firing in return he has at least something to divert his mind from dwelling solely on his own personal danger; but when he is compelled to stand or lie still and can do nothing but await the coming of a cannon ball, he is in a situation requiring the courage of the bravest man. General Sheridan in his *Memoirs*,² describing his division in such a position at Stone's River, says

² Vol. I, p. 234.

that the "torments of this trying situation were almost unbearable." In a reconnaissance made on Sunday, September 13, 1863, preceding the battle of Chickamauga, the 79th Ind. was for a few minutes posted on the top of a ridge in a field, exposed to the fire of a Confederate battery about half a mile distant on the opposite side of the field. The battery almost at once got the range of our colors, and one ball passed under the horse of the lieutenant-colonel who happened to be immediately behind the colors. We could see the smoke of the cannon an instant or so before we could hear the sound of the discharge and then another instant elapsed before the ball came along. We were all lying flat on the ground with our heads toward the cannon and I distinctly remember that every time I saw the smoke I thought of the possibility that the ball might hit my head. It is hardly necessary to say that when the order was given to fall back behind the brow of the ridge it was obeyed with the utmost alacrity.

Bayonet charges were not uncommon nor were hand to hand contests, but I think there were comparatively few instances in which opposing forces fought each other solely with bayonets. The statistics collected by Colonel Fox show a very small percentage of bayonet wounds. What generally happened when a bayonet charge was ordered is illustrated in a dialogue given by Piatt:³

³ *General George H. Thomas*, p. 14.

“‘Do you mean to say,’ asked a civilian of a veteran officer who had seen many fierce fights in Europe, ‘that bayonets are never crossed in battle?’

“‘Oh, no! I don’t say that. What I asserted was that I had heard of such but never saw it, and I have my doubts whether it ever occurred.’

“‘Well, when a charge of bayonets is ordered, what happens, how does it end?’

“‘Why, if the other fellows don’t run away, we do.’”

In the pictures of battles the officers are usually depicted in full uniform, generally on prancing steeds, and always far in advance waving their swords aloft and beckoning their men forward. Now this would be a very ridiculous position for an officer to take, because it would expose him not only to the fire of the enemy but to the fire of his own men. The army regulations required the officers, on the formation of a line of battle, to take their places in the rear of the line. An officer whose bravery or vanity induced him to expose his rank to the enemy was certain to be made a special target.

The men particularly aimed at in battle were the officers, especially those of high rank, if they could be distinguished, the artillerymen, and those bearing the regimental colors; but most of the firing was at ranks or masses of men, just as one would shoot into a flock of blackbirds. The old soldier, however, generally aimed at some particular person and with a view of hitting him. The difference in this respect between a veteran and a raw recruit is illustrated in the story

told by General Schofield⁴ the substance of it being as follows: A new recruit after a battle was proudly exhibiting to a veteran his empty cartridge-box and boasting of how many rounds he had fired, but he could not tell how many he had hit. "And how many rounds did you fire?" asked the recruit. "About nineteen" was the reply. "And how many did you hit?" "I think," said the veteran, "that I hit about nineteen."

In my company was a man who used to hunt squirrels in the woods of Brown county, and who could hit one in the top of the tallest tree. He was the most quiet and best-natured man in the company, and the coolest I ever saw under fire. Just after the storming of Missionary Ridge he showed me a bent sapling upon which he had rested his gun to take deliberate aim, and he assured me that he hit his man every time. I have not the least doubt of the truth of his statement.

The sensation of being under fire, under any circumstances, is not particularly agreeable, but when you know that the bullets are not aimed especially at you, you feel that the danger is being divided in some way between yourself and your comrades; that it is a sort of lottery in which you may draw a bullet or you may escape and others may be hit. But it is altogether different when you know that some one is taking aim at you individually. A Frenchman in describing a tiger hunt said: "It is great fun to hunt *ze tigare*, but when *ze tigare* hunt you it is fun for *ze tigare*."

⁴ *Forty-Six Years in the Army*, p. 142.

There is nothing very funny in the situation when some one is aiming at another, but if there is any fun it is not relished by the man who is being shot at. I do not know how many times I may have been aimed at, but I am sure of having been on one occasion. This was in front of Rocky Face Ridge in the Atlanta campaign. I was on the skirmish line, picking my way over the rough ground and through the underbrush, when a bullet whizzed past and cut a bush near my head. There was no volley and it happened that no one was within fifty feet of me. So I knew that some Confederate sharpshooter was directing his attention to me individually. He would probably have hit me if I had not been moving.

The last year of the war witnessed some radical changes in the method of fighting. The advance of Grant to Richmond as well as that of Sherman to Atlanta was through a thickly wooded country in which there was a dense growth of underbrush. This made it difficult to use in battle all the men on both sides, and also made it difficult for the artillery to do its most effective work. The result was the development of a style of warfare similar in some respects to that practised in the early Indian wars. It became part of the education of every soldier, officer as well as private, to take advantage of every tree, log, rock, or other natural barrier, in order to protect himself as much as possible in an advance against the enemy.

But the most radical changes were those occasioned by the fact that the armies of both Lee and Johnston

were almost continuously on the defensive, this making it necessary for them to construct formidable fortified lines. When driven from one line they fell back to another. The fortifications encountered by the Federal troops in the Atlanta campaign were of far more elaborate character than any which they had previously met. They were constructed of earth, four or five feet high and thick enough to withstand a six pound cannon ball. Over the top of these was a head-log, so placed as to leave an open space of about six inches between the lower side of the log and the top of the ridge. Behind was a trench about a foot deep in which the men stood while loading, entirely concealed from view. When ready to fire they stepped out of the trench and fired through the opening under the log, thus exposing only a small portion of their persons. Often in front of these breastworks were driven stakes with sharpened ends, pointing outward, and sometimes trees were felled in front of them for the purpose of embarrassing the progress of a charging column.

Even with such weapons as were in use during the Civil War, one man behind such breastworks equaled at least five in a charging column. Experience proved that it was a useless sacrifice of life, in fact little short of butchery, to attempt to take such breastworks by direct assault. No troops in the world could hold out in a charge against them, if they were defended by troops one-fifth in number and of equal valor, especially if the assaulting columns were compelled, in order to reach the works, to advance over a considerable open space

in front, exposed to both a direct and enfilading fire of musketry and artillery. Generally men would charge even against such works, when ordered to do so, for such was the high state of discipline in the last year of the war that soldiers would usually go whenever and wherever ordered, refusing only when it became evident that, if such assaults were persisted in, every man in the assaulting columns would be killed.

The futility of attempting to take strongly fortified lines by direct assault was clearly shown during the Virginia campaign in the assault at Cold Harbor. In his *Memoirs* Grant expresses regret that it was made. The uselessness of direct assault against such fortified lines was also shown, time and again, in the Atlanta campaign, as at Pickett's Mill, and especially in the bloody assault at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864, which was disapproved by Sherman's subordinate generals and afterward admitted by him to have been a mistake. In his account of the assault at Pickett's Mill, General Cox says:

"The attack of Hooker at New Hope Church and this of Howard at Pickett's Mill were both made in column of brigades or demi-brigades. The result in both cases demonstrated that in a difficult and wooded country, and especially against intrenched lines, the column had little if any advantage over a single line of equal front. It could not charge with the *ensemble* which could give it momentum, and its depth was therefore a disadvantage, since it exposed masses of men to fire who were wholly unable to fire in return. Since the office of breastworks is to give the defense

an advantage by holding the assailant under fire from which the defenders are covered, the relative strength of the two is so changed that it is within bounds to say that such works as were constantly built by the contending forces in Georgia made one man in the trench fully equal to three or four in the assault. Each party learned to act upon this, and in all the later operations of the campaign the commanders held their troops responsible for making it practically good. The boasts, on either side, that a brigade or division repulsed three or four that attacked it, must always be read with this understanding. The troops in the works would be proved to be inferior to the assailants if they did not repulse a force several times greater than their own.”⁵

General Schofield also gives very decided testimony on this point. He says:

“In the days of bayonet successful tactics consisted in massing a superior force upon some vital point and breaking the enemy’s line. Now it is the fire of the musket, not the bayonet, that decides the battle. To mass troops against the fire of a covered line is simply to devote them to destruction. The greater the mass the greater the loss—that is all. A large mass has no more chance of success than a small one. That this is absolutely true since the introduction of breech-loaders is probably not doubted by any one; and it was very nearly true with the muzzle-loading rifles used during our late war, as was abundantly demonstrated on many occasions.”⁶

⁵ *Atlanta*, p. 80.

⁶ *Forty-Six Years in the Army*, pp. 145-6.

There was only one way to take such works, and that was by flanking them. This required an attacking army largely superior in numbers to the enemy, so large that the attacking party could maintain its position in front of the works and still have enough to threaten the enemy's communication and thus force an evacuation. This was Grant's plan in the Virginia campaign, and Sherman's in the Atlanta campaign. This plan, however, while it largely avoided the inevitable and useless sacrifice of life in direct assaults, nevertheless required obstinate and bloody fighting for it was necessary continually to push the lines of the attacking army as near as possible up to those of the enemy. When, therefore, an advance was made against fortified lines, either for the purpose of carrying them, if a weak place could be found in them, or for the purpose of advancing the lines of the attacking army, it was necessary to provide for holding the ground gained, even if the attempt to take the enemy's works should fail.

Charging columns were often followed by men with entrenching tools with which defensive works could be speedily constructed, and it was not an unusual sight to see some of the men in a charging column carrying rails. These were thrown down as soon as a halt was made and then, if there were no picks and spades, the men would scoop out a trench behind the rail pile with their bayonets and their tin dinner plates, and thus construct rude breastworks even under a galling fire. I saw this done at New Hope Church and it was not

.

an uncommon occurrence in the Atlanta and Virginia campaigns.

Of course there was grave danger that those engaged in battle might be either killed or wounded, and some regiments, as shown by Colonel Fox, suffered an appalling loss of life. The artillery in battle made the greatest noise, but comparatively few men were killed by cannon-balls. A single cannon-ball rarely hit more than one man; most of them hit no one. The most deadly work of artillery was when it fired grape and canister at short range, especially at dense columns of men, or at a line exposed to an enfilading fire. The greatest danger in battle was that of being killed or wounded by a musket-ball. Considering the number of musket-balls fired in a great battle, the wonder, at first thought, is, not how many were killed or wounded by them, but how many escaped unhurt. It has been said, however, that it takes a man's weight in lead to kill him in battle, and, though this is a rough guess, I suppose that it is near the truth. Generally speaking, most of the bullets fired in battle overshoot the mark; many just miss; some go through the clothing only; of those which hit the person, many inflict only flesh wounds and do not touch a vital spot.⁷ The explosion of a mine, like that at Petersburg, causes great loss of life, but there were few such catastrophes in the Civil War.

In reading of battles and in considering the inspir-

⁷ See Colonel Fox, *The Chance of Being Hit in Battle*, *Century Mag.*, vol. 36, p. 93.

ing motives of those who fought them, there are many things to be taken into account. The personal bravery of the combatants is of course an important element. This has always been a distinguishing quality of the American soldier, and no troops in the world ever exhibited it in a higher degree than did the soldiers on both sides in the Civil War. I do not mean by this the dare-devil courage that apparently made many men reckless of life. Of this there were many instances also, but most men in the army did not expose themselves to danger from mere indifference to it. I am quite sure that on many occasions, if I had had nothing to stay me but my courage, I should have run away at once without standing upon the order of my going. But there were motives and feelings other than mere personal courage that inspired the soldier. An honorable pride nerved many men to face death rather than to seek safety in dishonorable flight. Moreover, there was something in the highest degree inspiring in a great battle. Probably some of the inspiration was artificially created, or at least stimulated, as we see it created and stimulated in an exciting political campaign by great processions, fire-works, huzzas, and other artifices well known to politicians. The example of a general rallying his troops, as General Sheridan rallied his at Winchester, seemed to impart to all who saw him an enthusiasm that spread like wild-fire. There were hundreds of such instances, less noted but equally heroic and equally inspiring, in the Civil War.

It was characteristic of the Confederates that they

charged with what came to be well known as the Confederate "yell." It was apt to strike terror to the new recruit who heard it for the first time, but his veteran comrade waited until the advancing hosts came within range of his musket, well knowing that a musket-ball was far more effective than a yell.

In my opinion, the most inspiring motive was a conscientious sense of duty—the same feeling that in all ages has inspired martyrs at the stake or on the scaffold. We call it patriotism, but patriotism is only another name for that sense of duty to country which, next to the sense of duty to God, is the highest motive that can excite men to heroic deeds. On a great battle-field everything is calculated to arouse heroic impulses in even the ordinary man. The most philosophic person catches some of the excitement created by a fire-engine tearing along the street. But such a sight is of trifling significance compared with that of a battery ploughing along a rough road, or through fields and woods, bouncing over rocks, logs and ditches, wheeling into position, and in the twinkling of an eye opening fire with deafening roar and sheets of flame mowing great swaths through the columns of an advancing enemy.

We see a great political procession go by with waving banners and loud huzzas and we can not help catching some of the enthusiasm. We see a regiment of militia marching with gleaming guns and martial step; we hear the bugle notes; and the sight inspires the ordinary spectator with something of military ardor.

An audience is sometimes stirred to its depths by the mere waving of a flag. An old soldier at a regimental reunion, even after a third of a century has passed, can hardly repress the tears that come unbidden at the unfolding of a battle-rent flag, typical to him of so many hard-fought battles and desperate contests. Is it cause for wonder that, when it waves over him in battle, it makes him almost delirious with enthusiasm?

But it is impossible to impart to one who never participated in a battle the feelings of the soldiers themselves, when, amidst the roar of cannon, the bursting of shells, and the flash of musketry, opposing hosts madly rush against each other in charge and counter-charge, "where men become iron with nerves of steel," and those who at home were esteemed the most quiet and orderly citizens, become, for the time, animated with almost supernatural courage that makes them utterly fearless of death.

In every battle were seen those known as "skulkers." Despite the utmost vigilance of the officers, they would succeed in getting to the rear, and to all who passed they would tell how their regiments had been cut to pieces and that they were the only survivors left to tell the doleful tale. They generally had a sneaking look and were easily recognized by the veteran soldier, who soon came to know them by sight and who paid little attention to their extravagant stories of carnage in front. These were the men who, after the war, were usually found on street-corners loudly boasting of their prodigies of valor.

Besides the ordinary skulkers there were the constitutional cowards. It is as difficult to define the psychological distinction between an ordinary skulker and a constitutional coward as it is to define that between an ordinary thief and a kleptomaniac, for between the skulker and the constitutional coward there were innumerable gradations. But a well-defined type of the latter was easily recognized. He did not boast. His face in time of battle took on a look of abject terror pitiable to behold, betokening an inward unspeakable agony. Men of this type could be found in almost every regiment. No appeal to their sense of duty, their patriotism or pride could overcome the terror inspired by the sound of battle. I have seen men who, the moment the firing commenced, began to tremble like an aspen leaf, with the perspiration dripping from them in great drops. An officer in the Army of the Potomac told me of a man of this type who, when situated so that he could not run away, would mechanically load his gun, shut his eyes, and fire into the air. The poor fellow was killed after all. The wise and humane officer soon acquired the experience enabling him to differentiate the constitutional coward from the ordinary skulker, and he endeavored, if possible, to assign the timid soldier to some duty where he could do better service than he was able to do on the firing line, and where his terror would not demoralize his comrades.

To speak of the "amenities of war" would seem to most persons like using a misnomer, and yet during the

Civil War there were many illustrations of a fraternal feeling between the combatants such as probably never existed between the soldiers of opposing armies in any other war in the history of the world. Those who have heard the eloquent lecture of the Confederate General John B. Gordon, recounting some of his war reminiscences, will remember hearing him relate how the Confederate and Union soldiers fraternized in the eastern armies, and how on one occasion the Confederate soldiers in his command indignantly insisted that the laws of hospitality required the safe return of the Union soldier who had been surprised while making them a friendly visit. Substantially the same fraternal feeling existed between the opposing pickets during the siege of Chattanooga. It was a frequent occurrence for them to meet and exchange papers and have a friendly chat, and I never heard that the laws of hospitality were abused by the soldiers of either side.

There were similar courtesies during the Atlanta campaign. A striking exhibition of them was given at Rocky Face Ridge. The 79th was posted about half way up the ridge, and at one time the pickets had orders to keep up a steady fire all night against the Confederates on the summit. One of the 79th pickets learned in some way that a Kentucky Confederate regiment, in which he had a brother or a brother-in-law, was near by. He communicated the fact to the nearest Confederate picket who kindly volunteered to find his relative and bring him to the Confederate picket line; this he did, and the 79th man and his Confederate

relative talked together for several hours from behind their respective trees, while each was keeping up a steady fire, according to orders, against the enemy's lines. It is to be presumed, however, that they took care not to aim at each other.

With the exception of the assault at Kenesaw Mountain, the bloodiest engagement of the Atlanta campaign, in proportion to the numbers engaged, was that at Pickett's Mill, May 27, 1864, in which an unsuccessful assault was made on the Confederate fortified lines. In this assault Wood's division of the 4th corps suffered a very heavy loss. The 86th Ind., one of the regiments in Wood's division, participated, and its colonel, George Dick, was severely wounded. It would naturally be supposed that these circumstances were not such as to inspire the most amicable feelings in the combatants, and yet in the *History of the 86th Indiana*^a is recorded this singular incident which occurred the next day between a Confederate picket and one of the 86th Indiana :

"On the next day, the 28th, the boys of the Eighty-sixth and the Confederates formed a 'Board of Trade' on a small scale for the purpose of disposing of surplus coffee on the one hand and tobacco upon the other. An offer to 'dicker' coffee for tobacco always caught the 'Johnnies' and put them in good humor, if there were no officers around. On the other hand tobacco was in brisk demand in the Union ranks. When there was an official about they would signal not to come,

^a Pp. 397-8.

but as soon as he was gone, traffic would be resumed. They seemed to be in excellent humor over their great success in repelling the assault of the previous day. They were quite willing to talk of the campaign, expressing themselves freely in regard to the probable success of it on the Union part, and "lowed they had enough for another killing yet in ranks.'

"At one of these meetings an interesting discussion arose between Wat Baker, of Company H, and a Confederate. Snugly ensconced behind two logs hid from view of the rebel line, the discussion began. Baker was an oddity, over six feet in height, of a nervous disposition, jerky in manner and emphatic in speech. The discussion, as related by Baker afterwards, ranged over the whole subject of contention between the North and the South—slavery pro and con was argued, secession and coercion, and the probable success of the northern armies finally. For nearly two hours these men chatted and argued every phase of the contest which suggested itself to their minds."

CHAPTER FOUR

SEEING REAL WAR; THE MARCH FROM LOUISVILLE TO NASHVILLE

As already stated, six companies of the 79th, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Oyler, left Indianapolis, August 27, 1862, arriving at Louisville and going into camp the same day, followed on September 2 by Colonel Knefler with the four other companies. The regiment remained in the vicinity of Louisville until the first of October, moving from one camp to another but not remaining very long in any of them.

Most of the time was employed in drilling, with a "grand review" once or twice a week, when the men, in woolen uniforms and carrying, in addition to their arms and accoutrements, heavy knapsacks, marched twelve or fifteen miles through the streets of Louisville. The weather was intensely hot, the streets were very dusty, and many, not yet inured to such discipline, were broken down before leaving Louisville. These reviews were especially hard upon the raw recruits of the 79th because, while their comrades in other regiments were armed with Enfield or Springfield rifles, the 79th was armed with Vincennes rifles—guns nearly twice as heavy as the Enfields and having

weighty sword bayonets with metal scabbards. On a very hot day during one of these idiotic parades more than fifty men of the 79th were prostrated by the heat, from the effects of which some never fully recovered.

While at Louisville we learned something of camp life and something of picket duty, but very little of real war. Only the Ohio river separated most of the regiment from their homes in Indiana and nearly every day they were visited by some of their relatives and friends. Nevertheless important military operations were taking place in Kentucky during our stay in Louisville. General Kirby Smith had entered eastern Kentucky and was threatening Cincinnati, and Generals Bragg and Buell were on a race to Louisville. On August 30, 1862, the battle of Richmond, Kentucky, was fought and the Federal troops under General Nelson, chiefly raw recruits, were defeated and routed. Nelson came on to Louisville and began the organization of the new troops. He was killed there by General Jeff. C. Davis for an unprovoked and flagrant insult.

For a time there were rumors that Louisville was about to be attacked. Breastworks were hastily thrown up and the indications were that we might have a battle at once; but Bragg, after halting a few days at Munfordsville, turned aside and went to Bardstown and Buell continued his march to Louisville. I was on picket duty and talked with many of Buell's men as they passed. Buell and Bragg had been marching for several days toward Louisville, and at Munfordsville the two armies were in close proximity, but each

seemed careful to avoid bringing on a battle. I thought at the time, in common with many others in and out of the army, that this was very mysterious strategy, but since then it has been satisfactorily shown that it would not have been good generalship on General Buell's part to risk a battle before reaching Louisville.¹ The last of Buell's army arrived September 29. The next day an order came relieving him and appointing General Thomas as his successor. General Thomas, with that loyalty to his superiors and total absence of selfishness which at all times characterized his conduct, earnestly protested, and so, for the time, Buell was retained, with Thomas as second in command, and on October 1 he marched in pursuit of Bragg.

The new troops already in Louisville, and those that came soon afterward, about 22,000 in all, were incorporated into the army as rapidly as possible, new regiments being brigaded with those that had seen actual service; and the army was divided into first, second, and third corps under the commands respectively of Generals Alexander McD. McCook, Thomas L. Crittenden, and Charles C. Gilbert. The 79th Indiana was assigned to General Samuel Beatty's brigade in Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. The other regiments of the brigade were the 19th Ohio, the 9th and 11th Ky. The 19th Ohio and the 9th Ky., both splen-

¹ See General Cist's explanation in *Army of the Cumberland*, p. 73.

did regiments that had fought at Shiloh, were brigaded with the 79th Ind. throughout the service.

As already stated, Buell's army left Louisville October 1. Contrary to the plans of Bragg, who now intended to avoid giving battle in Kentucky and who, at the time, was absent in Frankfort assisting in the installation of a Confederate "provisional governor," a general engagement was precipitated at Perryville, Kentucky, October 8, 1862. On account of a misunderstanding of existing conditions, the battle on the Federal side was fought chiefly by McCook's corps. It resulted in nothing of importance except great loss of life to the troops engaged. At this battle Beatty's brigade was in reserve, the men had been ordered to divest themselves of their knapsacks and were in momentary expectation of going into action, when it was learned that Bragg had withdrawn and was again in retreat. The next day I went over the battle-field, seeing many of the dead who had not yet been buried and many mangled bodies. One poor man was almost cut in two by a cannon-ball which had gone through his body near his waist. I observed large saplings and limbs that had been cut off by cannon-balls and great furrows which these had ploughed in the ground.

After the battle we marched to Crab Orchard, then to the Wild Cat battle-ground, and from there through Mt. Vernon, Somerset, and Glasgow, reaching Scottsville, Kentucky, November 6. On the 7th we passed over the Tennessee line, and reached Gallatin on the 8th. On the 10th we crossed the Cumberland river, camping

that night at Silver Spring, about eighteen miles from Nashville. We continued in camp there until the 18th, when we marched toward Nashville and remained in that vicinity, changing the location of our camp several times, until we started, December 26th, on the march to Murfreesboro. As we passed the Hermitage on our way to Nashville the men gave three cheers for "Old Hickory." He had said—and nobody doubted that he meant what he said—that "The Union must and shall be preserved." If he, instead of James Buchanan, had been President in the early part of 1861, the "irrepressible conflict" might have been postponed, but it could not have been avoided. The contest between freedom and slavery was inevitable.

On October 24, 1862, while on the march through Kentucky, General William S. Rosecrans had been appointed to the command of the Department of the Cumberland and the troops in his department were now designated as the Fourteenth Army Corps, but the name by which the army was popularly known was that later confirmed by general orders of the War Department, viz.: The Army of the Cumberland. Soon afterward the army was divided into the right wing, center, and left wing, under the commands respectively of Generals McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden.

General Buell was singularly unfortunate. Like McClellan he was unpopular with the people and with the authorities at Washington, but, unlike him, he was also unpopular with a large part of his own army, es-

pecially with the new troops, who were unaccustomed to the rigid restraints of military life and had not yet learned the value of military training. The soldiers who at first chafed under Buell's discipline came in time to realize that it was largely by reason of it that, out of the raw materials he found, he was able to lay the foundation of the splendid Army of the Cumberland. His unpopularity with the people of the North was due to a wide-spread distrust of his loyalty, but the injustice of this is now generally conceded. Like every other prominent Federal general, he had incurred the hostility of Halleck, and the immediate cause of his removal was probably his refusal to acquiesce in a ridiculous scheme of the latter which contemplated Buell's advance into east Tennessee through Cumberland Gap, a plan that would have compelled him to rely upon wagon transportation for a distance of 240 miles, would have exposed him to constant danger of having his communications destroyed and the different detachments of his army defeated in detail, and would likewise have left both Nashville and Louisville open to attack. General Cist, a military critic not unfavorable to Buell, thus sums up his weakness as a military commander :²

"Then, again, Buell's earlier military training in the bureau office he held so many years unfitted him for the handling, on the battle-field, of the large number of troops which composed his command. But very few

² *Army of the Cumberland*, p. 76.

generals during the rebellion were able to successfully handle on the battle-field as large an army as was under Buell. In fact, the general who has sufficient talent as a good organizer and drill master to enter into the details necessary to bring an army out of raw troops, has not the military genius required to handle a large army in fighting and winning great battles."

One of the very qualities, however, that made Thomas a great general was his familiarity with "all the details necessary to bring an army out of raw troops." Moreover, Buell was constantly hampered by Halleck and it is impossible at this day to determine what he might have accomplished if he had been given the men and the opportunities that were afterward so lavishly bestowed upon more favored generals. This much is certain: that it was his prompt movement, of his own accord, that ensured the Federal victory at Shiloh,³ and that many of his suggestions were afterward adopted by the War Department and carried into successful execution.

Of General Rosecrans, the new commander, we had heard but little, but that little was favorable, and he soon won the affections of his army.

³ Van Horne in *Hist. Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 1, pp. 103-105, shows conclusively that Halleck, Grant and Sherman were all surprised by the Confederate attack, and that, but for the timely arrival of the Army of the Ohio under Buell, the battle of Shiloh would have resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the Federal army. To the same effect see Ropes' *Story of the Civil War*, vol. 2, pp. 67-69.

I do not find in my diary a great deal pertaining to our march through Kentucky that would be of general interest. Much of the country through which we passed, after the battle of Perryville, was rough and broken and the inhabitants were poor. In the poorest portions, however, there was the greatest loyalty to the Federal cause. When going through Somerset, the county seat of Pulaski county, I was told that, of about 3,000 voters some 2,300 had enlisted in the Federal armies. We passed the battle-fields of Wild Cat and Mill Spring, but we saw little on our route that was of special interest. During a considerable portion of our march through Kentucky there was continual skirmishing between the rear guard of the Confederate and the advance guard of the Federal army, and the 79th was several times under fire, losing a few men killed and wounded, but there was no battle after that of Perryville. Nevertheless the march was very trying to raw recruits. The roads were rough and, on account of a long drought, water was scarce. Much of that found in the ponds along the roads was unfit to drink and caused a great deal of diarrhea. We had already learned something—we learned a great deal more afterward—about a soldier's life on the march.

While in the vicinity of Nashville we learned more also of camp life than we had learned at Louisville. We were now in the enemy's country, Bragg's army was not far distant, and detachments of Confederate cavalry hovered about Nashville, disputing the way with every forage and supply train, so that a whole brigade

of infantry was sometimes required to guard a forage train. The closest vigilance was demanded of the Federal pickets and there was heavy skirmishing almost every day. In addition to these troubles many of the regiment sickened and died. They had been worn out by the "grand reviews" in Louisville and by the hardships of the march through Kentucky. Several of our camps near Nashville were in unhealthy localities. Many contracted camp fever (a species of typhoid), pneumonia, and chronic diarrhea. Ten men of my company, most of whom had left home apparently strong, robust, and in perfect health, died in the month of December, 1862.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER

While at Nashville the army was again reorganized, pursuant to an order of General Rosecrans issued November 7, 1862—Major-General George H. Thomas commanding the center, Major-General A. McD. McCook the right wing, and Major-General Thomas L. Crittenden the left wing. Beatty's brigade became the 1st brigade of Van Cleve's division, which was the 3d division of Crittenden's corps.

The march from Nashville to Murfreesboro was begun December 26, 1862, Crittenden's corps moving by the Murfreesboro pike and bivouacking that night near Lavergne. Heavy rains and a dense fog retarded the advance on the next day and none was made on the 28th, which was Sunday. By the night of the 29th Crittenden's corps was within two or three miles of Murfreesboro. It was now evident that Bragg, contrary to the expectations of Rosecrans, intended to make a stand north of Murfreesboro, and that a battle was to be fought. On December 30 the time was employed by both armies in getting the troops into the various positions to which they were assigned.

Murfreesboro is a town on the Nashville and Chat-

tanooga railroad, about thirty miles southeast of Nashville. Stone's river, after passing the town, flows in a northwesterly course and separates the main portion of the battle-field from the town, the south end of the battle-field being about two miles west of the town. The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad and the Nashville and Murfreesboro turnpike run in a northwest direction and nearly parallel with the river, crossing it a short distance west of the town and intersecting about 500 yards beyond the river. The intersection, which makes two acute angles, is about one-half mile west of the river. The Wilkinson turnpike runs westerly through the southern portion of the battle-field; about one and one-half miles south of this pike, and nearly parallel with it, is the Franklin road. When the battle was fought a considerable portion of the ground in the vicinity of the Federal right was covered with a dense growth of cedar thickets.

General Bragg, supposing the Federal army to be largely superior to his own in numbers, and expecting to be attacked, had formed his lines originally for defense, but by December 30 he determined that he would himself take the initiative and deliver battle the next day. General Polk commanded the right wing and General Hardee the left wing of the Confederate army, all of it being on the west side of Stone's river except Breckinridge's division which was the extreme right and was on the east side of the river. McCown's division was on the extreme left, with Cleburne's division in rear of it; next was Withers's divi-

ion, with Cheatham's in rear of it, and next, and across the river, was Breckinridge's division.

All the Federal army on the night of December 30 was west of Stone's river, the final formation that night, counting by divisions from right to left, being as follows: Johnson's, Davis's and Sheridan's of the right wing, then Negley's division of the center with Rousseau's in reserve, and then Palmer's and Wood's divisions of the left wing. It was intended to put Van Cleve's division on the extreme left the next morning. The extreme right brigade of the Federal army was Willich's of Johnson's division, extending to the Franklin road; the extreme left was Hascall's brigade of Wood's division, extending to Stone's river; Sheridan's left connected with Negley's right on the Wilkinson pike; Palmer's left and Wood's right connected at the Nashville pike; Hascall's brigade of Wood's division, the extreme left, was next to the river.

The general direction of the Federal line conformed to that of the Confederates, except that there was a considerable distance between the north ends of the two battle-fronts, while the lines of Johnson's division were only a few hundred yards distant from the Confederate lines, and that the Confederate left extended a considerable distance beyond the Federal right. McCook's lines, in conforming to those of the Confederates in his front, were considerably broken.

The plans of both Rosecrans and Bragg were identical in this, that each had arranged to begin battle early on the morning of the 31st by an advance of his left,

wheeling to the right—Rosecrans with the expectation of advancing on Murfreesboro and getting into the rear of Bragg's army, and Bragg with the intention of doubling back the Federal right across the Nashville turnpike and cutting off retreat to Nashville.

General Rosecrans, on the night of the 30th, observing the position of McCook's lines, had suggested a reformation of them, but no change was made. The urgent necessity of a change was disclosed when it was discovered during the afternoon that the Confederate left extended considerably beyond Johnson's division, thus exposing the Federal right to great danger of being flanked. In his report of the battle, McCook states that this information was conveyed to Rosecrans. Nothing was done, however, except to order fires built still farther to the right "to deceive the enemy, making them believe we were massing troops there." It does not appear that the enemy was deceived, certainly not after daylight the next morning. McCook, however, called a conference of his division commanders and the brigades of Willich and Kirk were ordered to the right of his line "to protect the right flank and guard against surprise there." As the dangerous situation of the Federal right was known, it is clear that "some one had blundered."

Early on the morning of December 31st, Van Cleve's division was ordered to cross Stone's river and to begin the attack on Breckinridge, with the expectation of carrying out Rosecrans's original plan, which was for "Crittenden to cross Van Cleve's division at the

lower ford, covered and supported by the pioneer brigade and to advance on Breckinridge; Wood's division to follow by brigades, crossing at the upper ford, and, moving on Van Cleve's right, to carry everything before them into Murfreesboro." We waded Stone's river in water over waist deep, but before Van Cleve's and Wood's divisions had time to "carry everything before them," according to order, or even to fire a gun, ominous tidings came from the right where the "carrying all before them" at this stage of the battle was being done exclusively by the Confederates under General Hardee.

Bragg had himself opened the battle on our right at 6:30 A. M. To the blunder of not reforming McCook's lines were added still greater blunders. Although the dangerous situation of the Federal right was known, General Johnson's headquarters were a mile or more in rear of his division. Willich, discovering the imminent peril confronting him, instead of sending an orderly, had himself gone to the division headquarters to make a report and had ordered his brigade to breakfast. Some of the artillery horses were unhitched from the cannon and had been taken to water. McCook, it is said, was shaving when the attack began.

This was the situation when Cleburne's and McCown's divisions under General Hardee, rapidly advancing a little after daylight, fell upon Johnson's division. It has been asserted that this division was not surprised. If there was no surprise there was some-

thing worse. Willich's and Kirk's brigades were at once enveloped by the overlapping Confederate lines. Willich himself was captured while trying to join his brigade and before he could give a single order, and Kirk was mortally wounded. So sudden and fierce was the Confederate advance that three hundred and fifty of Kirk's brigade and over seven hundred of Willich's were taken prisoners. Both brigades were thrown into utter confusion and were swept from the field with a loss of eleven guns. Colonel Baldwin, commanding the remaining and reserve brigade of Johnson's division, had barely time to form it in line of battle when it was enveloped by the Confederate lines, extending far beyond the right flank, and was also driven back just in time to avoid being surrounded and captured, when it took position on the right of Davis's division.

The exulting troops of Cleburne's and McCown's divisions, now reenforced by those of Withers's, and later by those of Cheatham's, fell in turn upon Davis's and Sheridan's divisions and for several hours these two made a heroic effort to maintain their position, repeatedly repelling the assaults of the Confederate columns. At last, however, Davis was also forced back, and then Sheridan, the latter reforming on the right of Negley. Four Confederate divisions were now massed and hurled against the divisions of Negley and Sheridan, and in making and repelling these assaults occurred the fiercest fighting of the day. After four hours of fighting, and after his troops had exhausted

their ammunition, Sheridan's division was again compelled to fall back.

The Federal army was now in a most desperate situation and it was evident that it could be saved only by establishing a new line of battle. The position selected for this purpose was on the high ground west of and near to the Nashville pike. But it was necessary first to establish a temporary line strong enough to hold the enemy in check until the artillery could be saved and the troops posted on the new line. The temporary line selected was a depression in the open ground in rear of the cedar thickets, and to this line General Thomas now ordered Negley's and Rousseau's divisions to retire.

The formation of a new line of battle in face of the enemy is always a dangerous maneuver. The movement ordered by General Thomas was especially hazardous. Each of the three divisions on the right of Negley had been overlapped and enveloped by the Confederate lines, compelled to change front, and then to fall back, and two of them had been, for a time, almost completely disorganized. Flushed with victory and confident of success, the Confederate hosts were now swarming about Negley's and Rousseau's divisions in front and in rear, so that neither could fall back to the temporary line except by cutting its way through the Confederate lines. The movement ordered by Thomas was a desperate one, but on its successful execution depended the safety of the Federal

army, while its failure involved obvious defeat and probable annihilation of the Army of the Cumberland.

Rousseau's division cut its way through the Confederate lines to the position designated for the temporary line, but, in doing this, it was compelled to fight the enemy in front and in rear at the same time. Negley's division was now left in a very precarious situation, with swarms of Confederates in front and rear and on its right flank, and it, too, was compelled to cut its way through with a loss of six guns. So closely was it pressed on all sides that at one time, two of the brigades, Miller's and Stanley's, were compelled to face to the rear and charge the pursuing enemy, thus holding them in check until the new line was reached. Palmer's division, hotly engaged at the time of Negley's withdrawal, was now still more severely pressed, but by most heroic fighting repulsed the Confederates, preserved its organization, and established itself on the new line.

The offensive movement planned by Rosecrans as the ruling one was now out of the question. His supreme object now was to save his army from annihilation. It was plain that its salvation depended on maintaining the temporary line until the permanent one was securely established. It was equally plain to the Confederates that if they could break the temporary line their success was certain, and victory seemed to be almost within their grasp. Against the temporary line, therefore, the most desperate assaults were made

by the Confederates, which were resisted with equal desperation by those who realized that it must be held at all hazards.

As already stated, Van Cleve's division had crossed the river early in the morning for the purpose of participating in the attack on Breckinridge's division, but had scarcely completed the crossing when the news came of the disaster to the right. Price's brigade was left to guard the ford, Fyffe's was sent to fight off the Confederate cavalry which had attacked our trains, and Beatty's was ordered to hasten to the Federal right. The distance to be traveled was two or three miles but the brigade went on double quick, arriving at the moment Rousseau was being most sorely pressed, and took position on his right, where for a short time it became the extreme right of the Federal army and so continued until Fyffe's and Harker's brigades came up and took position on Beatty's right.

I could see, as we marched to position, that a great disaster had befallen our army. Artillery, ammunition wagons, ambulances, and men, apparently in a confused mass, were hurrying to the rear, while tremendous volleys of musketry were heard in the cedar thickets in front of us. Shells were bursting on every hand, cannon-balls were cutting their way through the thicket and ploughing up the ground, and dead men and horses in great numbers were scattered over the open fields near the pike. All this plainly indicated how sorely our army was being pressed, and the desperate character of the conflict in which we were about to

take part. The captain of my company was absent on sick leave, the second lieutenant had resigned, and I, a mere boy, was the only commissioned officer present. Not a man in the company had ever been in battle, if I except the little affair in which I took part at Carrick's Ford. But not a single man flinched.

There was no time to be lost and Beatty's brigade was at once thrown into a cedar thicket on the right of Rousseau's division, the 19th Ohio and the 9th Ky. forming the front line and the 79th Ind. and the 11th Ky. the rear line. As already stated, the two regiments in front had fought at Shiloh. There were no better in the service, and the bravery and coolness with which they held their ground furnished an inspiring example to the men of the 79th.

While in this position General Rosecrans rode up, remaining on horseback while he gave some directions to Colonel Knefler, inspiring us with confidence by the coolness with which he sat on his horse while the bullets were flying all about him. I was not ten feet distant and watched the commanding general with eager interest. After a few minutes he rode away to another part of the field and not long after a cannonball took off the head of Garesche, his chief of staff, who was by his side.

Presently the men in the front line, who had begun firing as soon as they took their position, exhausted their ammunition; and then the 79th Ind. and the 11th Ky. passed through their ranks, while the men of the front line took our former position in the rear. Nearly

all day the battle raged in that cedar thicket. The awful roar of cannon and musketry almost paralyzed with fright the wild denizens of the forest. The birds twittered and flitted about in dumb terror and the rabbits ran aimlessly hither and thither. In his *Memoirs* General Sheridan makes note of a frightened rabbit that skipped from back to back of his men as they lay on the ground, running in this way over the backs of a whole regiment. I did not see anything that day however that excited my pity more than a poor old horse between the lines, shot through and through and unable to move, though still able to stand, and exposed to every volley. Sometimes we would advance a few hundred yards and then would be driven back; again we would advance and again be driven back, but at the close of the day we held substantially the same position that we had taken in the morning, and that night we lay on our arms near the place where we had first gone into battle.

During the afternoon the permanent line of battle had been firmly established on the high ground near the railroad, extending from the railroad on the right to Stone's river on the left, formed by divisions from right to left in the order following: Davis's, Sheridan's, Van Cleve's, Rousseau's, and Palmer's, with Wood's division in reserve on the right and Negley's on the left. Against this new line charge after charge was made, the most bloody fighting in the afternoon being for the possession of Round Forest, the key to the left. But Palmer continued to hold it against every

assault. The last assault on the right and center of the new Federal line was repulsed chiefly by Van Cleve's division and Harker's brigade of Wood's division and by Stanley's cavalry.

The night was very cold, we had twice waded Stone's river in water waist deep; our clothes were still wet, and we had no fires. During the night I became so nearly frozen that I was forced to get up and walk about. At almost every step I stumbled against a dead man. It caused a strange sensation, but did not prevent me from lying down again in the midst of the dead and sleeping soundly for a few hours.

The result of the first day's fighting was not encouraging to the Federal soldiers. Twenty-eight pieces of artillery had been captured by the Confederates; General Sill had been killed, General Kirk had been mortally wounded, and General Willich was a prisoner. Many other officers had been killed or wounded. Sheridan had lost seventy-two officers, and the brigade of regulars, twenty-two. Seven thousand men had been lost from the ranks. The Federal line on the right had been driven back fully a mile from the position it occupied when the battle began. The supply trains sent back to Nashville had been attacked at Lavergne and part of them burned. The Confederate cavalry had gone entirely around the Federal army during the day, attacking trains, and the roads between Murfreesboro and Nashville were filled with frightened teamsters, skulkers, and stragglers. The Army of the Cumberland had been saved from destruc-

tion chiefly by the wonderful generalship of General Thomas.

That night a council of war was held in a little dimly-lighted log cabin. It was a weird New Year's eve party. The question of retreat to Nashville was discussed and urged by some. When it was submitted to General Thomas his laconic reply was "This army can't retreat," and it did not. Rosecrans, having ascertained that there was enough ammunition for another day, determined, contrary to the expectations of Bragg, to remain on the field and continue the battle.

Bragg felt confident on the night of the 31st that Rosecrans would not risk another battle, but would retreat to Nashville, and little was done by the former on January 1st beyond a few demonstrations made to ascertain whether Rosecrans was preparing to retreat and some attacks upon the Federal trains. The commanders of both armies occupied the day chiefly in reforming their lines, both preparing to resume the offensive the following day if the other did not.

By this time the Federal lines had been entirely reformed and preparations were made on January 2d to repel an anticipated Confederate attack on the Federal left. During the afternoon Van Cleve's division, now under command of General Samuel Beatty, Van Cleve having been wounded, had again been ordered to the left, and again had waded Stone's river and taken position in an open field between the river and the woods where lay Breckinridge's division, the right of the Confederate army. Price's brigade was on the

right next to the river; Fyffe's on the left, and Beatty's, now commanded by Colonel Grider, in reserve. Next on the left of Van Cleve's division was Grose's brigade of Palmer's division. These were the only Federal troops on the east side of the river. Negley's division was posted in reserve, in rear of them, on the west side of the river.

About 4 P. M., after an ominous stillness of an hour or more, Breckinridge's division suddenly emerged from the woods on the other side of the field, advancing in five or six columns. Halting a moment, the lines were formed as if for dress parade. On the right could be seen some general officer on a white horse and we could distinctly hear the command, "Forward, double-quick, guide center, march!" With the exception of the charge at Missionary Ridge it was the most magnificent spectacle that I saw during my entire service. Onward came the advancing columns, cheering as they came. When within two or three hundred yards of Van Cleve's division, the men of that division, who had been lying flat on the ground just behind the crest of a little knoll, rose and fired a tremendous volley. It did not seem to make the slightest impression. Instantly the fire was returned, and almost at the same moment the front line of Breckinridge's division fell back behind the second, disclosing four pieces of artillery, dragged by hand and hitherto concealed between the two front lines. The artillery at once opened fire, and Van Cleve's division was forced back across the river. A little while before, by order of

General Rosecrans, in anticipation of this attack, fifty-eight cannon had been massed near the river on a small hill which commanded the entire open field. As soon as Van Cleve's division was out of range, these fifty-eight cannon, loaded with grape and canister, opened their dreadful fire. The cannonading was the most terrific that I heard during the war and the destruction was dreadful, as shown by the official reports of the losses of the regiments in Breckinridge's division.

Three times the Confederates recoiled under the terrible fire, but rallied and again advanced. Some reached the brink of the river and a few crossed it, falling almost in front of the Federal artillery. No braver charge was made during the war. I do not except even the celebrated charge of Pickett's division at Gettysburg. But no troops could long stand such a death-dealing fire as that to which Breckinridge's division was now exposed.

By this time Miller's brigade of Negley's division and a part of Stanley's of the same division, under command of Colonel John F. Miller, crossed the river and poured volley after volley into the retreating Confederates, pursuing them and capturing four pieces of the New Orleans Washington Light Artillery. Other Federal troops rapidly followed and the Confederates abandoned the field, leaving it covered with dead and wounded. That was virtually the end of the battle. There was a little skirmishing the next day, but on the night of January 3 Bragg retreated. The dead were

buried on the 4th and on the 5th the Federal army occupied Murfreesboro.

The battle of Stone's River is one of the most striking illustrations given during the war of snatching victory out of defeat. The surprise at Shiloh well-nigh caused the annihilation of the Federal army on the first day of the battle, but the reenforcements brought by Buell turned the scale the next day. At Stone's River, however, the victory on the last day was won without reenforcements and after the army had lost twenty-eight pieces of artillery. But the most remarkable feature of the battle was one that had no parallel in any other of the Civil War: the successful formation of a new line in the face of the enemy, after half the army had been driven from position and when, in order to form it, the troops had to fight their way through the lines of the enemy enveloping them in front and rear. The losses were enormous, considering that nearly all of them occurred in one day and in about one hour of another.¹

¹ General Cist, *Army of the Cumberland*, p. 127, states the total numbers engaged as follows:

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Federal	37,977	2,223	3,200	43,400
Confederate	39,304	1,662	5,638	46,604

Cist also states the losses as follows:

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Federal	1,553	7,245	2,800	11,598
Confederate.....	(K. and W.)	9,000	1,125	10,125

The figures above vary slightly from those given by Colonel Fox and Colonel Livermore—the latter stating the numbers engaged as follows:

Federal	41,400
Confederate	34,732

and the losses as follows:

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Federal	1,667	7,543	2,626	11,846
Confederate	1,294	7,945	2,500	11,739

It is entirely safe to say that each army lost out of the total engaged at least 25 per cent. in killed, wounded and missing, and at least 20 per cent. in killed and wounded. Shepherd's regular brigade of Rousseau's division, of 1,566 engaged, lost, chiefly on Dec. 31 in killed and wounded, 26 officers and 611 enlisted men, or a total of 637, making its percentage of loss nearly 40 per cent. Donelson's (Confederate) brigade of Cheatham's division lost, chiefly on Dec. 31, of 1,529 engaged, 108 killed, 575 wounded and 17 missing, a total of 700, or more than 45 per cent. In the attack at Round Forest one regiment of this brigade, the 16th Tenn., lost 207 of 402 engaged, and another, the 8th Tenn., lost 306 of 424 engaged.

In Breckinridge's report of the Friday engagement he states that it occupied only an hour and twenty minutes, and that he lost about 1,700 men of 4,500 taken into action. There was a bitter controversy between him and Bragg, in which the latter maintained that Breckinridge had as many as 6,000 in action and that he lost only 1,338. The loss was very heavy even if based on Bragg's statement; it was frightful if based on that of Breckinridge.

The 79th went into action Dec. 31 with 341, rank and file, and in the two days, Dec. 31 and Jan. 2, it lost 11 killed, 74 wounded and 36 missing. Few of the missing were captured in the battle. Some of those reported as missing were afterward found to have been killed or wounded, and a considerable number, including two of my company, were sick men captured by the Confederate cavalry in ambulances or in the field hospitals near Lavergne.

CHAPTER SIX

SIX MONTHS IN CAMP AT MURFREESBORO

Probably the darkest period in the North during the Civil War was the first half of the year 1863. In every quarter the Union cause appeared to be dragging. Nowhere were there visible any preparations for an advance of the Federal armies.

Harper's Weekly of January 17, 1863, contained an editorial entitled, "Have We a General Among Us?" beginning with this sentence: "They say at Washington that we have some thirty-eight to forty major-generals and nearly three hundred brigadiers, and now the question is have we one man who can fairly be called a first-class general in the proper meaning of the term?" The article discusses the merits and prospects of various generals. Prophesying is always a risky business, but prophecy concerning the coming general in a great war is particularly hazardous. Sheridan and Thomas are not mentioned in the list as even among the possibilities. Concerning Sherman it was briefly said: "General W. T. Sherman is making his record at Vicksburg; hitherto he has been known as a capable officer and a far-seeing man." Of Grant the editor spoke somewhat doubtingly, as follows:

"Ulysses Grant has given evidence of enterprise,

determination and personal gallantry which have stood him in good stead. He was very fortunate at Fort Donelson. Whether his record at Shiloh—where he would have been destroyed but for accidents beyond his control—will bear the test of inquiry, is a question yet undetermined.”

The writer of the editorial concluded that “At the present moment, however, the most promising of our soldiers is William S. Rosecrans.” All this goes to confirm Livy’s statement concerning the uncertainty of war, “*Nusquam minus, quam in bello, eventus respondent.*”¹

From the beginning of the war continued disaster had attended the Union armies in the East. General McClellan had been superseded, November 7, 1862, in the command of the Army of the Potomac, by General Burnside, who on December 13, 1862, had led the Army of the Potomac into a trap at Fredericksburg from which it barely escaped annihilation by reason of the unaccountable forbearance of General Lee. Soon after that Burnside was superseded by Hooker, who, in May following, succeeded in getting the army across the Rappahannock again; but, at a moment when he supposed the Confederate army to be in full retreat, it suddenly emerged from the dense forests, fell upon the right of the Federal army and threw it into a stampede, from which it was rescued only by the most heroic fighting of the remainder, and again that

¹ Events less correspond to men’s expectations in war than in any other case whatever.

great army was withdrawn with immense loss to the north side of the Rappahannock.

Early in June the victorious Lee had begun to move for the invasion of Pennsylvania and a great battle was imminent, involving the fate of Washington and fraught with the greatest danger to the Union cause. At this critical time, most inopportune for changing commanders, Hooker was superseded by Meade.²

Since the battle of Stone's River the Army of the Cumberland had been inactive at Murfreesboro. General Banks with a small army was besieging Port Hudson but the garrison on July 1, after having successfully repelled two assaults, was still defiantly refusing to surrender and Banks was in imminent danger of an attack by the Confederate General Richard Taylor. Grant had Pemberton penned up in Vicksburg, but the first of July found the Confederate army still in its works and no one in the North knew how long it would continue to hold out.

Halleck was still posing as general-in-chief, concocting vast strategic movements and disapproving the plans of all the Union generals. Grant, indeed, had outwitted him, defeated the Confederate forces confronting him and invested Vicksburg, but he had accomplished this only by cutting loose from his former base and getting entirely out of reach of Halleck's letters and dispatches. It was characteristic of Hal-

² Soon afterward, by Halleck's order, Hooker was further humiliated by being placed under arrest for visiting Washington without leave.

leck to keep all the generals in the field in hot water, but after Rosecrans took command of the Army of the Cumberland an incident occurred that made him the special object of Halleck's displeasure. One of the latter's novel military conceptions was the offer of a major-general's commission in the regular army to the general who should first achieve an important military success. When the offer was submitted to Grant he made no answer, discreetly refraining from expressing any opinion. Rosecrans, however, whether correctly or not, interpreted the offer as grossly improper and wrote Halleck a long letter, indignantly denouncing "such an auctioneering of honors" as insulting and degrading. This letter undoubtedly sealed the fate of the writer, for he had already incurred the bitter hostility of Stanton and now had apparently gone out of his way, not merely to confirm the prior dislike of the general-in-chief, but to court his lasting resentment. Grant, however, after the surrender of Vicksburg, rose too rapidly in public esteem to be suppressed by either Stanton or Halleck.

During this period the soldiers themselves became restless and discontented, not because their loyalty was waning, but because so little progress had been made after nearly two years of war. The disastrous defeats of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville cast a gloom over the spirits of the soldiers of the West as well as those of the East. Moreover, there was much dissatisfaction in the army with the slow progress of the war and with the policy

of the Federal administration. Many of the officers and men in the Army of the Cumberland were Democrats when they enlisted. A considerable number in my company were Democrats. I was a Republican, but not an Abolitionist, when I entered the service. There was at first considerable hostility, even in the army, to the emancipation proclamation. Most of the men in the Army of the Cumberland were from Ohio, Indiana and Illinois and at this time affairs in these states were by no means encouraging to the soldiers at the front. Moreover, thousands of letters were received daily from disloyal writers at home, written for the express purpose of creating dissatisfaction among the soldiers and of encouraging desertions. The consequence was that during the early part of 1863 there were many desertions from all the Federal armies.³

³ The morning report of the Army of the Potomac for Jan. 31, 1863, showed:

Aggregate present and absent..... 326,750

Aggregate present..... 239,420

Aggregate absent..... 87,330

Reb. Rec., ser. No. 40, p. 15. Among Hooker's first orders on assuming command was one forbidding the sending of citizens' clothing through the mails, by which means many had previously been enabled to desert. There were also many desertions during this period from the Army of the Cumberland. A return of that army in December, 1862, showed 76,725 present and 46,677 absent. From the official returns in January, 1863, it was estimated that the absentees from all the Federal armies numbered 8,987 officers and 280,073 non-commissioned officers and privates. This extraordinary number included thousands absent without leave, and of these undoubtedly a great many were actual deserters.

In the North all classes were chafing under the enormous expenses of the war, the great increase in taxes, both national and state, and the enforcement of the draft. Those who had from the beginning opposed the war grew more and more outspoken and defiant. The emancipation proclamation, foreshadowed in September, 1862, but not issued until January 1, 1863, intensified the bitterness of those who denounced the war as an abolition crusade, and the enforcement of the draft drove them to frenzy. Even Republicans were not united. A radical element, which was constantly gaining strength, was becoming more and more impatient with what it denounced as the halting and vacillating policy of President Lincoln.

The grave question uppermost in men's minds was whether the Union could be saved at all; but, slowly evolving out of the doubts and perplexities of the situation, and beginning to assume definite shape, was another, destined to overshadow all other questions, whether it were best to try to save the Union with slavery or to try to save it without. The Radicals declared that it must be saved without slavery, but Lincoln hesitated and seemed to be groping his way. In a letter to Horace Greeley August 22, 1862, he said:*

"My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery.

"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it—if I could save it by freeing all

* Greeley: *American Conflict*, vol. 2, p. 250.

the slaves, I would do it—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that.

“What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save this Union.”

By September 22, 1862, he had made up his mind to cross the Rubicon, and on that day he issued a proclamation announcing his intention of declaring the freedom of all slaves in every portion of the United States in rebellion January 1, 1863. The great mass of voters in the North, however, were not yet abreast of this advanced idea. The fall elections in 1862 went heavily against the administration, and large opposition majorities were piled up in the great states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. Even Illinois, the President's own state, gave an enormous majority against him, while in almost all the other northern states the Republican majorities were cut down.

In New York Horatio Seymour was elected governor—a pronounced opponent of every measure of the administration essential to a vigorous prosecution of the war. His influence was seen some months later when the opponents of the draft, taking advantage of the absence from the state of the troops that had gone to repel Lee's invasion of the North, raised a howling mob which roamed through the city of New

York for three days, burning colored orphan asylums and recruiting offices, hanging negroes, dragging through the gutters the mangled corpses of murdered Union soldiers, and winding up its carnival of lawlessness by assembling to listen to an address of the governor. In his speech, while counseling moderation, he addressed the members of the mob as his "friends," assuring them that he was their friend. It is needless to add that these utterances of the distinguished speaker were received by his bloodthirsty hearers with uproarious applause.

No governor was elected in Indiana, but a legislature was chosen which, in every possible way, manifested its hostility to the further prosecution of the war.

Throughout the North there were secret political organizations, under various names, inimical to the Federal administration. Some of them had existed prior to 1863, the members afterward adopting successively the names of Knights of the Golden Circle, American Knights, and Sons of Liberty. In the rural regions many of them dyed their homespun clothes in the juice of the butternut, and hence became generally known as "Butternuts," a name which came to be well understood as indicative of hostility to the prosecution of the war. These treasonable organizations were most numerous and active in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri, but nowhere were they more lawless and rampant than in Indiana.⁵ All were

⁵ Their names, objects, and purposes are elaborately set forth in the report of Judge Advocate General Holt, submitted to the

designed to aid the cause of the Rebellion. In all the states named, lodges were organized with elaborate rituals, signs, grips, and pass-words. Early in the year 1863 the members began to arm and to practise in military drills. There is now no means of ascertaining their exact numerical strength, but it has been estimated that by March 1, 1864, they had 340,000 men capable of being mobilized into an effective military force.

The general purpose of these organizations was to aid the Rebellion by every practicable means and to embarrass the Federal government by the circulation of treasonable publications, by furnishing such intelligence as might be serviceable to the Confederates, by supplying them with arms and ammunition, by destroying the property of the government and of loyal citizens, by co-operating with the Confederates in raids and invasions, but more especially by encouraging desertions from the Federal armies, protecting deserters from arrest, discouraging enlistments, and resisting the draft.

Secret emissaries were sent to the armies at the front, and thousands of letters were written to incite discontent among the soldiers and to induce them to desert. When a deserter was arrested after his arrival at home, he was released on writ of *habeas corpus* if a disloyal judge could be found to issue the writ. In

Secretary of War Oct. 8, 1864. No soldier who reads the report even at this late day can repress his indignation. See also Benn Pitman's *Indiana Treason Cases*.

some localities in Indiana the Federal officers making arrests were openly attacked and fired on, and a number of enrolling officers were shot. In Blackford county the court-house was attacked and all the records pertaining to the draft were destroyed. Nowhere were the "Knights" more defiant than in the counties of Johnson and Brown, from which my company was chiefly recruited. Eight hundred of them rode through the streets of Franklin one night, shouting hurrahs for Jeff Davis, and at one time 1,500 armed men camped near Edinburg for the avowed purpose of seizing some men who were in the custody of military officers.

The Indiana legislature which met on the 8th day of January, 1863, was wholly controlled by these opponents of the Federal government. It refused to receive Governor Morton's message and one branch passed a resolution thanking Governor Seymour of New York for the "exalted and patriotic sentiments" contained in his message to the New York legislature, in which the chief measures of the Federal administration in the prosecution of the war were denounced as unconstitutional, tyrannical and despotic, but which was prolific of suggestions between the lines far more inimical to the Union cause than those openly expressed.* It was only because the Republican mem-

* A resolution was first introduced in the Indiana House of Representatives, Jan. 13, 1863, by Bayless W. Hanna, as follows:

"Resolved, That this House adopt the exalted and patriotic

bers left in a body, thus breaking a quorum, that the legislature was prevented from passing a bill designed

sentiments contained in the message lately delivered to the Legislature of New York by his Excellency, Horatio Seymour."

No action was taken on this resolution, but on Jan. 15 Marcus A. O. Packard introduced another, passed the same day by a vote of 52 to 35, as follows:

"*Resolved*, by the House, the Senate concurring, That the thanks of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana are due and are hereby tendered to the Hon. Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York, for the able and patriotic defense of the Constitution, the laws, and liberties of the American citizen, contained in his late message to the Legislature of that State, and particularly for his just and high appreciation of the interests, position, and patriotism of the great Northwest; and that we assure him that the conservative people of our own beloved State are looking with deep solicitude and confidence to his executive action, believing that they will find in it a firm and determined resistance to the encroachments of a despotic administration upon the liberties of the American people, as well as a bold defense of the independent sovereignty of the several States of this Union, and that such action will receive the warm sympathies and hearty co-operation of all the conservative citizens of this State.

"*Resolved*, That the Speaker of the House be directed to forward copies of these concurrent resolutions to his Excellency, Governor Seymour, and the Legislature of that State."

When the resolution reached the Senate it was referred to the Committee on Federal Relations, but it seems that no further action upon it was taken. See *House Journal* for 1863, pp. 68, 92-3; *Senate Journal* for 1863, pp. 112-113; *Brevier Legislative Reports*, vol. 6, p. 49. The message of Governor Seymour, containing the "exalted and patriotic sentiments" so highly extolled, was delivered to the New York Legislature Jan. 7, 1863, and is found in *Assembly Documents* for 1863, No. 2. It censured the Federal administration for authorizing martial law, suppression of newspapers, and arbitrary arrests, denounced the emancipation proclamation as "impolitic, unjust and unconstitutional," and

to strip Governor Morton of all military power and to transfer it to a board of state officers, three of whom were members of the Sons of Liberty, a measure that, if passed, would probably have precipitated civil war at once in Indiana.

The Indiana soldiers were watchful spectators of all these proceedings and deluged the legislature with their protests. Those from the Army of the Cumberland were numerous and emphatic.⁷ The soldiers re-

charged that the Federal War Department had set aside the authority of the judiciary and overridden the laws of the state, had treated its laws, courts and officers "with marked and public contempt," and had "insulted its people and invaded its rights." It contained an elaborate argument in support of "State Rights," and affirmed that "the North can not hold the southern states in subjection without destroying the principles of our government." It also urged "immediate attention to the inequality and injustice of the laws under which it is proposed to draft soldiers for the service of the general government" and condemned the exemptions allowed to the "favored classes" while "the only son of the widow, or the sole support of a family, may be forced into a distant and dangerous service." It also elaborated at great length the intimate natural relations between "the great central and western states," showing that "the people of the West must have the markets of the southwestern states to bring back their prosperity" and that "they must be reunited, politically, socially and commercially to the valley of the lower Mississippi." The message was undoubtedly the chief incentive to the bloody draft riots, which a few months later disgraced the city of New York, and probably furnished the chief arguments used at a later period in the western states by those who advocated the project of a northwestern confederacy.

⁷ They were printed in pamphlet form, entitled "Proceedings of the Officers and Soldiers of the Indiana Regiments in the Army of the Cumberland on the Memorial and Resolutions to the In-

spected the brave foemen who stood in their front, but they never quite forgave their enemies in the rear who were trying to stab them in the back.

As if to cap the climax of misfortune to the Union cause in Indiana and Ohio, the Confederate General John Morgan planned a raid into these states in the latter part of June. Gathering a mounted force of about 2,400 men, he crossed the Cumberland July 2, and the Ohio July 8, invading Indiana first and then Ohio. The raid, as originally planned and as approved by General Bragg, was intended as a diversion to arrest or embarrass the threatened advance of Burnside into east Tennessee and of Rosecrans against Bragg, and was to be confined to the state of Kentucky. The blunder of crossing the Ohio was that of Morgan himself.

Had the invasion been made with a great army, able to hold its own, the result might have been vastly different; but it was made with a comparatively insignificant force, constantly in danger of capture. The appearance of a foe on their own soil and threatening their own homes and firesides instantly inspired with new zeal and determination the loyal citizens of the invaded states, strengthened the patriotism of those

diana Legislature, with the votes and signatures of the officers of the 6th, 15th, 17th, 22d, 29th, 34th, 32d, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 42d, 44th, 51st, 57th, 58th, 72d, 73d, 75th, 79th, 82d, 86th, and 101st Regiments." When the memorial was presented to the Senate it was laid upon the table, with an order to print 5,000 copies, *Senate Journal* for 1863, p. 302. Copies were printed, but none were included in any of the bound volumes of the legislative proceedings. Some, however, have been preserved.

who had been wavering, and everywhere solidified the Union sentiment. It did not, however, as Morgan had probably been led to expect from the loud boasts of the Sons of Liberty, arouse any warlike ardor in the Butternuts of Indiana and Ohio, who shrank with horror from the idea of exposing themselves to the bullets of either side. They would not fight and Morgan's raid ended in ignominious failure and in his own capture. The patriotism inspired by the invasion, the ease with which it was repelled, and the inglorious ending of it, all combined to elate those friendly to the Union cause and to chagrin and dishearten those who were unfriendly to it. It did more than any victory that had been won in the field to strengthen the Union cause in Indiana and Ohio. Nevertheless the raid, while it lasted, created wide-spread consternation among the people and the soldiers of the invaded states and throughout the North.

For nearly six months after the battle of Stone's River, the Army of the Cumberland remained in camp, Van Cleve's division being stationed near Murfreesboro. During the months of January, February, and March the weather was generally very cold and disagreeable. Afterward there was warmer weather but the rains continued. About every other night the 79th was on picket and on these nights it nearly always rained. This made it hard for the men, especially as no fires were allowed at the picket stations and there was little or no shelter. Probably for the double purpose of guarding against surprise and to discipline the

troops, they were required every morning to stand at arms for an hour before daylight and this was not a pleasant duty when they stood in the rain and mud. During the first three months of our stay at Murfreesboro there was a great deal of sickness; thousands died of disease and the hospitals were full. At one time during this period the 79th, which left Louisville October 1, 1862, with 920 men, had only 175 present for duty. So frequent were desertions during this period that it became necessary to resort to the extreme penalty of military law. I witnessed the execution of a deserter while at Murfreesboro, and it left an impression which is as vivid now as if made only yesterday. The man was a member of a Kentucky regiment; he had been tried by court-martial and condemned to death. On the day fixed for the execution the whole division was ordered out and was so formed as to make three sides of a square. In the open side of the square a grave had been dug. At the time set the funeral procession entered the square, preceded by a band playing a dead march; following the band came the coffin, and behind it marched the condemned man in his shirt sleeves with his hands tied behind him and a guard on each side; then came the detail of twelve men selected to shoot him. Half the guns were loaded with ball and half with blank cartridges, but none of the detail knew how his own was loaded. As the procession passed the grave the coffin was deposited over it and the deserter was seated on the lid. The twelve men who were to do the shooting were then drawn up

about thirty feet in front of him; at the word of command they fired, and the man, shot through with several bullets, instantly fell over dead on the coffin. It was the most dreadful sight I ever saw, far more dreadful than anything I ever witnessed in battle.

By the first of April the weather had become warm but the rains continued, the rainy season being extraordinary even in that region, making the roads almost impassable and rendering a forward movement impracticable. With warmer weather sickness decreased and the men improved both in health and in spirits. Work on the fortifications was pushed with unremitting zeal, great forts were constructed, mounted with heavy siege guns, and immense supplies of ammunition and provisions were collected. We felt confident of our ability to hold our works if Bragg should attempt to attack us. Bragg probably never had such an idea. Indeed it was much easier to go around Murfreesboro, as Hood did when he marched to Nashville.

Our life while in camp at Murfreesboro became monotonous and irksome. There were drills, inspections, picket duty and working on fortifications. Occasionally we escorted a supply-train or were detailed to go on a foraging expedition and now and then we were stirred by rumors of intended attacks by the enemy which never resulted in anything more than slight skirmishes between our pickets and the Confederate cavalry. When not on actual duty we whiled away the time as best we could in reading, writing letters and in such amusements as camp life permitted. Long be-

fore we left Murfreesboro we learned enough of the war to understand that the Rebellion would never be suppressed by armies inside of fortifications and that we must meet the Confederate armies in the field.

While there I was for a time appointed to the command of Co. E of the 79th whose officers were all wounded or sick, and was offered the captaincy of it but declined, preferring to remain with the men of my own company, many of whom I had induced to enlist.

I can not describe the incidents of our stay at Murfreesboro better than by giving some extracts from my army diary. These are given just as they were written forty years ago, and, I believe, convey a fair idea of our life in camp in the enemy's country, and of our daily thoughts at that time. It is hardly necessary to add that my opinions of men and events, as expressed or implied in what I wrote then, underwent many changes even before the close of the war.

JANUARY, 1863.

10.—Wrote to mother to-day. Also one to *Jeff*. [*The Franklin Jeffersonian*.] Received a letter from home. Felt quite unwell this night. Weather pleasant and men occupied in writing or in boiling their clothes. Found myself reenforced by a number of "gray backs." For the first time in two weeks had an opportunity of changing clothes.

12.—Visited Louisville Legion and 6th Ind. Friends all safe and well. They confirm the reports

of the complete surprise of Johnson's division. There seems to be a general feeling of discontent among officers and men. They are discouraged at the slowness of the war.

14.—Detailed officer of guard. Guard taken off in consequence of a very heavy rain at 3 P. M. It rained harder than I have witnessed it since I have been in Tennessee. A dismal sleet followed in the morning. Lieut.-Colonel Oyler and Walter Hunter arrived to-day. Also several ladies from Indianapolis as volunteer nurses.

15.—Very cold to-day; so cold that it is almost impossible to keep warm. Ladies must think soldiering a horrid business, taking this weather for a specimen.

16.—Went out on picket. My Co. [E] being stationed at the house formerly occupied by a — Spence, now in the rebel army, I had an opportunity of seeing what havoc war makes upon wealth and refinement. I saw before me a house once elegantly, even luxuriously, furnished, now stripped of books, pictures, furniture, and nothing left but bare walls. Got myself a volume of Cicero's orations.

21.—Ordinary routine of camp resumed. Policing and company drill as in former times. Haven't enough men for battalion and the men don't take any interest in company drill, so we usually stack arms, sit down and amuse ourselves in any way except drill. Pleasant but muddy.

25.—Relieved at 2 P. M. Weather damp and disagreeable. There is, I find, a general anxiety among

the men to go home. They can not fail to see that we are wanting in a vigorous policy and vigorous generals to carry it out. Desertions are frequent and affairs in Indiana are anything but encouraging.

26.—Strolled around camp busily employed in doing nothing. The sad diminution of our regiment does not tend to create cheerfulness. We started from Louisville with 920 men. We have now in camp about 250, of whom about 175 only are fit for duty. Where are they?

31.—Relieved at 1 P. M. Weather mild. A blockade of mud stops up all avenues to camp. The rain and mud in the South (I speak of what I have seen) are far more disagreeable than the snow and cold of the North. There is much sickness now in the army. Men are dying off by thousands. Disease kills far more than the sword. Few men who go to the hospital are ever fit for duty. So well known is this fact that there is a great aversion to hospitals, and many refuse to go until their disease gets a firm hold on them. The men, too, many of them, become despondent and give up too easily. I am convinced that much sickness in the army begins with pining for home and continually thinking of home until the patient loses his appetite, and his system becomes so reduced as to invite disease.

FEBRUARY, 1863.

1.—Regt. detailed to work on the fortifications. They are very formidable—consisting of heavy breast-

works with numerous forts, so situated as to sweep with an enfilading fire almost every assailable point. Whisky was issued to the men after their day's work was over, and it had the "desired effect."

4.—Picket. The night was particularly severe. The rain began in the afternoon and during the night turned into a driving sleet. An attack seems to be apprehended, as a new order forbids *any* fires at night and demands of the pickets the utmost vigilance generally. It is reported that we received twenty-four pieces from Nashville.

6.—To-day our brigade started at 6 A. M. on a forage expedition and returned at 3 P. M., having secured our forage without molestation. Marched altogether some twelve miles. Day clear and pleasant. Boys brought in a number of *white deer*. [Sheep.]

7.—Remained in camp. Orders to make preparations to go to Nashville as an escort for provision train with two days' rations and forty rounds of cartridges. Ours the only regiment detailed.

8.—Started at 6 A. M. Train consisted of about seventy wagons. The effective force of the escort about 175 men, the men riding in the wagons. Roads pretty good to Lavergne, but desperate after that. Saw remains of the train burned there a few weeks ago and was thankful it wasn't ours. The road is strongly guarded. Reached N. at 4 P. M.

9.—Spent the day in looking around. Visited the convalescent camps, hospitals, state capitol, boat-landing, and other places of interest. About thirty boats

are at the landing, among them the Jacob Strader, on which I went aboard. Regiment quartered at court-house and got full of "gray backs."

11.—Started at daylight and moved about two miles when we halted and waited for the pontoons which didn't come up; so we camped for the night and I got a nice rest. I haven't heard of the pontoons since, and I reckon they are there yet waiting for the mud to dry. Jo. Applegate accompanied us in search of McKane.

12.—Got under way at daylight and made camp at 3 P. M. The men were very tired as the road was very muddy and slippery. The trip cost me some two dollars in sole leather. A good supper, however, put all right. Found Lieut. Robinson in camp.

14.—Picket. Nothing occurred of interest except a slight skirmish between one of our forage trains on the Lebanon pike and a squad of rebel cavalry. It didn't amount to anything, however. It rained to-night as usual.

15.—Relieved at 10 A. M. After getting into camp, whisky rations were issued, which of course were very acceptable. By the way, teetotalers are scarce in the army, especially in wet weather. An alarm was raised at 9 P. M. or near and the regiment called out under arms, after which the men went to bed.

18.—Picket. Line has been advanced a mile and a half from camp. The orders are that there shall be neither fires nor sleep on out-post. Picket is now re-

duced to a high state of efficiency. Cleared off to-night.

21.—Picket. Rained furiously and the water caused me to speedily evacuate my first shanty. Rain ceased after dark. Sometime after dark Colclaser [quartermaster] brought out whisky rations. If ever whisky was acceptable, it was to us drowned rats. Nothing unusual during night. Letter from H. C. B.

23.—Did not do anything to-day. Weather promises rain. Wrote to-day to mother and to W—. No news to-day relative to our future movements. Get mails and papers now quite regularly. The late Federal conscription act pleases me very much. Prospects now look brighter.

MARCH, 1863.

1.—By a new order men are required to stand to arms about an hour before daylight until further orders. "Everything quiet on *Stone's river*."

5.—To-day we were paid up to the 31st of October, 1862. Are in hopes to be paid up to the 1st of February, 1863, in a few days. Payment occasioned great rejoicing among the men.

6.—Picket. I had command of stations 3 and 4. Rained incessantly all night. I got drenched from head to foot. Felt unwell and did not eat a bite while on picket.

22.—Very unpleasant weather. Don't get any letters except from mother. We drill now four hours per

day. The duties of the men have been somewhat lighter for a few days. They are on [picket] once in four or five days. Get mails and papers regularly.

25.—Officer of guard to-day; noticed elm trees in leaf for the first time this season. Although the season is so far advanced I don't see any signs of cultivation. This whole country will probably remain a waste till the end of the war. We are now continually excited by rumors of our intended attack by the enemy.

26.—Didn't do anything to-day out of ordinary camp routine. We drill four hours per day and have three roll calls. Rumors of an attack are still plenty. For several days we have been throwing up rifle-pits near the picket line. We hear of skirmishes along the line daily. The men are in good spirits and confident of the issue.

28.—Nothing of importance except that our brigade got dog-tents.

29.—The great topic to-day is the dog-tents. Each tent is designed for three men and consists of three pieces of cotton, each about six feet square which are joined by means of buttons and holes. There are no poles or pins. They must be made. There are ropes, however, to stretch with.

31.—Relieved [from picket duty] at 10 A. M. Nothing of importance to-day. Last night very rainy, turning off cold. The rumors continue of the near presence of the enemy. The indications now are that we shall remain here until the reduction of Vicksburg

or repulse of the rebels in [illegible] will allow Grant or Burnside or both to co-operate with Rosecrans. The great amount of provisions accumulating here, the elaborate fortifications, mounting on them of heavy siege guns, the activity in operations of other departments, go to prove that we shall not move soon. Meanwhile the army is daily and wonderfully improving its discipline and acquiring an abiding faith in Rosecrans. The men do not seem much affected by political excitement at home. It is true that the majority would willingly see slavery go by the board if it stood in the way of peace. But at the same time many, if not a majority would be perfectly willing for the slaves to remain in slavery if that would end the war. The fact is— [remainder of sentence illegible.]

APRIL, 1863.

1.—I believe an effort is making to abolitionize the army. The chaplain has in the past week distributed a great number of abolition pamphlets published by the American Reform [Society.]

5.—Nothing out of way in camp. Rumors of attack have subsided. Everything now indicates that we shall stay here for several weeks, if not months. The impression seems to be gaining ground that the rebellion will be subdued by fall or Christmas.

8.—Men in camp seem in better health and spirits than ever before. Their time, when not on duty, is occupied in healthful amusements such as ball, pitching

quoits, tossing cannon-balls, &c. A great change is visible every way in the last six weeks. Got a letter from Ben Williams.

9.—Got up this morning stiff from the violent exercise I took yesterday in playing ball. Adorned our company street to-day with cedars. Gives it a very tasty appearance. Everything very quiet in camp nowadays. Weather warm.

10.—Everything has assumed a kind of monotonous domestic way; that is, there is no more excitement about attacks, advances, moving, etc. Still the men are enjoying themselves better than ever and there is a great deal less sickness. Weather pleasant with indications of an approaching warm spell.

13.—Picket. Had command of post 1, station 1. From 20 to 30 women and children (negroes) have congregated at a house just outside our lines on the pike, who are in a starving condition. They have run away from their masters or their masters have run away from them and they all refused to come in our lines. This is only an example of worse to follow a protracted war.

15.—Very disagreeable, rainy day. Several officers to-day put under temporary arrest. Four officers besides — are now under arrest. Lieut. — for neglect of duty on picket; Lieut. — for drunkenness on guard, etc.; Capt. — and Lieut. — for singing and laughing in a low tone after taps.

16.—About midnight last night camp was aroused and orders issued to march with three days' rations and

100 rounds to the man. Started at about 3 this morning and went to old camp on Stone's river on Lebanon pike. Our brigade and part of another with a battery of eight guns composed the force. We brought nothing along but knapsacks and purp tents. Don't know object in coming.

17.—This is our first experience with our dog-tents. They are very convenient and are growing in favor. This place has improved since we left. The trees are out and the prospect from the hill delightful. The hill has been strengthened by a sort of a fort and rifle-pits, Weather very warm.

18.—The commander of the post here has impressed a number of contrabands to work on fortifications. They take hold quite readily and say they belong to the 1st Tennessee. They have a great desire to be considered soldiers. Nothing remarkable. Days hot and mornings very cold.

19.—Were paid yesterday up to March. I received \$208.65. Have more money than I know what to do with. From some cause the paymasters decline adopting Goodwin's allotment roll plan. A good many of the boys will, I think, send money home by Moore. But a good many of the regiment have already begun to gamble.

22.—Nothing of importance occurred to-day. The weather is now quite warm, disagreeably so along the middle of the day. The men go on duty about every other day. They have plenty to do in the way of policing, cleaning guns and clothes, etc. They appear,

nevertheless, to be in fine spirits. Homesickness is not nearly so prevalent as it was some time back.

23.—Picket. In command of station 2. Instructions on picket more stringent than ever. Was visited ten different times while on. This station has two commissioned and seven non-commissioned officers and sixty privates. My detachment composed of men from 79th Ind. and 19th Ohio. All quiet. Elected company cooks to-day by general order.

24.—Relieved at 10 A. M. Had battalion drill this afternoon for the first time since leaving Nashville. John Eaton [sutler] arrived with a stock of goods. Also Frank Jelleff from Franklin. Weather quite warm.

25.—Had officers' school to-day. Capt. — put under arrest to-day. Erected a clapboard kitchen and an awning over our company table. It adds much to appearance of company quarters. Every company now has to have company cooks who cook according to furnished recipes. To-day for the first time a company fund was distributed. Co. I got \$15.25.

26.—Visited to-day by Capt. Herriot and Ord. Brown. Very quiet and still in camp. Sunday is now in the army as at home; a day of rest as far as practicable. By a general order no work not absolutely necessary is to be done on Sunday.

27.—Everything quiet in camp. Everybody appears to be settling down into the belief that we shall stay here some time and we are making preparations accordingly. Boxes of good things from home come

to the regiment daily to enliven and cheer the hearts of the soldiers. Batchelor started home.

29.—To-day turned over our old tents and put up the "purps." They are put up three together and all on one side of the street. The cedars were also set out to-day. We have a nice camp now. Great pains are taken to preserve cleanliness. Policing is done very thoroughly and large and commodious covered sinks dug.

MAY, 1863.

5.—On picket in command of station 1. Was complimented by corps officer of day. Occasional rain during the day. An improvement has been lately adopted in the picket system. A mounted courier is now kept at an important station. The whole picket system is now reduced almost to a state of perfection. Had a severe headache all day and night.

7.—There was great cheering and rejoicing last night over Hooker's supposed victory. All day the most exaggerated reports of Hooker's success have been floating through camp. All eyes are now turned toward the Potomac army. To-day was as disagreeable as I almost ever experienced. Cold, rainy, and discomforting. Enough to give Mark Tapley the blues.

8.—To-day it is said that Hooker has completely cut the rebel communications and is only waiting for the 30,000 reenforcements that are coming up to fall upon and annihilate the rebels. Of course we are all on our

heads with excitement. Cleared up this afternoon and there is a promise of fine weather. Regimental troubles pretty near a boil.

9.—There are rumors to-day, which seem to be of a credible character, that Hooker has retired to the north bank of the Rappahannock and is again in his old camp at Falmouth. It is said the whole affair was a mere cavalry raid by Stoneman. I am almost prompted to say fizzle! fizzle! fizzle!

10.—Sunday. Had company inspection. Men looked remarkably neat and clean. A very perceptible change has come over them, inducing them to manifest a good deal of pride in personal cleanliness. The order excusing five men from picket and camp guard most distinguished for soldierly appearance has, so far, been highly beneficial. Day beautiful. Nothing definite from Hooker. Wrote to —.

11.—Nothing of importance to-day. The weather is becoming very uncomfortably warm and the men go out into the woods in front of camp to sleep during the heat of the day. After sundown they amuse themselves in playing cards, marbles, boxing, dancing, etc. Everybody is in good spirits and seems disposed to be as merry as possible.

12.—Officer of guard. Was very busy all day. Our camp now presents a beautiful appearance but does not equal the 19th Ohio which excels in everything. We're improving fast though. The first brigade drill for our brigade took place to-day. I could not attend.

13.—Had regimental inspection to-day. After that

we had brigade drill, the first I was ever on. I was much pleased. The news from the Rappahannock is beautifully dubious and magnificently vague. I am prepared for a grand "let down." After Hooker, who? A brigade camp guard was organized to-day.

14.—Company was occupied all day in raising tents, building an arbor for the company table and improving quarters generally. Our company quarters look actually enticing. The tents are only made for three but are large enough for five when raised with boards. The streets are neatly graded and ornamented with cedars. Commodious slops and wash sinks, kitchen, etc.

16.—Hooker seems to have very quietly subsided. The Army of the Potomac has now resumed its proper function, awaiting a forward move. But somehow it doesn't get along very fast. For two years that army has been on the eve of going somewhere and doing something but never doing it. We of the West will have to whip the rebels after all.

17.—Usual Sunday inspection. Men remarkably neat and clean. Batchelor returned to-day. Brings very favorable news from home. Very hot and nothing stirring. The flies are growing exceedingly troublesome. The pertinacity with which they dispute possession of the victuals is truly remarkable.

18.—I don't know what to fill out this journal with. There is a dearth of news here. The weather is hot, the flies terrible, and everybody in his hole during the heat of the day. Soldiering has become a systema-

tized business now and is pretty much the same thing every day.

19.—What will be done next? Hooker in Falmouth, Rosecrans taking it easy and making much ado about nothing, Grant bobbing around, nobody knows what at. It looks to me as if nobody is in any hurry about closing up the war, but that the North, confident of its power, is preparing to eat up the rebels by piecemeal. I hardly look for a great battle soon.

22.—Completed and sent off ordnance reports this morning. This has been a tedious job. I now have a prospect of a little ease. For the last three or four days we have had no brigade drill, but instead two battalion drills—one in the morning before breakfast and one after dress parade. Fact is we have had an easy time for a week.

26.—Picket to-day in command of station 4. Lost my way twice in trying to find out-post 1. The sentinels of out-post 1 are stationed on the side of the field from which the rebels emerged on Friday of the battle. Everything looks as natural as life, or rather death, for such was that field to many a poor soldier. Was visited only once during the night. Lizards and ticks abound in the woods.

27.—Nothing unusual occurred last night. The relief this morning was nearly an hour behind time, having missed the way and traveled about four miles before they found us. Didn't get a letter to-day, which disappointed me much; I don't think I'll write to anybody for six months.

29.—Had squad drill this afternoon and battalion after supper. That was about all of importance. There was some talk of our going to Knoxville, but that has played out. The General has recommended the drawing of two months' supplies of clothing, etc., which I suppose indicates something, though it's "mighty onsartain." Rained like blazes last night.

30.—Rained nearly all day. A partial inspection of the guns was made to-day with the object of exchanging our present for Springfield rifles. Very quiet in camp and not much prospect of a move. Grant has not taken Vicksburg yet. It begins to look like the Fredericksburg humbug. What if he don't take it? Good for three years I am afraid.

31.—Day opens cloudy but cool and pleasant. Had regimental inspection at 5 P. M. Our company looked particularly fine. Lieut. Taylor of the 21st Ills., Gen. Grant's old regiment, was over to-day. He used to be a student at Franklin [College, Ind.]—is now adjutant of a convalescent regiment. He vindicates Grant from all aspersions but didn't convince me of his abilities as a general.

JUNE, 1863.

8.—Wrote to — and —. Gave them both particular fits for not writing more promptly. The forward move seems to have played out. It is high time the Army of the Cumberland was doing something. Six months in one place won't do. The science of "how

not to do it" seems to have been again inaugurated with improvements. Weather clear.

13.—Drill this morning. Put in the day as usual in cleaning up. Eaton brought some cherries and raspberries which a person could luxuriate on at 25 cents per pint. Went to river this evening and had a good, nice bath. We go to the railroad bridge about three-fourths mile distant from camp. Awfully hot to-day. Wm. Jacobs, Co. C, was killed yesterday by an accidental shot.

16.—Ordered to march out to witness the execution of a deserter, Wm. Minix, private, Co. —, 9th Ky., for desertion. The whole division turned out. We were on the ground by 8. The troops formed three sides of a square. The prisoner was brought in at about 9. The procession was as follows: 1st the band, 2d the guard, 3d the coffin and bearers, 4th the prisoner, 5th the detail to shoot him. The sentence was executed between 9 and 10. The whole affair was very impressive and solemn.

23.—Officer of guard. Pleasant day. Rumors that the army marches to-morrow. Impression that our division remains. Wagons coming in all night from the Lebanon pike. The movement has begun.

24.—Day opens with a drizzling rain. This morning discovers all the troops gone but our division. At 3 P. M. struck tents and moved over near the fortifications southwest of town about a mile from our old camp. Rained all day.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

The country was becoming impatient because of the long stay at Murfreesboro; the soldiers there were also becoming restive. It was plain to all that we must go outside our camp to meet the enemy. Naturally the next objective point for the Army of the Cumberland was Chattanooga. There was, however, but one line of railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga; great mountain ranges were to be crossed before getting to the latter point; and it was a most difficult problem how to procure supplies for the army on its way to Chattanooga and after it should get there. It was, therefore, deemed advisable to defer the forward movement until the roads should become better, and until the ripening corn should afford the necessary forage; so it was not begun until the latter part of June, 1863.

Bragg's army was then posted north of Duck river, the infantry in a strongly fortified position between Shelbyville and Wartrace, with cavalry flanks at McMinnville on the right and Spring Hill and Columbia on the left, his chief depot of supplies being at Tullahoma.

The forward movement from Murfreesboro, known

as the "Tullahoma campaign," began June 23, and in the brief period of nine days resulted in the evacuation by Bragg of Tullahoma without a great battle and with slight loss to the Federal army. But Bragg's army was still in the field and the stronghold of Chattanooga was yet to be won. To capture it would require long and arduous marches over a barren and broken country destitute of necessary supplies, the constant depletion of the advancing army, already 113 miles from Nashville, its secondary base, by the withdrawal of troops to guard its communications in the rear, and undoubtedly the fighting of a great battle against all the troops that could be assembled to defend a point of such vital importance to the Confederacy.

The authorities at Washington knew very little about the character of the country over which such a march must be made,¹ but they were clamorous for an immediate advance of the Army of the Cumberland and preparations for it were now pushed with all possible celerity.

Bragg had established his headquarters at Chattanooga and the main body of his army was there or in the near vicinity. Detachments guarded all the available crossings of the Tennessee for considerable distances above and below that point, and Forrest's cavalry kept watch on the north side of the river. Rosecrans had his headquarters at Winchester, Tennessee, where were also those of the 20th Army Corps; the

¹ See Cox's *Military Reminiscences*, vol. 1, p. 541.

14th and 21st corps were posted at different points between Winchester and McMinnville and west of the Cumberland Mountains; while the reserve corps was disposed in the rear at various points north of Duck river. The primary base of supplies was Louisville, connected by only a single railroad with Nashville, the secondary base.

To take Chattanooga either by direct assault or by siege was plainly impracticable. The only practicable plan was to force the evacuation of it by Bragg's army, and to accomplish this it was necessary to get in the rear of the army and threaten its communications. There were two ways of doing this: To cross the Tennessee river above Chattanooga or to cross it below. Rosecrans's plan was to cross below but to divert Bragg's attention by making a feint of crossing above. To execute this plan required sending a considerable force across the Cumberland Mountains and Walden Ridge and making demonstrations indicating an intent to cross the river above Chattanooga while the main body of the army was crossing below.

The Tennessee is a deep and wide river, and at Bridgeport, where it was intended to construct a bridge, it is over a half mile wide. Crossing the river in the face of the enemy was not an easy undertaking, but far more serious obstacles would confront the army after a crossing had been effected; for it would then be necessary, in order to get in rear of Chattanooga, to cross Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Mountain, two precipitous ranges, having few passes with wide inter-

vals between, and next Missionary Ridge, a lower range. It also involved cutting loose from Stevenson, Alabama, the proposed new base of supplies, and marching with at least twenty-five days' rations and enough ammunition for two battles.

Rosecrans had an army of about 60,000 men with which to start on such a stupendous undertaking. He pleaded with the Washington authorities for reinforcements and especially for more cavalry. When Sherman, in May, 1864, started on his Atlanta campaign through the already exhausted Confederacy, beginning, moreover, at Chattanooga where Rosecrans left off, he was supplied with a magnificent army of more than 100,000 men. Rosecrans also urged that he should be supported by such forward movements of other Federal armies as would protect his flanks and prevent Confederate concentration against the Army of the Cumberland. When Sherman began his Atlanta campaign Grant also began his campaign against Richmond, leaving Lee no men to spare to reenforce the army confronting Sherman. Indeed, it seems now that a movement so important as that contemplated by Rosecrans should have been made only in connection with a simultaneous movement of the Army of the Potomac, that of Burnside in east Tennessee, and that of Grant at Vicksburg. But the Army of the Potomac was then inactive and had been since the battle of Gettysburg. Grant, soon after the surrender of Vicksburg, had suggested to the authorities at Washington that a portion of the force under his command be sent

against Mobile, a movement which would have aided Rosecrans by compelling the withdrawal of detachments from Bragg's army, while, as it was, reenforcements were sent to Bragg. But Grant's suggestions were unheeded. Burnside had been busy in looking after General John Morgan and did not reach the vicinity of Knoxville until August 26. He never was near enough to Rosecrans to render him any assistance and as soon as he appeared in east Tennessee Buckner's corps was withdrawn and sent to reenforce Bragg.³

A deaf ear was turned to all the appeals of Rosecrans. He had sent General Rousseau to Washington with letters to President Lincoln, to Halleck, and to Stanton, urging the necessity of giving him the aid essential for a movement so important as that designed to take and hold Chattanooga. Rosecrans was somewhat given to making complaints, but in this instance his appeals seem to have been well grounded. Lincoln sent him a kind letter; Stanton did not answer and is reported to have said that he would be damned

³ Halleck, as usual, sought to shift the blame for his own failures on some other person, and on Sept. 22, 1863, he sent a dispatch to General Burnside, saying: "I fear *your delay* has already permitted Bragg to prevent your junction." To this Burnside sent a caustic answer emphatically denying that he had been guilty of any delay and showing that he had obeyed all orders to the letter, and that from the time when his troops first entered east Tennessee it had been impracticable to effect a junction with Rosecrans. See *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 52, pp. 785, 904; Cox: *Military Reminiscences*, vol. 1, pp. 530-541.

if he gave Rosecrans another man.³ Halleck sent the following dispatch August 5, 1863: "The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory." Not a man was sent to Rosecrans, nor was his movement supported by that of any other Federal army.

The advance to Chattanooga began August 16th. The 21st Army Corps crossed the Cumberland Mountains into the Sequatchie Valley; two brigades of that corps then crossed Walden Ridge into the Tennessee Valley, and these, with Wilder's brigade and Minty's cavalry, at once proceeded to stir up a lively commotion in front of and above Chattanooga. Camp-fires were lighted on the ridge, bugles were blown at numerous fords, Chattanooga was shelled from across the river, and various demonstrations were made indicating a purpose to cross the Federal army at some point above Chattanooga.⁴

So successful was the feint that Bragg was completely deceived and withdrew from Bridgeport the only

³ See Rosecrans's testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War; *Report of Committee on Rosecrans's Campaign*, p. 28.

⁴ The official report of General Daniel H. Hill, in command of the place, fairly illustrates the manner in which the Yankee invaders were regarded in the South. He says: "On fast day (August), while religious services were being held in Chattanooga, the Yankees appeared on the opposite side of the river and commenced shelling the town without giving any notice. Our pickets and scouts, if any were out, had given no warning of the Yankees' approach. Some women and children were killed and wounded by this not unusual act of atrocity of our savage foe."

brigade that had been guarding against the crossing of the Federal army at that point. Meanwhile the main body of the Army of the Cumberland was concentrated with as much secrecy as possible, near Bridgeport, and by September 4 all the army had crossed the Tennessee at that point and others near by, and by the 6th was in the vicinity of Chattanooga. Bragg began the evacuation of the place September 7 and had completed the withdrawal of the main body of his army by the evening of the 8th. On that day there were rumors of the evacuation and on the day following Beatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division ascended Lookout Mountain at Nickajack Trace and advanced to the point, about twelve miles distant, in order to ascertain the truth of the rumor. It was found that the Confederates had abandoned both Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga, and on the same day the Federal troops entered Chattanooga as the rear guard of Bragg's army was leaving. Thus by skilful strategy Chattanooga had been gained without a battle, or even a considerable skirmish, after the evacuation of Tullahoma. The 79th Ind. had made another long march, crossing the Cumberland Mountains and passing down the beautiful Sequatchie Valley, seeing on the way magnificent mountain scenery whose grandeur often evoked the enthusiastic cheers of the passing troops. We were now in Chattanooga, but the great battle for its permanent occupation was yet to be fought.

Much has been written about the battle of Chicka-

mauga, containing a vast deal of misinformation.⁵ No battle in the Civil War was more stubbornly fought on both sides than was that of Chickamauga. Considering the number of men engaged, it was by far the bloodiest, and was characterized from first to last by exhibitions of bravery on both sides not surpassed in any battle in history. No writer of fiction ever portrayed anything equal to the reality. No orator could ever find language adequate to describe the heroic achievements on that bloody field. The monuments, the tablets, the dumb batteries that stand there now, remind those who participated in the conflict of the dreadful carnage, but can not convey to one that did not witness it the faintest conception of the battle. The field marks a contest between the highest types of American soldiery.

Moreover, no battle of the Civil War more clearly illustrates upon what slender chances victory depends. Looking back at the mistakes of both sides, one can now easily see how the absence of some of them might have turned the scale, and caused either the defeat of the Confederate, or the total annihilation of the Federal army. To understand fully that memorable

⁵ The most intelligible accounts of the battle, valuable chiefly because written by eye-witnesses, and accompanied by maps essential to an understanding of it, will be found in Van Horne's *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, Cist's *Army of the Cumberland*, Turchin's *Battle of Chickamauga*, Piatt's *George H. Thomas*, and Boynton's *Chickamauga National Military Park*. The official reports of the battle are contained in *Rebellion Records*, ser. Nos. 50. 51.

battle it is necessary to have in mind the operations of the ten days or more preceding it.

Complete success had attended the movement against Chattanooga and, as already stated, the town had been occupied by General Rosecrans's army September 9, 1863, without serious resistance and with little loss of life. Thus far it seemed that the strategy by which the gateway to the South had been secured was beyond criticism, and so it was regarded by the military authorities at Washington:

Bragg was apparently in full retreat. Rosecrans, thinking that he did not intend to stop north of Dalton or Rome in Georgia, and elated by his own easy triumph, instead of concentrating his already widely separated corps, as Thomas urgently advised,⁶ ordered them to continue in pursuit of the fleeing enemy. On the morning of the 9th Rosecrans dispatched to Crittenden, and on the evening of the same day, to McCook, that Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga and was in full retreat, directing the former to push forward with five days' rations in vigorous pursuit, and the latter to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, intercept Bragg's retreat, and attack on his flank. The divisions of Thomas's corps were already far south of Chattanooga, but as late as 9:45 P. M. on September 10, Rosecrans, in a dispatch to Thomas, expressed his impatience that his advance had not been more rapid, and, in entire ignorance of the fact that Bragg's army

⁶ See Van Horne: *Life of George H. Thomas*, p. 104.

was even then concentrated at Lafayette, gave Thomas peremptory orders that his movement on Lafayette "should be made with the utmost promptness."

Halleck, as general-in-chief, was still conducting military operations by telegraph from Washington. He, too, seems to have been somewhat dazed by the success of his own strategy, and to have been revolving in his mind some stupendous plan for an "advance into Georgia or Alabama or into the valley of Virginia and North Carolina," as indicated in his dispatches of September 11 to Burnside and Rosecrans. Until Halleck's plan could be more fully matured, Burnside was to "hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains" and Rosecrans "the mountain passes on the west and Dalton or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army." From such dreams there was a sudden and rude awakening. It came first to Rosecrans. McCook on his way to Alpine had entirely missed the Confederate army. He had sent out several detachments on the 8th and 9th to scour the country in search of the whereabouts of Bragg's army, but no traces of it had been found. On the 10th, however, he discovered that if he had gone to Summerville he would probably have been surrounded by it. When Crittenden reached Ringgold he found that there had been some grievous misunderstanding of Bragg's whereabouts. Negley's division of Thomas's corps, in its hot chase, almost tumbled headlong into the midst of Bragg's army at Mc-

Lemore's Cove, but fortunately discovered its peril in time to escape.

Halleck's air-castles were undermined more slowly, by gradual approaches, to use a military phrase. From the tales related to him by deserters, who were probably sent expressly to tell them, he was induced to believe that Bragg, instead of making preparations to give battle himself, was sending reinforcements to Lee. On September 13 Halleck learned that a portion of Lee's army had gone somewhere; the next day it was reported that it was Longstreet's corps that had gone. But where had Longstreet gone? There were various suppositions. He might have gone to Petersburg; he might have gone to Norfolk. At any rate, Halleck wisely conjectured that he would "soon strike a blow somewhere." By and by it occurred to him that possibly Longstreet had gone to reenforce Bragg, and then the telegraph was put to work again and frantic dispatches were sent at once in every direction to Grant, to Sherman, to Hurlbut, to Burnside, to hurry to Rosecrans the reinforcements that should have been sent months before—as if armies hundreds of miles away could be put in motion in an instant.

It was indeed true that a grave mistake had been made concerning Bragg's movements. He had retreated only a short distance. Taking advantage of the broken and mountainous character of the country, well adapted to concealing his movements, he had retired into the rocky fastnesses of northern Georgia and was secretly massing his troops in the vicinity of La-

fayette, hiding behind Pigeon Mountain and awaiting the opportunity to strike and crush in detail the widely separated columns of Rosecrans's army as they debouched from the mountain passes, and to cut off retreat by the Lafayette road, the only available route from that region back to Chattanooga.

General Rosecrans, as late as September 11, seems to have doubted the truth of the reports that Bragg was concealing his army within striking distance. By that time the true condition of affairs had been ascertained. The situation of the Federal army was very critical. Bragg had been reenforced by General Johnston with 15,000 men and by Buckner's corps, which had been withdrawn from east Tennessee, and his army was massed nearly opposite the center of the Federal army whose right and left flanks were forty miles apart and separated by mountain ranges permitting the passage of troops only through passes or defiles few and far between. McCook's corps was at Alpine, fifty miles south of Chattanooga, and could effect a junction with the other corps only by long and difficult marches. The intervening country was rough and broken and covered with a dense growth of trees and underbrush. The Federal commanders were imperfectly acquainted with the mountainous region into which Rosecrans had been inveigled, but with every road and path and mountain pass the Confederates were familiar.

Moreover, in his hot pursuit of the Confederates Rosecrans had left Chattanooga uncovered, thus ex-

tending an invitation to Bragg, which he was not slow to accept, to intervene between that place and the Federal army and so cut off its retreat. Besides this Rosecrans had so scattered his corps that they were no longer in supporting distance and were nearer to Bragg's army than they were to each other. The divisions of the different corps were also disunited. Crittenden's corps, to use a military phrase, was "in air." There was no hope of reinforcements for the Army of the Cumberland. The only hope was that it might unite in time to meet the forces gathering for its destruction.

This was Bragg's great opportunity. Had he been a Grant or a Lee he would have seized it promptly and inflicted a crushing blow on the Federal army. But he was neither a Grant nor a Lee. If the Confederate commander was unequal to the occasion, his subordinates were still more so and delayed carrying out his orders until the golden opportunity had slipped past. For this, after the battle, Generals Polk, D. H. Hill, and Hindman were, at General Bragg's request, relieved of their commands.

Negley's division was in an exceedingly critical situation. It had crossed Lookout Mountain through Stevens's Gap, twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga, and on September 8 was opposite Dug Gap on the west side of Pigeon Mountain, Negley not then knowing that Bragg's whole army was on the east side. There was another gap—Catlett's—a little north of Dug Gap, and another—Blue Bird Gap—a little south

of it, and Negley's division was in imminent danger of an attack in front, on both flanks, and in the rear. The situation was quickly perceived by Bragg and on the evening of the 8th he ordered General Hindman to attack Negley's division at once and Hill to support Hindman. Hill failed to obey the order and reported a flimsy excuse, but Hindman marched ten miles and halted within three miles of Negley, where, according to Bragg's order, he was joined by Buckner on the 10th. When these three Confederate generals came together they held a council of war, determined that Bragg's order was impracticable, and deliberately waited for further orders. Additional troops were then sent to support Hindman until 30,000 troops were massed for the contemplated attack, but there was one hitch after another until Negley had safely got away and had fallen back to Stevens's Gap.

Having thus failed to crush Thomas's corps, Bragg next attempted to concentrate against that of Crittenden, and on the evening of the 11th he ordered General Polk to begin the attack at Lee and Gordon's Mill. In order to inspire Polk with enthusiasm he said to him: "This presents a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed and the others are yours; we can then turn on the force in the Cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success." Notwithstanding these alluring as-

surances of future glory, Polk that night reported that he had taken a strong position for *defense* and asked for reenforcements. Bragg sent a peremptory order to Polk not to defer the attack, and the next morning went himself with Buckner's corps to see that it was made, when he found that Polk's troops had not budged and that Crittenden had got his divisions together and had recrossed the Chickamauga. If there is still surviving a Confederate that sincerely mourns the failure of the "lost cause," he must writhe in agony when he reads, even at this late day, of the blunders of Bragg and his subordinates, and thinks of what "might have been."

Owing partly to the celerity and skill of the Federal generals and in part to the failure of his subordinates to carry out his plans, Bragg's attempts to destroy Thomas's and Crittenden's corps had been foiled, as already stated, but there was still left the opportunity to turn Rosecrans's left flank, get possession of the Lafayette road, and thereby cut off the retreat of the Federal army to Chattanooga, and to this object all Bragg's operations were now directed.

Every day the situation of the Army of the Cumberland became more critical. Immense reenforcements were being hurried to Bragg. In addition to those of Johnston and Buckner, two divisions of Longstreet's corps were sent from the east and every militiaman of northern Georgia that could carry a gun was pressed into service. By the time the battle opened Bragg had an army conservatively estimated at 67,000

arrayed against the Army of the Cumberland, 10,000 less in numbers.

It was now, as Rosecrans expressed it in his report, "a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army." Crittenden's corps had been pulled together and brought within supporting distance of Thomas's. But McCook was still afar off. To form a junction with Thomas and Crittenden he would have been obliged to travel, by the most direct route, about forty miles; he took a wrong road and traveled a distance of fifty-seven miles, marching day and night over roads almost impassable, crossing mountains and overcoming obstacles apparently insurmountable. With Wellington it was "Oh for night or Blücher!" With Rosecrans it was "Oh for night or McCook!" Every day, every night, every hour, was precious. By September 17 McCook had joined Thomas and the three Federal army corps were in supporting distance but they were not yet in position to avert the impending danger. Bragg had his army in readiness for a general advance, and, had it been made on the 17th, it would undoubtedly have been successful, as the Federal army was not then in a position to prevent the Confederate army from getting possession of the Lafayette road. Various delays occurred, but finally, on the evening of September 17, Bragg ordered a general attack to be made the following day.

Delays again intervened and it was late in the afternoon when the Confederate heads of columns appeared at Reed's and Alexander's bridges. Generals Wilder

and Minty made a heroic resistance, fighting off the advancing Confederates and yielding inch by inch and so retarding Bragg's advance that another day was gained. But the Federal army, though now united, was not yet in the position that it must occupy to be able to defeat Bragg's purpose. To accomplish this it was necessary to make still further dispositions which could not safely be made in the daytime. All night long Thomas's corps was marching to the left; but the Federal lines had not been formed, nor had Thomas's troops reached the positions designated for them, when the battle opened on the morning of the 19th. Indeed, the situation was such that Rosecrans was unable to present a continuous battle-front until the close of the day. Thomas's and McCook's corps had been marching all the night of the 18th from McLemore's Cove. Of Thomas's four divisions Baird's and Brannan's had reached the Kelly field about sunrise on the 19th and the former had been posted on the extreme left with the latter on the right of it; Negley's was at Glass's Mill, about two miles southeast of Crawfish Spring. Of Reynolds's division, Wilder's brigade was west of the Lafayette road and near the widow Glenn's house, and the two other brigades were marching to reach the positions designated for them. The three divisions of Crittenden's corps were at Lee and Gordon's Mill, Wood on the right, Van Cleve next, and Palmer on the left; the left of the latter extending about a mile north of the mill. Davis's, Johnson's, and Sheridan's divisions of McCook's corps

had reached Crawfish Spring and were there awaiting further directions. Granger's reserve corps was concentrated early in the morning at McAfee's Church, about two miles east of Rossville.

On the morning of the 19th Bragg's army was formed for battle, which had been ordered to begin at 7 A. M. by an attack on Crittenden's corps, supposed by Bragg to be the Federal left. The Confederate army was composed of the infantry corps of Polk, Hill, Buckner, Walker, and part of Longstreet's (commanded by Hood), with Forrest's and Wheeler's cavalry corps. Polk's corps included the divisions of Cheatham and Hindman; Hill's those of Cleburne and Breckinridge; Buckner's those of Stewart and Preston; Walker's those of Walker (commanded by Gist) and Liddell; Longstreet's (commanded by Hood) those of Hood (commanded by Law) and Bushrod Johnson; Forrest's those of Armstrong and Pegram, and Wheeler's those of Wharton and Martin. At the opening of the battle these divisions were east of and facing the Lafayette road, ranged from right to left as follows: Forrest's cavalry on the right near Jay's Mill; McLaws, Bushrod Johnson, Stewart, and Preston with Cheatham in reserve. Walker's division was marching to take position on the right of McLaws's; Wheeler's cavalry was posted along the upper fords of the Chickamauga. Forrest's cavalry was in close proximity to Brannan's division.

On the morning of the 19th Rosecrans and Bragg were each ignorant of the exact position of the army

of the other. Bragg supposed Crittenden's corps to be the Federal left, but during the night of the 18th Rosecrans had inverted his army, still leaving Crittenden's corps at Lee and Gordon's Mill but now making it the extreme right, whereas before it had been the extreme left, and making Thomas's corps the extreme left by moving it from McLemore's Cove, where it had been the extreme right, to a position where it was nearer Chattanooga and where it could better hold possession of the Lafayette road. On the other hand, Rosecrans supposed that the extreme right of the Confederate army was on the east side of Chickamauga creek and opposite Lee and Gordon's Mill. In fact during the night Bragg had thrown a large force on the west side of the Chickamauga with the intention of turning Crittenden's left flank. Bragg had intended attacking in the vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill what he supposed to be the Federal left, but by one of the chances of war the battle opened in a quarter not anticipated by any one.

Early on the morning of the 19th it was reported to Thomas that a Confederate brigade had been left on the west side of the river after the burning of a bridge the night before, and Brannan's division was sent out to make a reconnaissance, and, if possible, to capture the brigade supposed to have thus been separated from the Confederate army. Brannan's reconnaissance unexpectedly disclosed the presence of a portion of Forrest's cavalry, which was encountered by Brannan's right brigade, that of Croxton, about 7:30

A. M., and the battle at once opened there with great fury, resulting in such fierce fighting that Bragg was compelled, for a time, to give his entire attention to that part of the field. Reenforcements were hurried by Bragg to his right and assault after assault was made on Thomas's lines, but the Confederates were repulsed at every point with heavy loss. By 1 P. M. there was a lull in the fighting in that quarter, the wave of battle having passed down the line.

It was now taken up by the divisions of Cheatham, Walker, and Stewart, who were suddenly precipitated against the Federal center, the weight of the blow falling upon the division of Johnson and then on those of Palmer and Reynolds which had been sent to reenforce that part of the line. About 1 P. M. Beatty's and Dick's brigades of Van Cleve's division were also marched to the left, taking position on the right of the brigade of Reynolds next on Palmer's right. Beatty's brigade had scarcely taken position when a Confederate battery was discovered directly in front of it, the guns spread out in fan shape, at a point southeast of the Brotherton house, now marked by a monument to the 79th Ind. It proved to be Carnes's battery belonging to Wright's brigade of Cheatham's division. The guns were loaded with canister and a single discharge would have inflicted immense loss of life. Instantly a volley of musketry was fired by the 79th, disabling both the gunners and the horses of the battery, and, before reenforcements could arrive, a rush was made, the battery was captured, and the guns were

dragged to the rear. This was one of the few Confederate batteries captured. It was retaken after the disaster to the Federal right the next day.

The auspicious beginning of Van Cleve's division was not long sustained. Following closely Van Cleve's division came Carlin's and Heg's brigades of Davis's division, which took position on Van Cleve's right. At about the same time the Confederate divisions of Law and Bushrod Johnson, under command of Hood, were preparing to turn the Federal right and at once fell on the divisions of Van Cleve and Davis. Wilder's brigade, then Wood's division and Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve, and finally Sheridan's division, were sent to reenforce this part of the line, and, even then, it required the most heroic efforts to maintain the Federal right. On no part of the field was the contest more stubborn. For over three hours there was a desperate stand-up fight between the combatants without breastworks or protection of any kind, until the Viniard fields were literally piled with dead and wounded. The tide of battle ebbed and flowed, each side alternately advancing and retreating as victory seemed to incline first to one and then to the other, hesitating with which to abide.

During all this time the Confederates were persisting in their attacks on the divisions of Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, and all, together with that of Van Cleve, were forced back toward the Lafayette road. Finally the retreat was stayed, the Federal lines were hastily reformed, all the artillery that could be

collected was brought to that part of the field, and a determined stand was made. But the Federal right center had been broken and the Confederate troops, pouring through the opening made by the falling back of Van Cleve's division, had crossed the Lafayette road, and with loud cheers were now rapidly advancing into the fields west of it. As the tide of battle neared Rosecrans's headquarters at the widow Glenn's house it seemed like a repetition of the disaster at Stone's River, and that the Federal right was doomed to destruction. But in the nick of time Brannan's division coming from the left and Negley's from the right appeared, the Confederates were repulsed, and the Federal lines on the right were restored.

During the day the sound of musketry was appalling. At times no interval between the volleys could be distinguished, but there was a continuous roar like that of Niagara Falls. The fighting did not cease with the close of the day, for long after the going down of the sun the stillness of the night was suddenly broken by tremendous firing in front of the divisions of Johnson and Baird, now fiercely assailed by Cleburne and Cheatham. In the dense and dark woods, lighted only by the flashing of the guns, the weird contest, bordering on the supernatural, was waged for an hour or more. Again, however, the Confederates were repulsed with frightful slaughter and the Federal lines remained unbroken.

The day closed with the Army of the Cumberland

still intact and holding its own. It had been a hard day on the troops, many of whom had been marching all the night before and fighting all day. Nearly the entire army had been engaged and, with the exception of Granger's reserve corps, there were no fresh Federal troops with whom to renew the battle on the following day. On the other hand, Breckinridge's and Hindman's divisions and two brigades of Preston's division had not been in the battle, and two fresh brigades of McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps arrived on the evening of the 19th. Nevertheless, there was much to encourage the Federal army and to inspire it with confidence at the close of the day. The Confederates had suffered enormous losses. Bragg had been completely foiled in every attempt to get possession of the Lafayette road, the Federal lines were unbroken, and Bragg's right had been defeated at every point. But he had no thought of giving up the contest and laid his plans to renew battle the next morning.

Various changes in the formation of the Federal lines had been made during the day and night of the 19th. The next morning Thomas still held the left, the order of formation by divisions from left to right being as follows: Baird on the extreme left near the Kelly house; Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds, all on the east side of the Lafayette road, Brannan on the west side of the Poe field, Negley west of the Brotherton field, Sheridan in front of the widow Glenn's house, Wilder's brigade on the right and in rear of

Sheridan. Early in the morning the divisions of Wood, Van Cleve and Davis were in rear of the center, but Davis soon took position on the left of Sheridan and Wood took the place of Negley who had been ordered to the left. Granger's reserve corps was still at McAfee's Church. The cavalry was mostly on the right guarding the upper fords of the Chickamauga.

Various changes had also been made in the Confederate lines. Longstreet reached the battle-field at 11 P. M. and was assigned to the command of the Confederate left wing, while General Polk was placed in command of the right wing. The formation of the Confederate right wing in the order of divisions from right to left was as follows: Forrest's cavalry east of Cloud's; Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions on the east and south of the Kelly field and the east side of the Poe field; Walker's (Gist's) and Liddell's divisions in reserve in rear of Breckinridge's and Cheatham's in rear of Cleburne's. The left wing was posted as follows from right to left: Stewart's, Bushrod Johnson's, Hindman's and Preston's with Law's in rear of Johnson's and Kershaw's (McLaw's) in rear of Law's. Bragg's order to Polk was to begin an attack on the Federal left at daylight on the 20th, the battle to be taken up by divisions along the line from right to left.

During the day and night of the 19th the movement of the Federal army had been continually to the left, the point of danger. Division after division, brigade after brigade, had been sent from the corps of McCook and Crittenden to reenforce Thomas. Before the dis-

aster on Sunday in which the Federal right was broken, Crittenden's corps organization had been completely broken up by taking from it the troops sent to the support of Thomas. Palmer's division had gone on the 19th. Wood's was taken out to reenforce Thomas on the 20th, just before the break, and with it Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division, and at the same time the two remaining brigades of Van Cleve's division, Beatty's and Dick's, were also on their way under orders to march to the support of Thomas.

Had the right wing of the Federal army been posted on the ridge where the lines were finally established during the afternoon of the 20th as Thomas had advised,⁷ there is little doubt that the result of the battle would have been altogether different. It was, however, posted in such position as to give it little, if any, advantage over a superior force of the Confederates, and to make any change in the face of the enemy extremely hazardous. So hasty was the formation that there was no time to construct rifle-pits, and the light barricades of rails, logs, and stones afforded but slight protection.

What added to the danger of the right, and especially to the danger of making any change in its formation on the morning of the 20th, was the fact, of which Rosecrans seems to have been entirely unconscious, that a large Confederate force had been massed opposite the Federal right. Concealed in the dense woods

⁷ Van Horne: *Life of George H. Thomas*, p. 121.

east of the Lafayette road were the heavy Confederate columns under the command of General Longstreet, momentarily expecting the order to advance. Immediately in front of Wood's division, and but a short distance away, lay the division of the Confederate General Bushrod Johnson, and behind this, in supporting distance, were the divisions of Law and Kershaw, while to the left of Johnson was the division of General Hindman.

The battle opened on the morning of the 20th with another desperate attack on the Federal left. Had it been made earlier it might have been most disastrous to the Union army, but the disaster was averted by another Confederate blunder. Bragg had ordered General Polk, in command of the Confederate right wing, to attack the Federal left at daylight and secure possession of the Lafayette road which was not sufficiently guarded. Had the attack been made as ordered it would probably have been successful, as Thomas had not then enough troops to defend it. But Polk on the night of the 19th slept outside the lines and was not on the field at the time when he should have opened the battle. Bragg sent Major Lee to ascertain the cause of the delay and to urge a prompt movement. He found Polk at the breakfast-table, surrounded by a brilliantly dressed staff. With pompous politeness, Polk replied to the message: "Do tell General Bragg that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack—overflowing with anxiety, sir." When this was reported to the Confederate commander-in-chief it is

said that it called forth a volley of sulphurous imprecations upon Polk and all his corps commanders, and that Bragg in the fury of his disappointment at once gave orders to Major Lee to "ride along the line and order every captain to take his men instantly into action."⁸

By the time the attack was made Thomas was prepared for it and, though sorely pressed, he succeeded in maintaining his position. Against his lines the Confederate billows surged and beat in vain. Once indeed, only a little before the fatal break on the right, the columns of Breckinridge, under the supervision of Bragg himself, had completely enveloped the Federal left, and for a few moments it seemed that nothing could avert the impending ruin, when a single brigade—Van Derveer's of Brannan's division—rushed forward in one of the most brilliant charges of the battle and turned back the Confederate tide.

The roar of musketry that morning clearly indicated the frightful carnage on the left. I never heard anything so appalling. Requests still came from Thomas for reenforcements. Just before the disaster to the right, General Rosecrans rode up in front of the 79th Ind. and exchanged a few words with Colonel Knefler. Though not near enough to hear what was said, I could plainly see Rosecrans's face. The intense strain under which he had been laboring for days had told upon him. He was pale as a corpse and, as he rode

⁸ Pollard: *The Lost Cause*, p. 450.

away, his looks too plainly disclosed the apprehensions he could not conceal.

By a strange misunderstanding of the actual situation, General Rosecrans, in order to prevent a supposed gap between the divisions of Wood and Reynolds, at about 11 A. M. ordered General Wood to close up on Reynolds's right. There was in fact no gap, Reynolds needed no support, and the order could be executed only by taking Wood's division entirely out of line and marching it in the rear of Brannan's, which General Wood at once proceeded to do, taking with him Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division.* At the

* The facts relating to this order, as nearly as I can gather them from the official reports and all other available sources of information, seem to be as follows: Thomas had sent to Rosecrans an urgent request for reinforcements and the latter had sent a staff officer to Brannan directing him to go immediately to Thomas's support. On the supposition that Brannan would go at once, thus leaving a gap between Reynolds and Wood, Rosecrans sent another staff officer directing Wood to close up on Reynolds. At the time Brannan received the order directed to him, the enemy was already advancing against him, and he could not withdraw without exposing the army to great danger. He therefore sent word of the situation to Rosecrans and delayed moving until the receipt of further directions. When the order to Wood was received by the latter, he had not yet been attacked, though he expected to be soon. But the order was imperative and he proceeded at once to obey it. Before doing so he informed General McCook, who was present, and advised him to make such dispositions as would be necessary to fill the gap that would be caused by the withdrawal of his division. By McCook's direction the two brigades of Davis's division were on their way, at the time the catastrophe of Sunday occurred, to take the position vacated by Wood. In view of the facts above detailed, it would

same time the two remaining brigades, Beatty's and Dick's of Van Cleve's division, were ordered to the left to support Thomas and were in motion by the left flank and on double quick. Sheridan's division was also ordered to the left to support Thomas and was likewise in motion by the left flank and on double quick.

Just at this juncture, while all these movements were being executed, the Confederate advance upon the Federal right began, and almost instantly the wide gap made by the withdrawal of Wood's division was filled with the advancing troops of General Bushrod Johnson, followed by those of Law and Kershaw. Striking Brannan's division, then on the west side of the Poe field, the brigade on the right of it was thrown into confusion, and artillery and men rushed through the moving columns of the brigades of Beatty and Dick, which happened at that particular moment to be passing in Brannan's rear, throwing them also into confusion. At nearly the same time Davis's division, now left without support on either flank or in the rear, was enveloped by the troops of General Hindman and was forced to fall back. As it was falling back it came into collision, at an angle, with Sheridan's division, rapidly moving to the left, and both these divisions were instantly broken in fragments.

seem unjust to censure severely either Rosecrans or Wood for the disaster that followed. It was one of those unforeseen and unfortunate calamities of battle which it seems impossible for human wisdom to anticipate or guard against.

Thus almost at the same moment portions of Brannan's, Van Cleve's, Davis's, and Sheridan's divisions, together with part of Negley's, which had also been ordered to the left but had not yet gone, became inextricably mingled in a confused mass which, even if no enemy had been in sight, it would have taken several minutes to disentangle. But there was not even a single minute to spare, for the rapidly advancing Confederate columns were now only a short distance away and were pouring volley after volley into the disorganized mass of troops before them. Division, brigade, and regimental organizations went to pieces in an instant.

It was impossible, under such circumstances, to make any new formations or to conduct an orderly retreat. Even Sheridan, whose influence was so magical at Winchester and whose subsequent career so clearly demonstrated his dash and his soldierly qualities, was powerless to stem the overwhelming tide of disaster. So sudden and irresistible was the onset that General Rosecrans and staff, who were immediately behind Sheridan's division, narrowly escaped capture. A portion of the 79th Ind. went with Colonel Knefler in one direction and a portion with Lieut.-Colonel Oyler in another. Continuing their advance westward, Hindman's forces swept Davis's and Sheridan's divisions and part of Van Cleve's from the Dyer field and over the ridge on the west side of it. Hindman then returned and reformed his lines on the left of Bushrod Johnson, and the Confederate columns started

north through the Dyer field in the direction of the ridge of which Snodgrass Hill forms a part.

Rosecrans, supposing that all was lost, hastened to Chattanooga to prepare for the retreat of the army to that place, and not long afterward sent word to Thomas to take command of all the forces remaining on the battle-field. Rosecrans was soon followed to Chattanooga by McCook and Crittenden.

A large part of the Federal artillery on the right was captured; about fifty pieces were saved and hauled off the field by order of General Negley in order, as he said, to avoid capture, but they were never fired during the remainder of the battle. Five or six thousand men or more, who had escaped over the ridge west of the Dyer field, got into the valley beyond it. General Davis gathered together a few of them and started to join General Thomas but was unable to do so before the close of the battle. General Sheridan collected others and tried to effect a junction with Thomas by way of Rossville, but he also arrived too late to be of service. General Negley kept a large part of them under his command for the purpose, as he asserted, of protecting the retreat of the artillery and ammunition trains. He was accused of taking with him, in addition, part of Connell's brigade of Brannan's division.¹⁰ As if to insure the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland, "some unauthorized person," whose name, if known, has been considerably

¹⁰ See the report of Col. John M. Connell, *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 50, p. 407.

suppressed in the official reports, ordered Thomas's ammunition trains back to Chattanooga.

Charles A. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, who was with General Rosecrans and with him had been swept from the field, sent Stanton a dispatch at 4 P. M. in which he said: "My report to-day is of deplorable importance. Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run." Affairs were bad enough but not quite so bad as Dana pictured, and at 8 P. M. he was "happy to report that my dispatch of 4 P. M. to-day proves to have given too dark a view of our disaster."¹¹ In face of such an appalling train of disasters, it seems miraculous that the Army of the Cumberland escaped annihilation. Had the movement by which General Hindman, later in the afternoon, gained the top of the ridge north of Snodgrass Hill, been made before the arrival of Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades, it is probable that the Federal army would have been totally defeated. The movement was not made solely for the reason that the Confederate generals supposed that the troops that had been driven over the ridge west of the Dyer field were still in fighting condition and liable to fall on the Confederate flanks. Indeed, Hindman supposed the troops of Whitaker and Mitchell, that later in the afternoon drove his own from the hill west of the Snodgrass house, to be the same that he had before driven from the Dyer field. "At 3 P. M.," he reports,¹² "a force

¹¹ *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 50, pp. 192, 193.

¹² *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 51, p. 304.

of the enemy, probably that which I had recently confronted west of the Crawfish Spring road, appeared on my left, capturing several men of my infirmiry corps and others who had fallen out from fatigue or wounds. I was apprehensive of an attack in rear, and sent to General Longstreet and General Buckner for reinforcements."

I return now to the time when Generals Bushrod Johnson and Hindman, after advancing to the west side of the Dyer field, reformed their lines and started north. When the Confederate troops broke through the gap caused by the withdrawal of Wood's division, I was near the left of the regiment. A portion of the regiment fell back a short distance and joined some fragments of other commands that were endeavoring to make a stand behind a slight barricade of rails. The bullets were still coming fast and thick from the east, and, so intent was I in looking in that direction, expecting every moment to see emerging from the woods an advancing Confederate line, that I did not observe the columns of Bushrod Johnson and Hindman, which had then reformed and had begun their advance northward through the Dyer field, until Lindsay Stinnett, one of my company, touched my arm and said: "Captain, they are all gone." Hastily looking I saw that what he said was true and the next instant I observed the Confederate columns advancing north and within two hundred yards of us. They wore dark-colored uniforms and for a second I mistook them for Federal troops, but a glance at the stars and bars

dispelled all doubt. We were in very close and dangerous quarters. Escape either to the east, west or south was then out of the question, and the only way out was in the direction of Snodgrass Hill. In going we passed through a portion of the field where there must have been at least twenty or thirty pieces of Federal artillery. Not an artilleryman nor horse was near; the cannon had evidently been abandoned and were undoubtedly soon captured by the enemy. My heart sank as I threaded my way through and past them, for the abandonment of our artillery signified to me with more emphasis than anything I saw the extent of the disaster which had overtaken us.

Reaching Snodgrass Hill I took my position near the east end, fifteen or twenty yards northeast of the place where the government observation-tower now stands, and there I remained until after dark, leaving only for a few minutes to assist one of my company who was wounded. About the time I reached the hill, General Brannan had posted his division near the place where the observation-tower now stands, and Wood's division took position on the left of Brannan's. Besides these, there were gathered there fragments of the divisions of Negley and Van Cleve. The latter included representatives of the 19th Ohio, the 9th and 17th Ky., and the 79th Ind., all of Beatty's brigade, and the 44th and 86th Ind. of Dick's brigade. There were colonels without regiments, captains without companies, and men without officers, all gathered promiscuously together. Van Horne estimates that there

were at that time on Snodgrass Hill, all told, about 4,000 men. General Turchin¹⁸ makes the number 6,500. With the exception of Brannan's and Wood's divisions there was little semblance of brigade, regimental, or company organization.

It was at this critical time that I witnessed what I have always thought to be the most striking illustration in the whole war of the coolness and intrepidity of the American private soldier when left to his own resources and compelled to fight "on his own hook." The men on Snodgrass Hill were smarting under the mortification of having been driven there because of a disaster for which they knew they were not responsible and which was not caused by any lack of bravery or discipline on their part. They were resolved to be driven no farther and, facing the advancing foe, they savagely stood at bay. Taking in the situation at once, and acting as if by instinct, they immediately began the construction of rude breastworks on the brow of the hill from such logs, rails, and stones as could be hastily raked together, and then awaited the coming Confederate hosts. Every man seemed to realize that it was now a life and death struggle for the preservation of the Army of the Cumberland. They had not long to wait, for the Confederate columns were advancing rapidly, cheering as they came. Exalted to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by their previous success, it seemed that nothing could stay them in their

¹⁸ *Battle of Chickamauga*, p. 124.

victorious advance. But the men on the hill fought with a desperate courage that I never saw surpassed on any other field. At every point on the line the charge was repulsed, and the hosts that had charged so exultingly were forced to fall back. Again and again they rallied and again and again were repulsed. For more than four hours the sanguinary contest lasted, waged with a valor on the part of the Confederates only equaled by the grim steadfastness of the Spartan band on Snodgrass Hill.

Some time between 3 and 4 P. M., during a lull in the assaults, a solitary cannon was heard and then began a cheer on the Confederate right which seemed to be taken up, regiment by regiment, until it extended apparently to the extreme left. It seemed to me, judging the position of the Confederate lines by the course of the cheering, that we were almost surrounded. I did not then understand the situation but I know now that I was correct in my conjecture.

About this time, despairing of success in their attempt to drive from the hill by direct assault the troops who were so bravely holding it, a portion of the Confederate troops had passed round the north end of the hill and, establishing themselves on one of the ridges, were about to attack Brannan in the rear. The troops on the hill were now subjected to a fire not only in front, but in the rear. Soon after this Wesley Shepard, one of my company, while in the act of firing at the Confederates in front, was struck by a bullet from the rear. The ball struck him near his shoulder and

went clear through his body. There were no ambulances nor stretcher-bearers near and, as I saw his gun drop from his hands, I hastened to his assistance. He was still able to walk with my aid and I took him first to the Snodgrass House. As the ground for several rods about the house was covered with dead and wounded, we passed on to a straw-stack near the Snodgrass stable where I thought to leave him, but fearing that some exploding shell might set the straw on fire, I took him a little farther, leaving him in a fence corner with some straw under his head and bade him good-bye.¹⁴ After leaving Sheppard I hastened back to the little squad of the 79th that I had left, having been absent, I presume, not more than fifteen or twenty minutes. I did not fail to observe that in the field where I left Sheppard a line of Federal troops was on one side facing one way, and on the other side was a line facing another way, confirming my supposition that we were at that time nearly surrounded.

The position of the troops on the hill was indeed most critical, but help was coming from an unexpected quarter. General Gordon Granger, of the Reserve Corps, four miles away at McAfee's Church, had heard the tremendous firing and had rapidly "marched to the sound of the cannon," brushing aside the Confederate

¹⁴ When I left Sheppard the blood was gushing from his mouth in torrents, and I did not suppose that he would live ten minutes, but after having been captured by the Confederates that night, he recovered, was exchanged, rejoined his company in east Tennessee, and remained with it to the end of the war.

cavalry that attempted to impede his march. He reached the hill with two brigades of Steedman's and one of Morgan's divisions about the time I left Shepard. Van Derveer's brigade was also approaching. Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steedman's division were at once deployed, Van Derveer joining them on the left, and advanced against the Confederates who had now gained the north end of the ridge in rear of Brannan. I saw the brilliant charge of Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades, led by General Steedman waving a regimental flag. It was the turning-point in the battle. Fearlessly confronting the advancing Confederate columns, Steedman's troops drove the enemy from the hill and again established the Federal right. But for this timely reenforcement there is little doubt that the Army of the Cumberland would have been utterly defeated and probably annihilated, for Granger had brought 4,000 fresh troops to the field and, what was needed as much as men, a supply of ammunition of which we were now almost destitute.

But the end was not yet. With eleven brigades Longstreet again sought to dislodge the little band on Snodgrass Hill and assault after assault was made. Times of greatest danger develop the highest courage, often making heroes of men who are themselves unconscious of the transformation. On one side were men flushed with victory and fighting to expel from their soil those whom they regarded as invaders of their homes; on the other were men making a last

stand for an army of which they were proud and for a Union they loved; both sides fought with a desperate valor never surpassed in the annals of war. Confederate soldiers were killed in front of the breastworks, some after they had crossed, and some were thrust back with the bayonet or with clubbed musket. When the ammunition of those on the hill ran low they replenished their scanty store from the cartridge-boxes of their dead and wounded comrades and renewed their fire, and those who had no ammunition still held fast to their guns, resolved to use their bayonets as a last resort. Thus the conflict was maintained until night-fall.

No higher tribute has ever been paid to the valor of both the Federal and the Confederate troops who fought that afternoon at Snodgrass Hill than that of General Hindman in his official report of the battle. Describing the assaults, he says:¹⁵

"The movement began at 3:30. Skirmishing extended along the whole line as Deas, at the extreme left, commenced swinging. In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which continued at close quarters, without any intermission, over four hours. Our troops attacked again and again with a courage worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet was used, and men also killed and

¹⁵ *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 51, p. 305.

wounded with clubbed muskets. A little after 4 the enemy was reenforced and advanced with loud shouts upon our right, but was repulsed by Anderson and Kershaw. At this time it became necessary to retire Garrity's battery, of Anderson's brigade, which had been doing effective service. It was subsequently held in reserve. Dent's battery of Deas's brigade was engaged throughout the struggle. Notwithstanding the repulses of our infantry, the officers and men of this battery stood to their guns undaunted and continued firing, inflicting severe loss on the enemy and contributing largely to the success of my operations.

"At 4:20 Brigadier-General Preston, of Buckner's corps, in answer to my application for help, brought me the timely and valuable reenforcement of Kelly's brigade, and within an hour afterward the remaining brigades of his division—Gracie's and Trigg's. These brave troops as they arrived were conducted by officers of my staff to the right of my line, and promptly advanced, in conjunction with the rest, upon the enemy. From this time we gained ground; but, though now commanding nine brigades, with Kershaw co-operating, and all in action, I found the gain both slow and costly. I have never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better."

Some time after dark, probably about 7 P. M., an order came to those on the hill to retire, and that every man should hold his cartridge-box to prevent its rattling, step lightly, and make no noise. The little squad with which I left the hill was under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Oyler of the 79th Ind. It numbered from one hundred and fifty to two hundred men, in-

cluding some of the 79th and some of other regiments. We left none too soon, for a few minutes later three regiments posted to our right, the 21st and 89th Ohio, and the 22d Mich., which had not received the order in time, were quietly surrounded and captured by the Confederates.

Stepping on tip-toe the little band left the hill, no man speaking above a whisper. The deserted camp-fires by which we marched told us that a great part of the army had already retreated. We expected every moment to be halted or fired on by the Confederates. Our way was over a rough road through McFarland's Gap, a narrow mountain pass bordered by precipitous and densely wooded hills, of wild and forbidding appearance in the day-time, and transformed by the somber shadows of the night into a region of almost supernatural gloom. To us, traveling at such a time and under such circumstances, everything assumed a weird look, suggestive rather of the infernal regions than of mother Earth. Now and then from some flickering camp-fire by the roadside a fitful flame shot up, for a moment illumining the dark ravine and showing the haggard and powder-begrimed faces of the passing marchers; but most of the way was traveled in silence and in darkness, with barely light enough to enable us to discern the dim outlines of the file in front. We reached Rossville some time after 10 o'clock that night, and foot-sore and heart-sore, lay down for a few hours' sleep. The great battle was over and the Army of the Cumberland had been defeated.

One need read but little of the literature relating to the battle of Chickamauga to discover that it has given rise to infinite speculation and controversy concerning the causes of the defeat of the Federal army and the errors of both Rosecrans and Bragg. It is, however, generally conceded now that the initial blunder of Rosecrans was in allowing his troops to get so far away from Chattanooga and to become so widely separated without first ascertaining the whereabouts of Bragg's army. So great an army could not long have remained hidden, and, had Rosecrans used proper diligence, he might have ascertained its location in time to concentrate his own forces and so have avoided the disasters that followed.

Before Rosecrans had obtained definite and reliable information of the location of the Confederate army, his own army was in imminent danger of being crushed in detail and, even after the junction of the Federal corps had been accomplished, there was still great danger that Bragg's army would intervene between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, cut off his communications, and block retreat. To avoid these perils required long and hard marching, and for several days before and during the battle the movement of the Federal army was steadily to the left. Day and night, over mountains and hills, through forests and fields, it was moving to the left. When the battle could no longer be postponed, the Federal forces, worn out by hard marching, were pitted against fresh troops on ground of the enemy's choosing.

Moreover, the exigencies of the situation were such that, to supply Thomas with the reinforcements necessary to enable him to prevent Bragg from turning the left of the Federal army and getting between it and Chattanooga, it was necessary to weaken the right continually in order to strengthen the left. In doing this the unity of the organizations of the 20th and 21st corps was broken, divisions were separated from corps and brigades from divisions, so that the troops were placed under strange commanders and subjected to conflicting orders, and all the strength coming from long association of officers and men was lost at a time when it was most needed. As already stated, immediately before the break on Sunday McCook was bereft of all but two brigades of Davis's division, and when the order was given for the remaining two brigades of Van Cleve's division to go to the support of Thomas, Crittenden was left without a single brigade and Van Cleve without a single regiment. The new formations and changes of front in face of the enemy, made necessary by unexpected emergencies, were especially dangerous to the weakened right of the Federal army, exposed to the overwhelming forces massed against it on Sunday.

These facts should be emphasized in refutation of the impression which prevailed generally for some time after the battle, and may perhaps still exist in the minds of those who have not carefully studied the official reports, that the battle on the Federal side was

fought chiefly by the 14th corps and that nearly all of the 20th and 21st corps ran away.

Notwithstanding all the previous mistakes, the result would undoubtedly have been vastly different had it not been for the disaster on Sunday; but for this possibly "Flodden had been Bannockburn." No human being could have anticipated the combination of circumstances which caused it. Mere chances seemed to have developed the actual existing conditions. If these had been prearranged for the express purpose of producing the result which followed, they could not have been made to follow in more exact sequence or to fit together more nicely.

Even after the confusion and partial demoralization following the break on Sunday afternoon, it was possible that the result might have been different if it had occurred to some other general, as it did to Granger, "to march to the sound of the cannon" with even half of the five or six thousand men huddled together in Dry Creek Valley and about Rossville, and to make a stand on Snodgrass Hill with their comrades who were there making such a heroic fight.

Colonel Thruston, McCook's chief of staff, states that he saw Sheridan soon after the disaster to the Federal right and informed him of a short route by which he could effect a junction with General Thomas by marching only about two and a half miles. Had Sheridan taken this route with such soldiers as he could gather together he might have fallen upon Longstreet's flanks, just as the latter was expecting, or might have

taken some other position that would have turned the tide of battle. Instead of doing so he marched seven or eight miles over a circuitous route and did not reach Thomas until 6 P. M.¹⁰ No one doubts the bravery or the soldierly abilities of General Sheridan and we must accept the explanation given by him in his *Memoirs* and by General Davies, his biographer, that, at the time, he thought himself in imminent danger of being cut off from the remainder of the army and believed the route which he took to reach General Thomas to be the only one practicable.

Courts of inquiry were held to investigate the conduct of some of the Federal generals but all were exonerated in flattering terms. The court which sat in General Negley's case went out of its way to censure a general who remained on the field and was conspicuous for gallant fighting at Chickamauga and in subsequent battles. One reading the proceedings of these courts is, indeed, likely to be somewhat bewildered in trying to ascertain the object of the inquiry—whether it was to vindicate those who left the field or to call for an explanation of the conduct of those who remained and fought out the battle to the end.

¹⁰ In fact Forrest's cavalry and a Confederate corps of infantry (Walker's) had by that time intervened between Sheridan and Thomas. At dark Sheridan's heads of columns had advanced only as far as the Cloud House. A staff officer, sent by him to report his position to Thomas, reached the latter only by riding around the enemy. Thomas at that time was preparing to retire and sent word to Sheridan to remain where he was until Thomas's troops were withdrawn and then to return to Rossville.

One general was never called to explain his conduct. No hostile criticism was ever made of the conduct of General Thomas, "the Rock of Chickamauga." Justice to the men of the 20th and 21st army corps, however, requires that something should be said in addition to what has already been stated, concerning the stripping of these corps of troops to reenforce Thomas. Palmer's and Wood's divisions of the 21st corps and Johnson's of the 20th preserved their organization throughout the battle, and no better fighting was done by any troops on the field than was done by these divisions. Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division of the 21st corps also retained its organization. Of the two remaining brigades, Beatty's and Dick's, part only left the field, and a very considerable number were with those who made the memorable stand on Snodgrass Hill. Five brigades of the 20th corps left. These were the three of Sheridan's and two of Davis's. The men of Thomas's corps who left the field exceeded in number all who left of the 21st corps. Van Horne states the facts very clearly:

"As the statement appears in many histories of the war, and even in some of recent publication, that General Thomas with his single corps saved the army at Chickamauga, it is imperative to refute this error, as it does great injustice to the officers and men of the other corps. The preceding narrative gives an indirect refutation, but this prevalent mistake should be explicitly corrected. Generals Crittenden and McCook had each eight brigades on the field, and General Granger had three. And of these nineteen brigades,

twelve were with General Thomas in the final conflict. Five brigades of McCook's corps were cut off on the right, but not more than two from Crittenden's, counting fragments. Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps and Johnson's from McCook's were with General Thomas throughout the battle, and General Wood of the former corps, with two brigades of his own division and one from Van Cleve's, went to him on the second day. Granger's three large brigades constituted nearly one-fourth of the entire force on the final line. More men left the field from General Thomas's own corps, the Fourteenth, than from General Crittenden's. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division were on the right of the breach; a large portion, more than a moiety, of Negley's division was led or driven from the field (Beatty's brigade, through the emergencies of battle and orders of General Negley's adjutant-general, joined the divisions on the right, and at night were found by General Beatty, at Rossville), and Brannan lost a portion of one of his brigades through orders of a general who left the field before the final crisis of the battle. The glory of the final conflict is then the common inheritance of the army, as it was won by the valor of troops representing the four grand units."¹⁷

I have laid particular stress, even at the risk of being tiresome, upon the facts relating to the part taken by the 20th and 21st corps, because of the injustice done them in the early reports of the battle. For this injustice Halleck is largely to blame. In the official report of the battle made by him as commander-in-chief,

¹⁷ *Hist. Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 1, pp. 361-2.

November 15, 1863, he said: "Our right and part of center had been completely broken and fled in confusion from the field, carrying with them to Chattanooga their commanders, Generals McCook and Crittenden, and also General Rosecrans who was on that part of the line." In the same report, in order to emphasize the matter, he says, "As most of the corps of McCook and Crittenden had retreated to Chattanooga, it was deemed advisable to withdraw the left wing to that place."¹⁸

This report was made nearly two months after the battle and it would seem reasonable to suppose that in that time some glimmering idea of the greatest battle fought in the West, and, with the exception of Gettysburg, the greatest of the Civil War, would have penetrated even the brain of Halleck; but we have his own word for it in a dispatch to General Thomas, as late as January 12, 1864, that he had never read nor seen the latter's report of the battle. It is doubtful whether Halleck ever obtained a more accurate conception of the battle than he had of the military operations preceding it, and of these it is certain that his ignorance was impenetrable. If any further vindication of the men of the 20th and 21st corps is needed, it will be found in the statistics of their losses given in the following tables.

The victory, such as it was, had been won by Bragg, but it had been dearly bought. A few more like it

¹⁸ *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 50. pp. 38, 39.

would have annihilated his army. It was too much broken and shattered to strike another blow, and Chattanooga, the prize for which the great battle was fought, had eluded the grasp of the victor.

It is difficult to obtain from the official reports accurate statistics of the numbers and losses of the Federal army in the battle of Chickamauga, and still more difficult to ascertain the Confederate numbers and losses. The following tables are compiled chiefly from the official reports found in the *Rebellion Records*, ser. Nos. 50 and 51, and from the tables given in Turchin's *Battle of Chickamauga*:

NUMBERS AND LOSSES OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND IN THE
BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Organization.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per Cent.
General Headquarters.	2	4	6
14th Corps.				
Staff				1	1
1st D. Baird.....	5,541	181	794	1,202	2,177	39.28
2d D. Negley.....	2,755	66	430	295	791	28.71
3d D. Brannan.....	5,400	325	1,652	214	2,191	40.57
4th D. Reynolds.....	6,461	93	685	176	954	14.76
Aggregate.....	20,157	665	3,563	1,892	6,120	30.61
20th Corps.				
1st D. Davis.....	3,900	124	820	405	1,349	34.58
2d D. Johnson.....	4,200	148	940	554	1,642	39.09
3d D. Sheridan.....	4,200	151	939	276	1,366	32.52
Aggregate.....	12,300	423	2,699	1,235	4,357	35.42
21st Corps.				
Staff.....			3		3
1st D. Wood.....	2,965	132	744	194	1,070	36.08
2d D. Palmer.....	5,005	134	1,031	203	1,368	27.33
3d D. Van Cleve.....	4,000	56	604	302	962	24.05
Aggregate.....	11,970	322	2,382	699	3,403	28.43

Organization.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per Cent.
Reserve Corps. Granger.						
Staff.....		1			1	
1st D. Steedman.....	3,913	212	962	613	1,787	45.66
2d D. Morgan.....	1,500	2	14	18	34	.226
Aggregate.....	5,413	215	976	631	1,822	33.65
Cav. Corps. Mitchel.						
1st D. McCook.....		6	24	254	284
2d D. Crook.....		26	112	46	184	.23
Aggregate.....	8,000	32	136	300	468
Total.....	57,840	1,657	9,756	4,757	16,170	27.95

The character of the ground and the nature of the battle were not favorable to operations of the cavalry, and calculations based on the numbers and losses of the infantry only show a percentage of loss of 31.50. Of the 4,757 reported "missing," doubtless many were killed and many more wounded. The general hospital at Crawfish Spring was captured, and it is estimated by Surgeon Glover Perin, the Federal Medical Director of the Department of the Cumberland, that 2,500 of the Federal wounded were left on the field.

The brigade reports show still larger percentages of loss. Baldwin's and Willich's brigades lost heavily, but no official reports were made of the numbers who went into action, and hence the percentages of their losses can not be given. The same is true of the brigades of Sheridan's division, none of which made any return of the numbers engaged. The following tables show that several brigades lost over 40 and some over 50 per cent.:

FEDERAL BRIGADE NUMBERS AND LOSSES.

Brigade.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per Cent.
Heg.....	1,218	70	519	107	606	57.14
King.....	1,513	61	255	523	839	55.45
Carlin.....	1,215	54	299	298	651	53.58
Dodge.....	1,130	27	200	309	536	47.43
Whitaker.....	2,922	154	654	518	1,326	45.37
Van Derveer.....	1,788	145	600	65	810	45.30
Buell.....	1,445	79	443	129	651	45.05

Whitaker's brigade suffered much the heaviest loss for the time engaged, nearly all having occurred between 2 P. M. and nightfall on the second day of the battle. Of the seven brigades cut off on the right and driven from the field on Sunday, Carlin's and Heg's belonged to Davis's division, Lytle's, Laiboldt's, and Bradley's to Sheridan's, Beatty's and Dick's to Van Cleve's. That they did not leave the field until they had done some hard fighting is shown by their losses. From those of Carlin's and Heg's brigades, given above, it appears that Heg's brigade lost a greater per cent. than any other brigade in the battle, and that Carlin's was third in the list. The losses of the other five brigades are shown in the following table:

Brigade.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per Cent.
Lytle, Laiboldt, Bradley —Aggregate.....	4,200	151	938	276	1,365	32.52
S. Beatty.....	1,384	16	254	61	331	23.91
Dick.....	1,122	16	180	83	279	24.86

The following table of Confederate numbers and losses is taken from Turchin's *Battle of Chickamauga*, p. 240:

NUMBERS AND LOSSES OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE IN THE
BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Command.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Per Cent.
Right wing—Polk.						
Hill's Corps :						
Breckinridge's Div.	3,769	166	909	165	1,450	38.47
Cleburne's "	5,115	204	1,539	6	1,749	34.19
Walker and						
Liddell's "	6,534	341	1,949	733	3,023	46.26
Polk's Corps :						
Cheatham's "	6,454	218	1,624	118	1,973	30.57
Total right wing	21,872	929	6,021	1,022	8,195	37.46
Left wing—Longstreet.						
Stewart's Div.	4,358	205	1,499	29	1,707	39.16
Hood's "	5,500				2,919	53.07
McLaws's "	2,500				640	25.06
Johnson's "	3,428	188	1,081	180	1,449	42.26
Hindman's "	6,122	272	1,480	98	1,850	30.21
Preston's "	4,809	198	1,077	61	1,336	27.78
Total left wing.	26,717	861	5,137	368	9,901	37.05
Cavalry, Wheeler, about.	12,000					
Total Army of Tenn.	60,589	1,790	11,158	1,380	18,096	29.86

It will be noted that the foregoing calculations are based on the statements placing the numbers engaged as :

Federal.....57,840
Confederate.....60,589

Van Horne (vol. 1, pp. 360-361) says that there is no reason to doubt that "General Bragg's army was the larger." He estimates that General Rosecrans had in action 30 brigades of infantry, 5 of cavalry, and 1 of mounted infantry; in all, 135 regiments of infantry, 21 of cavalry, and 5 of mounted infantry, together with 33 batteries, amounting in all to 56,160. He estimates that General Bragg had in the field 35 brigades of infantry and 10 or 12 of cavalry, and that he had in all 70,000, thus making his army su-

perior in numbers to that of General Rosecrans by 12,000 to 15,000.

In *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (vol. 3, pp. 673, 676) are tables compiled from statistics furnished by Adj.-Gen. Richard C. Drum, stating the numbers engaged as:

Federals.....	56,965
Confederates.....	71,551

Colonel Livermore's tables (2d ed., pp. 105, 106) state the numbers engaged as:

Federals.....	58,222
Confederates.....	66,326

The latest computation of the Confederate losses which I have seen is the following, furnished me by Colonel William F. Fox:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Right wing.....	950	6,257	943	8,150
Left wing.....	1,137	6,952	452	8,541
Scott's Cavalry.....	10	39	49
Other Cavalry (estimated).	30	120	15	165
	<hr/> 2,127	<hr/> 13,368	<hr/> 1,410	<hr/> 16,905

To this Colonel Fox adds the following:

"The provost marshal of the Union Army reported that 2,005 Confederate prisoners were captured at Chickamauga. This would indicate a total loss of 17,500 instead of 16,905, as shown in the Confederate returns, some of which make no mention of their missing."

It will be seen that in the tables given above there is not a great difference in the statements of the numbers of the Federal army engaged, the average being about 57,675, but that there is a considerable variation in the figures given for the Confederate numbers engaged, the general average being about 66,155, which very nearly agrees with the figures of Colonel Livermore. The percentages of losses, computed on Colonel Livermore's tables, are about the same as those above given for the Federal, but somewhat less for the Confederate.

General Boynton (*Chickamauga National Military Park*, pp. 227-8), basing his calculations upon estimates of numbers and losses somewhat different from those of the foregoing tables, states the percentages of losses as follows:

"A reference to the losses on each side will show that there has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. Rosecrans's loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records office, were 17,804. Thus the total loss for each army was over 25 per cent. of the entire force of each, and it will be found to average about 33 per cent. on each side for the troops actually engaged.

"Longstreet's wing of the Confederate army lost 44 per cent., nearly all of this on the second day, and the largest part of that in an hour and a half on Sunday afternoon.

"Steedman's and Brannan's divisions, which confronted a portion of Longstreet's assault, lost, the first, 49 per cent. in four hours, and all these were killed or wounded but one, and the second, an average of 38 per cent., while one brigade, Van Derveer's, of Brannan, lost only a small fraction less than 50 per cent.

"For the entire Union army the losses ranged from these maximum figures down to 33 per cent., a terrible minimum of one in three.

"Bushrod Johnson's division lost 44 per cent., Patton Anderson's brigade, of Hindman's, 30 per cent., and most of this on Sunday afternoon. Bate's brigade, of Stewart's division, lost 52 per cent. Preston's division, in an hour and a half before sunset on Sunday, lost 33 per cent., and Gracie's brigade nearly 35 per cent. in a single hour while assaulting Brannan's position on the Horseshoe. The brigade losses in Cheatham's division ranged from 35 to 50 per cent. The aggregate loss in Breckinridge's division was 33 per cent. Cleburne's loss was 43 per cent."

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SIEGE AND BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA¹

By midnight on September 20 nearly all the survivors of the Army of the Cumberland, able for duty, were collected by General Thomas at or near Rossville and were posted across the Lafayette road, at McFarland's Gap, and on Missionary Ridge to the right and left of it. They maintained substantially this position on the 21st. Bragg followed and that night the Federal army occupied Chattanooga; by morning of the 22d its lines were established and fortifications begun. The same day Bragg's army took possession of Look-out Mountain and Missionary Ridge, but the attack ordered by him for the 23d and fully expected by the Federal troops, was indefinitely postponed. By this time the Union troops had learned that the great battle had been as disastrous in loss of life to the victors as to the vanquished, and that their defeat was due to accident, not to any lack of courage or discipline. There

¹ For descriptions of the battle-fields about Chattanooga, the troops engaged and many valuable statistics, I am largely indebted to General Boynton's *The Chickamauga National Military Park*. See also Van Horne: *Hist. Army of the Cumberland*; Cist: *Army of the Cumberland*, and the official reports contained in *Rebellion Records*, ser. No. 55.

remained an army that would have been formidable on any field, and no one in its ranks doubted its ability to hold Chattanooga. Bragg was evidently of the same opinion for his army quietly settled down about the town with the expectation, not of fighting out the Union troops, but of starving them out. The danger of starving them out grew greater every day.

Bragg's army, stretching from the Tennessee river along Missionary Ridge and across the valley to Lookout Mountain, almost encompassed the town. The Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain commanded the river as well as the road and the railroad on the south bank of the Tennessee. To procure supplies from the North the supply trains were obliged to travel from Bridgeport, Alabama, to Chattanooga, a distance of sixty miles, by way of the Sequatchie Valley and over the mountains. When the rains set in the roads became very bad and the exhausted mules died by thousands until the route, strewn with their skeletons, looked, as I once heard it described, like a long extended back-bone. Moreover, this slender line of communication was continually threatened by the enemy's cavalry. Wheeler's troops captured and burned one supply train and every day increased the danger that the Union army would be compelled either to surrender or to attempt a retreat to Nashville, which would expose it to the hazard of utter demoralization and possible destruction. From lack of forage great numbers of the artillery horses died, and the little corn for the few remaining horses and mules was guarded

with the utmost vigilance from hungry soldiers, who were first put on half and then on quarter rations. I sometimes saw men pick up the few grains of corn left where horses had been fed and parch them for food. During the whole of October, while I was never off duty, I was so sick that I had little appetite, and lived chiefly on one meal a day—a scanty dinner procured at the house of a colored man near the camp. During the time of our sorest distress, Jefferson Davis visited Bragg's army and, looking down from Pulpit Rock, on Lookout Mountain, upon the starving garrison in Chattanooga, he gloatingly predicted its speedy extermination.

The situation is thus concisely stated in the report of General Grant:²

“Up to this period [October 28] our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's line extending from the Tennessee river above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads to any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with

² *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 55, p. 29.

only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating forces. Already more than 10,000 animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over Walden Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week."

It was during this stress that General Thomas, in response to a message from General Grant, telling him to "hold Chattanooga at all hazards" and inquiring the prospects for holding out, returned the historic answer, "We will hold the town till we starve."

The timber near the fortifications had been cut down and the proximity of the Confederate pickets made it difficult to procure enough wood with which to cook the few provisions we had. The Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain were continually harassing us, and so near was the enemy to our lines that the moment the Federal pickets left their works to go to the picket stations they were exposed to the fire of the Confederate sharpshooters. Evidently the Confederates expected that the Union army would soon be compelled to evacuate.

On a clear night the band at Bragg's headquarters on Missionary Ridge could be distinctly heard in our camp. We had no army tune so melodious as "Dixie," but when wafted through the still night air from Mis-

sionary Ridge it seemed to have a weird sound, creating in me a strange foreboding.

As the days passed the situation of the beleaguered army became more critical. But relief was coming. Early in October, "fighting Jo. Hooker" arrived from the East with the 11th and 12th corps, and so disposed his troops between Nashville and Bridgeport as to protect a portion at least of Rosecrans's communications.

About this time important military changes were made. Parts of the 11th and 12th corps had been transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of the Cumberland, and, as already stated, they had arrived early in October. Generals McCook and Crittenden were relieved October 9, and the 20th and 21st corps were consolidated into the 4th, under command of General Gordon Granger. The new corps comprised three divisions, General John M. Palmer commanding the first, General Philip H. Sheridan the second, and General Thomas J. Wood the third, which included the brigade of General Samuel Beatty. On October 18th the Military Division of the Mississippi was created, including the three departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland and the Ohio, with General Grant in command, and at the same time General Rosecrans was superseded by General Thomas.

The soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland always entertained kindly feeling for Rosecrans, believing that he had been made to suffer for disasters for which he was not wholly responsible, and that if he had been sustained with the powerful backing at Washington

extended to some other generals, he might have achieved higher distinction among the military heroes of the war. But with all this kindly feeling, unmixed with the slightest doubt of either his bravery or his loyalty, there was also a conviction that he possessed some faults which seriously impaired his usefulness as a commander. He had an unfortunate tendency to set up his own judgment against that of his superiors, and this continually involved him in trouble with them. Moreover, it was thought that he lacked the far-seeing sagacity and careful attention to details which characterized Thomas; that he also lacked the latter's equipoise, self-possession, presence of mind, or some other quality, whatever it was, that in time of disaster, seemingly irretrievable, made Thomas as clear-headed, as imperturbable, as immovable as he would have been if witnessing nothing more exciting than a grand review. Rosecrans had neither the foresight which enabled Thomas to avoid disaster nor that extraordinary quality, characteristic of Thomas but possessed by so few men, which, when disaster comes, however great, develops in them a latent power enabling them to triumph over it. Had Rosecrans possessed the qualities for which Thomas was so conspicuous, the misfortunes at Stone's River and Chickamauga might never have occurred, at least their consequences would probably have been far less serious.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga October 23, and at once began preparations for raising the siege. Toward the end of October Hooker advanced from

Bridgeport, and, after a sharp encounter with the Confederates at Wauhatchie, took possession of Lookout Valley, and the way was speedily opened for getting supplies. General Sherman was on the way with the 15th and part of the 17th corps, advancing as rapidly as the roads would permit; all available troops in the rear were hurried forward to Chattanooga; great siege-guns were mounted in the forts; and on every hand were visible preparations indicative of some momentous movement.

About this time Bragg committed the blunder of diminishing his army by sending Longstreet to attack Burnside in east Tennessee, and Longstreet started November 4 with 20,000 men. On November 7 General Grant issued peremptory orders to Thomas to attack the north end of Missionary Ridge on the following morning. A careful examination showed that such an attack under the existing circumstances would almost certainly fail. Thomas so reported and the order was revoked. This seems to have been the beginning of the ill opinion which Grant ever afterward appears to have entertained for Thomas. The subsequent failure of Sherman, under much more favorable circumstances and after two days' fighting, to make a successful assault at the identical place mentioned in the order to Thomas, justifies the opinion of military critics that, in this instance, Thomas was right and Grant was wrong.⁸

⁸ See General William F. Smith's article, *Comments on General Grant's "Chattanooga,"* in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*,

It was found that the contemplated attack on Missionary Ridge would be impracticable until the arrival of Sherman. He reached Bridgeport, Alabama, November 15, and, in anticipation of his arrival in time, it was decided to begin the attack on Missionary Ridge Saturday, November 21. The general plan was outlined in an order issued to General Thomas on the 18th, in which it was stated :

"However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with his force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him.

"You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and center, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whenever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible, on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the north end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as nearly simultaneously with him as possible. The juncture once formed and the ridge

vol. 3, p. 715; Van Horne: *Life of George H. Thomas*, pp. 160-166; Nicolay and Hay: *Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 8, p. 131.

carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies, by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.”⁴

In this general plan it will be observed that Sherman was to take the leading part and that to his movements those of the troops under Thomas were to be entirely subordinate. The former was delayed, however, by the bad condition of the roads and the attack designed to be begun on the 21st was postponed to the 23d. In the meantime Grant, fearing that Bragg was preparing to retreat before a decisive blow could be struck, ordered Thomas to make a reconnaissance to ascertain whether the Confederates were still maintaining their position. This was done by the troops of the Army of the Cumberland under the immediate command of Thomas, beginning about noon on Monday the 23d, Wood's and Sheridan's divisions being in the lead, the former advancing in the direction of Orchard Knob with Sheridan's division on the right. So secretly had all the arrangements been made that when the troops leading the advance were formed in front of Fort Wood, many supposed they were preparing for a grand review on the open space in front. They were not long in doubt, however, for about 2 P. M. the advance began. So rapidly was it made that Orchard Knob and the high ground in its vicinity were speedily taken

⁴ *Reb. Rec.*, vol. 55, p. 31.

and fortified and that night a battery was planted upon the knob.

Tuesday, the 24th, was an exciting day. Wood's and Sheridan's divisions of the 4th corps and Baird's and Johnson's of the 14th remained in line of battle near Orchard Knob. At intervals the siege-guns in Fort Wood fired at the Confederates on Missionary Ridge, the shells going over our heads and making a most unearthly screeching noise, such as we imagined might be made by some invisible saw-mill swiftly transported through the air and in operation by Satan with a full set of hands.

Other and far more exciting movements occupied our attention during the day. Sherman's troops had arrived on the 23d and he had three of his divisions in position behind the hills opposite the mouth of Chickamauga creek. By daylight of the 24th these had crossed to the east side of the Tennessee river where they were joined by General Jeff C. Davis's division of the 14th corps. One of Sherman's divisions, Osterhaus's, not being able to cross in time to co-operate with the others, joined the command of General Hooker. At 1 P. M. Sherman's troops were formed to begin the attack on the north end of the ridge, with the expectation of carrying it as far south as the tunnel, and at 3:30 they had gained the foot-hills and two high points, separated by a deep depression from the portion of the ridge over the tunnel; but they failed to reach the tunnel, which was Sherman's chief objective point, and at night the Confederates still main-

tained their position. We could not see, but could plainly hear, the battle on our left. All that afternoon the volleys of musketry indicated to the veteran soldier the fierceness of the conflict.

A still more exciting contest was being waged on our right. General Hooker with Geary's division of the 12th corps, Osterhaus's division of the 15th, and two brigades (Whitaker's and Grose's) of Cruft's division of the 4th, had crossed Lookout creek early in the morning of the 24th and had begun the attack on the Confederate forces at the base and sides of Lookout Mountain. This was wholly unexpected, for it had never occurred to us that an attempt would be made to scale its precipitous and rocky steeps. One would almost as soon think of storming Gibraltar. But surely the attempt was being made to carry Lookout Mountain. During a considerable part of the day it was so foggy that we could see only the flashing of the guns, but at intervals the fog lifted, revealing the Federal line in the distance looking like a dark thread, slowly advancing from rock to rock. Then cheer after cheer went up from our own lines, for it was obvious that the Federal troops were steadily but surely gaining ground. Far into the night the flashes of musketry indicated that the weird "battle among the clouds" had not ceased.

A grander sight greeted us next morning, for, as soon as it was clear enough to see, we beheld, floating from the summit of the mountain, the stars and stripes. The mountain itself is grand. Lifting its bold and

frowning front 1,600 feet above the valley below, it affords from its summit one of the most magnificent views in America. But it never looked grander than on the morning of November 25, 1863.

Neither the advance on Orchard Knob nor the storming of Lookout Mountain was contemplated in Grant's original plan. The first was intended merely as a reconnaissance to develop the enemy's position and to determine whether Bragg had begun to retreat; the second was undertaken at the suggestion of Thomas. Both had resulted in surprising and unlooked-for success. On the other hand, Sherman had failed to capture the north end of Missionary Ridge and thus carry out what was designed as the leading movement, to which, as already stated, the movements of all the other troops were intended to be subordinate.

On the night of the 24th General Grant, as shown in his dispatch to Halleck of that date, and also in his order to Thomas of the same date, erroneously supposed that Sherman had gained the north end of Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel. On this supposition, at midnight on the 24th, he issued an order to Sherman directing him "to attack the enemy at the point most advantageous for his position at early dawn to-morrow morning." At the same time the following order was issued to General Thomas:

"General: General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel, with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga creek.

"I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation.

"Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare and ascend by the first practicable road.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT,

"Major-General, Commanding."

When this order was issued it was expected that Sherman on the morning of the 25th would sweep down the ridge from the north end, that Hooker would reach the south end of the ridge near Rossville and advance northward; and it was intended that the appearance of his column, moving north on Missionary Ridge, should be the signal for the advance of the troops under the immediate command of Thomas, who were then to storm the enemy's center on Missionary Ridge. But the next morning it was discovered that the Confederates, though they had evacuated Lookout Mountain, had concentrated their entire army on Missionary Ridge and that, instead of retreating, they were prepared to make a stubborn defense. They had successfully resisted all Sherman's assaults, had fortified the north end of the ridge, and had reenforced the troops at that point. Hooker started from Lookout

Mountain about 10 A. M. to fulfil his part of Grant's plan, but was detained three or four hours at Chattanooga creek, on account of the burning of a bridge by the retreating Confederates, and could not cross until about 2 P. M. Though "anxiously looked for and momentarily expected," by General Grant, Hooker was not in sight at the point where he was expected to be on the morning of the 25th.

The day wore on until noon and still the Confederates were successfully resisting every assault on the north end of the ridge by the troops under Sherman, who now had under his command three of the divisions that he had brought with him, Morgan L. Smith's and Ewing's divisions of the 15th corps and John E. Smith's of the 17th, and, besides these, Steinwehr's and Schurz's divisions of the 11th corps, Davis's division and Starkweather's brigade of Baird's division of the 14th corps—six divisions and one brigade of the thirteen divisions of the whole army at Chattanooga. Confronting Sherman were three brigades—Smith's, Govan's and Lowrey's—of Cleburne's division; two—Brown's and Cummings's—of Stevenson's division, and one—Maney's—of Walker's division.

Of the remaining divisions, three and part of another were in the vicinity of Orchard Knob under the immediate command of Thomas. These were Sheridan's and Wood's divisions of the 4th corps, Baird's division, and two brigades—Carlin's and Moore's—of Johnson's division of the 14th corps. When the assault began, these four divisions were ranged from right to

left in the following order: Johnson's, Sheridan's, Wood's and Baird's. Confronting them were the Confederate divisions of Stewart, Bate, Anderson, and Cheatham, ranged from left to right in the order named.

As expressed by brigades, the comparative strength of Sherman and Thomas and the Confederate troops confronting them was as follows: Sherman had thirteen brigades, and opposed to these the Confederates had six; Thomas had eleven, and opposed to these the Confederates had thirteen.

Hooker had under his immediate command Whitaker's and Grose's brigades of Cruft's division of the 4th corps, Geary's division of the 12th and Osterhaus's division of the 15th. A considerable interval separated the right of Sherman's troops from the left of Thomas, and there was a still greater interval between the right of Thomas and the left of Hooker.

In the forenoon of the 25th Baird's division had been sent to reenforce Sherman, in pursuance of Grant's purpose to make Sherman's movement the cardinal one of the battle, but, as there was no place in Sherman's line for this division, it was sent back, and about 2 P. M. took position on the left of Wood.

All the Confederate army was now on Missionary Ridge, and on its summit were planted fifteen batteries, comprising about fifty guns. There were also two siege-pieces near Bragg's headquarters. The distance from the Federal lines to the top of the ridge was about one mile, and the slope of the ridge, which

was steep and rough, was about six hundred yards in width, its average height being about four hundred feet. There was a line of rifle-pits at the base, a line of breastworks on the crest, and at various intermediate places there were breastworks on the slope of the ridge.

During the forenoon the movements of the Confederates seemed to indicate that they were massing against Sherman, and Grant supposed that, in order to do this, they were weakening their center. This was not true, however, for the Confederate troops seen during the forenoon marching north along the ridge were those that had been withdrawn from Lookout Mountain and the valley. In his *Memoirs*⁵ Grant says: "Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer." In his official report⁶ he says:

"Being satisfied from the latest information from him [Hooker] that he must by this time be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman was weakening his center on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, Baird's division (Fourteenth corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (Fourth corps), and Johnson's division

⁵ Vol. 2, p. 78.

⁶ *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 55, p. 34.

(Fourteenth corps), with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge."

It is not probable that Grant at this time intended that Thomas with four divisions, isolated from both Sherman's and Hooker's forces, the latter not yet in sight, and with the entire Confederate army on the ridge, should make an independent assault with any reasonable expectation of breaking the enemy's center posted on the steep and well-fortified heights in front. It is evident that only a demonstration for the relief of Sherman was intended, with the expectation that, after taking the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, the further movements of the assaulting columns would be governed by further orders, dependent on subsequent developments, and especially upon the success of Hooker's movement.

Soon after the return of Baird, Grant ordered an advance of Thomas's four divisions. Six cannon planted on Orchard Knob were to be fired in quick succession, the firing to be the signal for the advance. On the knob stood Generals Grant, Thomas, and Granger. Near by were Generals Sheridan, Wood, and others whose names are now historic. In front of them was a long line of men in blue, upon whom all eyes were fixed—battle-scarred veterans of many bloody conflicts—standing motionless in the trenches,

eagerly waiting for the signal to advance. It was given between 3 and 4 P. M. and at once began the charge, characterized by Dana in his dispatch to Stanton as "one of the greatest miracles in military history." It was a sight never to be forgotten by those who witnessed it. No sooner had the signal been given than the men of the four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland leaped from their places, eighty-eight battle-flags waved in line, and 18,000 men, making a battle-front two miles long, rushed forward with loud cheers, heard above all the din of battle, and drove the Confederates from their works at the foot of the ridge. At the same instant all the batteries on the ridge concentrated their fire upon the rifle-pits at the base and the bursting of shells made the very sky look as if filled with falling meteors.

Then occurred the grandest spectacle I ever saw, affording another striking illustration of the intelligence and intrepidity of the American soldier acting on his own instincts. The orders given contemplated carrying the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge and then reforming and waiting for further orders; at least they were so understood by all or nearly all the troops engaged in the assault, and certainly by those of Wood's and Sheridan's divisions. But, after the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge had been taken, it was at once apparent that they were completely commanded by the Confederate artillery on the top of the ridge and could not be held, and that the Federal troops must either advance or retreat. This is evident from

the official report of General Sheridan, and it was as obvious to the men as it was to the generals. Without waiting for further orders the advancing troops at once began the ascent of the ridge, the men going first, the officers following, and the *orders* following the officers.

To one who stands now on the summit of Missionary Ridge, looking down its steep sides, the wonder is that an attempt to carry the works on the crest could have been contemplated, and still greater wonder that such an attempt could have been successful. Certainly, until the last moment, Bragg never entertained a thought that such an assault would be made. But there were the Federal troops in long lines rushing up the steep ascent.

All the batteries on the ridge to the right and left of Bragg's headquarters opened a terrific cannonade, firing in front and across the sides of the ridge at the ascending columns, while sheets of flame shot forth from the Confederate troops behind the breastworks on the crest.

The 79th Ind. and the 86th Ind. regiments had been consolidated for the day under the command of Colonel Knefler, the 79th forming the right wing and the 86th the left, and the two being in the front line of Wood's division. When within fifty or seventy-five feet of the crest, at a point a little north of Bragg's headquarters, a halt was made in order to reform the lines. At this moment I looked and saw that Wood's division was considerably in advance of the divisions on

its right and left, and I spoke to Colonel Knefler, near whom I was standing, calling his attention to the fact that we were alone. I am confirmed in my recollection of this incident by the mention of it in Colonel Knefler's official report of the battle.

We were now so near the Confederate breastworks that they afforded almost as much protection to us as to the troops behind them, but our only safety lay in keeping up a steady fire. If a retreat had been attempted every Confederate behind the breastworks would have risen and fired and we knew that such a fire meant certain death to all of us. But no one thought of retreating, though our position for a few moments was very critical. It seemed an age, but it could not have been more than a few minutes, perhaps not more than two or three, before the divisions on our right and left were in line with that of Wood. During the interval I was nearly opposite a gigantic Confederate who stood for a time in one position firing guns handed him by those in the trenches. He looked to me like a demon. Once I thought he was aiming at Colonel Knefler or me and we both lay down. As I lay down a bullet rattled the leaves under me and I noticed from the peeling of a small sapling near by that another had passed just where my head had been the instant before.

We waited only a few minutes, perhaps only a few seconds, for no man can accurately measure the passing time when seconds seem ages, and then the whole Federal line made an almost simultaneous rush and

at six different points, in almost the same instant, the Federal soldiers leaped over the breastworks. General Bragg, after vainly endeavoring to rally his men, barely escaped by galloping at full speed down the other side of the ridge. We found the giant Confederate, whom I had observed a few moments before, lying dead in the trenches, riddled with bullets. Hundreds of Confederates threw down their arms and surrendered. Thirty or forty pieces of artillery stood near the place where we crossed, abandoned by their gunners. It was an inspiring sight. I was myself, for the moment, utterly delirious with excitement. We had recovered not only the guns but the prestige lost at Chickamauga, and I knew then that no higher tribute could ever be paid a soldier than to say of him that he was in the charge at Missionary Ridge. Shortly after this General Grant and all his staff came riding up the ridge, crossing the Confederate lines a little south of Bragg's headquarters. That was the first and last time I saw Grant on a battle-field.

Some further resistance was made by the Confederates on the north end of the ridge, but the battles about Chattanooga were virtually over. Bragg's army was completely broken and in full retreat, and the siege of Chattanooga was ended. So rapid was the advance of the Federal lines that only fifty-five minutes elapsed from the time they started until they gained the crest.

That night we heard floating through the still frosty air the notes of a band playing a familiar tune near

the place where Bragg's headquarters had been. It was not "Dixie" that we had so often heard there but the "Star-spangled Banner." Regiment after regiment took up the cheer until it was heard ringing all round the line to Lookout Mountain.

The battles that ended the siege of Chattanooga will ever be memorable in the history of the Civil War. The glory of the final triumph was shared by the heroes of three great northern armies—the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Cumberland. On the field were four Federal generals whose names stand highest on the roll of famous Union commanders—Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan. No other battle of the war exhibited anything more sublimely picturesque than the "battle among the clouds" and the storming of Missionary Ridge.

Some surprise has been expressed that such an assault as that of Missionary Ridge was successfully made with so little loss of life. In some of the official reports this is explained as due to the conformation of the ground and to the fact that the Confederate artillerymen could not, or did not, sufficiently depress their guns and so overshot the assaulting columns. Grant's explanation¹ is that: "In fact on that occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position." This explanation is all the more singular because it overlooks the fact that the Union soldier

¹ *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 79.

"nearest the enemy," in order to get there, was obliged to travel a mile, going up a steep ascent and exposed at every step to a galling fire in front and on each side. All these "explanations" tend to belittle the achievement of the four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland by creating the impression that, as the losses were so slight, there could not have been very hard fighting nor very much danger, and that, in fact, the brilliant victory won by the Army of the Cumberland was merely a lucky accident. Considering its actual losses and that they were sustained within less than one hour, it does not seem that these explanations are called for.

The tables in the note appended to this chapter show that, in the space of one hour, the four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland which made the assault on Missionary Ridge lost over sixteen per cent., and that two of them lost over twenty per cent., nearly twice as many as all the troops under Sherman in two days' fighting. Such losses in so short a period indicate that the great victory gained by the Army of the Cumberland was far from being bloodless and that it was won by as desperate and heroic fighting as was exhibited on any battle-field of the Civil War.

The battle of Missionary Ridge illustrates very clearly how the plans of the wisest generals may be modified by circumstances that no man can foresee. Grant clung with characteristic tenacity to his original plan. There is nothing in the official reports tending to show that, at the time he issued the order to Thomas to take the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, he intended

by it anything more than a movement for the relief of Sherman in order to enable the latter to carry out the movement intrusted to him. Neither Grant nor any one at that time supposed that the subordinate movement which Thomas was ordered to make would prove to be the decisive one, the turning-point of the battle. But so it proved. It is in regard to this unexpected turn of affairs that General Thomas in his official report says with characteristic modesty :

"It will be perceived from the above report that the original plan of operations was somewhat modified to meet and take the best advantage of emergencies, which necessitated material modifications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results."⁸

Grant underrated the ability of General Thomas. He was equally mistaken in underrating the soldierly qualities of the men of the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman tells us in his *Memoirs*⁹ that when Grant first informed him of his plans for taking Missionary Ridge, he said "that the men of Thomas's army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive," and that for this reason he wanted Sherman's troops "to hurry up, to take the

⁸*Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 55, p. 96. See also Cist: *Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 259-262.

⁹Vol. 1, p. 390.

offensive *first*; after which he had no doubt the Cumberland army would fight well." The result is a sufficient vindication of the Army of the Cumberland.

I have one memento of the battle of Missionary Ridge that I greatly prize. It is the sword of a Confederate captain, surrendered to one of my company and given by him to me. I would gladly return it to its owner if there were anything about it by which I could determine his name. But there is not, and so, during all the long years, I have preserved it with tender care. This sword and my own, crossed in friendly touch, hang over the mantel in my library, mute but eloquent reminders of days that tried men's souls, recalling no feeling of resentment, but inspiring the wish that if they are ever drawn again in war by Americans, it may be in defense of a common country against a common foe.

It is difficult to state accurately the numbers engaged or the losses in the battles of Chattanooga. The official reports do not show the numbers engaged in each battle, and the revised "Return of Casualties in the Union Forces," given in ser. No. 55, p. 80, of the *Rebellion Records*, includes in one table the losses at Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, and the minor engagements in the vicinity of Chattanooga on Nov. 26 and 27. There is no complete report of the Confederate losses. Van Horne estimates that General Grant had 60,000 and General Bragg 40,000 men in action, and that the aggregate losses of the armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee were:

Killed	757
Wounded	4,529
Missing	330
<hr/>	
Total	5,616

Colonel Fox makes the total loss 5,382.

General Bragg's loss in killed and wounded is not known, but Van Horne states that "he lost by capture six thousand one hundred and forty-two men, forty-two guns, sixty-nine gun carriages and seven thousand stands of small arms. His loss in material was immense, part of which he destroyed in his flight, but a large fraction, which was uninjured, fell to the national army."

The latest, and I presume the most accurate, list of Union losses is that given by General Boynton in *The Chickamauga National Military Park* (pp. 137-8), from which I have condensed the following tables:

Battle.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Orchard Knob.....	36	197	233
Lookout Mountain.....	81	390	471
Missionary Ridge.....	612	3,948	4,560
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total.....	729	4,535	5,264

The losses in the attack on Missionary Ridge, as apportioned between the troops commanded by General Sherman and those under the immediate command of General Thomas, were as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Sherman.....	209	1,141	1,350
Thomas	403	2,807	3,210
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total.....	612	3,948	4,560

The two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland which led the advance and bore the brunt of the losses in the assault of Missionary Ridge on Nov. 25 were those of Sheridan and Wood.

Sheridan went into action with about 6,000 men and Wood with about 5,200. Their losses were as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Sheridan.....	130	1,213	1,343
Wood	148	875	1,023
Total.....	278	2,088	2,366

It will be noted from the foregoing tables that each of these divisions lost, in about one hour, over 20 per cent., and that together they lost nearly twice as many as were lost by all the troops under Sherman in two days' fighting.

There has been considerable discussion of the question whether Grant's order for taking the rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge contemplated an advance afterward, *and without further orders*, against the works on the crest. There has also been much newspaper comment upon a supposed "lost order" to that effect, alleged to have been issued by General Grant to General Granger, commanding the 4th corps. As to the supposed "lost order," it suffices to say that it is not probable that Grant would have issued a written order of any kind directly to Granger, inasmuch as, according to the regular course, Grant would have issued his orders to Thomas and he to Granger. There is no mention in Grant's *Memoirs* of any "lost order" to Granger, and the official reports make it clear that Grant's order for taking the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge did not contemplate the assault of the works on the crest, and that, when the orders for this assault were issued, by whomsoever given, the men who had taken the rifle-pits were already far on their way up the ridge.

General Grant in his official report states that the order to Thomas on Nov. 25 was to "carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge and, when carried, to reform his lines on the rifle-pits *with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.*" The inference from this is that, after carrying the rifle-pits, the further movements of the assaulting columns would depend on subsequent developments, and especially upon the progress of Hooker; and we should not infer from it that, after taking the rifle-pits, the troops were to advance without further orders. Other official

reports clearly show that, whatever Grant may have intended, his order was understood by most of the corps and division commanders as not directing an advance beyond the rifle-pits without further orders; that the ascent of the ridge was made by the men themselves without orders, and that the one issued afterward was not given until the men were on their way.

General Granger reports that he was "ordered to make a *demonstration* upon the works of the enemy directly in his front *at the base of Mission Ridge.*" After describing the taking of the rifle-pits, he says further:

"My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had accomplished so much. Although the batteries on the ridge, at short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron and the musketry from the hill-side was thinning their ranks, they dashed over the breastworks, through the rifle-pits, and started up the ridge. They started without orders along the whole line of both divisions from right to left and from left to right, simultaneously and with one accord, animated with one spirit and with heroic courage. Eagerly they rushed forward to a danger before which the bravest, marching under orders, might tremble. Officers caught the enthusiasm of the men, and the men in turn were cheered by the officers. Each regiment tried to surpass the other in fighting its way up a hill that would try those of stout limb and strong lungs to climb, and each tried first to plant its flag on the summit. Above these men was an additional line of rifle-pits filled with troops. What was on the summit of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to inquire. The enemy was before them; to know that was to know sufficient. At several points along the line my troops were ascending the hill and gaining positions less exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, though more exposed to the fire of his musketry. Seeing this, I sent my assistant adjutant-general to inquire, first of General Wood and then of General Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and to instruct them to take the ridge if possible. In reply to this, General Wood told him that the men had started up without orders, and that he could take it if he could be supported. In the meantime an aide-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that

the general wished to know whether the order that had been given to take the rifle-pits 'meant those at the base of the ridge or those on top.' My reply was that the order had been to take those at the base."

General Sheridan states in his report that the original order to him was "to carry the enemy's rifle-pits *at the base of Mission Ridge*," but that after they had been carried, being in doubt as to what was meant by the order, he sent Captain Ransom of his staff to General Granger to ascertain "whether it was the first line that was to be carried *or the ridge*"; that Captain Ransom had brought back word "that it was the first line which was to be carried," but that soon after "Captain Avery of General Granger's staff came up and informed him that the original order was to *carry the first line of pits*, but that if, in his judgment, the ridge could be taken, to do so."

General Wood reports that he was "ordered to advance and carry the enemy's entrenchments *at the base of Mission Ridge* and hold them." After describing the taking of the rifle-pits, he continues:

"When the first line of entrenchments was carried, the goal for which we had started was won. Our orders carried us no farther. We had been instructed to carry the line of entrenchments at the base of the ridge and there halt. But the enthusiasm and impetuosity of the troops were such that those who first reached the entrenchments at the base of the ridge bounded over them, and pressed on up the ascent after the flying enemy. Moreover, the entrenchments were no protection against the enemy's artillery on the ridge. To remain would be destruction—to return would be both expensive in life and disgraceful. Officers and men all seemed impressed with this truth. In addition, the example of those who commenced to ascend the ridge so soon as the entrenchments were carried was contagious. Without waiting for an order the vast mass pressed forward in the race of glory, each man anxious to be the first on the summit. The enemy's artillery and musketry could not check the impetuous assault. The troops did not halt to fire. To have done so would have been ruinous. Little was left to the commanders of the troops than to cheer on the foremost—to encourage the weaker of limb, and to sustain the very few who seemed to be faint-hearted."

General Baird reports that the order to him was to take the pits at the base of the ridge, "as *preparatory* to a general assault on the mountain"; that after taking the pits General Turchin pushed on with his brigade; that, when in the act of starting the other two brigades to his support, he received orders "not to permit his men to go farther and not to permit them to become engaged"; but that "*another order* came in less than three minutes for the whole line to charge to the top."

Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who was on the ground, says in his report to the Secretary of War:

"The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant nor Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the base of the ridge and capture their occupants, but when this was accomplished the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up these impracticable steepes, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully. The order to storm appears to have been given simultaneously by Generals Sheridan and Wood, because the men were not to be held back, dangerous as the attempt appeared to military prudence. Besides, the generals had caught the inspiration of the men, and were ready themselves to undertake impossibilities."

Finally, General Grant in his *Memoirs* (vol. 2, p. 80) says: "Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works, over that, and on for the crest." Other witnesses of the battle assert, not only that General Grant did not order the advance beyond the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, but that he manifested some irritation at the supposed presumption of the unknown officer who had given such an order. General Cist, a member of General Thomas's staff, says:

"No wonder that General Grant failed to appreciate this movement at the time, not understanding the troops who had it in charge. When he found these commands ascending the ridge to capture it when he ordered a 'demonstration' to be made to the foot of the hill and there to wait, he turned sharply to General

Thomas and asked, 'By whose orders are those troops going up the hill?' General Thomas, taking in the situation at once, suggested that it was probably by their own. General Grant remarked that 'it was all right if it turned out all right,' and added, 'if not, some one would suffer.'" (*Army of the Cumberland*, p. 262. See also Piatt: *George H. Thomas*, p. 481; General Joseph S. Fullerton: *The Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga*, in *Battles and Leaders*, vol. 3, p. 725.)

From all this accumulation of testimony, it seems to be very clear that the original order for taking the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge did not include the storming of the ridge itself; that, after they had been taken, it was found that they were untenable and that the assaulting columns must either retreat or advance; that this was as evident to the men as to the generals; and that the men preferred to advance rather than to retreat. It is also clear that, before the orders *finally* given to go on to the summit were received, the men of Wood's and Sheridan's divisions were already far on their way up the ridge. To the private soldiers belongs the chief glory of the successful assault of Missionary Ridge.

I trust that I may not be considered vainglorious or as intending to detract in the least from the credit due the other troops engaged in the assault of Missionary Ridge, if I refer in this note to the part taken by my own division and regiment. Van Horne (*Hist. Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 1, p. 43) says:

"To this general result, each of the four central divisions and those with General Hooker contributed, in coordination and harmony unprecedented in an improvised attack. Each one was successful, though each was not equally prominent in success. From General Bragg's declaration that his line was first pierced on the right—that is, to the north of the house which he occupied as his headquarters—and from the observation of those occupying elevated positions, there is no room to doubt that General Wood's division first reached the summit."

In his official report General Sheridan describes the temporary halt of his division after carrying the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge, and then says: "Looking to the left, I saw a single regiment far over in Wood's line dash up the hill and lie down below the crest." The regiment to which he refers was the consoli-

dated 79th and 86th Indiana. This is indicated in a letter of Mr. Theodore R. Davis, the illustrator of Harper's Weekly, who witnessed the battle and who, in a letter to that journal published Dec. 19, 1863, says: "The color sergeant of the Seventy-ninth Indiana, Henry C. Lawrence, carried his colors far in advance of his regiment, which was the first to commence the ascent. The whole army are admiring him."

CHAPTER NINE

THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN

Wood's division had little opportunity to rest after the battle of Missionary Ridge. General Burnside was penned up at Knoxville, besieged by General Longstreet, and it was certain that he could not hold out much longer unless relief were sent. Immediately after the battle of Missionary Ridge orders were given to prepare for a forced march to Knoxville. General Howard started on the 29th, followed on the same day by three divisions of Sherman's army and Davis's division of the 14th corps, and on the next day by General Granger with Wood's and Sheridan's divisions of the 4th corps. But on December 5 it was learned that Longstreet had retreated after an assault on Fort Sanders on November 29, in which he had been repulsed with great loss. Sherman's and Howard's divisions and that of Davis returned, leaving the 4th corps to continue its march and keep on the lookout for Longstreet.

This was by far the hardest campaign in which the 79th Ind. was engaged during the service, for, after leaving Chattanooga, it was almost continually marching up and down east Tennessee until it started on the

Atlanta campaign. It was especially severe on the men of the 79th because, when they left Chattanooga, they were told that they were going on a foraging expedition and would return in three or four days, and, under that impression, they prepared themselves with only a light marching outfit, leaving everything that could not conveniently be carried. Most of them had no tents and the only shelter they had was such as could be improvised. Supplies of clothing were slow in coming. Nearly all left their overcoats in Chattanooga. I left mine and did not get another until the middle of February. The one pair of stockings with which I started soon wore out and before I got others only the legs and part of the heels remained. Many of the men were almost barefoot before shoes arrived.

Several times, deluded with the expectation that we should remain at least a few weeks, we built comfortable log huts, but invariably the order came to march as soon as they were completed and we were compelled to abandon them.

The difficulty of getting supplies made it necessary to depend largely for provisions upon what could be picked up in the country through which we passed. It was very poor picking. Most of east Tennessee through which we marched was a mountainous, barren region, with only here and there a fertile valley, and Longstreet's army, wherever it had preceded us, had stripped the country. Some cattle, probably driven from Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap, furnished our supply of meat. There was not enough corn

for the artillery and cavalry horses, so the cattle got little or none. It was current rumor that they were inspected every morning and that those were killed first that seemed to be most nearly dead of starvation. It was also said, though I can not affirm this to be anything more than an army joke, that, in order to determine the amount of vitality left in a herd of starving cattle, they were made to jump a ditch and that those found to be too weak to leap across were at once dispatched. The beef from this source was commonly known as "blue beef." There was not a particle of fat in it, we had no salt with which to season it, and it was utterly unfit to eat. So near were the men to the verge of starvation that they often went miles to get a little corn to parch.

There were a few pleasant days after leaving Chattanooga but cold and rainy weather soon set in, causing great suffering. We often marched in drizzling rain or sleet and over roads almost impassable, camping at night with nothing to shelter us but cedar branches. Many in the North will recall the cold first day of January, 1864. That night the 79th was on picket duty near Strawberry Plains and was stationed about half way up the side of House Mountain, which was so steep that unless hung up to the trees one was in danger of sliding down. I had been trying to sleep with my feet next to a log fire, but getting up to replenish it I accidentally poked out the stones placed behind the enormous back-log to prevent it from rolling down and away it went, bouncing twenty feet in

air over the stumps and rocks in its course until it reached the valley below, and from that time until morning it was with difficulty that I avoided freezing. During a considerable part of the winter our base of operations, if in our ramblings we had anything like a base, was the little village of Strawberry Plains, about twelve or fifteen miles east of Knoxville. Our regular exercise was to march from Strawberry Plains to New Market, ten miles farther east; sometimes we went on the same day or the next to Morristown, eight or ten miles farther east, and then we would return to Strawberry Plains. Sometimes we went as far east as Rutledge and once to Bean's Station. At another time we went within a few miles of Cumberland Gap. We also explored Flat Creek Valley and Poor Man's Valley and Rich Man's Valley and ever so many little valleys lying between mountain spurs, some of them not more than two or three hundred yards wide, where the few inhabitants lived in small log-houses, knowing little and caring little about the great world outside.

This was the most primitive region in east Tennessee. It is, I presume, the locality from which came the hogs known in the early history of Indiana as "Tennessee sharpshooters," long-snouted hogs, that lived on mast, ran like deer, and never could be fattened, and so thin that the only way, it was said, to prevent them from going through a fence was to knot their tails.

During all this winter our army in east Tennessee

was what, in military parlance, was known as an "army of observation." We were observing the movements of General Longstreet and he was observing ours—we to see that he did not get back into east Tennessee or reenforce the Confederate army in the East or West, and he to see that the Federal army did not invade Virginia from the west. There was constant skirmishing between the Federal and the Confederate cavalry but little fighting of any consequence, the nearest approach to a battle being a small engagement at Dandridge. It was not the intention, it seems, of the generals on either side to bring about a battle in that region.

I have few pleasant recollections of our campaign in east Tennessee. The most pleasant are those connected with a foraging party ordered to go from Maryville to McGee's Ford on the Little Tennessee, about eighteen or twenty miles distant, and gather some corn which had hitherto escaped the notice of both armies. The detachment consisted of my own company and Company C, and the command of it was intrusted to me. It was the highest that I ever attained in the army and I felt highly honored by it. I was ordered to report to General Willich, then temporarily in command of the division, for instructions. I found him in his tent, a fatherly, benevolent-looking man who at once made me feel quite at ease. After giving me my instructions he informed me that I should be provided with a small steer which would furnish enough meat for two weeks. I have probably inherited from my

Yankee ancestors the trait, for which they were proverbial, of "looking ahead"; so I ventured to ask: "What shall I do after the two weeks are out?" The good old general almost went into convulsions of laughter and, patting me on the head, replied: "Tut, tut, my boy, two weeks in ze army is an eternitee." I never forgot the interview nor the truth of what he said.

Starting with my little force we arrived at our destination that night. The Little Tennessee is a beautiful stream and the rocks and fish can be seen through its clear waters at a depth of more than twenty feet. The valley is extremely fertile, yielding fine crops of corn. Along the river were great plantations, not common elsewhere in east Tennessee, well stocked with slaves. On some of them were as many as two or three hundred.

I was now practically monarch of all I surveyed, and I immediately assumed the prerogatives as well as the honors of a military commander of high rank. I established my headquarters in the best negro cabin on the plantation and my men in others near. The little steer had already been traded by the men to a farmer for a barrel of sorghum molasses. They had been surfeited with "blue beef." But we could not live on sorghum molasses alone. We had no money and but little coffee for exchange, and we were strictly forbidden to pillage. It was not to be thought of, however, that I should let my men starve in the midst of plenty. In this dilemma I resorted to the plan of providing my

foraging parties with blank receipts, signed "Daniel Wait Howe, Captain Commanding Detachment 4th Army Corps U. S. A." The issue was limited only by our supply of paper. The "U. S. A." gave the receipts an official appearance, and nobody to whom they were tendered ever refused them. My impression is that the adjacent region was pretty well plastered over with them, and I fear that they speedily depreciated in value after our departure, but they were good as long as we remained.

When the foraging parties returned they brought great stores. Hams and shoulders were piled in one corner of my headquarters reaching from floor to ceiling. Butter, milk, eggs, honey, and other luxuries were soon added to our larder. The "contrabands" were only too glad to see us and they brought fish and corn pones in great abundance.

I soon ascertained about how much corn a given number of men could gather in a day and established it as a day's work, but the men usually did it in half the time, and I allowed them the remainder of the day in which to rest and recuperate. They soon found a still some distance from camp, and I was informed, but never instituted an official investigation of the rumor, that some of the corn gathered was converted into whisky through the connivance of the "moonshiner" who owned the still.

"There was a sound of revelry by night," for every night there was in some cabin a "stag dance" to music furnished by a venerable contraband with a banjo. If

he could not be procured, some darky who was an adept in the art was engaged to "pat Juba" and keep the dance going. Though I was careful to keep pickets posted, it is strange that we were not all captured by the Confederate cavalry, and I look upon it now as a piece of extraordinary good luck that we were not.

But this luxurious life soon came to an end. At the expiration of two weeks we had gathered all the corn, the division was again ordered to march, and we were ordered to rejoin our regiment. About no other spot in the South do such pleasant memories cluster as those that are recalled by the name of McGee's Ford on the Little Tennessee.

Preparations had begun for the Atlanta campaign and Wood's division left Strawberry Plains April 6, arriving April 16 at Cleveland, Tennessee, where it remained until May 3 when it started on the Atlanta campaign.

The following extracts from my diary given just as they were written thirty-nine years ago, portray better than any language I could now substitute, some of the incidents of the campaign in east Tennessee as I saw them. They illustrate also some of the hardships, the pleasures, the daily thoughts of a soldier in such a campaign, typical, for the most part, of the life of thousands of others in the Civil War.

NOVEMBER 28, 1863.

Rained a little. Turned cool and chilly toward afternoon; moved at 4 P. M. in the direction of Cleveland. Bivouacked at night about five miles from Chattanooga. Our whole corps is in the expedition.

DECEMBER.

3.—Rumored that we are going to Knoxville by the shortest route, living on the country, and that we will draw no rations till we get there. Camped at night a mile beyond Sweet Water, having made about twenty miles.

4.—Marched at 6 A. M. Two men detailed from each company to forage. Marched about twelve miles and camped at 3 P. M. four or five miles from Morgantown. Weather pleasant.

5.—Cloudy. Marched at 6 A. M. The fruits of the forage party were a spoonful of flour and a potato to the man. They "went for" eatables to-day with a vengeance. Passed through Morgantown, a smart little village. Crossed the Little Tennessee about 12 M. Were delayed about two hours by the breaking of the bridge. Marched some eighteen miles. Got into camp at 8 P. M. The question is, What shall we eat? This living on the country is a wretched plan.

6.—Sunday. Moved at 5 A. M. Marched till 12 and camped on Little river. Our regiment was the advance regiment of the column and was, by the new

rule, detailed for picket. Nothing unusual. Rations were issued to-night—the fruits of the forage party. Three-fourths of a cup of meal for four men and a potato to a man. This is living on the country.

10.—Got an old copy of Brownlow's *Knoxville Whig*, giving an account of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, of the members of Lincoln's cabinet, and several interesting articles relating to secession in its then incipient state. This is the only paper I have seen for a long time. The surest way of learning to appreciate the importance of railroads and telegraphs is to be cut off from them as we have been for three or four weeks. Nothing unusual.

13.—Went on picket at 8 A. M., relieving the 19th Ohio. Quite a shower blew up during the night and rendered it very disagreeable. A chance was offered to-day for the first time since we left Chattanooga to send off letters. The brigade postmaster goes to Chattanooga to-morrow for mail-matter and is to take letters. We have received no mail or papers since we crossed the Hiawassee.

16.—Reveille at 4. Marched at 6 A. M. Passed through Knoxville and took the road to Strawberry Plains. Bivouacked at night twelve or fourteen miles from Knoxville. Hear that there is some skirmishing in our front. I do not see how we can go much longer. The men are sadly in need of rations. The fact is, we are not, and have not since we left Chattanooga, been getting even quarter rations. It is grow-

ing worse every day. They all want overcoats also, and shoes worst of all.

17.—Very disagreeable and wet last night. Got up in the morning to find myself in a bundle of wet blankets. Got hold of a paper—the *Cin. Comm.* of December 2, the latest I have seen. It contains a partial account of the action at Chattanooga. Did not move to-day. No news from the front.

19.—Picket at 3 P. M. Visited by—[illegible]—of the 4th Cav., also by Loomis, sutler in same. Conversated a long time with an old lady named Fitz-Jerold. Her husband died about the time Tennessee seceded. His last vote was for the Union and he was hauled to the polls to give it. Her only son of any size is in our army in 1st Tenn. Batt. The rebs took nearly everything and our men the rest. But she is true yet.

25.—Another Christmas dawns upon me in the service. I hardly expected it last Christmas at Nashville. But things look much brighter now than then. Nearly all of the 19th Ohio re-enlisted yesterday and day before in the veteran service. They are making great preparations to go home in a day or two. How different is this from Christmas at home. But I must not let my mind dwell on the unpleasant contrast.

JANUARY, 1864.

I.—Picket at 3 P. M. Extremely cold all day. In fact the coldest day we have experienced this year and here we are destitute of everything in midwinter. The

men are ragged, hungry, and with no shelter except a few miserable worn-out dog-tents. We have one consolation at least—they are thinking and caring for us at home this day. May the good people who are getting up fairs and subscriptions for the benefit of those who are in the field meet with the greatest success.

9.—Spent the day reading old newspapers and a novel, *Louisa Elton*, a southern concern remarkable for the bombast and egotism of its author. It is written by a lady and is dedicated to Jeff Davis as a defender of the "Union of these states."

11.—Accepted the invitation of Sergt. — to visit a cousin (female) who resides about two miles from camp. Started on foot about 9 A. M. Very cold. Noticed boys sliding on mill-pond as we passed. Reached our destination about 10 A. M. Found the young lady, Miss Lizzie, to be a miss of some eighteen summers, of average good looks and intelligence, an ex-schoolmarm, and very communicative. Showed me her album and set me to reading poetry for her. Spread myself in the latter business. Ate a passable dinner. Played cards and conversed a while and started back about 3 P. M.

18.—Marched at 3 A. M., taking the back track. Of course a drizzling rain set in. The roads were in a most wretched condition. In many places it was almost all the teams could do to pull an empty wagon, and men had to be detailed to help them along. We took a roundabout road and reached the Plains about dark without any special incidents. It was a day long

to be remembered as severe in the extreme upon the troops. Turned off very cold and snowed to the depth of about two inches during the night.

21.—Ammunition sufficient to supply each man with sixty rounds was issued this morning. Marched at 8 A. M. Reached Knoxville at noon. Halted just before entering town for the column to close up. Entered the city at 1 P. M. with banners flying. Saw Fred Fout and Columbus Hancock [of Co. I]. Passed through the city without stopping and went into camp two miles from town across the river on the Sevierville road, which we supposed to be our destination. Mounted a horse and went out into a Union settlement a mile or so from camp. Ate supper with a Mr. Bareford, a true blue Union man. He and his wife put me more in mind of genuine home sympathy than any people I have met for a long time. Afterward I visited a Mr. Anderson who is a member of the 3d East Tenn. Cav., at home on furlough. He is a brother-in-law of Bareford and I found them the same kind of people. Although his wife had been cooking three days for soldiers, she said she could not turn me away, and so baked me a dozen ginger-cakes, for which I was glad to be able to pay her. His sister, who lives near and whose husband is in our army, had also been cooking all day for soldiers, and yet one graceless scamp had tried to steal her husband's drawers. Such vagabonds should be shot.

23.—Moved at 8 A. M.—79th in advance. Took the Maryville road. Rumored that our brigade and Wil-

lich's, under command of Willich, go to Maryville to rest a spell. Bivouacked twelve miles from Knoxville.

FEBRUARY.

16.—Started at 2 A. M. A train being ahead of us we moved very slowly, marching a few yards and then stopping five or ten minutes. Any soldier who has ever marched behind a train over a bad road realizes how fatiguing it is. To make matters worse, it was raining, the roads were wretchedly miry, and it grew constantly colder. A little before daylight we halted and threw ourselves down right in the mud, just as we were, and slept for perhaps an hour. By 7 in the morning we were just about two miles from camp. We had not time to get breakfast before the column started. We moved on without much stoppage, reaching the hills in the vicinity of Knoxville just before dark. We camped on a high, bleak hill. Hardly a splinter of wood could be found and it seemed as though the wind would cut us in two. The night was intensely cold. It is this kind of soldiering that kills men. It is nothing more nor less than wholesale butchery.

17.—Remained on the hill all day. It was very cold and snowed during the day to the depth of several inches. The scanty fires emitted little heat and many had to stay in their tents, wrapped in their blankets, and even then could not keep warm. Stiff and sore, too, from yesterday's march, we were miserable in the

extreme. If ever a man thinks of "Home, sweet home," it is during such experiences as we have had the last three days.

19.—Relieved about dark. When I reached camp I felt a strange itching and, upon examination, found I was alive with "graybacks," which I had probably got by sleeping in straw that we procured for beds from some huts in an abandoned camp near by. There was no alternative but to burn my shirt after which I felt considerably relieved.

22.—Spent to-day putting a floor and bunks in my tent. If I can only get it finished it will be the snug-gest arrangement I ever had. The men have pretty much quit making winter quarters. They have put them up only four times since we left Chattanooga and never were permitted to stay in any except those at Maryville, over three days. If campaigning is as active in the coming summer as it has been this winter, this department will afford a fine field for gymnastics and we shall all retire from the service finished acrobats. Opened my desk to-day and examined my books and papers. Sad spectacle. Not a report or return since we left Chattanooga! I am nearly six months behind in my ordnance and clothing returns. Mustered up courage to make out three monthly returns and do some official correspondence this evening.

23.—Orders this morning to clean up the quarters. Ordinarily this would signify that we were to remain here for a few days at any rate. But by the rule of contraries which obtains in this department, it fore-

shadows an immediate movement. It has been said that this division is running an express train to all the little by-places around Knoxville, and it is about time for us to make another trip. Got my marque up to my notion to-day. Am prepared now to go to work at my books and papers and enjoy myself in comfortable quarters. Finis at 8. Go to bed. Grand sequel. At 9, orders to put everything in readiness to march, with three days' rations for the men and complement of eighty rounds of cartridges. Oh! for our old department and our old commander! But I presume this is strategy. It's no use to swear, for like the profane man on a certain occasion, "I can't do justice to the subject."

29.—Reveille at 4. Marched at 5. Passed Mossy Creek Station about 8 A. M. It began to rain last night and continued all day. The roads were very slippery and there was a great deal of straggling. General Schofield passed us again to-day and the boys lustily yelled "hard-tack" and "sow-belly." He took it in good humor and remarked that they "would get harder tack than they had."

MARCH.

2.—Reveille at 4 A. M. Moved at 5. Supposed we were going toward Bull Gap until we reached the railroad when we abruptly turned toward New Market. The 79th was in advance of the division. Am entirely

at a loss to know why we made either the movement here or the movement back. Suppose it's "strategy." Anticipate seeing something like the following in the papers in a few days: "Brilliant movement in east Tennessee." "General Schofield drives the enemy out of the state." "No rebels this side of Virginia." "Longstreet's forces demoralized and deserting by scores." "Whole expedition returned without the loss of a man." About two miles from Morristown we passed the camps of a portion of the 23d Army Corps. Think about half the corps were straggling along the road. The advance of the corps and the stragglers probably formed a junction somewhere between Morristown and New Market. Reached latter place at 2 p. m. and camped. The day has been beautiful.

3.—Listened intently for the "general" this morning, but nobody "blowed the bazoo." Last night the orders were for the men to be kept in camp in readiness to move at a moment's notice. Probably somebody is scared. Or it may be that the express line is to be again opened up to Dandridge. Wrote a letter to-day to ——. Also took a bath, giving myself a good scouring. Luckily I brought a few clean underclothes with me in a knapsack. I have cause to congratulate myself on so doing for not another officer in the regiment has a stitch of clothing except what he has on and no very flattering prospect that his condition will be bettered for weeks. A report of the number of rounds of ammunition on hand was called for to-day, which may portend something and may not. Passed my time

to-day principally in loafing. Think I shall become an adept in it. Weather warm and pleasant.

4.—No orders to move. We shall probably go somewhere soon. I hear it rumored to-day that within three weeks our division will go back to the Department of the Cumberland. I shouldn't be surprised at anything now. Heard to-day from Major Parker the only lucid explanation of our late movements. General Schofield is making a topographical map of east Tennessee and is taking the soldiers along just to show them the country. In absolute despair of something to read or do, I spent to-day in reading a horrid *Mercury* novel—*Catholina or the Niche in the Wall*, by "Dr. J. S. Robinson." I am ashamed to make even this private confession, but 'tis done. I excuse myself in this way: a man hungry for something to read will do as a man hungry for something to eat; if he can not get good he will take bad. Just after I had gone to bed companies I and C were detailed to guard a supply-train which arrived to-day. Received a mail to-night.

5.—It rained last night and I climbed into a wagon for shelter. Got out a little before daylight to warm. When I returned, found the mules had pulled my blankets out of the wagon and had well-nigh devoured one. The train pulled out early in the morning and as there was no further need of my services I returned to camp about 8 A. M. Cloudy and prospect of rain this morning, but it finally cleared and the day was pleasant. Drew five days' rations to-day—full of meat,

sugar, coffee, and half of bread. Also drew clothing, consisting of blouses, shirts, stockings, and shoes. The men are now pretty well supplied with clothing, except shoes, of which there is still a great deficiency, many being nearly barefoot. Hear that slight skirmishing is going on in our front, which is supposed to be at Mossy creek. My impression is that no very heavy engagements will take place.

6.—The day opened gloriously. The sun shone with a warmth and splendor seldom seen in Indiana before May. The songsters made the woods fairly ring with their joyous melodies. The trees have not yet put forth their buds but the meadows are growing green and the unmistakable signs of spring begin to manifest themselves. It being Sunday, divine service was held in the several churches of New Market. I have not seen nor heard anything since I have been in Tennessee which so much reminded me of home as the pealing of the bells. It sounded so sweet and yet so sad, for while it brought pleasant memories it created sad longings. But let us "learn to labor and to wait." O. M. Colclazer [quarter-master] came up to-day, bringing a bundle of clothing for Colonel [Oyler] and me, sent from home. Never was clothing more acceptable. Orders issued to be ready to move at any moment. Wrote to — to-day.

9.—Spent to-day as yesterday—reading and writing. We have at least one consolation now—a daily mail. We get the Nashville, Louisville, and Cincinnati papers regularly by newsdealers, besides the papers

which come by mail. A newspaper is a great thing in camp. Men who scarcely ever read, much less buy, a paper at home, are eager to see one in camp. There seems to be a general desire to keep posted. This may be attributed to the great interest felt by all in everything which affects the conduct or prospects of the war. To the same cause may be traced the interest in politics. People at home have no idea how well posted and how interested the soldier is in the political questions of the day. My impression is that the majority of soldiers are now much better qualified to decide political questions than they were at home; therefore I think they should be allowed to vote.

24.—Relieved at 10. Reached camp about 11. Shoes and rations were to be issued. The shoes were in the nick of time. Four of my company were almost literally barefoot and three others were nearly as bad. Had not finished issuing when orders were received to be ready to march at 1 P. M. Noticed as we marched out that the men had left nearly all their beef untouched, preferring to do without rather than eat it.

29.—Rained all day or nearly all day. Somebody once reproved Dr. Johnson for his malignant hatred of Scotland and threw in, as a kind of sedative, the remark that "God made Scotland." "Yes," retorted the Doctor ferociously, "God made hell, too." I am inclined to feel the same way toward this woebegone waste. It looks like the refuse of creation. It might look romantic in summer-time with the land under cultivation, but it doesn't now by a long shot. The

weather of the last three weeks has been highly favorable to in-door amusements, viz.: rolling one's self up in his dog-tent like a dog in his kennel or a hedgehog in his hole. I should say Diogenes might have made equally as philosophical reflections in one of these as in his tub. (By the way, my opinion of Diogenes is that he was a hoax.)

30.—It has been raw and blustery all day. I have passed much of the time in talking over home affairs with Captain Ellis. What a great pleasure it is to see one who has just come from the scenes to which our memory is constantly going back and where are all that are near and dear to us. It is like seeing them by proxy. How many inquiries we press upon the visitor that attest the eagerness of our interest even by their very simplicity.

"How dear to this heart are the scenes of my childhood,
When fond recollection presents them to view;
The orchard, the meadow, the deep tangled wild-wood,
And every loved spot which my infancy knew."

Capt. Ellis confirms the report I have often heard of the reckless extravagance which is fast pervading all classes at the North. Parties, balls, festivities of every kind—there is no end to them. "On with the dance" is the cry. God forbid that in the midst of all these gaieties the widow and orphan be forgotten.

31.—Picket at 10. Companies D, E, I and C. I had command of outpost No. 2 on the Rutledge road about a mile from camp. Had eight reliefs and seven

men over for stack guards. The day was very pleasant. Being close by a house occupied by an old lady I made a little visit and found her to be one of the most intelligent women I ever conversed with. I believe she had been teaching several years before the war began. On examining the library (for she had a scant one) I noticed D'Aubigne's *Reformation*, Plutarch's *Lives*, Josephus, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, Everett's *Washington*, and several other works by eminent authors. A Latin reader, well thumbed on the page beginning with "*Antiquissimis temporibus*," she informed me belonged to her son, now in the rebel army in Texas. She also told me that the whole family, consisting of nine whites and six blacks, had been living for more than ten days on nothing but boiled corn. I believe her story for in all my travels I have not seen a family in apparently more destitute circumstances.

APRIL.

3.—Troops drew three days' rations. We still get, for a part of our meat rations, the lean, miserable, and unhealthy beef that we have had all winter. Perhaps we are kept in this barren country that we may be starved into eating it and so take it off the Q. M.'s hands. "Hold on there, butcher," yelled a soldier the other day as that amiable individual was about to end the miseries of a very attenuated bovine, "wait for sick call."

4.—Picket at 10. D, E, I and C at the same out-

posts as before. It began to rain shortly after we reached the picket-line and continued all day and night at intervals. Borrowed Everett's *Life of Washington* from the family living near the outpost. It is written with great beauty of diction and in the purest style. Still I do not look upon it as remarkable either for great originality of thought or for presenting any very new or uncommon theories. Being intended as an encyclopedic article, however, it is all that could be expected. I marked one passage which impressed me with its beauty. It is the author's illustration of *genius* in the closing chapter. I also finished reading *Oliver Twist*. Chapters 1, 5 and 14, Book 2, finely exhibit Dickens's humorous powers. The narrative of the murder of Nancy and of the remorse and pursuit and final end of the career of Sykes are striking displays of strong and powerful writing.

5.—Relieved at 10. The creek had risen so rapidly last night that this morning it could not be crossed until trees were felled across it. Companies D and E were not relieved till afternoon. It looked like clearing off to-day. The rain has been warm and the grass and buds seem ready to leap right up. I sat down to-day to the best dinner I have eaten in camp for two months. It consisted of coffee, "slap-jacks," baked beans, and a pot of boiled beef and desiccated vegetables. The molasses for the slap-jacks was made by boiling common sugar. The meal was far better than any I have had since I left Pikeville. The great desideratum all the time has been to get enough of

anything. Started a furlough to-day for Mat. Chandler [of Co. I]. Orders received this evening to march at 6 to-morrow. Great glee and rejoicing prevailed all over the whole division until late at night, it being understood that we were going to Knoxville.

6.—This evening an order from Schofield was read, expressing his thanks to Wood's division. So it seems certain we are at last to leave this one-horse department. We all go without regret. There was great cheering and rejoicing to-night.

7.—Reveille at 4. Marched at 6. Stopped an hour for dinner at noon. Traveled very leisurely, the 2d brigade in advance and Willich's in the rear. At 4 P. M. passed through Knoxville in style with fixed bayonets. Saw nobody that I knew. Camped about three miles on Loudon side of Knoxville. John Israel, Columbus Hancock, and Matthew Chandler joined the company to-day. All our wagons—six—reported to regiment last night and, after unloading, went back to Knoxville for the baggage stored there. The impression is that our destination is Cleveland. It is reported that Major-General Howard has been assigned to the command of the 4th corps and Hooker to the command of the 11th and 12th corps, consolidated and called the 20th. Did not observe anything noticeable at Knoxville except a couple of negro soldiers in full uniform, the first I ever saw. A great many spectators were out to see us pass. All the "nigs" must have been out too, judging by the multitude I saw. We marched about twenty miles to-day. Rained to-night.

9.—Reveille at 5. Column in motion at 7. The rain was drizzling with no prospect of slacking, when we started, but finally, about 10, the skies cleared and the sun came out. The roads, however, were very muddy and marching very tedious. Passed Campbell's Station at 10. The traces of the skirmish there where Burnside fell back before Longstreet are very plenty. Most of the houses and trees about there exhibit the mark of a cannon-ball or bullet. The country through which we passed can not be surpassed for beautiful landscapes. It needs only a river to make it perfectly charming. The land is rolling, the farms are well cleared, and the farm-houses indicate wealth and taste. From the number of orchards, I should judge it a great peach country, indeed a good country for all kinds of fruits. Camped at 3:30 P. M. near Lenoir Station, six miles from Loudon and twenty-two from Knoxville. A portion of Sheridan's division is here.

15.—Reveille at 4. Marched at 6. Athens is a neat little place, said to be a strong Union town. Noticed several handsome buildings, both public and private. It is reputed to have many pretty girls but they didn't make themselves visible. Perhaps the southern beauties were in bed. The country not so good as that passed yesterday. Reached Calhoun about 12. Consumed about an hour in crossing the Hiawassee and getting into camp. Charlestown is opposite Calhoun and is somewhat noted as the place where the "convalesce" whipped Wheeler last winter. Camped on the battle-ground. A meaner place could not have

been selected for our brigade. A couple of regiments are stationed at this point and a fort on a high hill commands a wide scope. The troops stationed along the road seem to be living "old folks at home." Paper collars and blackened boots abound, to which our rough boys call the attention of the owners in no flattering terms. Marched about fifteen miles.

16.—Reveille at 4. Marched at 6, our brigade in advance. The country not as good as that heretofore passed though I noticed a great many very fine farm-houses. Reached Cleveland, twelve miles from Charlestown, at 12. It was doubtless the intention for us to stop here but for some reason we were ordered forward. Went through town in style in column of companies. A portion of Stanley's division is here. This is called the prettiest place between Chattanooga and Knoxville. Did not stop in the town but marched six or seven miles beyond and camped. This turn of affairs surprises all of us and where we will go next is the question. We are only twenty-two or twenty-three miles from Chattanooga. Met General Beatty and staff at Cleveland, also all the recruiting officers except Dick [Gosney], who sent word that he was sorry he couldn't come, wherein I think he slightly prevaricated.

CHAPTER TEN

NEGRO SOLDIERS IN THE CIVIL WAR

The two negro soldiers I observed at Knoxville in April, 1864, were the first I saw, although black men had been enrolled in the Federal armies long before that time. During the progress of the war a marked change was brought about in the attitude of the people of both North and South, not only as to the question of freeing the negroes, but also of arming them. It was, however, a change caused by the exigencies of the war, rather than by any change of sentiment in regard to the moral aspects of slavery. At the beginning of the war the radical element in the North would have preferred to let the seceding states go rather than that they should remain in the Union with slavery; before the war closed the radical leaders in the South would have preferred to let slavery go if by so doing they could have remained out of the Union. The evidence is abundant and convincing that, before the close of the war, many of the radical leaders of the South would willingly have consented to universal emancipation if by so doing they could have saved the Confederacy. The study of the causes operating to produce such a revolution of ideas is both curious and interesting.

The value of the services of the slaves to the Confederate cause was manifest from the beginning. Jefferson Davis says:¹

"Much of our success was due to the much-abused institution of African servitude, for it enabled the white men to go into the army, and leave the cultivation of their fields and the care of their flocks, as well as of their wives and children, to those who, in the language of the Constitution, were 'held to service or labor.'"

This fact was soon perceived in the North. At an early stage of the war the slaves were also employed in building forts and breastworks and in various places at first filled by white men, thus relieving an equal number of white soldiers for service in the Confederate ranks. This also was seen and its significance was appreciated in the North and especially in the northern armies. It was obvious that whatever would weaken the allegiance of the slaves to their masters and induce them to favor the Federal cause would weaken the Confederate armies and the Confederate cause. The emancipation proclamation was, therefore, a logical war measure, and it was on this ground that many in the North and in the northern armies, at first hostile to emancipation, were at a later period induced to favor it.

If the first step in severing the allegiance of the slave to his master was to declare his freedom, then obvious-

¹ *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. 1, p. 303.

ly the next step was to arm him so that he might fight for it; because, in fighting for his freedom, he was not only directly aiding the Federal armies, but was inspiring his fellow-slaves to do likewise. Thus a dangerous enemy of the South and a zealous ally of the North was developed in the very heart of the Confederacy.

But, when it was first suggested, the idea of arming negroes and enrolling them as soldiers in the Federal armies aroused violent opposition in the North and furnished new arguments to those who denounced the prosecution of the war as an Abolition crusade.

The first act of Congress authorizing the enlistment of colored soldiers was passed July 17, 1862, after very bitter opposition, particularly from the members representing the border states, but this act discriminated between the slaves of loyal and those of disloyal citizens. Few colored men enlisted, and the first order for raising colored troops was issued by the War Department August 25, 1862, to General Saxton, in command at Hilton Head, South Carolina, authorizing him to enlist and equip "such number of volunteers of African descent as he might deem expedient, not exceeding five thousand." When the order was issued it was accompanied with the remark, "This must never see daylight, because it is so much in advance of public sentiment." It was not until 1863 that the work of enrolling colored troops in the Federal armies was begun in earnest. The first order for raising colored troops in the free states was issued from the War

Department January 20, 1863, to Governor Andrew of Massachusetts. It was not until March 3, 1864, that Congress passed an act making free the families of colored soldiers, and not until later in that year that colored soldiers were allowed the same pay and emoluments as white soldiers.

The first colored regiment mustered into the United States service was the First Louisiana Native Guard, raised by General Butler in New Orleans and recruited chiefly among the free blacks. It was mustered in September 27, 1862. Another, organized in Kansas but recruited chiefly from Missouri slaves, was mustered in January 13, 1863, as the First Kansas Colored Volunteers, but the name was afterward changed to that of 79th U. S. Colored Infantry. The first colored regiment raised in a seceding state from former slaves was recruited in South Carolina, of which T. W. Higginson was commissioned colonel. Its organization was begun by order of General Hunter in May, 1862, but not completed until January 31, 1863. It was at first called the First South Carolina but afterward the 33d U. S. Colored Infantry. The first colored regiment raised in a northern state and recruited from free blacks was the 54th Massachusetts, organized in Massachusetts, but recruited from several northern states. Its organization was begun in February and completed in May, 1863. The total number of colored troops enrolled in the Federal

armies during the war was 178,975, of whom 99,337 were recruited in the southern states.²

The idea of enlisting negro soldiers was not at first favorably received in the northern armies. The opposition was plainly manifest in the Army of the Potomac during McClellan's command of that army. Nor was the idea generally favored in the Army of the Cumberland. There were never many colored soldiers in that army. They were at first viewed with curiosity by the white troops, but all finally came to the conclusion that the black man might quite as well help the Union cause by fighting for his freedom and that, in so doing, he was far better employed than he was when helping to construct Confederate forts and breastworks.

So vindictive was the feeling inspired in the South by the enrollment of negroes in the northern armies, that, in 1863, the Confederate Congress passed an act providing that "every white commissioned officer commanding negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate states shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection and shall, if captured, *be put to death* or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court," and also providing that the negro and mulatto soldiers so captured should be delivered to the authorities of

² For a history of the Federal legislation on the subject and the organization and enrollment of colored soldiers in the Federal armies, see Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, vol. 3, pp. 357-379, 403-414; Fox, *Regimental Losses*, pp. 52-56; Appleton's *Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1863, pp. 25-29.

the states wherein captured, "to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such state or states."

During the first two years of the war few could have been found in the South bold enough to advocate the dangerous experiment of arming the slaves and putting them into the Confederate armies. In the North, even at this day, many would probably be surprised to learn of the gradual change of sentiment in the South on this proposition. It affords most striking proof that, long before the close of the war, the desperate nature of the contest was appreciated by the southern leaders; for, in their eagerness to save the Confederacy, they were ready to throw overboard slavery itself.

The first significant evidence of this change of sentiment is found in the proceedings of a meeting of the officers of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee at Dalton, Georgia, January 2, 1864. The meeting was attended by Joseph E. Johnston, the general commanding, Generals Hardee, Walker, Stewart, and others. Patrick Cleburne, one of the most noted generals of the army, read an elaborate paper prepared for the evident purpose of being circulated in the army if approved by the meeting.

The paper set forth the depletion of the Confederate armies, the constantly increasing number of desertions, and the discouragement of the Confederate soldiers, who were "growing weary of hardships and slaugh-

ters" which promised no results, and portrayed in strong language the impending danger of "subjugation." One of the three great causes "operating to destroy" them was alleged to be slavery, which from being one of their "chief sources of strength at the commencement of the war," had now become, "in a military point of view, one of their chief sources of weakness." The paper emphasized the reasons for regarding slavery as a source of weakness to the Confederacy:

"Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, whether by the actual presence or the approach of the enemy, or even by a cavalry raid, the whites can no longer, with safety to their property, openly sympathize with our cause. The fear of their slaves is continually haunting them, and from silence and apprehension many of these soon learn to wish the war stopped on any terms. The next stage is to take the oath to save property, and they become dead to us, if not open enemies. To prevent raids we are forced to scatter our forces, and are not free to move and strike like the enemy; his vulnerable points are carefully selected and fortified depots. Ours are found in every point where there is a slave to set free. All along the lines slavery is comparatively valueless to us for labor, but of great and increasing worth to the enemy for information. It is an omnipresent spy system, pointing out our valuable men to the enemy, revealing our positions, purposes, and resources, and yet acting so safely and secretly that there is no means to guard against it. Even in the heart of our country, where our hold upon this secret espionage is firmest, it waits but the opening fire of the enemy's battle line

to wake it, like a torpid serpent, into venomous activity."

In order, therefore, to fill the ranks of the Confederate armies, to insure the sympathy of foreign nations, and to infuse new life into the decaying Confederacy it was proposed "that we retain in service for the war all troops now in service and that we immediately commence training a large reserve of the most courageous of our slaves, and further that we guarantee freedom within a reasonable time to every slave in the South who shall remain true to the Confederacy in this war."

General Cleburne recognized, not only the absurdity, but the danger, of arming the slaves without freeing them. It would be preposterous, he argued, to expect the negro to fight against the hope of freedom with any degree of enthusiasm:

"Therefore," he adds, "we must bind him to our cause by no doubtful bonds; we must leave no possible loophole for treachery to creep in. The slaves are dangerous now, but armed, trained, and collected in an army, they would be a thousandfold more dangerous; therefore when we make soldiers of them we must make free men of them beyond all question, and thus enlist their sympathies also."

General Patton Anderson, who attended the conference, felt moved to write General Leonidas Polk a confidential letter on the subject of Cleburne's "monstrous proposition" and his own feelings "on being

confronted by a project so startling in its character—may I say, so revolting to southern sentiment, southern pride, and southern honor.” He adds: “Not the least painful of the emotions awakened by it was the consciousness which forced itself upon me that *it met with favor by others, besides the author, in high station then present.*”

Somehow the matter reached the ears of Jefferson Davis and thereupon his Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, wrote a letter to General Johnston expressing the earnest convictions of the President that “the dissemination or even promulgation of such opinions under the present circumstances of the Confederacy, whether in the army or among the people, can be productive only of discouragement, distraction, and dissension,” and General Johnston was requested to communicate the President’s views to the officers present at the meeting “and urge on them the suppression, *not only of the memorial itself, but likewise of all discussion and controversy respecting or growing out of it.*”³

The question of arming the slaves continued to be agitated in the South, and was favorably considered, though public sentiment never quite reached the point of universal emancipation. The *Richmond Enquirer*, in an editorial, October 6, 1864,⁴ said:

“Whenever the subjugation of Virginia or the em-

³ The memorial itself and the correspondence relating to it will be found in *Reb. Rec.*, ser. 1, vol. 52, pt. 2, pp. 586, 598, 606, 608.

⁴ McPherson: *Hist. of the Rebellion*, p. 428.

ployment of her slaves as soldiers are alternative positions, then certainly we are for making them soldiers and giving freedom to those negroes that escape the casualties of battle."

Jefferson Davis foreshadowed his own views in a message to the Confederate Congress, November 7, 1864, in which he said :

"Should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems to be no reason to doubt what should then be our decision."

General Lee also became a convert to the proposition for arming the slaves, and, in a letter written January 11, 1865, to Andrew Hunter, expressing his views on the subject, he said :

"I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social institutions. My own opinion is that we should employ them without delay. I believe that, with proper regulations, they can be made effective soldiers. They possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled with that moral influence which in our country the white man possesses over the black, furnish the best foundation for that discipline which is the surest guarantee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be to secure their fidelity. There have been formidable armies composed of men having no interests in the

country for which they fought beyond their pay or the hope of plunder. But it is certain that the best foundation upon which the fidelity of an army can rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar hardships and privations, is the personal interest of the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an interest we can give our negroes by granting immediate freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of the war to the families of those who discharge their duties faithfully, whether they survive or not, together with the privilege of residing at the South."

On February 7, 1865, a letter from General Lee to General Wise was published, thanking the latter's brigade for resolutions adopted declaring that they would consent to gradual emancipation for the sake of peace. Jefferson Davis, explaining his own change of mind, says:⁵ "Subsequent events advanced my views from a prospective to a present need for the enrollment of negroes to take their place in the ranks." On February 8, 1865, Senator Brown of Mississippi introduced a resolution in the Confederate Senate that, if adopted, would have freed 200,000 negroes and put them into the army, but this was defeated the next day in secret session. On February 11 a bill was introduced in the Confederate House of Representatives, authorizing the enrollment of 200,000 slaves with the consent of their masters. While it was pending, General Lee wrote a letter to E. Barksdale of the House, urging its passage. On the subject of

⁵ *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. 1, pp. 515-519.

emancipation he said, "I think those who are employed should be freed. It would be neither just nor justice, in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves." The proposed bill was defeated February 23 by the vote of Senator Hunter of Virginia, who, while it was under discussion, made a bitter speech opposing it, in which he said:

"When we left the old government we thought we had got rid forever of the slavery agitation; but, to my surprise, I find that this [the Confederate] government assumes power to arm the slaves, which involves also the power of emancipation. This proposition would be regarded as a confession of despair. If we are right in passing this measure, we are wrong in denying to the old government the right to interfere with slavery and to emancipate slaves. If we offer the slaves their freedom as a boon, we confess that we were insincere and hypocritical in saying slavery was the best state for the negroes themselves. I believe that the arming and emancipating the slaves will be an abandonment of the contest. To arm the negroes is to give them freedom. When they come out scarred from the conflict they must be free."

On March 4 the bill was again taken up and passed, Senator Hunter voting for it under instructions from the Virginia legislature.

The negro soldier bill passed by the Confederate Congress March 9, 1865, authorized the President of the Confederacy "to ask for and accept from the owners of slaves the services of such number of able-bodied negro men as he may deem expedient for and

during the war, to perform military services in whatever capacity he may direct." It also provided for the organization of such troops into companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, and that while in the service they should "receive the same rations, clothing, and compensation as allowed troops in the same branch of service."

A proviso was added to the bill before its final passage, providing that "not more than 25 per cent. of the male slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 in any state should be called for under the provision of this act." Section 5 of the act expressly provided "that nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize a change in the relation of said slaves."

On February 25, 1865, the legislature of Virginia also passed an act authorizing the governor of the state "to call for volunteers from among the slaves and free negroes of the state to aid in the defense of the capital and such other points as may be threatened by the public enemy."⁶

It will be observed that there was nothing in either the act of the Confederate Congress or in that of the Virginia legislature providing for emancipation, immediate or gradual. But, as had been pointed out by Generals Cleburne and Lee, it was futile to arm

⁶ For the history of Confederate legislation on the subject of negro soldiers, see McPherson: *Hist. of the Rebellion*, pp. 282, 283, 427, 429, 611, 612; Davis: *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, vol. 1, pp. 514-519; Pollard: *The Lost Cause*, pp. 659-660; Jones's *Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 413-444.

the slaves without giving them their freedom; it was worse than futile—it was suicidal. Nevertheless, the negro soldiers' bill held out some hope, and Mr. Jones records in his *Diary* under date of March 17:

"We shall have a negro army. Letters are pouring into the department from men of military skill and character, asking authority to raise companies, battalions, and regiments of negro troops. It is the desperate remedy for the very desperate case—and may be successful. If 300,000 efficient soldiers can be made of this material, there is no conjecturing where the next campaign may end."

It was then too late to raise an army of Confederate negroes, with or without emancipation. There were not arms enough for them; there was not time sufficient to organize and drill them. The Confederacy was in the throes of dissolution. Pollard speaks with bitterness of this last puerile attempt of the southern leaders to galvanize into life the dying Confederacy:¹

"Such paltry legislation, indeed, may be taken as an indication of that vague desperation in the Confederacy which grasped at shadows; which conceived great measures, the actual results of which were yet insignificant; which showed its sense of insecurity—and yet, after all, had not nerve enough to make a practical and persistent effort at safety."

Calling on the negroes at this stage of the war to enlist in the Confederate armies was like calling spir-

¹ *The Lost Cause*, p. 660.

its from the vasty deep. They did not come. A few were gathered together in Richmond, about twenty all told, including three slaves of Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, and these were paraded through the streets as an illustration of the loyalty of the southern negroes to the cause of their masters and as an inspiring example to their fellows. The loyalty of the slaves or that of their masters had waned, and a draft was ordered. The 3d day of April, 1865, was appointed to begin the conscription of negroes for the Confederate armies.

But there were to be no more drafts in the South for either black or white men. Before the 3d day of April arrived, Lee had evacuated Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his cabinet had fled; the members of the Confederate Congress were fugitives, the Confederate government had disappeared, and the city of Richmond was on fire. On the day set for the draft, amidst the smoke and flames of the burning city, 10,000 black soldiers were marching through the streets singing "John Brown" and scattering broadcast the emancipation proclamation, and thousands upon thousands of the resident Richmond negroes were joining in the joyful chorus:

"Glory, glory hallelujah,
Glory, glory hallelujah,
Glory, glory hallelujah,
We is free to-day."

The black soldiers who marched were not Confederate conscripts; they wore the blue and carried the stars and stripes.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

The future historian who looks for a date from which to trace the decline and fall of the Confederacy, will probably fix upon July 4, 1863. On that day the news of two great Federal victories, one at Gettysburg, the other at Vicksburg, thrilled the northern heart and cast a gloom over the South which never lifted. Lee's defeat ended all hope of successful invasion of the North, and the surrender of Vicksburg opened the Mississippi and practically cut off all the country west of it from the Confederacy.

Public sentiment in the North underwent a rapid and radical change. The fall elections of 1863 unmistakably showed the turning tide. In Ohio, Indiana, and other western states large numbers of the Democratic party were loyal to the Federal government and, while those known as "copperheads" became more and more venomous, their power to harm the Federal cause diminished and they came to be universally despised by all decent citizens, both in the North and in the South. In fact, after the Morgan raid, the "Peace at any Price" platform at Chicago, and the exposures in the treason trials at Indianapolis of the infamous

schemes of the Sons of Liberty, public sentiment underwent a change so marked that nothing more was needed to solidify the whole North.

The resources of the Federal government seemed to be inexhaustible and, notwithstanding the enormous expenses of the war and the steady drain of men, there was no abatement of the martial spirit that pervaded the North, now thoroughly aroused, determined, and confident of ultimate success. The three-years' troops who had entered the service in 1861 and 1862 were now veteran soldiers. Many of them, on the expiration of their terms of enlistment, reenlisted. On January 1, 1864, there were on the Union army rolls 860,737 men—nearly twice the number on the Confederate rolls. To insure enough soldiers, drafts for three-years' men were ordered February 1, 1864, for 500,000, and March 14, for 200,000 more. On April 23, the Federal government accepted a tender from the governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin of 85,000 hundred-day men. Between that date and July 18, 83,612 men were mustered into the United States' service for 100 days. There was no lack of men.

On the other hand the Confederacy was now on the defensive. It had been shorn of a large part of its territory by the opening of the Mississippi; it was hard pushed for means to carry on the government and to maintain its armies in the field; and by the beginning of the year 1864, it was evident that it was in process of rapid disintegration. All hope of for-

eign intervention had vanished and Jefferson Davis is reported to have replied to some one who inquired about the prospect of it, "We have no friends abroad."

The Federal blockade was now so stringent that all foreign trade was cut off and nothing could be taken into or out of the Confederacy except in occasional blockade runners and at great risks. The Confederacy had no credit abroad or at home. Its financial system, if it can be called a system, violated every cardinal principle of national finance, and, in the issue of paper money, the wildest dreams of "fiaters" were realized. As the volume of irredeemable currency expanded, prices went up and the result, inevitable in such cases, was that those receiving fixed salaries, especially salaries fixed by law, were the first and greatest sufferers. The railroads were largely used for military purposes, and in Richmond and other cities, dependent chiefly on the railroads for supplies, provisions commanded exorbitant prices.

The fallacy of the fascinating idea that government can, by mere paper decrees, create value out of nothing was never more clearly illustrated than it was in the financial measures of the Confederate government.

"The consequences of this ignorant and wild financial policy," says Mr. Pollard,¹ "were, that, by the next meeting of Congress, the volume of currency was at least four times what were the wants of the community for a circulating medium; that prices were in-

¹ *Southern History of the War*, vol. 2, pp. 233-4.

flated more than an equal degree, for want of confidence in the paper of the government had kindled the fever of speculation; that the public credit, abused by culpable ignorance and obstinate empiricism, had fallen to an ebb that alarmed the country more than any reverse in the military fortunes of the war; and that the government was forced to the doubtful and not very honorable expedient of attempting to restore its currency by a system of demonetizing its own issues.

"The redundancy of the currency was the chief cause of its depreciation. The amount of money in circulation in the South, in time of peace, was \$80,000,000. In January, 1863, it was \$300,000,000. In September, 1861, Confederate notes were about equal to specie; before December, specie was at 20 per cent. premium; before April, 1862, it was at 50 per cent.; before last of September, at 100; before December, at 225; before February, at 280; and in the spring of 1863, at the frightful premium of 400 per cent., while bank bills were worth 190 cents on the dollar.

"Since the foundation of the Confederate government, its finances had been grossly mismanaged. The treasury note was a naked promise to pay; there was no fund pledged for its redemption; and the prospect of the rigid liquidation of the enormous debt that this class of paper represented six months after the restoration of peace, depended solely on the speculative prospect of a foreign loan to the amount of many hundred millions of dollars. At the commencement of the war the South had the elements for the structure of one of the most successful and elastic schemes of finance that the world had seen. The planters were anxious to effect the sales of their cotton and tobacco to the Confederate States; these would have supplied the

government with a basis of credit which would have been extended as the prices of these staples advanced, and therefore kept progress with the war; but this scheme was opposed by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Memminger, and defeated by his influence. He was unfortunately sustained by an executive grossly incompetent on subjects of finance; which was ignorant of the principle of political economy that there are no royal ways of making money out of nothing, that governments must raise money in the legitimate way of taxation, loans, etc.; which relied upon the manufacture of a revenue out of naked paper obligations; and which actually went to the foolish extremity of recommending that the creditors of the government should take their payment in currency rather than in the public stocks. It appears, indeed, that our government was ignorant of the most primitive truths of finance, and that it had not read in history or in reason the lesson of the *fatal connection between currency and revenue.*"

A southern writer² has given some Richmond prices during the first three months of the year 1864. Flour sold at \$200 per barrel; meal at \$50 per bushel; beans at \$75 per bushel; bacon at \$7.75 per pound; butter at \$8 per pound; sugar at \$10 to \$12 per pound; and \$40 was asked for "an old, tough turkey gobbler." Fabulous prices were also demanded for clothing and all other necessities of life.

Various financial expedients had been tried. On February 17, 1864, a new funding law was passed, and also an act largely increasing taxation and author-

²Jones: *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 122-179.

izing the collection of taxes in kind. The purpose of the funding act, as expressed in the title, was "to reduce the currency and to authorize a new issue of notes and bonds." It was "hoped that as money got scarcer food and raiment would get cheaper." But the funding of old notes did not keep pace with the issue of new ones. Eight hundred or 1,000 millions of the old notes had been issued; 200 to 250 millions were funded, leaving over 600 millions outstanding. The Confederate Secretary of the Treasury is reported to have said that he could make "2,000,000 to 3,000,000 of the new currency per day." How much he did issue, there is no way of ascertaining, but he made all that was called for; prices continued to advance and there were renewed complaints against the "extortioners" who charged such enormous sums for everything that people were obliged to buy.

Before the opening of the great campaign of 1864, the Confederate currency had so depreciated that it had practically ceased to afford any certain measure of values and, consequently, had ceased to be a medium of exchange. The result was that the people in their commercial transactions returned to the primitive system of barter.³ In the agricultural regions, likely to be traversed by either the Federal or the Confederate armies, there was little encouragement for the farmer

Prof. Schwab in *The Confederate States of America* has given an exhaustive financial history of the Confederacy and has clearly shown to what desperate straits the Confederate government had been reduced prior to the last year of the war.

to raise more than was absolutely necessary for his own use. He was in danger of foe and friend alike. If Federal troops came by they took what he had and paid him nothing; if Confederate troops visited him they took what they wanted and paid him in depreciated currency; if he chanced to escape both and took his surplus to market, he could get nothing but a wad of worthless paper. Under such conditions commerce was paralyzed, manufactures and agriculture languished, and all business suffered.

Dire distress was on every hand and destitution in many homes. A southern writer⁴ has given a graphic description of *Hard Times in the Confederacy*; of the fabulous prices of all the necessities of life; of the substitutes people were compelled to use in place of luxuries formerly enjoyed. Those who liked coffee were obliged to content themselves with a decoction of dried sweet potatoes; old ladies who loved their tea "drowned their happy memories of hyson in a solution of raspberry leaves"; the children ate ginger-cakes sweetened with sorghum; all kinds of make-shifts were resorted to in desperate attempts to preserve an appearance of gentility by bringing forth from old closets and garrets the antiquated and battered hats and bonnets that had been worn "before the war"; even the insignia of rank of a distinguished Confederate general were made of some yellow flan-

⁴ A. C. Gordon, *Century Mag.*, vol. 36, p. 761.

nel procured from children's petticoats that his wife had resurrected. We may smile when reading all this, but there are few that will not agree with the writer that "though there is something ludicrous in it all, the humor of it touches so nearly the outer edge of the heroic as to seem strangely like pathos."

The Confederacy was driven to the severest straits in maintaining its armies. Its military strength had been largely spent. Sweeping conscription acts that seemed to rob the cradle and the grave for recruits had been passed by the Confederate Congress and were unsparingly enforced. The first of these had aroused violent opposition, but one still more sweeping was passed February 11, 1864, subjecting to conscription all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty, and providing that all then in service between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be retained during the war. The opposition to these acts continued, and large numbers of those so forced into the southern armies deserted. It has been stated that few conscripts were found in the Army of Northern Virginia or in any other southern army at the final surrender.⁵ The additions to the Confederate armies hardly supplied the vacancies caused by deaths, disease, and desertions, and, long before the close of the war, Lee was urgently calling the attention of the Confederate government to this alarming fact.

But to obtain men for the armies was not more diffi-

⁵ See Stephens: *The War Between the States*, p. 573.

cult than it was to procure supplies for them. In January, 1864, General Lee wrote the President of the Confederacy that he had "but one day's meat rations and feared that he should not be able to retain the army in the field," and on February 29 his commissary reported that he had bread enough to last only until the next day. On March 14 Lee dispatched that "the army was out of meat and had but one day's rations of bread." Mr. Jones, recording this in his diary, adds: "No wonder that generals are in consultation, for all the armies are in the same lamentable predicament." The Confederate soldiers were as poorly clothed as they were fed and their pay was still more scanty. Indeed, they were practically serving without pay.⁶ Death stared them in front and starvation of their families lurked in the rear. Whatever we may think of their "cause," we must admit their devotion to it and admire the heroism with which they fought for it. No soldiers ever made greater sacrifices.

Moreover, the very idea which constituted the corner-stone of secession was now developing its destructive tendency and bearing fruit in renewed and determined opposition to the measures which the government had been forced to adopt. The conscription

⁶ The pay of the private Confederate soldier was fixed at \$11 a month until June 9, 1864, when the Confederate Congress raised the amount to \$18. In January, 1864, \$1 in gold was worth \$21 in Confederate currency, so that at that time the pay of the Confederate private soldier, measured in gold, was about fifty-two cents a month.

laws had aroused violent hostility from the beginning. The suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* and the declaration of martial law created great dissatisfaction. When people refused to sell supplies for the army at the prices fixed by the government, often far below the market prices, and to take their pay in Confederate currency, impressment was resorted to. This caused universal complaints of favoritism, corruption, and oppression on the part of the impressing officers. In many places impressment by roving bands, claiming to be acting under authority of the government, degenerated into what was denounced as no better than pillage. The collection of taxes in kind, a measure forced upon the government as one of the results of the depreciation of its currency, was necessarily accompanied with great waste and occasioned loud complaints of corruption and oppression of the tax-gatherers, especially in North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama where the greater part of such taxes was collected.

General Bragg, chief military adviser of the President, was extremely unpopular with the Confederate generals and with the people. Not only were his own official actions criticized, but he was often compelled to bear hostile criticism intended to cover an attack upon Jefferson Davis himself, for the people had already begun to denounce what was now openly styled a military despotism. Both in North Carolina and in Georgia there were loud protests against the conscription and impressment laws and arbitrary arrests, and

it was said that "seizures of persons and property had become as common as they were in France and Russia." Public meetings denouncing these proceedings were held in various counties in North Carolina, and eight of the ten persons chosen in 1863 to represent the state in the Confederate Congress were reported to be secretly in favor of peace.⁷

Judge Pearson of North Carolina assumed the right to discharge, on writs of *habeas corpus*, conscripts who had substitutes in the army, on the ground that the law authorizing their conscription was unconstitutional. Governor Vance of that state wrote President Davis a letter saying that he should be obliged to sustain Judge Pearson "even to the summoning the military force of the state to resist the Confederate States authorities." Governor Brown of Georgia was equally outspoken in denying the constitutional power of the Confederacy to enforce its conscription laws in a "sovereign state." Even the Confederate Vice-President, Alexander Stephens, is quoted as saying in a public speech that "Independence without liberty was of no value to him, and if he must have a master he cared not whether he were northern or southern."

On every hand were signs of revolt against the Confederate administration. So loud were the complaints of illegal impressments in east Louisiana and southern Mississippi, that the Confederate President directed George B. Hodge, the Assistant Inspector-General, to

⁷ See Appleton's *Annual Cyclopedia* for 1863, under *North Carolina* and *Georgia*.

make an official investigation of them. This officer interviewed "the most prominent and respectable citizens," and on July 14, 1864, submitted a report. Some complaints were ascertained not to be well founded, but, the report stated, "The proofs, however, are overwhelming that the people of this district have for months and years undergone exactions and oppressions at once illegal, vexatious, and unjust." The military officers "imagined themselves invested with plenary powers" and "supplies of forage and subsistence were impressed by officers of all grades, and even by privates," for which certificates were given. There was no money in circulation, but the people were "laden with these worthless certificates," which the Confederate disbursing officers would not honor and the tax-collectors would not receive in payment of taxes. A few examples were given in order to convey "an idea of the chaotic condition of affairs," but, says the report, "to enumerate all would swell the list of claims to thousands, the amount claimed to millions."⁸

No northern writer ever penned so bitter an arraignment of the Confederate authorities as did Governor Brown of Georgia. His voluminous correspondence with the Confederate authorities amply proves that in his hands the pen was mightier than the sword. In a letter written by him November 14, 1864, to the Confederate Secretary of War, denying the right of the

⁸ See report in *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 110, pp. 695-700.

Confederate government to control the militia of Georgia, the usurpations of the Confederate authorities are set forth in forceful language. There is no doubt that the Richmond military despotism grew more and more intolerable, but, if so obnoxious in November, 1864, as Governor Brown's letter indicates, it must have been very bad at the beginning of the year. In his letter Brown says:*

"It is not only my right, but my duty, to uphold the constitutional rights and liberties of the people of Georgia by force, if necessary, against usurpations and abuses of power by the central government. The militia is, under the constitution, one of the proper instrumentalities for that purpose. There is scarcely a single provision in the constitution for the protection of life, liberty, or property in Georgia that has not been and is not now constantly violated by the Confederate government through its officers and agents.

"It has been but a short time since one of the stores of the state of Georgia, containing property in the peaceable possession of the state, was forcibly entered by a Confederate officer, and the property taken therefrom by force. I had no militia present at the time to repel this invasion of the rights of the sovereign state, but should have had them there soon if the property had not been restored. A single Confederate provost-marshal in Georgia admits that thirty citizens and soldiers have been shot by his guard without his right to shoot citizens being questioned till within the last few days, when he was greatly enraged that a true bill for murder should have been found by a grand jury

* *Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 110, pp. 789-790.

against one of them for shooting down a citizen in the streets, who offended him by questioning his authority over him. Every citizen in the state, both man and woman, is arrested in the cars, streets, and highways, who presumes to travel without a pass. They are arrested without law and imprisoned at pleasure of government officials. The houses, lands, and effects of the people of Georgia are daily seized and appropriated to the use of the government or its agents without the shadow of law, without just compensation, and in defiance of the decision of the supreme tribunal of the state, and her officers of justice are openly resisted by the officers of the Confederate States. The property of the families of soldiers now under arms to sustain the Confederacy is forcibly taken from them without hesitation, and appropriated, in many cases, without compensation."

The wonder is that, under the conditions prevailing in the southern states, the Confederacy was able to keep in the field such armies as it had in the beginning of the year 1864. Nevertheless, a great Confederate army, commanded by a great general, stood between Washington and Richmond, and one as formidable, commanded by another great general, still barred the advance of the Union armies south of Chattanooga. Halleck continued to pose at Washington as general-in-chief. For nearly two years he had been confounding the Federal generals and amusing the Confederates with his stupid strategy, but the Union cause had survived all his blunders. It was impossible, however, to foretell what might happen if he were retained in chief command, and so in February, 1864, Congress revived

the grade of lieutenant-general. Grant's nomination to fill the place was confirmed March 2; on the 9th he received his commission and on the 12th was appointed general-in-chief of all the Federal armies. President Lincoln, after so long and painful and hitherto fruitless search, had at last found the general who was destined to lead to victory the armies of the East as he had led the armies of the West.

About the same time Sherman was appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. The two generals held a conference in March and planned an early and simultaneous movement against the Confederate armies. Grant was to move on Lee's army, with Richmond as the objective point; Sherman was to attack General Joseph E. Johnston, who, after the battle of Missionary Ridge, had superseded Bragg; and General Banks was to move against Mobile.

Pursuant to this general plan, a mighty army was gathered at Chattanooga, in every respect the greatest ever assembled in the West; great in numbers, great in commanders, and great in respect to the troops that composed it. It drew from the Northwest the flower of its youth; in its ranks were representatives of all the leading Federal armies of the East and of the West, veterans of Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Stone's River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, and other famous fields.

Three armies were combined to make up the splendid host led by Sherman—the Army of the Cumber-

land, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio. General Thomas commanded the Army of the Cumberland, composed of the 4th corps under General O. O. Howard, the 14th corps under General Palmer, and the 20th corps (formed by consolidation of the 11th and 12th) under General Hooker, with a cavalry corps under General Elliott. General James B. McPherson commanded the Army of the Tennessee, composed of the 15th corps, under General John A. Logan, the 2d and 4th divisions of the 16th corps under General Granville M. Dodge, and two divisions of the 17th corps under General Frank P. Blair. General Schofield commanded the Army of the Ohio, composed of the 23d corps and General George Stoneman's cavalry division.

During the entire month of April, troops, ammunition, provisions, and military stores of all kinds were hurried to Chattanooga. Everything was in readiness for the forward move which began May 5, 1864. When General Sherman's army started it numbered over 100,000 men.

General Johnston's army, variously estimated at from 55,000 to 65,000 on May 5, was increased in a few days to about 75,000. As it was too weak to take the aggressive, Johnston was obliged, from the beginning, to act on the defensive, keeping his army intact and waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of any false move that might be made by Sherman. It was also necessary for Johnston to rely very largely upon fortifications and to prepare for the contingency

of being driven out of one line of works by having another in rear of it behind which he could fall back when compelled to retreat.

Sherman's tactics were to move his army as near the Confederate works as practicable and to make such demonstrations in front as would fully occupy the attention of the occupants while he was sending a flanking force to the right or left. In this way the campaign was conducted from the beginning to the capture of Atlanta—Sherman continually flanking and Johnston continually falling back from one fortified line to another.

A marked peculiarity of the campaign was that the two armies fought no great battle, such as that of Chickamauga or even that of Stone's River. There was none in which all the troops of both armies were engaged. The greatest number engaged at one time was in the battle of Atlanta, July 22, 1864, where the Federal troops numbered 30,477 and the Confederates, 36,934. In the bloody assault on Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864, the Federal troops numbered 16,225 and the Confederate, 17,733. The greatest Federal loss in any battle of this campaign was 4,200, at Atlanta, July 21 and 22, the next largest being 3,000 in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, June 27.

There was, however, a succession of battles such as those of Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, New Hope Church, Pickett's Mill, Kenesaw Mountain, and those in the vicinity of Atlanta, in which large losses were sustained. These do not, by any means, represent all

the fighting. In fact there was almost continual fighting in the Atlanta campaign from May 5 to September 1. Besides the battles there was heavy skirmishing nearly every day at various points along the lines, resulting in severe losses to the troops that participated. From May 3, when the 79th left Catoosa Springs, until June 23, there were only three days when the regiment was not under fire. I was wounded on the 23d and can not state from personal observation what occurred after that date, but my information is that the regiment was almost continuously under fire until the capture of Atlanta. As already stated, Sherman's plan was to push his lines as near those of the Confederates as practicable, so that often the main lines of the two armies were not more than two or three hundred yards apart. From their works or in trees near by, Confederate sharpshooters kept up a constant fire into our lines. Men were liable to be struck by a bullet at any time while walking about behind their own works. Frequently some one was killed in his sleep by a stray ball of a Confederate sharpshooter. Sometimes in the night a furious cannonading was begun at some point in the front, and then a whole brigade or division was hastily awakened and compelled to remain for hours in line of battle expecting an attack.

The sanguinary character of the fighting may be inferred from the statistics given by Colonel Fox, who states that the total losses in the Atlanta campaign from May 5 to September 1 were:

Killed	4,423
Wounded	22,822
Missing	4,442
<hr/>	
Total	31,687

The Confederate losses during the same period, as estimated by Colonel Fox, were:

Killed	3,044
Wounded	18,952
Captured	12,983
<hr/>	
Total	34,979

The Army of the Cumberland began the campaign with 60,773 men. Between May 5 and September 6, it lost in

Killed	3,041
Wounded	15,783
<hr/>	
Total	18,824

The Atlanta campaign illustrates very clearly the folly, to call it by no harsher name, of attempting to take, by direct assault, strongly fortified positions. This was demonstrated in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. It has never been satisfactorily explained why it was ordered but it is known to have been made without the approval of Sherman's subordinate generals and over the vigorous protests of McPherson and Logan. The assault was made with the 2d and part of the 1st division of the 4th corps,

the 2d division of the 15th corps, and part of the 2d division of the 14th corps. The Federal forces numbered 16,225 and the Confederate 17,733. The losses in killed and wounded, not including the missing, most of whom were probably killed, were as follows:

Federal	1,999
Confederate	270

It will be observed that, the numbers being about equal, the Federal army lost eight men killed and wounded for every killed or wounded Confederate. At such a rate it would not take long to fritter away an army of a million. We can well understand the indignation of General Thomas expressed in a note to General Sherman on that day, when, after two unsuccessful assaults, a third was suggested.

“The Army of the Cumberland has already made two desperate, bloody, and unsuccessful assaults on this mountain. If a third is ordered, it will, in my opinion, result in demoralizing this army, and will, if made, be against my best judgment and most earnest protest.”

In a later dispatch on the same day, when asked by General Sherman his opinion concerning a proposed movement, General Thomas said:

“What force do you think of moving with? If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised.”

The campaign very rapidly exhausted the vitality of the men. Hard marches, intense heat, loss of sleep, bad water, constant exposure to miasma, told heavily on the strongest constitutions. Hardest of all was the intense mental strain of being continually under fire, with the possibility of being killed or wounded at any moment in the day or night. No man ventured to undress; every soldier sleeping in his clothes and with his musket and accoutrements by his side, ready to spring into line of battle at a moment's notice. For a week before I was wounded, though I was never relieved from duty, I had been taking medicine and was scarcely able to march. I probably could not have kept up another week even if I had not been wounded.

Van Horne states that, in the Army of the Cumberland alone, "during the campaign forty-three thousand one hundred and fifty-three were reported sick to Major George E. Cooper, Surgeon United States army, medical director of the department. Of these, twenty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-four were sent to the rear; two hundred and seven died from disease, and one thousand and sixty-seven died from wounds."¹⁰

The campaign closed with the surrender of Atlanta, September 1, 1864, leaving the Confederate army near by. Notwithstanding its heavy losses it was still intact and formidable though it had been greatly shorn of its power by the removal of its commander, General

¹⁰ *Hist. Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 2, p. 150.

Johnston, who, after Lee, was the ablest general in the Confederacy. He had done all that could reasonably have been expected. Though unable to resist successfully the advance of an army greatly superior in numbers, he had contested its advance with signal ability. Because he had not accomplished more, Jefferson Davis, yielding to senseless clamor, had removed him and in his place had appointed General Hood, who was understood to be a "fighting general."

General Humphreys closes his *Virginia Campaign* with this modest sentence: "It has not seemed to me necessary to attempt a eulogy upon the Army of the Potomac or the Army of Northern Virginia." The same may be said of Sherman's army and of the Confederate army confronting it in the Atlanta campaign. No eulogy could add to the admiration inspired by the bare recital of their deeds.

CHAPTER TWELVE

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE

For more than a month after the capture of Atlanta, Sherman and Hood were each ignorant of the other's plans. Jefferson Davis had visited Hood and had discussed the latter's project of marching north in order to draw Sherman's army after him and thereby avert its threatened march through the heart of the Confederacy. Hood crossed the Chattahoochee September 29; on October 4th he captured the Federal garrisons at Big Shanty and Ackworth; on the 13th that at Dalton, and on the 15th, halted his army near Lafayette where he remained a few days and then moved to Gadsden. There he had a conference with Beauregard who had been appointed to the command of the Confederate department to which Hood's army was assigned. From Gadsden Hood marched to Tusculum, Alabama, where he arrived October 31. Sherman, leaving the 20th corps at Atlanta, had followed Hood as far as Gaylesville and there had abandoned the pursuit.

Meanwhile Sherman had been revolving in his mind the plan of marching through the South. There was nothing very wonderful in the mere idea of pushing

on past Atlanta. It was not to be expected that, having taken Atlanta, his army would sit down there and do no more. Nor was it to be expected that it would march back north. This would have been imitating the King of France who "went up the hill with twenty thousand men" and then—came down.

Manifestly it was advisable to push farther south, which would compel Sherman to abandon Atlanta as a base of supplies and seek a new one. To have retained a base so far south of the Ohio would have required a vast army to keep open his line of communications extending, for a long distance, through the enemy's country. The successful execution of Sherman's plan obviously required the selection of a new base at some point on the gulf coast. All this is clear even to one not versed in military strategy. It is equally clear that it was a very hazardous undertaking to cut loose from Atlanta before Hood's army, which was still intact, with the possibility of being largely augmented, had been destroyed, or until it was certain that there was a Federal army north of Atlanta sufficient to prevent Hood's advance in that direction. If, as Sherman maintained, the divisions of the 16th corps under General A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, could be brought to Nashville in ten days to reenforce Thomas, who was to be left to look after Hood, it would seem to have been the prudent course for Sherman to delay his proposed march until they came, or at least until it was certain that they were on the way.

That Sherman was sincere in his prediction that

Thomas would be able to hold Hood in check, there can be no doubt. His enthusiastic belief in the success of his plan led him to underestimate its dangers. He dispatched Grant October 9 that he could "make the march and make Georgia howl," and the day following, assured him that Thomas "would have an ample force when the reenforcements ordered reached Nashville." On the 17th he said to Thomas: "Hood won't dare to go into Tennessee. I hope he will." On the 19th in a dispatch to Halleck, Sherman was confident that "the enemy would not venture toward Tennessee except around by Decatur."

As late as November 1, Grant does not seem to have been convinced of the wisdom of cutting loose from Atlanta and leaving Hood's army to roam about at will in the rear. His own idea of an "objective" was well known—it was the army of the enemy in his front. The three dispatches that follow show clearly his objections and the assurances by which they were overcome:

CITY POINT, Nov. 1, 1864—6 P. M.

Major-General Sherman:

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is so far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are pushing the

other. If you can see the chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GA., Nov. 2, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va.:

If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my movements, I have thrown Beauregard well to the west, and Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until reenforcements meet him from Missouri and recruits. We have now ample supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta to stand a month's interruption to our communications, and I don't believe the Confederate army can reach our lines, save by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate that. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow me in my contemplated movement through Georgia.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

CITY POINT, VA., Nov. 2, 1864—11:30 A. M.

Major-General Sherman:

Your dispatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I dispatched you the same date advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, ought to be looked upon more as the object. With the force, however, you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood, and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from where you are, to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Grant's permission having at last been obtained, Sherman did not long delay. Thomas had already been sent to Nashville and, in view of the proposed movement south, Sherman had authorized him "in the event of military movements or the accidents of war separating the general in command from his military division," to assume command over all troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence of the commanding general.

In a dispatch to Thomas November 10, Sherman made the prediction: "I think you will find Hood marching off and you should be ready to follow him," and in another on the 11th he gave Thomas this cheerful assurance: "You can safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and follow me; in which event you should cross at Decatur and move directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies." Sherman started November 15 on his poetic and erratic "march to the sea," carrying out his threat to "make Georgia howl."

Hood, meanwhile, had been cogitating a plan of his own which he tells us he had evolved during his stay at Lafayette, October 15 and 16,¹ and to which he had finally won the consent of General Beauregard and Jefferson Davis. This was to march rapidly north, cutting off the 4th and 23d corps, then to Nashville, and thence to the Ohio. In order to accomplish this,

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, vol. 4, p. 427.

he expected to be reenforced by Forrest's cavalry, 12,000 strong, and by 18,000 or 20,000 Confederate troops west of the Mississippi. He also expected the advance of his army to be greeted by a great uprising of the people in Tennessee and Kentucky. His plan has been denounced by both Federal and Confederate critics as chimerical, but, from his standpoint, and taking into account the unforeseen accidents which prevented its accomplishment, it does not seem to merit so severe a criticism.

It was evident that Hood could not make a successful stand against Sherman's strong and well-equipped veteran army, and, desperate as was the venture made, the condition of the Confederacy was such that nothing remained for Hood but to take desperate chances. No critic has yet suggested any plan which offered greater promise of success than the one which he adopted. Even if he had reached the Ohio it is not probable that he could have gone beyond it, or that his march would have saved the dying Confederacy; but it is probable that, but for the unforeseen delay in crossing the Tennessee at Florence and the blunder by reason of which Schofield's army was permitted to escape at Spring Hill, Hood might have reached the Ohio. It is also probable that if he had done so the war would have been indefinitely prolonged, that he would have been the hero of the "march to the Ohio," and that Sherman's "march to the sea" would have been condemned as the colossal blunder of the war.

On November 13 Hood moved to Florence, Ala-

bama, where he was joined the next day by Forrest, one of the boldest and best cavalry commanders in the war, with 12,000 cavalry fully equipped. The vigilance of Canby and the gunboats prevented his receiving the trans-Mississippi reinforcements which he had expected, but, with Forrest, he had an army of nearly 50,000 veteran soldiers. He had ordered the railroads and bridges to be repaired, so that he could cross the Tennessee at once and begin his march to Nashville, but this had not been done. The weather was bad, the roads were in wretched condition, and he was obliged to wait another week before starting. By November 21 all his army had crossed the Tennessee near Florence and he began his march, intending first to cut off the Federal troops between him and Nashville.

Sherman, before starting south from Atlanta, had sent to Nashville all superfluous baggage, arms, and stores, and also all sick and disabled soldiers. Two divisions of cavalry were dismounted in order to supply horses and equipments for General Kilpatrick's cavalry which was selected to accompany Sherman and the dismounted cavalry and scraps of accoutrements were also sent to Nashville.

It was originally intended to leave Thomas only the 4th corps, but to this was afterwards added the 23d. These were the two smallest corps of Sherman's army and they were still further depleted before the battle of Nashville by the return home of large numbers whose terms of enlistment had expired.

By this division of the army which had accompanied Sherman to Atlanta he retained a force of about 62,000 veteran soldiers, with nothing to impede their march that could be dispensed with, while Thomas was given the 4th and 23d corps, together with the divisions of A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, and the "odds and ends."

We turn now to the man who thenceforward, until after the battle of Nashville, becomes the chief figure in the exciting military drama that followed. Upon Thomas the eyes of all the North were riveted; it was he whose success was to make the "march to the sea" the theme of poets' songs for all ages, or whose failure was to stamp it as a stupendous blunder. It was with great reluctance that he had assumed the vast responsibility placed upon him by Sherman, but having accepted it he discharged it, as he could always be depended upon to do, faithfully and loyally.

When Hood began his advance on Nashville, Sherman's army was so far away that, for all the aid it could render Thomas, it might as well have been in South America. The divisions of Gen. A. J. Smith had not arrived. Thomas had telegraphed to Rosecrans for them but could get no response. As was afterward learned, the river was too low to transport them by boats and they were obliged to march across the state of Missouri in order to reach St. Louis. They did not arrive until November 30, the day on which the battle of Franklin was fought and one day before the advance of Hood's army was encamped before

Nashville. Troops were stationed at various garrisons throughout Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama, but it was necessary that a large portion of them should remain to save the immense stores collected at Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Murfreesboro, and other points, and to guard the railroads, unless all the territory, acquired after two years' hard fighting, was to be abandoned.

All the troops that could possibly be spared were hurried to Nashville. Raw recruits, belated soldiers who had been home on furloughs, conscripts, and convalescents, about 12,000 in all, had been gathered together by Thomas. These were put into provisional organizations, but they made a motley gathering. "In some of the companies," it has been said,² "every soldier was a stranger to every other. No man knew his file leader and the officers did not know a single member of their command." Such an organization was ill fitted to take the place of the 15,000 veterans who had been sent north from Nashville on furlough or by reason of expiration of enlistment within a few days after Hood's movement began.

No better cavalry commander could have been selected than General Wilson, a general of great energy and recognized ability, whom Grant had recommended to Thomas with the assurance that he "would add fifty per cent. to the effectiveness of his cavalry."

² Captain John E. Cleland: *The Second March to the Ohio*, a paper read before the Indiana Loyal Legion, *War Papers*, vol. 1, p. 233.

But notwithstanding the most extraordinary exertions of General Wilson, he had been able, from the dismounted cavalry sent to Thomas, to send to the front only about 5,000 and of these only about 4,300 were fully mounted and equipped and able for duty. With these he was to oppose Forrest's 12,000.

The only available forces to resist the advance of Hood were the troops about Pulaski, Tennessee, comprising the three divisions of the 4th corps, numbering about 12,000, the second and third of the 23d numbering about 10,000, and Wilson's cavalry. Immediate command of the troops at the front was given to General Schofield. It would have been madness to risk a pitched battle, if it could be avoided, with Hood's army, numbering twice as many, and, therefore, the instructions to Schofield were to fall back, contesting the Confederate advance as stubbornly and as long as practicable, until Thomas could gather troops enough to make a stand or to take the offensive.

Hood's first move was to cut off Schofield's retreat to Nashville, and this compelled the quick withdrawal of the troops at Pulaski. It was thought that a stand might be made at Columbia on Duck river, and preparations were made accordingly. But Schofield stood longer than was safe, and during the night of November 28 General Wilson found that Hood's infantry was crossing the river with the purpose of getting in Schofield's rear and cutting off retreat by the pike, leading from Columbia to Spring Hill and Franklin, by which

the army must pass to reach Nashville. Forrest's cavalry was already between Wilson and Schofield, so that the messenger who was to carry this most important and alarming news was obliged to travel by a long and circuitous route and did not reach Schofield until daylight on the morning of the 29th. There was now a race to Spring Hill between the Federal and the Confederate troops. Forrest's cavalry arrived first, but as his men were entering the town, General Stanley, with Wagner's division of the 4th corps, appeared, drove Forrest's troops out of town, and began to prepare works to hold Hood's army in check until the remaining four divisions of Schofield should arrive.

In the meantime Hood, with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's corps, had come up, going into camp about 3 P. M., two miles and a half from Spring Hill and not more than half a mile from the pike by which Schofield's troops and trains must pass to reach Franklin. Schofield's little army was now in a very perilous situation. Of the three divisions of the 4th corps Wagner's had preceded Hood's army and was at Spring Hill, but Kimball's was at Rutherford creek, seven miles south, and Wood's was still at Duck river, where were also Cox's and Ruger's divisions of the 23d corps, and all of them with their trains, in order to reach Spring Hill, were obliged to march over the pike near which Hood's army had halted. The danger greatly increased when

darkness came on. Colonel Stone, of Thomas's staff,* thus describes the situation:

"When night came the danger increased rather than diminished. A single Confederate brigade, like Adams's or Cockrill's or Maney's—veterans since Shiloh—planted squarely across the pike, either south or north of Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented Schofield's retreat and daylight would have found his whole force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom would have been madness and to avoid whom would have been impossible."

And now occurred one of the most extraordinary incidents of the war, betokening something like a miraculous intervention of Providence. Nearly all that night the four divisions mentioned, with their trains, were passing along the pike on the road to Spring Hill. Hood states⁴ that he called Generals Cheatham and Cleburne to the spot "where sitting upon his horse he had in sight the enemy's wagons and men passing at double quick along the Franklin pike," and, pointing out to them the moving columns, urged them to attack at once, but that they failed to do so. Cleburne was killed the following day and we do not have his version of the matter, but Cheatham indignantly denies that anything of the kind occurred, and says that, on the contrary, Hood told him he had concluded to defer

* Article on *Repelling Hood's Invasion of Tennessee, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 4, p. 446.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 429.

the attack until the next morning and that the only thing in the semblance of an order was the suggestion received about midnight that it would be well for him to order his pickets to fire on the stragglers of the Federal army that Hood understood to be passing along the road.⁵

Why Hood did not place his army across the pike as soon as he reached the place where it halted, and why he allowed the troops and trains to march by during the entire night without molestation, has never been satisfactorily explained. I have often talked about it with the men of the 79th Ind. They speak of it as a "close call," but they are at a loss to explain this, to them, the most inexplicable circumstance of their entire military experience. I have in my possession the diary of Lieut. William H. Huntzinger of Co. I, which states that the regiment started at 8 o'clock on the evening of the 29th. He records: "At midnight we were ordered to be very still and march very quietly, as we must pass near a rebel camp-fire not more than half a mile from the pike. Soon we came to the light from the rebel camp-fires; the rebel pickets heard us and began firing." He adds that they marched safely by, passing through Spring Hill and halting at 3 A. M.

The whole army, with all its trains of ammunition and supplies, reached Franklin the next day, November 30, but here another trouble arose. The Confederate advance at Columbia had been so rapid that Schofield

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 429, 439.

was unable to save his pontoons and, without them, it was impossible to get the army across the Harpeth river at Franklin before the arrival of Hood. To make a stand was not a matter of choice but of necessity. Such works were thrown up and such preparations made as were practicable in the short time allowed and one of the bloodiest battles of the war, in proportion to the numbers engaged, was now fought. Again it seemed that the little Federal army was doomed. This time, however, it was saved, not by the blunder of Hood, but by the desperate valor of the Federal troops.

By some misunderstanding of orders, two brigades of Wagner's division stood too long in an exposed position and were driven back by an overwhelming force of the Confederates which followed so closely that the Federal guns could not fire on the pursuers without subjecting the pursued to equal danger, and so all entered together the Federal works at the strongest point in them. At once the Federal guns at that point were captured and turned on the Federal troops, and for a few minutes it seemed that all was lost. At this critical juncture General Stanley, commanding the 4th corps, hastened to order forward the remaining brigade of the division, but Colonel Opdycke, the brigade commander, without waiting for orders, had already started, and Stanley himself marched with the men of the brigade. The charge was one of the most brilliant in the war and resulted in recapturing the guns, driving back the Confederates, and firmly

establishing the Federal lines. From that time until the end of the battle every assault was repulsed with frightful loss to the Confederates. The bloody character of the contest may be inferred from the fact that in this single engagement more general officers were killed and wounded than in any other battle of the war. The Confederate loss in general officers was five killed, including General Cleburne, one of the most noted of the Confederate fighters, six wounded, and one taken prisoner.

That night the Federal army with all its trains crossed the Harpeth and the next night reached Nashville. Hood was not far behind, and by December 3 his entire army was in front of the Federal lines, just where it had been two years before. General A. J. Smith had arrived on the day the battle at Franklin was fought. Not until then, since Hood had started on his march to Nashville, had Thomas troops sufficient to justify him in risking a battle.

By this time the whole North was alarmed, the authorities at Washington were in a panic, and Grant himself exhibited more uneasiness than ever before or after. The danger now was not that Hood would attack Nashville—it was almost certain that he would not—but the danger was that he would go around it and continue his march through Kentucky to the Ohio, leaving both Sherman's and Thomas's armies behind him. He had not even waited for the "invitation," which Sherman thought Thomas might safely extend,

to invade Tennessee, and here he was in front of Nashville.

Grant, foreseeing the danger, had sent General Rawlins, his chief of staff, to St. Louis to hasten the divisions of General A. J. Smith. Every day he became more pressing in his demand that Thomas should take the offensive and attack Hood. Thomas was ready to move December 9, but a great storm of sleet fell upon the country about Nashville, making the ground so slippery that, until the 14th, it would have been difficult for infantry to march on level ground and impossible for them to ascend the hills upon which Hood's army was entrenched, and the cavalry horses would have been liable to fall and maim both themselves and their riders. Under such circumstances an assault on the Confederate entrenchments would have savored of madness, as Thomas's subordinate generals in council of war agreed.

Grant's demands on Thomas for an immediate advance became more urgent every day. Halleck also prodded him with messages, and Stanton sent insulting dispatches. The cruelest of all was a dispatch sent by the latter to Grant December 7, in which he said: "Thomas seems to be unwilling to attack because it is hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his horn." And this was said of the man by whose heroic stand, more than all else, the Union army had been saved from annihilation at Chickamauga!

Indeed, for a few days, the fault-finders at Wash-

ington made Thomas's life more miserable than all the Confederates that had ever confronted him in battle. Notwithstanding his explanation of the situation, the carping at his alleged "slowness" continued. Grant every day became more importunate and plainly indicated to him that unless he made an immediate advance, sleet or no sleet, cavalry or no cavalry, he was likely to be removed from command. But Thomas comprehended, more clearly than Grant or any one in Washington, the gravity of the situation; he understood his duty and he had the moral heroism that nerves a man to discharge it, fearless of all personal consequences. He knew that, by refusing to advance, he was incurring the displeasure of his superiors, and that he might bring upon himself the disgrace of being removed from command, but knowing that to advance at that time would, in all probability, result in a disastrous defeat and in incalculable injury to the Union cause, he remained as immovable in his purpose as he had been at Chickamauga. The high quality of moral heroism which he exhibited in this trying situation is admirably expressed by Prof. Coppee:⁶

"A weaker man than Thomas would have yielded to the importunity and attacked before he was ready. Indeed, there seemed little discretion in the matter. He was ordered to attack at once. If he obeyed, the best interests of the country were endangered. If he

⁶ *General Thomas*, p. 262

did not, he was liable to the charge of 'disobedience of orders.' The firmness of General Thomas, therefore, assumes the proportions of a martyr's faith; he would die for the cause, for the honor of the profession of arms, and for his own spotless character, rather than obey the orders."

Thomas had explained the situation to Grant and the Washington authorities. With modest dignity he said in a dispatch to Grant December 9: "I can only say that I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you should deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit without a murmur." He did not know that on the very day he penned this dispatch, an order, dictated by Grant, had been prepared, relieving him and turning over his command to General Schofield. The order was withheld at the instance of Halleck, who redeemed many of his own mistakes by this one exhibition of ability to comprehend the situation, superior to that of both Stanton and Grant.

But Grant would brook no delay, and another order, prepared December 13, was given to General Logan, directing him to proceed at once to Nashville and to take the command if Thomas had not moved before his arrival. Grant finally started to Nashville to take command in person. Fortunately for Thomas and fortunately for the country, the battle of Nashville had begun before the arrival of either Logan or Grant. On the 14th a thaw set in which broke the sleet blockade and orders were given for opening the battle on

the following day. It could not safely have been begun a day sooner.

It is not necessary to tell again in detail the story of the battle of Nashville. Military critics unite in saying that the generalship of Thomas was unsurpassed by that of any other general in any other battle of the Civil War. His plan of battle is studied in military schools and will be for ages, as a marvelous masterpiece of battle tactics. It was far-reaching, comprehending the minutest details, and was executed with unerring skill. The battle was like a game of chess in which a skilful player so disposes his pieces and so makes his moves that the defeat of his adversary is inevitable. The fighting lasted two days. When it ended Hood's army was utterly broken and practically destroyed. The victory at Nashville, quoting again from Prof. Coppee,¹ "stands alone as a unique, thorough, magnificent and far-reaching victory, achieved by the skill and firmness of one man, who had acquired the confidence of his officers and men, so that they fought for him as well as for the cause."

It was the last great battle fought by General Thomas and by the 4th corps or by any part of the Army of the Cumberland. It was a fitting climax to the military career of that great general, and added fresh laurels to the brilliant record of the 4th corps and the Army of the Cumberland. For the Confederates it was the most crushing defeat inflicted during

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

the war upon an army in the field. In the battle and in the rout which followed Hood lost over 13,000 men, seventy-two guns, and seventy flags. In the retreat thousands of Confederates, especially those whose homes were in Kentucky and Tennessee, left the ranks never to return. They were not cowardly deserters. Far from it. Among them were doubtless great numbers whose bravery and whose loyalty to the Confederate cause had been amply proved on many bloody fields. They were men who now saw plainly the handwriting on the wall and who were determined to be led no longer to useless slaughter in a vain attempt to prolong a hopeless struggle.

The Confederate Army of the Tennessee never fought another battle under that name. Hood himself, on January 23, 1865, was relieved of its command at his own request. Between the Ohio and the Gulf of Mexico there was no Confederate organization left which deserved the name of army. The only Confederate army worth considering was that of Lee, now hemmed in between the great host of Grant in front and that of Sherman in the rear. The final blow to the dying Confederacy was given at Five Forks, but the mortal wound was inflicted at the battle of Nashville.

Mr. Ropes,^{*} while awarding the credit due to Gen-

^{*}Article on General Sherman in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Aug., 1891, reprinted in a volume entitled *Some Federal and Confederate Commanders*, pp. 125, 144, 152, published by the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts.

eral Sherman's great military ability, thus clearly states the risks that attended the march to the sea and the importance of Thomas's victory at Nashville:

"Yet the propriety of the withdrawal of this army from the seat of war in the west can be defended only by the event. To have imperiled the hold of the Union government on the states of Tennessee and Kentucky; to have exposed all the posts from Chattanooga to Nashville, to say nothing of Louisville, to assault and capture by the Confederate army under Hood; in short, to have left so much to chance when everything might so easily have been made secure, was to count unwarrantably upon the favors of fortune. No margin was left for accidents. It is not easy to see why 50,000 men would not have served Sherman's purpose as well as 62,000 men; and assuredly 12,000 good troops would have added greatly to Thomas's scanty resources, and contributed largely to insure the destruction of Hood's army, which alone could give to the strategy which sanctioned the withdrawal of so many troops to the Atlantic coast the possibility of leading to useful results. It is true that Thomas's victory practically attained this end. In the march of his army through the Carolinas, Sherman had to encounter only the remnants of Hood's defeated and discouraged troops added to the insignificant garrisons of the Atlantic cities; and with these forces he was abundantly able to cope. But Thomas's success was really unprecedented. It could not fairly have been anticipated. And it would have been an entirely different matter for Sherman if Hood's whole army, or the greater part of it, had confronted him at the marshes and rivers over which his toilsome and difficult route lay. . . .

"Thomas, however, was equal to the occasion. He scored a magnificent success at Nashville. Sherman at the same time captured Savannah. Everything turned out marvelously well. Both officers showed themselves at their best. The risk having passed by, the North reaped the full advantage of the daring march. The task then before Sherman was one to which he was by nature wonderfully adapted, and which he soon brought to a triumphant end."

The victory at Nashville was fortunate for the Union cause. It was fortunate for Thomas because it saved a noble soldier the mortification of a shameful requital for four years of conspicuous services and unflinching loyalty to the Union cause. It was fortunate for Sherman, because defeat would have stripped all the glory from the march to the sea; it was fortunate for Grant, because, if his ill-advised order to Logan had been carried out, he would have been adjudged guilty of the most stupendous blunder of the war.

General Thomas, above all other generals who ever commanded them, is the idol of the survivors of the Army of the Cumberland. A born Virginian, he remained steadfast to the Union cause. His ability as a general was demonstrated on many fields. There was nothing of the martinet in his military character. He disciplined his troops in all that was required to make soldiers of them, but avoided wearing them out in useless drills and pompous displays. He never uselessly sacrificed them in battle. His fatherly care of them was so proverbial that he was familiarly known

as "Pap Thomas." He was equally distinguished for his generosity and his sense of justice. After Halleck had shelved Grant in the reorganization of his army for the advance on Corinth, Thomas voluntarily resigned his command of the right wing, the Army of the Tennessee, in order that Grant might take it, and he himself resumed the command of a single division in the Army of the Ohio under General Buell. He was as loyal to his superiors in command as he was to the government. He refused to take Buell's place when it was offered, because of his belief that the latter had been unjustly criticized. He stood by Rosecrans long after the hostility of Stanton and Halleck had become apparent, and after it had become equally apparent that they were seeking some excuse to remove him from command, and when Thomas must have known that in the event of the removal of Rosecrans he would become his successor.

It is painful, even at this late day, to read of the jealousy and envy of generals in the early years of the war, of the political "pulls," the intrigues by which promotion was sought, of the disasters that came because some risked defeat of the Union arms rather than help achieve victory under the leadership of another. Thomas's rugged honesty would have made him recoil from the mere suggestion of his own advancement by such means. Modest and retiring, he never thrust himself forward to grasp for honors; those that came were almost thrust upon him. When juniors in rank were appointed over him, when his

own plans or suggestions were ignored by his superiors, he never, like Achilles, sulked in his tent, but manfully and faithfully persevered in doing all in his power to aid the cause he had espoused.

The affection of the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland for their loved commander has been intensified by the conviction that he was unjustly treated by his superiors and was deprived, during his lifetime, of the recognition that he had so fairly earned. As the years go by General Thomas's fame grows. In the estimation of those who served under him no man ranks higher on the splendid roll of famous Union generals. But there is something more than admiration and respect for his military abilities. There is added a feeling such as one entertains for a kind father. Other great Union generals may be admired and respected for their shining soldierly qualities and their great achievements—the memory of none is cherished with such deep and lasting affection as that of General Thomas.⁹

⁹ Adam Badeau in his *Military Life of U. S. Grant* has probably done more than any other writer to cast discredit upon the well-earned fame of General Thomas. In all his allusions to Thomas we perceive a covert attempt to damn him with faint praise. That he merited some commendation for his great achievements and that he had earned the love of his soldiers and the respect of his country, Badeau could not well deny, and so there is a studied effort to show that Thomas's "slowness" perpetually exasperated the general-in-chief and thwarted his plans, and was, in fact, one of the chief drawbacks to the Federal cause in the last year of the war. This slowness, which Badeau variously characterizes as "torpor," "inertia," or "a provoking, ob-

stinate delay before battle," he would have us believe was a constitutional defect in Thomas's character, so deep-seated and inveterate that it rendered him invulnerable to any amount of prodding and goading by his superior officers. To prove that he "was always heavy and slow," Badeau has raked up an alleged nickname of "Slow Trot Thomas," a sobriquet which he says Thomas acquired as a West Point cadet at the very outset of his military career. We are assured that his failure to carry out Grant's order of Nov. 7, 1863, to attack Missionary Ridge the next morning "was a great disappointment" to Grant; that there was no necessity for Thomas falling back to Nashville "except what Thomas imposed on himself by not concentrating earlier." For his alleged procrastination in giving battle at Nashville, Badeau finds no excuse, and he asserts that Thomas's delays continued to embarrass Grant in 1865 and "now compelled Grant to change his plans." Indeed, according to Badeau, the "torpor of Thomas in the Nashville campaign had determined the general-in-chief to entrust to that commander no more operations in which prompt aggressive action was necessary." Finally we are told, notwithstanding the admission that Thomas's signal victory at Nashville vindicated the soundness of his judgment and his splendid generalship, that "if Grant's other subordinates had taken it upon themselves at critical moments to defy his judgments and disregard his orders, the strategy which gave Thomas the opportunity to strike that blow would have come to naught."

At this day little weight is accorded Badeau's opinion of any Federal general. Van Horne, in his *Life of Thomas*, has conclusively shown that Badeau's aspersions on his character are made with a reckless, if not malicious, disregard of facts which are amply established by the official records.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE END OF AN UNIMPORTANT MILITARY CAREER

I did not see the close of the Atlanta campaign. My military career was abruptly cut short June 23, 1864. My experience on the last day of service in the field affords a fair illustration of much of the fighting during the campaign.

The Confederates had made a stand at Kenesaw Mountain. On June 23 Wood's division occupied a position in the line six or eight miles southeast of Big Shanty, a small station on the railroad. At that point the main lines of the two armies were hardly more than three hundred yards apart. The Confederate breastworks were so formidable that to take them by direct assault was plainly a hopeless undertaking. In front of them, probably seventy-five or one hundred yards, were the rifle-pits of the Confederate skirmishers. About seventy-five yards in front of these were the Federal rifle-pits, merely a slight barricade of rails, two or three feet high, with a shallow excavation behind them. To reach these from the main line, the pickets were obliged to run from the brow of a little elevation, exposed at every step to the bullets of the Confederate skirmishers and sharpshooters, jump into

the rifle-pits, and lie flat on the ground all day. So close was the watch that the exposure by a man in the rifle-pits of his head, his arm, or any part of his person, instantly drew the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters.

Six companies of the 79th were on skirmish duty that day and I was in command of the right of the line. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon orders came for the skirmishers to advance at the sound of the bugle and to charge the Confederate rifle-pits. I do not know whether the purpose was to develop the actual strength of the Confederates at that point, or to ascertain if they had evacuated their main works, or whether the charge was designed as a mere feint to cover an attack in some other quarter. When the bugle sounded there was a momentary hesitation, for every one felt that those who first exposed themselves were doomed to certain death. A second time the bugle sounded the advance, and then the whole line of Federal skirmishers leaped from the rifle-pits, every man rushing forward, sheltering himself as much as possible behind trees and stumps. This advance drew the fire of the Confederates, and before they could reload, the Federal skirmishers were upon them, driving them out of their rifle-pits and back into their main works. For a few seconds not a Confederate could be seen. Then came a volley and I felt a sharp, stinging sensation and knew that I had been hit. As far as I could see, the space directly beneath the head-log of the Confederate breastworks was filled with human faces. That was

all we could see of those behind the works but the protruding guns and the flash of their discharge told very plainly that the works had not been evacuated. Almost immediately after the first volley the Confederates made a counter-charge; reenforcements were sent from our lines, and, for a few minutes, there was an almost hand to hand struggle. So closely were the combatants intermingled that a Confederate captain, with drawn revolver, chased the color-bearer of the 79th around a tree demanding his surrender. It is almost needless to say that the demand was emphatically rejected. Sergeant Matthew Chandler of my company assisted me to the rear. As we were leaving the field we were pursued by two Confederates. They were about to overtake us when Chandler turned and shot one of them. He fell dead and the other stopped.

This engagement was never specially mentioned in the official reports. It was only a skirmish, and yet two men of my company, which numbered about twenty-five on the skirmish line, and five Federal commissioned officers standing within twenty-five yards of me, were killed within less than ten minutes. Similar skirmishing occurred almost every day at various points along the lines.

The rest of the story of my military career can be briefly told. I was taken to one of the general field hospital tents in the rear. There I rested for three days on a cot laid on the ground. All was done for me that could be done there. The surroundings were not very cheerful, and now and then I involuntarily shud-

dered as I looked through the opening of the tent and spied a hospital attendant carrying an armful of amputated legs and arms with as much indifference as if they had been so many sticks of stovewood.

On June 27, the day of the general assault on Kenesaw Mountain, the ambulances having been sent to the front, I was put in a government wagon and hauled eight miles over a new corduroy road to Big Shanty, the nearest railroad station, where I was put on board a freight train with three or four hundred wounded soldiers. There were various delays, occasioned by the passing of other trains and anticipated attacks of guerrillas, and our train did not reach Chattanooga until nearly noon on the 29th.

On my arrival there I was put into an ambulance and driven to the officers' hospital on Lookout Mountain. As the ambulance neared the hospital I observed several female nurses moving about and instantly it occurred to me that I was appareled in a style scarcely befitting my return to civilized society. One leg of my trousers had been cut off to facilitate the dressing of my wound, and, as the weather was very hot, I had not paid much attention to the remnant which entirely disappeared on the way to Chattanooga, so that when I arrived at the hospital I found myself bereft of every stitch of clothing except a very short blouse and a very short undershirt. However, the driver lent me a long-tailed rubber overcoat, in which I was smuggled into the hospital without attracting special attention.

It was found that I had a very bad wound, but I received every possible attention from the kind hospital surgeon in charge, Dr. J. G. McPheeters, and his attentive assistants. In about five weeks I was pronounced strong enough to be sent home on furlough. I reached Franklin August 4. At that stage in the war the return of dead and wounded soldiers had long ceased to be an unusual spectacle. Four old friends of the family met me at the railroad station. Any of them could easily have carried me on one arm, so poor and thin had I grown, but they put me on a stretcher and tenderly bore me home. My mother was waiting at the gate to clasp in her arms once more her boy, the mere shadow of his former self, but still alive. She had discharged her duty to her country and I had discharged mine.

My wound healed slowly. It was several months before I could sit in a chair and many months after that before I could walk without crutches. On November 10, 1864, I was honorably discharged from the service. The day that I received notice of it I hobbled on crutches to my stepfather's law office and resumed the study of law. I had laid aside forever the duties of an American soldier, thenceforth to resume the less dangerous, but not less important duties of an American citizen.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE STORY TOLD BY THE STATISTICS

The United States government has published a great mass of records, both Federal and Confederate, relating to the Civil War, including reports of battles, military reports, correspondence, and documents of all kinds. The volumes, popularly known as the "Rebellion Records," are bulky and now number 130. These are the great storehouse of information relating to the war.¹

A large amount of information is to be gathered from the muster-out rolls on file in the United States

¹ There is much diversity in the methods of citing these volumes. The official title printed on the back of each is: *War of the Rebellion. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. They are variously cited as *Official Records*, *War Records*, or *Rebellion Records*. I have referred to them by their popular title, or by the abbreviation *Reb. Rec.* To one not familiar with the method of citation there may also be difficulty in following references to volumes prior to the one now designated as "Serial Number 36" which, according to the original and cumbersome method of citation adopted by the government, was "Series 1, Vol. XXIV, Part 1." This and following volumes now have double labels, one designating the series, volumes and parts, and the other the serial number. The volumes subsequent to vol. 35 are usually referred to by the serial numbers; those prior to that volume by series, etc.

war department and in the archives of the different states. Indiana has published eight large volumes, compiled by Adjutant-General Wm. H. H. Terrell, containing not only the muster-out rolls of the various military organizations contributed by the state during the Civil War, but also a brief history of each. Other northern states have issued similar publications, but few are so complete as those of Indiana. North Carolina has published a roster of the Confederate organizations contributed by that state. But many states are still much behind in such work; some have not even printed their muster-out rolls and the information contained in them can be found only in the unpublished records.

To make all this mass of facts available to the general reader requires long and laborious investigation and study. No single volume yet published gives such an exhaustive compilation of statistics as that of Colonel Fox, entitled *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War*, published in 1898. A smaller book, by Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, entitled *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America*, has recently passed to a second edition. It contains in a condensed form a great deal of information compiled from official records, the portion relating to the numbers and losses of the Confederates being especially valuable and interesting. Many statistics are also to be found in the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, published by the Century Company, and in Phisterer's *Statistical Records of the Armies of the United States*. Besides

these, there are multitudes of histories of the war, of particular campaigns and battles, regimental histories, etc., in which statistics of various kinds may be found.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of men enlisted on each side. Some of the records have been lost; others were imperfectly kept; the enlistments covered various periods, and some men enlisted more than once. Reducing the whole number to a three-years' basis, Colonel Fox's estimate of the total number of men enlisted in the northern armies is 2,326,168 while that of Colonel Livermore is 1,556,678.²

It has been much more difficult to ascertain the total number of enlistments in the Confederate armies. For a long time those speaking from the Confederate standpoint assumed that it did not exceed 600,000, but Colonel Livermore has shown that it was much larger—nearer 1,000,000.

Mere figures do not convey a tangible idea. We obtain a clearer conception of the great armies in the last year of the war, of their composition and dimensions, from General Webb's statement of the organization and strength of the army with which General Grant entered upon the Virginia campaign in April, 1864. He says:³

²The variance is chiefly the result of differences in the method of computing the term of service of those who enlisted for three years, but who were discharged before the expiration of that period by reason of the close of the war. See *Numbers and Losses*, 2d ed., p. 49.

³Article on *Through the Wilderness, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 4, p. 152.

"The total force under General Grant, including Burnside, was 4,409 officers and 114,360 enlisted men. For the artillery he had 9,945 enlisted men and 285 officers; in the cavalry 11,839 enlisted men and 585 officers; in the provost guards and engineers 120 officers and 3,274 enlisted men. His 118,000 men, properly disposed for battle, would have covered a front of twenty-one miles, two ranks deep, with one-third of them held in reserve; while Lee, with his 62,000 men, similarly disposed, would cover only twelve miles. Grant had a train which he states in his *'Memoirs'* would have reached from the Rapidan to Richmond, or sixty-five miles."

What became of the vast host enrolled in the Federal and Confederate armies? Of those in the Federal armies Colonel Fox estimates that there were

Killed in battle (including those who died of wounds).....	110,070
Died of disease.....	199,720
Deaths from all causes.....	359,528

It is impossible to make an accurate statement of the Confederate losses. The number of those killed in battle or died of wounds has been variously estimated; it is stated by Colonel Fox as at least 94,000. The lowest estimate of the number of those who died of disease is 59,297.

It is difficult to form an adequate idea, from these figures, of the enormous number killed and died of wounds. The number in fact was much larger than that given by the statistics, for these include only those who died in service, while many died of wounds after their discharge from the army. Instances are

not rare of men who died many years after the close of the war from wounds received in the service.

Persons not familiar with the statistics usually imagine that most of those who died in the service died on the battle-field or as the result of wounds received in battle. In fact the number of those who died from disease was nearly twice as large as the number killed in battle, or, exactly stated, 199,720. Colonel Fox states that of those who died from disease, one-fourth died from fevers, principally typhoid; one-fourth from diarrhea or other bowel trouble; nearly one-fourth from consumption or other pulmonary disease, and the remainder from various other diseases.

The statement of the number of deaths from disease is remarkable when considered in connection with the fact that, before being mustered in, a physical examination was made of the enlisted men, and that most of them were young, strong, and robust; but it is not surprising when we consider the exposures to which they were subjected, the unhealthy camps, the poor diet, the bad water, and the great physical and mental strain to which they were subjected. My company on December 1, 1862, numbered ninety, rank and file. Of these ten died of disease in that month. We can form some idea of this per cent. of mortality if we imagine a village of nine hundred in which one hundred are carried off by cholera or other epidemic in one month.

But appalling as are these statistics of the loss of life, they do not by any means tell the whole story of

those who died from disease; for many of those discharged for disability died after reaching home, and of these the army records give no account. The men who died either in or out of the army, from disease contracted in the service, as truly gave their lives for their country as did those who died on the field of battle. Nor do the statistics tell of all who lived, some of whom still live, with broken health and shattered constitutions.

Notwithstanding the drafts ordered during the war there were very few drafted men in the Federal armies in proportion to the total enrollment. The total number held to service, as given by Colonel Fox, was 52,068.

There was also a very small percentage of regulars in proportion to the volunteers. "At no time," Colonel Fox states,⁴ "during the period of active hostilities, did the regular army number, present and absent, over 26,000, officers and men."

There are some curious statistics concerning the number of deserters. In the regular army the loss by desertions was 24 per cent., while in the volunteer service it was only 6 per cent. But, according to the provost marshal general, 25 per cent. of those reported as deserters were wrongly reported. I have no doubt of the truth of this statement. There was but one real deserter from my company, though several men who had been sent home on

⁴ *Reg. Losses*, p. 528.

sick furloughs from various hospitals were reported by the hospital authorities as deserters and were so entered on the muster-rolls. All of them afterward rejoined the company, when it was ascertained that they had been unable from sickness, inability to get transportation, or other meritorious excuse, to return to the hospitals at the expiration of their furloughs.

The most interesting statistics, on the compilation of which the greatest labor has been expended, are those relating to the battles in which the armies were engaged. These give the number engaged, the number killed, wounded and captured, the number *hit* in every 1,000, the proportion of the number killed and wounded to the number engaged, and various other curious facts.

The magnitude of the Civil War will most clearly be perceived by comparing it with prior wars of this country. The statistics given in Spofford's *American Almanac* for 1886^{*} of the Mexican War and the War of 1812, are as follows:

Mexican War 1846-1848:

Total American troops enrolled.....	101,282
Total killed.....	1,049
Total died of wounds.....	508
Total wounded.....	3,420
	<hr/> 4,977

* P. 23.

War 1812-1815:

The whole number of regulars during the entire service can not be accurately given, but there were in service in February 1815, 33,424. The whole number of militia enrolled during the war was 471,622 and the losses were:

Killed	1,877
Wounded	3,737
	— 5,614

The battles of the Revolution deservedly occupy a prominent place in history, but they seem insignificant when compared with those of the Civil War. The official records of the Revolutionary battles, especially those relating to the militia, are very imperfect and it is impossible to reconcile the discrepancies in the unofficial accounts given of the numbers and losses.

The report of the Secretary of War May 10, 1790,* gives the number of troops from each of the thirteen states during the years 1775-1783, including continental soldiers and militia. The largest number in service at any time was in the year 1776, when it amounted to 89,651. In the last year, 1783, it was 13,476. The following table is probably sufficiently accurate for the purpose of making a comparison between the battles of the Revolution and those of the Civil War:†

* *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, vol. I, pp. 14-19. An abstract of this report will be found in Spofford's *American Almanac* for 1886, p. 23.

† This table does not include the naval engagements and omits

NUMBERS AND LOSSES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

Battle—Date.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured or Surrendered.	Total.
Lexington, April 19, 1775.	A.	8	9	17
	B. 1,700
Concord, April 19, 1775.	A.	41	39	5	85
	B.	68	178	26	272
Noddles Island, May 27, 1775.	A.
	B.	2	2	4
Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775.	A. 3,000	136	304	9	449
	B. 4,500	226	828	1,054
Montreal, Sept. 25, 1775.	A. 110	7	21	28
	B. 240
Quebec, Dec. 31, 1775.	A. 900	50	150	426	626
	B. 1,200	5	13	18
Moore's Cr'k Bridge, N. C., Feb. 27, 1776.	A.	1	1	2
	B.	10	20	30
Sullivan's Island or Ft. Moultrie, S. C., June 28, 1776.	A.	12	25	37
	B.	64	141	205

some insignificant skirmishes and "affairs," and also various engagements between the Patriots or Whigs on one side and the Tories on the other, but it includes all the principal land battles of the Revolution and most of the minor engagements. In compiling the table I have taken the numbers of those engaged from Townsend's *U. S. Curious Facts*, pp. 338-9. This author does not cite his authorities and I have been unable to verify his figures.

Statements of the numbers of killed, wounded and missing in some of the battles are given in Bancroft's *Hist. of the U. States*, but, in the main, I have adopted the figures kindly furnished me by Colonel William F. Fox, author of *Regimental Losses*. These correspond substantially with those given in Dawson's *Battles of the United States*, Lossing's *Field Book of the Revolution*, and Carrington's *Battles of the Revolution*. In a few instances the numbers given are only estimates and these are indicated by asterisks.

Battle—Date.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured or Surrendered.	Total.
Long Island, N. Y., August 27, 1776.	A. 10,000	*40	*160	*1,097	*1,297
	B. 20,000	64	282	21	367
Harlem Plains, N. Y., Sept. 16, 1776.	A.	17	40	57
	B.	14	78	92
White Plains, N. Y., Oct. 28, 1776.	A. 1,600	59	65	39	163
	B. 2,000	48	163	20	231
Ft. Washington, N. Y., Nov. 16, 1776.	A. 3,000	54	93	214	2,600	2,961
	B. 5,000	79	375	6	460
Trenton, N. J., Dec. 26, 1776.	A. 2,400	2	4	6
	B. 5,000	30	50	918	998
Princeton, N. J., Jan. 3, 1777.	A. 3,000	20	40	60
	B. 1,800	18	58	200	276
Danbury, Conn., April 25-27, 1777.	A.	20	40	60
	B.	*50	*130	*20	200
Hubbardton, Vt., July 4-7, 1777.	A. 700	30	66	228	324
	B. 1,200	55	148	203
Oriskany or Ft. Schuyler, N. Y., Aug. 2-22, 1777.	A.	*100	*300	400
	B.	*100	*300	400
Bennington, Vt., Aug. 16, 1777.	A. 2,000	30	40	70
	B. 1,200	207	744	951
Brandywine, Pa., Sept. 11, 1777.	A. 11,000	200	800	200	1,200
	B. 18,000	90	488	6	584
Bemis Heights or Stillwater, N. Y., Sept. 19, 1777.	A. 2,500	65	218	38	321
	B. 3,000	*200	*400	600
Paoli, Pa., Sept. 20, 1777.	A. 1,500	*100	*200	80	380
	B.	4	4	8
Germantown, Pa., Oct. 4, 1777.	A. 11,000	152	521	400	1,073
	B. 15,000	100	400	35	535
Ft. Clinton, N. Y., Oct. 6, 1777.	A.	*50	*180	*20	250
	B.	*40	*150	190
Saratoga, N. Y., Oct. 17, 1777.	A. 13,222	40	110	150
	B. 8,000	*50	*300	*150	5,791	6,291
Ft. Mercer, N. J., Oct. 22, 1777.	A. 450	14	23	1	38
	B. 2,000	78	150	228
Ft. Mifflin, Pa., Nov. 10-15, 1777.	A.	*50	*200	250
	B.	13	24	37
Whitemarsh, Pa., Dec. 5-8, 1777.	A.	10	34	44
	B.	8	26	34
Monmouth, N. J., June 28, 1778.	A. 12,000	69	161	132	362
	B. 11,000	65	160	61	286

Battle—Date.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured or Surrendered.	Total.
Wyoming, Pa., { A.	400	227	227
July 1-4, 1778. } B. & I.	1,000	10	40	50
Ft. Boone, Ky., Aug. 8-20, 1778. { A.	2	4	6
Quaker Hill, R. I., Aug. 20, 1778. { B.	37	100	137
Tappan, N. Y., Sept. 27, 1778. { A.	5,000	30	137	44	211
Cherry Valley, N. Y., Nov. 11, 1778. { B.	5,000	38	210	12	260
Savannah, Ga., Dec. 20, 1778. { A.	40	20	60
Sunbury, Ga., Jan. 9, 1779. { B.	1	1
Beaufort or Port Royal, S. C., Feb. 3, '79. { A.	32	30	62
Kettle Creek, Ga., Feb. 14, 1779. { B. & I.
Brier Creek, Ga., March 3, 1779. { A.	900	80	200	453	733
Stono Ferry, S. C., June 20, 1779. { B.	2,000	3	10	13
New Haven, Conn., July 5, 1779. { A.	200	4	7	189	200
Stony Point, N. Y., July 16, 1779. { B.	2,000	1	3	4
Paulus Hook, N. J., Aug. 19, 1779. { A.	8	22	30
Newtown or Chemung, N. Y., Aug. 20, 1779. { B.	15	52	8	75
Siege of Savannah, Ga., Sept. 23-Oct. 18, 1779. { A.	9	23	32
Young's House, N. Y., Feb. 3, 1780. { B.	40	120	75	235
Siege of Charleston, S. C., March 29-May 13, 1780. { A.	2,000	20	50	189	259
Waxhaws, S. C., May 20, 1780. { B.	1,800	5	11	16
Springfield, N. J., June 23, 1780. { A.	800	*30	*116	155	301
..... { B.	2,000	26	103	1	130
..... { A.	22	17	39
..... { B.	9	40	25	74
..... { A.	1,200	15	83	98
..... { B.	600	20	74	58	472	624
..... { A.	400	*4	*16	20
..... { B.	208	*10	*40	158	208
..... { A.	4,500	7	30	37
..... { B.
..... { A. & F.	1,500
..... { B.	4,500	228	610	838
..... { A.	2,000	40	63	52	155
..... { B.	14	37	68	119
..... { A.	5	18	23
..... { A.	3,900	92	148	2,000	2,240
..... { B.	9,000	76	189	265
..... { A.	400	113	203	316
..... { B.	16	12	28
..... { A.	3,000	13	61	9	83
..... { B.	5,000

Battle—Date.	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured or Surren- dered.	Total.
Rocky Mount, S. C., July 30, 1780.	A. 600 B. 500	4 10	10 10	14 20
Green Spring, S. C., Aug. 1, 1780.	A. B.	4 28	23	27 28
Hanging Rock, S. C., Aug. 6, 1780.	A. 600 B. 500	12 23	41 40	53 269
Camden, S. C., Aug. 16, 1780.	A. 3,000 B. 2,200	*200 68	*500 245	*300 11	*1,000	*2,000 324
Musgrove's Mill, S. C., Aug. 18, 1780.	A. B.	5 86	11	16 164
Fishing Creek, S. C., Aug. 18, 1780.	A. B.	*30 9	*120 6	300	450 15
Charlotte, N. C., Sept. 26, 1780.	A. B.	6	13	19
King's Mountain, S. C., Oct. 7, 1780.	A. 900 B. 1,100	28 225	60 263	718	88 1,206
Blackstocks, S. C., Nov. 20, 1780.	A. B.	3 92	4 100	7 192
Cowpens, S. C., Jan. 17, 1781.	A. 900 B. 1,100	12 100	60 229	500	72 829
Guilford Ct. H., S. C., March 15, 1781.	A. 4,404 B. 2,400	78 159	183 331	1,046 25	1,307 515
Hobkirks Hill, S. C., April 25, 1781.	A. 1,500 B. 950	19 38	115 200	136 20	270 258
Siege of Augusta, Ga., April 16-June 5, 1781.	A. B.	*10	*30	300	40 300
Ft. Ninety-Six, S. C., June 19, 1791.	A. 1,000 B. 550	40 25	115 60	155 85
Jamestown Ford, Va., July 6, 1781.	A. B.	20 20	80 55	18	118 75
Ft. Griswold, Conn., Sept. 6, 1781.	A. 150 B. 800	95 48	75 145	170 193
Eutaw Springs, S. C., Sept. 8, 1781.	A. 2,000 B. 2,800	114 85	262 351	32 257	408 693
Yorktown, Va., Sept. 28-Oct. 19, 1781.	A. 16,000 B. 8,000	72 156	202 326 70	7,073	274 7,625

SUMMARY.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Captured or Surrendered.	Total.
Americans.....	3,112	7,518	3,415	8,064	22,109
British.....	3,212	8,314	1,237	16,880	29,643
Total.....	6,324	15,832	4,652	24,944	51,752

Killed, wounded, missing, captured or surrendered:

Americans.....22,109

British.....29,643

51,752

Killed, wounded and missing:

Americans.....14,045

British.....12,763

26,808

Killed and wounded:

Americans.....10,630

British.....11,526

22,156

It would require too much space to give the numbers and losses in each of the battles of the Civil War. Those stated in the following table, compiled mainly from Livermore's *Numbers and Losses*, are for battles in which the total engaged was 50,000 or more. In preceding chapters are given fuller statistics of the battles of Stone's River, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES IN THE CIVIL WAR.

Battle.		Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total loss.
Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862.	F.	62,682	1,754	8,408	2,885	13,047
	C.	40,335	1,723	8,012	959	10,694
Williamsburg, May 4-5, 1862.	F.	40,768	456	1,410	373	2,239
	C.	31,823	K.&W.	1,570	133	1,703
Fair Oaks, May 31-	F.	41,797	790	3,594	647	5,031
June 1, 1862.	C.	41,816	980	4,749	405	6,134
Gaines's Mill, June 27, 1862.	F.	34,214	894	3,107	2,836	6,837
	C.	57,018	K., W.	& M.	8,751
Seven Days', June 25 to July 1, 1862.	F.	91,169	1,734	8,062	6,053	15,849
	C.	95,481	3,478	16,261	875	20,614
Manassas & Chantilly, Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 1862.	F.	75,696	1,724	8,372	5,958	16,054
	C.	48,527	1,481	7,627	89	9,197
Antietam, Sept. 16-17, 1862.	F.	75,316	2,108	9,549	753	12,410
	C.	51,844	2,700	9,024	2,000	13,724
Perryville, Oct. 8, 1862.	F.	36,940	845	2,851	515	4,211
	C.	16,000	510	2,635	251	3,396
Fredericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862.	F.	106,007	1,284	9,600	1,769	12,653
	C.	72,497	595	4,061	653	5,309
Stone's River, Dec. 31, 1862, to Jan. 1, 1863.	F.	41,400	1,677	7,543	3,686	12,906
	C.	34,732	1,294	7,945	2,500	11,739
Chancellorsville, May 1-4, 1863.	F.	97,382	1,575	9,594	5,676	16,845
	C.	57,352	1,665	9,081	2,018	12,764
Champion Hill, May 16, 1863.	F.	29,373	410	1,844	187	2,441
	C.	20,000	381	1,800	1,670	3,851
Assault on Vicksburg, May 22, 1863.	F.	45,556	502	2,550	147	3,199
	C.	22,301
Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863.	F.	88,289	3,155	14,529	5,365	23,049
	C.	75,000	3,903	18,735	5,425	28,063
Chickamauga, Sept. 19-20, 1863.	F.	58,222	1,657	9,756	4,757	16,170
	C.	66,326	2,312	14,674	1,468	18,454
Chattanooga, Nov. 23-25, 1863.	F.	56,359	753	4,722	349	5,824
	C.	46,165	361	2,160	4,146	6,667
Mine Run, Nov. 27-Dec. 1, 1863.	F.	69,643	173	1,099	381	1,653
	C.	44,426	110	570	65	745
Wilderness, May 5-7, 1864.	F.	101,895	2,246	12,037	3,383	17,666
	C.	61,025
Spottsylvania, May 12, 1864.	F.	65,785	K.&W.	6,020	800	6,820
	C.
Cold Harbor, June 1-3, 1864.	F.	107,907	K.&W.	12,000	12,000
	C.

Battle.		Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total loss.
Petersburg, June 15-18, 1864.	F.	63,797	K., W.	& M.	8,150
	C.	41,499
Atlanta, July 22, 1864.	F.	30,477	430	1,559	1,733	3,722
	C.	36,934	K. & W.	7,000	1,000	8,000
Winchester Sept. 19, 1864.	F.	37,711	697	3,983	338	5,018
	C.	16,377	276	1,827	1,818	3,921
Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 1864.	F.	30,829	644	3,430	1,591	5,665
	C.	18,410	320	1,540	1,050	2,910
Boynton Plank Road, Oct. 27, 28, 1864.	F.	42,823	166	1,028	564	1,758
	C.	20,324
Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864.	F.	27,939	189	1,033	1,104	2,326
	C.	26,897	1,750	3,800	702	6,252
Nashville, Dec. 15, 16, 1864.	F.	49,773	387	2,562	112	3,061
	C.	23,207
Assault at Petersburg, April 2, 1865.	F.	63,299	625	3,189	326	4,140
	C.	18,576

The greatest loss of general officers in any single engagement was that of the Confederates in the battle of Franklin, in which one major-general and four brigadier-generals were killed, one major-general and five brigadier-generals were wounded, and one brigadier-general was captured. This was most remarkable, considering that the total number of Confederates engaged was only 26,897.

Neither the number of men lost in a particular battle nor the number lost by a particular regiment gives us an accurate idea of the dangers to which the participants were exposed, unless we know the proportion of the killed and wounded to the number engaged. Many regiments lost a greater per cent. of killed and

wounded in some small battle or skirmish than others lost in greater ones.

The charge of the Light Brigade has been celebrated in prose and verse as the most striking exhibition in history of men marching into the very jaws of death. The Light Brigade lost 36.7 per cent. in killed and wounded. Colonel Fox gives a list of 63 Federal regiments and 52 Confederate regiments, each of which in a single engagement lost over 50 per cent. in killed, wounded, and missing; 24 of the Federal regiments lost over 60 per cent. Two Federal regiments, the 1st Minn. and the 141st Penn., and two Confederate regiments, the 1st Texas and the 21st Ga., each lost at Gettysburg over 75 per cent. In a single charge at Gettysburg, the 1st Minn. took into action 262 officers and men and lost 50 killed and 174 wounded; seventeen officers, including the colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and adjutant, being among the number. In the same battle the 26th North Carolina of the Confederate army went into the first day's fight with 800 men, losing 86 killed and 502 wounded; it participated on the third day in the charge of Pickett's division with 216 men; of these only 80 were left for duty the next day. The 5th New Hampshire, during its four-years' service, lost 295 men killed in action or died of wounds, the killed including 18 officers and 277 enlisted men. The Federal regiment that lost the greatest number, though not the greatest per cent., of killed and died of wounds, was the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, recruited for artillery service but serving as

an infantry regiment. Of its total enrollment of 2,202, it lost 423 in killed and died of wounds, or 19.2 per cent., all these losses occurring during a period of about ten months.

Undoubtedly there were other regiments, Federal and Confederate, the statistics of which are imperfect, whose losses were fully fifty per cent., or perhaps more; but the average per cent. of killed and died of wounds was far below that of the regiments above mentioned. It was about 4.7 per cent. of Colonel Fox's total of 2,326,168, and about 7 per cent. of Colonel Livermore's total of 1,556,698.

The figures given in the foregoing tables do not fully represent the fighting in campaigns such as those of Grant and Sherman in the spring and summer of 1864. The battles beginning with the first day's fight in the Wilderness, May 3, 1864, and ending with that of Spottsylvania, May 12, were really parts of one continuous battle in which the Federal loss, according to Colonel Livermore, was 26,815 in killed and wounded, and 4,183 missing. So the battles of the Atlanta campaign in the month of May, 1864, were really parts of one continuous battle in which the Federals, with an effective force of 110,123, lost in killed and wounded 10,528 and in missing, 1,240, and the Confederates, with an effective force of 66,089, lost in killed and wounded 9,187. Even these figures do not convey an accurate idea of the desperate fighting and the enormous losses in the last year of the war.

Charles A. Dana^{*} has compiled from the official reports a table showing the losses in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James in Grant's Richmond campaign, from the beginning, May 3, 1864, to the surrender at Appomattox, April 9, 1865. It shows the following totals:

<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Captured and Missing.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
15,139	77,748	31,503	124,390

Some idea may be formed of these enormous losses if we consider that they far exceed the great army with which Sherman began his Atlanta campaign, and that they more than twice outnumber the army with which Rosecrans started on his Chattanooga campaign. They also outnumber all the American troops engaged in the whole of the Mexican War. And yet these figures represent only the Federal losses and do not take into account those of the Confederates.

The magnitude of the battles of the Civil War, compared with those of the Revolution, will be seen by comparing the following summary of the losses at Chickamauga and Gettysburg with the summary given of the Revolutionary losses.

LOSSES AT CHICKAMAUGA.

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Federals	1,657	9,756	4,757	16,170
Confederates	2,312	14,674	1,468	18,454
Total	3,969	24,430	6,225	34,624

^{*} *Recollections of the Civil War*, p. 211.

Killed, wounded and missing:

Federals	16,170
Confederates	18,454
	<hr/> 34,624

Killed and wounded:

Federals	11,413
Confederates	16,986
	<hr/> 28,399

LOSSES AT GETTYSBURG.

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Federals	3,155	14,529	5,365	23,049
Confederates	3,903	18,735	5,425	28,063
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	7,058	33,264	10,790	51,112

Killed, wounded and missing:

Federals	23,049
Confederates	28,063
	<hr/> 51,112

Killed and wounded:

Federals	17,684
Confederates	22,638
	<hr/> 40,322

The following statistics of my company probably do not vary materially from those of other companies in active service, in the showing made of the men who entered the service and what became of them.

Mustered into service:

Captain	1
1st Lieutenant.....	1
2d Lieutenant.....	1
Sergeants	5
Corporals	8
Wagoner	1
Privates	79

Gained by assignment.....	1
Gained by recruit.....	1
	<hr/>
Total	98
Resignations	3
Transferred by promotion.....	1
Transferred to Engineer Corps, Veteran Reserve Corps, and other army organizations.....	10
Released by civil authority.....	1
Deserted	1
Killed in action.....	5
Died of disease.....	22
Discharged for wounds or disability.....	15
	<hr/>
	58
	<hr/>
Mustered out at expiration of enlistment.....	40

The number killed and wounded during the service were :

Killed, enlisted men.....	5
Wounded, officers.....	2
Wounded, enlisted men.....	10
	<hr/>
	12
	<hr/>
Total	17

All these were killed or wounded after December 30, 1862, at which time the total rank and file of the company numbered only eighty, so that about 20 per cent. of those remaining after that date were killed or wounded. But there were never eighty men in any engagement. At Stone's River, the first battle, the total number engaged was only thirty-four, and there was never a greater number in action at one time.

The statistics give us only a hint of the development

of a citizen into a soldier, and, to understand this fully, we must read such books as General Humphreys's *Virginia Campaign* and General Cox's *Atlanta Campaign*. These are not mere eulogies, such as are found in regimental histories and memorial day addresses. They are careful statements of facts by men fully conversant with them. They tell of such heroic fighting on both sides as was never surpassed in any war in the world. The men of the North and the South that fought in 1864 in the Richmond and Atlanta campaigns were veteran soldiers, whose training and experience had raised them to the highest grade of efficiency. We read of repulses but of few panics. The men on both sides went where they were ordered, stood as long as they were commanded to stand, and retreated only when it was apparent to their officers that to stand longer would result in useless slaughter.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

REVISITING CHATTANOOGA AND CHICKAMAUGA

Since the close of the Civil War the United States government has established the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, including not only the battle-ground of Chickamauga, but considerable portions of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain and the approaches to the battle-fields. Part of the ground has been acquired by purchase and part by donation.

The plan of this great work originated with General Henry V. Boynton, then the Washington correspondent of the Cincinnati *Commercial-Gazette*, and now President of the Park Commission. As Lieut.-Colonel of the 35th Ohio Vols., he participated in the battle of Chickamauga and in the assault of Missionary Ridge, and he has been actively identified with the park since its inception. He began by advocating the project in a series of letters to the *Commercial-Gazette*. It was favorably considered at a meeting of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland, and a committee was appointed by the society which met in Washington in February, 1889, and secured the cooperation of a number of those, formerly in the Confederate army,

who had taken a prominent part in the battle. Out of this grew the Chickamauga Memorial Association. The original plan was to include in the proposed park only the Chickamauga battle-ground, but its scope was enlarged to include the approaches and portions of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain. Later the aid of Congress was invoked. This resulted in the passage in 1890 of a bill, prepared by General Boynton, for the purchase of the necessary ground and the establishment of a national park to be known as the "Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park." The purchase of the ground and the establishment of the park were placed under the direction of the Secretary of War, and the management, subject to his supervision, was given to three commissioners, each of whom must have actively participated in the battle of Chickamauga or in one of the battles about Chattanooga. Two of the commissioners were to be appointed from civil life by the Secretary of War and a third was to be detailed by the Secretary from among the officers of the army best acquainted with the details of those battles, who was to act as secretary of the commission.

Since then the government has acquired 5,000 acres of the ground on which the battle of Chickamauga was fought, about fifty acres of the north end of Missionary Ridge, five acres where the north observation tower stands, and three acres where Bragg had his headquarters, also Orchard Knob, about eight acres, and about ninety-eight acres at the point of Lookout Moun-

tain, besides about 330 acres for the various approaches. About seventy-five miles of the approaches have been improved and converted into magnificent boulevards. The ground which it is proposed to acquire, in addition to that already obtained, will make a total of nearly 7,600 acres.¹

The appearance of Missionary Ridge has been much changed since the war. Several houses have been erected on it and a considerable portion of the ground between Fort Wood and the base of the ridge has been platted into lots upon which houses have been built. The government has constructed a road on the crest, following the line occupied by Bragg's army, and has erected two observation towers, one at the point where Bragg's headquarters were located, the other some distance north of that point and opposite the place where the left of the assaulting line reached the summit. Along the crest of the ridge are various monuments and markers commemorating the positions of some of the troops engaged, but when I was last there the marking was not so complete as that on the battle-field of Chickamauga.

Greater changes are seen on Lookout Mountain and

¹ General Boynton published a volume in 1895 entitled *The Chickamauga National Military Park*, containing a full history of the preliminary steps and the legislation leading to the establishment of the park, its boundaries, the approaches, and the method of marking the various points of interest, with much valuable information concerning the battles intended to be commemorated. To this volume I am largely indebted for statistics not easily obtainable elsewhere.

in its vicinity. A railroad now reaches the summit by winding around the mountain. There is also an inclined railroad on which cable cars, drawn by powerful machinery, are hauled up a very steep incline. A dummy railroad on the top extends back several miles from the point. There is a large hotel not far from the place where the old wagon road reaches the summit and another on the side of the mountain a little below the point. The old officers' hospital burned down and on its site another building has been erected. Various other changes are manifest but the point itself looks precisely as it looked during the war.

The greatest effort made by the government is seen in the work which has been done to restore the battle-field of Chickamauga, so that it may present, as nearly as possible, its appearance when the battle was fought. The timber which afterward grew in the open fields has been cut down, and in places where, after the battle, timber was cut down, trees are now being allowed to grow. Nearly all the old roads and bridges are there just as they were during the battle, but the roads have been improved by the government and converted into splendid driveways. Roads opened since the battle have been closed, except a few, constructed by the government to afford greater facilities for viewing the battle-field. The most noticeable change in the natural surface of the ground itself is seen in the clearing away of the underbrush, which was necessary in order to give an unobstructed view of the lines of battle, and access to them. A few structures appear that

were not there at the time of the battle, particularly the buildings erected by the government for the use of the troops quartered in the park during the Spanish War, and a hotel near Crawfish Spring. But nearly all the old houses, chiefly log structures, remain, notably Lee and Gordon's Mill, the Widow Glenn, the Brotherton, the Poe, the Kelly, and the Snodgrass houses, and they show few changes.

Three iron and steel observation towers, each seventy feet high, have been erected by the government, one on Snodgrass Hill, one near Hall's Ford and one near Jay's saw mill. The positions occupied by the Federal and Confederate lines during each day of the battle are designated by small stone markers, indicating each regiment engaged. The position of each battery is indicated by cannon, of the kind used by it in the battle, mounted on carriages but without caissons. Iron markers, three by four feet, indicate the headquarters of the armies and the positions of the corps, divisions and brigades. A tablet designating the position of a corps is inscribed with the name of the commander, the divisions, and the division commanders. The division tablets represent the brigade organizations, and the brigade tablets, the regimental organizations. On each tablet is also inscribed the position or event which it commemorates. Smaller tablets commemorate some notable event of the battle. The place where any general officer was killed is indicated by a pyramid of cannon-balls. Monuments have also been erected by the government and by the states whose

troops were represented in the battle, in honor of the various organizations engaged. These are generally located at some point where the organization designated especially distinguished itself, or where, for some other reason, the site was deemed most appropriate. The monument erected by the state of Georgia, the Wilder brigade monument, and some others, are beautiful and imposing.

I did not see Chattanooga or the Chickamauga battle-field after the year 1864 until the fall of 1899, when Captain Eli F. Ritter, of the 79th Ind., and I accompanied a small party going to participate in the dedication of the monument erected to Wilder's brigade. In the forenoon of the first day after our arrival we visited the National Cemetery. To me it did not seem right that only Union soldiers should be buried there. I hope to see the day when the Confederate dead also shall be buried in this ground which now belongs to a common Union.

We next visited Missionary Ridge, ascending at the north end where Sherman fought, and driving along the magnificent boulevard on the crest to a considerable distance south of the point where Bragg had his headquarters. From the summit one has a full view of the valley below, of Orchard Knob, Chattanooga, and Lookout Mountain. The distance from Orchard Knob to the top of the ridge in front is a mile or more, the slope of the ridge is about six hundred yards, and its height about four hundred feet. It would require considerable physical exertion to walk from Orchard

Knob to the top of the ridge, and not many would attempt it without a good stout pair of legs. Looking at the long distance traveled by the assaulting forces and at the steepness of the ascent, it seems incredible that the Union troops should have carried the works on the summit. But Captain Ritter and I can each vouch that the other, on November 25, 1863, ran at a pretty brisk gait from Orchard Knob to the foot of the ridge and then climbed the hill without stopping to take breath until near the top.

In the afternoon we ascended Lookout Mountain in a cable car which, at times, seemed to be going almost straight up. Notwithstanding the changes since the war, the essential features of the mountain, and especially of Lookout Point, remain as they were during the war. From the point, which rises almost perpendicularly about 1,600 feet above the valley of the Tennessee, the view is one of the most beautiful in America. It is said that one standing there on a clear day can see portions of seven states—Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Virginia. When in the hospital there I could view from my window the thunder-storms raging in the clouds below. It was below and about Lookout Point that Hooker's men fought the memorable "battle among the clouds." After going on the dummy railroad to its terminus, we returned and spent some time walking about in the vicinity of the point.

The next day we drove from Chattanooga to the Chickamauga battle-ground, passing through Ross-

ville, of which I had a very vivid recollection as it appeared on the morning of September 21, 1863. Leaving Rossville we drove first to the Wilder monument near Lytle's station. All along the road from Chattanooga we passed the tablets commemorating some important event that occurred during or shortly before the battle.

To one who participated in the battle of Chickamauga, it is a weird sight which the field now presents to his view. Looking through the trees at the monuments and markers which indicate the lines of battle and at the batteries which now stand as mute as the monuments themselves, one can almost imagine the dead rising out of the ground and taking their places in mortal conflict.

Some points on the field were especially interesting to us. We first visited the place now marked by a monument to the 79th Ind., a little southeast of the Brotherton House, where Beatty's brigade charged and captured a Confederate battery. As we stood silently looking at the monument I felt the tears trickling down my cheeks. I looked at Captain Ritter and the tears were running down his cheeks also. Neither of us spoke, but each understood that memory had recalled the scenes of long ago and had touched some hidden spring in the human heart that causes it to overflow.

Lee and Gordon's Mill appears almost precisely as it did at the time of the battle, but there has been a change in the road crossing Chickamauga creek. Crawfish Spring is unchanged, but the surroundings

have been somewhat altered by the erection of a dam just below it and a hotel near by. The flow is of sufficient volume to make a large stream. We camped near it a few days before the battle, after a hot and dusty march, and I recall the ecstasy with which men and beasts quenched their thirst in the cold clear water that gushed out of the rocks.

The point that interested me more than any other was Snodgrass Hill. I easily found the spot, a few yards east of the observation-tower, where I stood Sunday afternoon until after 7 o'clock and witnessed the repeated assaults of Longstreet's forces and the magnificent charge of Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades.

The day after visiting the battle-field of Chickamauga I happened to meet in the hotel at Chattanooga a Confederate officer of the brigade to which Carnes's battery was attached. This was the battery in the capture of which I had participated. We had a brief but social talk about it and, with a cordial grasp at parting, he said: "Well, Captain Howe, the war is over." I replied: "Thank God, we can at last clasp hands over the bloody chasm."

That evening all the visiting Union soldiers were cordially invited to attend a camp-fire at one of the Confederate camps in the city. Much to my regret, on account of engagements at home, I could not stay. Nothing would have pleased me better than to accept the hospitality of the battle-scarred veterans who were once my foes. I felt that I had been thoroughly "re-

constructed." "Old age," it is said, "ne'er cools the Douglas blood.". Perhaps it has not cooled my own patriotic ardor, but the lapse of years has wrought a wonderful change in my feelings toward my ancient foemen.

No one who took part in the bloody contest at Chickamauga can ever forget it. But the field on which that memorable battle was fought has since taken on a new glory. We recall that it was the camp-ground of the soldiers of the Spanish-American War. We see marching from that field to the defense of a common country men of Massachusetts and South Carolina, of Georgia and Indiana, marching side by side, men whose fathers a third of a century before had met there in mortal combat. Whether they step to the tune of "Dixie" or the "Red, White and Blue," they are marching under one flag and keeping time to the music of the Union. Is there a soldier, Federal or Confederate, in whom this scene inspires no generous thoughts, no new devotion to his country?

We of the North recall with honest pride the splendid achievements of the Army of the Potomac, the wonderful victories won by Grant, Sheridan's brilliant climax at Five Forks. But as I read the glowing accounts of the final Federal triumph, I can not help thinking of the last stand made by the gallant band under General Lee at Appomattox Court House, of the little handful left of the once great Army of Northern Virginia, men whose valor had been proved in many desperate conflicts, heroes who had fought at Freder-

icksburg and Chancellorsville, at Gettysburg and on many famous fields, tired, hungry, worn with days and nights of fighting and marching, brought to bay at last, hemmed in by overwhelming numbers, knowing that the cause so dear to them had been forever lost, and yet ready at the word of command to rush against their exulting foes and cut their way out or perish in the attempt.

When I reflect on all this I respect more than ever the brave men against whom I fought. I no longer think of them as foemen, but as Americans whose ancestors and my own were comrades in the Revolution; and I rejoice, as I believe most of them in their hearts rejoice, that the war ended as it did, not as a mere triumph of the soldiers of the North over those of the South, but as the close of a struggle which, without casting any shadow on the motives or the valor of the soldiers of either section, makes this the common country of us all, and enables us all to say, whether we stand at the base of Bunker Hill monument or beside Georgia's shaft at Chickamauga, "This is my own, my native land." The "Lost Cause" has been forever lost, but the heroism it developed will bear fruit for ages yet to come.

It was the soldiers of the North and of the South who first learned to respect their adversaries and who were the soonest reconciled. In the last volume of *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*² is a picture of a

² Vol. 4, p. 745.

scene at Appomattox after Lee's surrender. Though a mere wood-cut it tells a touching, an impressive story. The picture is entitled: "Union soldiers sharing their rations with the Confederates. From a sketch made at the time." The restoration of brotherly feeling between the North and the South, slow as it may have been in coming, began with the men who for four years had confronted each other in mortal combat; it began as soon as the last gun had been fired; it began with the sharing of rations.

I grasp with greatest ardor the hand of the comrade who stood side by side with me in deadly conflict; but, strange as it may seem, next to the pleasure of grasping the hand of one who fought with me is the pleasure of grasping the hand of the man who fought against me. All are Americans now; all are comrades. Why should we not clasp hands? It is true that in the bloody contest many went down, but in both North and South widows and orphans still weep for the "touch of a vanished hand, the sound of a voice that is still." It is true that we may not agree in our views of the causes of the strife long past, but when we talk of long and weary marches, of standing on picket, exposed to howling storms and wintry blasts, of battles in which Federals and Confederates marched into the very jaws of death, we speak in words that all understand and of experiences in which, as American soldiers, all bore an honorable part.

"LET US HAVE PEACE."

APPENDIX

When General Buell arrived at Louisville in September, 1862, he combined the old regiments of the Army of the Ohio and the new ones which he found there, and which subsequently came there, into brigades, and the brigades into divisions. The brigades and divisions were consecutively numbered from first to last; the army was designated as the Army of the Ohio, and was divided into the First, Second, and Third Corps.

Pursuant to general order No. 168 of the War Department, issued Oct. 24, 1862, General Buell was superseded by General William S. Rosecrans, a new department was created, called the Department of the Cumberland, and the army was designated as the Fourteenth Corps. It was, however, from that time popularly known as the Army of the Cumberland.

On Nov. 7, 1862, by order of General Rosecrans, the army was divided into the Center, Right Wing, and Left Wing, under the commands respectively of Generals George H. Thomas, Alexander McD. McCook, and Thomas L. Crittenden, the brigades and divisions retaining their former numbers. The roster of the army under this order is given in Cist's *Army of the Cumberland* (pp. 263-5).

By a subsequent order of General Rosecrans, issued Dec. 19, 1862, the Center was given five divisions and the Right Wing and Left Wing three each. Most of the divisions comprised three brigades, the brigades being numbered as parts of the division to which they were assigned, and the divisions as parts of the Center, Right Wing, and Left Wing. The organization so effected continued without substantial change until after the battle of Stone's River.

Pursuant to general order No. 9 of the War Department, issued Jan. 9, 1863, the Center, Right Wing and Left Wing were respectively designated as the 14th Army Corps, the 20th Army

Corps, and the 21st Army Corps, but the commanders were not changed and the army was now formally called the Army of the Cumberland.

The corps and division organizations remained substantially the same until after the battle of Chickamauga, Sept. 19 and 20, 1863, the roster at that date being given in one of the tables following.

Soon after the battle of Chickamauga the second and third divisions of the 11th corps and the first and second of the 12th were transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of the Cumberland, the 11th under General Oliver O. Howard and the 12th under General Henry W. Slocum, both under general command of General Joseph Hooker.

Generals McCook and Crittenden were relieved Oct. 9, 1863, and the 20th and 21st corps were consolidated into the 4th under command of General Gordon Granger. The new corps comprised three divisions, General John M. Palmer commanding the first, General Philip H. Sheridan the second, and General Thomas J. Wood the third. General Rosecrans was superseded Oct. 16 by General Thomas. General John M. Palmer afterward succeeded Thomas in command of the 14th corps, General David S. Stanley succeeding Palmer in command of the first division of the 4th corps, this division, during the battles at Chattanooga, having been under the temporary command of the senior brigadier, General Charles Cruft.

The roster of the Army of the Cumberland at the battles of Chattanooga, Nov. 23-25, 1863, is given in one of the tables following.

Pursuant to general order No. 144 of the War Department, issued April 4, 1864 (*Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 59, p. 258), the 11th and 12th corps were consolidated into the 20th under command of General Hooker; General Granger was superseded in command of the 4th corps by General Howard, and General Sheridan was transferred to the Army of the Potomac. Subsequently General John Newton was assigned to the command of Sheridan's division of the 4th corps.

The roster of the Army of the Cumberland at the beginning of the Atlanta campaign, May 5, 1864, is given in one of the tables following.

The Army of the Cumberland practically ceased to be known by that name after Sherman began his march to the sea. The 14th and 20th corps made part of the army which accompanied him, being thereafter designated as the Army of Georgia, under command of General Slocum. The 4th corps returned to Nashville and remained under the command of General Thomas.

The roster of the troops which took part in the battle of Nashville, including the 4th corps, is given in one of the following tables.

The following rosters contain only the corps, division, and brigade organizations. The regimental lists and lists of department, headquarter, unassigned, garrison, and other detached troops will be found in the volumes cited.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AT THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER.

Dec. 31, 1862—Jan. 1 and 2, 1863.

(*Reb. Rec.*, ser. 1, vol. 20, pt. 1, pp. 174-182; Van Horne: *Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 1, pp. 281-286.)

MAJ.-GEN. WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS, Commanding.

CENTER.

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

FIRST DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Benj. F. Scribner.
2d, Col. John Beatty.
3d, Col. John C. Starkweather.
4th, Lt.-Col. Oliver L. Shepherd (Regulars).

Artillery. Capt. Cyrus O. Loomis.
Kentucky Battery A.
1st Mich. Battery A.
5th U. S. Battery H.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JAMES S. NEGLEY.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. James S. Spears.
2d, Col. Timothy R. Stanley.
3d, Col. John F. Miller.
Artillery. Kentucky Battery B.
10th Wis. (2 sections).
1st Ohio Batteries G and M.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. SPEED S. FRY.

(The first brigade and Church's Battery were the only troops of this division engaged.)

Brigades. 1st, Col. Moses B. Walker.
2d, Col. John M. Harlan.
3d, Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman.
Artillery. 1st Mich. Battery B.
1st Ohio Battery C.
4th U. S. Battery I.

FOURTH DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. ROBERT B. MITCHELL.

(Only a portion of the division engaged. See *Reb. Rec.*, ser. 1, vol. 20, pt. 1, p. 179.)

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan.
2d, Col. Daniel McCook.
Artillery. 2d Ill. Battery I.
10th Wis.
Artillery Reserve. 11th Ind. Battery.
12th Ind. Battery.
1st Mich. Battery E.

FIFTH DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOSEPH J. REYNOLDS.

(The division was not engaged.)

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Albert S. Hall.
2d, Col. Abram O. Miller.
- Artillery. 18th Ind. Battery.
19th Ind. Battery.

RIGHT WING.

MAJ.-GEN. ALEXANDER McD. MCCOOK.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. P. Sidney Post.
2d, Col. William P. Carlin.
3d, Col. William E. Woodruff.
- Artillery. 2d Minn. Battery.
5th Wis. Battery.
8th Wis. Battery.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. RICHARD W. JOHNSON.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. August Willich.
2d, Brig.-Gen. Edward N. Kirk.
3d, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin.
- Artillery. 5th Ind. Battery.
1st Ohio Batteries A and E.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Joshua W. Sill.
2d, Col. Frederick Schaeffer.
3d, Col. George W. Roberts.
- Artillery. Capt. Henry Hescocock.
1st Ill. Battery C.
4th Ind. Battery.
1st Mo. Battery C.

LEFT WING.

MAJ.-GEN. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS J. WOOD.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Milo S. Hascall.
2d, Col. George D. Wagner.
3d, Col. Charles G. Harker.
- Artillery. Maj. Seymour Race.
8th Ind. Battery.
10th Ind. Battery.
6th Ohio Battery.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN M. PALMER.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft.
2d, Col. William B. Hazen.
3d, Col. William Grose.
- Artillery. Capt. William E. Standart.
1st Ohio Batteries B and F.
4th U. S. Batteries H and M.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. HORATIO P. VAN CLEVE.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Samuel Beatty.
2d, Col. James P. Fyffe.
3d, Col. Samuel W. Price.
- Artillery. Capt. George R. Swallow.
7th Ind. Battery.
26th Penn. Battery B.
3d Wis. Battery.

CAVALRY.

BRIG.-GEN. DAVID S. STANLEY.

DIVISION.

COL. JOHN KENNETT.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Robert H. G. Minty.
2d, Col. Lewis Zahm.
Reserve. Gen. David S. Stanley.
Artillery. 1st Ohio Battery D.

PIONEER BRIGADE.

CAPT. JAMES ST. CLAIR MORTON.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND AT THE BATTLE
OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Sept. 19 and 20, 1863.

(*Reb. Rec.*, ser. 1, vol. 30, pt. 1, pp. 40-47; Van Horne: *Army of the Cumberland*, pp. 378-385; Turchin: *Battle of Chickamauga*, pp. 215, 223.)

MAJ.-GEN. WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS, Commanding.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. ABSALOM BAIRD.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Benj. F. Scribner.
2d, Brig.-Gen. John C. Starkweather.
3d, Brig.-Gen. John H. King (Regulars).
Artillery. 1st Mich. Battery A.
4th Ind. Battery.
5th U. S. Battery H.

SECOND DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. JAMES S. NEGLEY.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. John Beatty.
2d, Col. Timothy R. Stanley.
3d, Col. William Sirwell.
- Artillery. 1st Ohio Batteries G and M.
Ill. Light Art., Bridge's Battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN M. BRANNAN.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. John M. Connell.
2d, Col. John T. Croxton.
3d, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.
- Artillery. 1st Mich. Battery D.
1st Ohio Battery C.
4th U. S. Battery I.

FOURTH DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. JOSEPH J. REYNOLDS.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. John T. Wilder (Mounted Infantry).
2d, Col. Edward A. King.
3d, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin.
- Artillery. 18th Ind. Battery.
19th Ind. Battery.
21st Ind. Battery.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. ALEXANDER McD. MCCOOK.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. P. Sidney Post.
2d, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin.
3d, Col. Hans C. Heg.
- Artillery. 5th Wis. Battery.
2d Minn. Battery.
8th Wis. Battery.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. RICHARD W. JOHNSON.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. August Willich.
2d, Col. Joseph B. Dodge.
3d, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin.
- Artillery. 1st Ohio Battery A.
20th Ohio Battery.
5th Ind. Battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William H. Lytle.
2d, Col. Bernard Laiboldt.
3d, Col. Luther P. Bradley.
- Artillery. 2d Ind. Battery "11."
1st Mo. Battery G.
1st Ill. Battery C.

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS J. WOOD.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. George P. Buell.
2d, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner. (Not engaged.)
3d, Col. Charles G. Harker.
- Artillery. 8th Ind. Battery.
10th Ind. Battery. (Not engaged.)
6th Ohio Battery.

SECOND DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN M. PALMER.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft.
2d, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen.
3d, Col. William Grose.
- Artillery. Capt. William E. Standart.
1st Ohio Batteries B and F.
4th U. S. Batteries H and M.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. HORATIO P. VAN CLEVE.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty.
2d, Col. George F. Dick.
3d, Col. Sidney M. Barnes.
- Artillery. 7th Ind. Battery.
26th Penn. Battery.
3d Wis. Battery.

RESERVE CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. GORDON GRANGER.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JAMES B. STEEDMAN.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker.
2d, Col. John G. Mitchell.
3d, Col. John Coburn. (On detail service; not engaged at Chickamauga.)
- Artillery. 18th Ohio Battery.
1st Ill. Battery M.
9th Ohio Battery. (Not engaged.)

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JAMES D. MORGAN.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Robert F. Smith. (Not engaged.)
2d, Col. Daniel M. McCook.
3d, Col. Charles C. Doolittle. (Not engaged.)
- Artillery. 10th Wis. Battery. (Not engaged.)
2d Ill. Battery I.
1st Ohio Battery E.

THIRD DIVISION.

(Not engaged.)

BRIG.-GEN. ROBERT S. GRANGER.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. S. D. Bruce.
2d, Brig.-Gen. T. D. Ward.
3d, Brig.-Gen. James G. Spears.

Artillery. 2d Ill. Battery H.
5th Mich. Battery.
1st Tenn. Battery.

CAVALRY.

MAJ.-GEN. DAVID S. STANLEY (Absent).

BRIG.-GEN. ROBERT B. MITCHELL (Commanding).

FIRST DIVISION.

COL. EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Archibald P. Campbell.
2d, Col. Daniel M. Ray.
3d, Col. Louis D. Watkins.

Artillery. 1st Ohio Battery D (Section).

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. GEORGE CROOK.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Robert H. G. Minty.
2d, Col. Eli Long.
3d, Col. William W. Lowe. (Not engaged.)

Artillery. Chicago Board of Trade Battery.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND AT THE BATTLES
OF CHATTANOOGA.

Nov. 23-25, 1863.

(*Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 55, pp. 14-21.)

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. GORDON GRANGER.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. CHARLES CRUFT.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. (The brigade not engaged; stationed at Bridgeport, Ala.; the brigade commander temporarily in command of division.)
- 2d, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker. (The 115th Ill., 84th Ind. and 5th Ind. Battery not engaged; stationed at Shellmound, Tenn.)
- 3d, Col. William Grose. (The 30th Ind., 77th Penn., and Battery H 4th U. S. Art. not engaged; stationed at Whitesides, Tenn.)

SECOND DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. PHILIP H. SHERIDAN.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Francis T. Sherman.
- 2d, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner. (The 51st Ind. not engaged; between Nashville and Chattanooga.)
- 3d, Col. Charles G. Harker.
- Artillery. Capt. Warren P. Edgerton.
- 1st Ill. Battery M.
- 10th Ind. Battery.
- 1st Mo. Battery G.
- 1st Ohio Battery I.
- 4th U. S. Battery G.
- 5th U. S. Battery H.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS J. WOOD.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. August Willich.
- 2d, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen.
- 3d, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty.

Artillery. Capt. Cullen Bradley.
Bridge's (Ill.) Battery.
6th Ohio.
20th Ind.
Penn. Light Battery B.

ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. OLIVER O. HOWARD.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. ADOLPH STEINWEHR.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Adolphus Buschbeck.
2d, Col. Charles Smith.

THIRD DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. CARL SCHURZ.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Hector Tyndale.
2d, Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski.
3d, Col. Frederick Hecker.

Artillery. Maj. Thomas W. Osborn.
1st N. Y. Light Batteries I and I3.
1st Ohio Batteries I and K.
4th U. S. Battery G.
(Batteries I, 1st Ohio, and G, 4th U. S., temporarily attached to 2d div. 4th corps.)

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. HENRY W. SLOCUM.

(The corps commander and the first division on detached duty and not in battle.)

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN W. GEARY.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Charles Candy.
2d, Col. George A. Cobham.
3d, Col. David Ireland.

Artillery. Maj. John A. Reynolds.
Penn. Light.
5th U. S. Battery K.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN M. PALMER.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. RICHARD W. JOHNSON.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin.
2d, Col. Marshall F. Moore.
3d, Brig.-Gen. John C. Starkweather. (During
the battles was holding fort and breastworks at
Chattanooga.)

Artillery. 1st Ill. Battery C.
1st Mich. Battery A.
5th U. S. Battery H. (Temporarily attached to
2d div. 4th corps.)

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan.
2d, Brig.-Gen. John Beatty.
3d, Col. Daniel McCook.

Artillery. Capt. William A. Hotchkiss.
2d Ill. Battery I.
2d Minn.
5th Wis.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. ABSALOM BAIRD.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin.
2d, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.
3d, Col. Edward H. Phelps.

Artillery. Capt. George R. Swallow.
7th Ind.
19th Ind.
4th U. S. Battery I.

ENGINEER TROOPS.

BRIG.-GEN. WILLIAM F. SMITH.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN M. BRANNAN.

CAVALRY.

SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION.

COL. ELI LONG.

(The other brigades of first and second divisions on detached duty at various points.)

POST OF CHATTANOOGA.

COL. JOHN G. PARKHURST.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND AT BEGINNING OF
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

May 5, 1864.

(*Reb. Rec.*, ser. No. 59, pp. 551-560; Van Horne: *Army of the Cumberland*, vol. 2, pp. 31-39.)

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. OLIVER O. HOWARD.

FIRST DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. DAVID S. STANLEY.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft.
2d, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker.
3d, Col. William Grose.

Artillery. Capt. Peter Simonson.
5th Ind. Battery.
Penn. Battery B.

SECOND DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN NEWTON.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Francis T. Sherman.
2d, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner.
3d, Col. Charles G. Harker.

Artillery. 1st Mo. Battery G.
1st Ill. Battery M.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS J. WOOD.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. August Willich.
2d, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen.
3d, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty.

Artillery. Capt. Cullen Bradley.
6th Ohio Battery.
Bridge's (Ill.) Battery.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN M. PALMER.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. RICHARD W. JOHNSON.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin.
2d, Brig.-Gen. John H. King.
3d, Col. James M. Neibling.

Artillery. Capt. Lucius H. Drury.
1st Mich. Battery A.
1st Ill. Battery C.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan.
2d, Col. John G. Mitchell.
3d, Col. Daniel McCook.

Artillery. Capt. Charles M. Barnett.
2d Minn. Battery.
2d Ill. Battery I.
5th Wis. Battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. ABSALOM BAIRD.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin.
2d, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.
3d, Col. George P. Este.

Artillery. Capt. George R. Swallow.
7th Ind. Battery.
19th Ind. Battery.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Joseph F. Knipe.
2d, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger.
3d, Brig.-Gen. Hector Tyndale.

Artillery. Capt. John D. Woodbury.
1st N. Y. Batteries M and I.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN W. GEARY.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Charles Candy.
2d, Col. Adolphus Buschbeck.
3d, Col. David Ireland.

Artillery. Capt. William Wheeler.
Independent Penn. Battery E.
13th N. Y. Battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William T. Ward.
2d, Col. John Coburn.
3d, Col. James Wood.

Artillery. Capt. Marco B. Gary.
1st Ohio Battery C.
1st Mich. Battery I.

FOURTH DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.

(The organization of this division was incomplete and it never joined the corps; portions of it were on detached or garrison duty. See Fox: *Reg. Losses*, p. 104.)

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Robert S. Granger.
Various regiments not brigaded.

Artillery. 9th Ohio Battery.
20th Ind. Battery.

CAVALRY.

BRIG.-GEN. WASHINGTON L. ELLIOTT.

FIRST DIVISION.

COL. EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Archibald P. Campbell.
2d, Col. Oscar H. LaGrange.
3d, Col. Louis D. Watkins.

Artillery. 18th Ind. Battery.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. KENNER GARRARD.

Brigades. 1st, Col. William B. Sipes.
2d, Col. Robert H. G. Minty.
3d, Col. Abram O. Miller.
Artillery. Chicago Board of Trade Battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JUDSON KILPATRICK.

Brigades. 1st, Col. William W. Lowe.
2d, Col. Charles C. Smith.
3d, Col. Eli H. Murray.

FOURTH DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. ALVAN C. GILLEN.

Brigades. 1st, Lt.-Col. Duff G. Thornburgh.
2d, Lt.-Col. George Spalding.
3d, Col. John K. Miller.

ARTILLERY.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN M. BRANNAN.

ORGANIZATION AT THE BATTLE OF
NASHVILLE.

Dec. 15 and 16, 1864.

(Cox: *March to the Sea*, pp. 223-227.)

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.

BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS J. WOOD.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. NATHAN KIMBALL.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Isaac M. Kirby.
2d, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker.
3d, Brig.-Gen. William Grose.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. WASHINGTON L. ELLIOTT.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Emerson Opdycke.
2d, Col. John Q. Lane.
3d, Col. Joseph Conrad.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. SAMUEL BEATTY.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Abel D. Streight.
2d, Col. P. Sidney Post.
3d, Col. Fred Knefler.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE.

MAJ. WILBUR F. GOODSPEED.

TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN M. SCHOFIELD.

SECOND DIVISION.

MAJ.-GEN. DARIUS N. COUCH.

- Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. Cooper.
2d, Col. Orlando H. Moore.
3d, Col. John Mehringer.
- Artillery. 15th Ind. Battery.
19th Ohio Battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JACOB D. COX.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Charles C. Doolittle.
2d, Col. John S. Casement.
3d, Col. Isaac N. Stiles.
- Artillery. 23d Ind. Battery.
1st Ohio Battery D.

DETACHMENT OF ARMY OF TENNESSEE.

MAJ.-GEN. ANDREW J. SMITH.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN McARTHUR.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. William L. McMillen.
2d, Col. Lucius F. Hubbard.
3d, Col. S. G. Hill.

SECOND DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. KENNER GARRARD.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. David Moore.
2d, Col. James I. Gilbert.
3d, Col. Edward H. Wolfe.

THIRD DIVISION.

COL. JONATHAN B. MOORE.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Lyman M. Ward.
2d, Col. Leander Blanden.
Artillery. 14th Ind. Battery.
2d Mo. Battery A.

PROVISIONAL DETACHMENT (District of the
Etowah).

MAJ.-GEN. JAMES B. STEEDMAN.

PROVISIONAL DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. CHARLES CRUFT.

- Brigades. 1st, Col. Benjamin Harrison.
2d, Col. John G. Mitchell.
3d, Lt.-Col. Charles H. Grosvenor.
Second Brigade (Army of Tenn.), Col. Adam G. Malloy.
First Colored Brigade, Col. Thomas J. Morgan.
Second Colored Brigade, Col. Charles R. Thompson.

POST OF NASHVILLE.

BRIG.-GEN. JOHN F. MILLER.

- Second Brigade, 4th Div., 20th Army Corps, Col. Edwin G.
Mason.
Garrison Artillery, Maj. John J. Ely.

QUARTERMASTER'S DIVISION.

(Composed of Quartermaster's employees.)

COL. JAMES L. DONALDSON.

CAVALRY CORPS.

BREVET MAJ.-GEN. JAMES H. WILSON.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton.

Artillery. Ill. Board of Trade Battery.

FIFTH DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. EDWARD HATCH.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Robert R. Stewart.

2d, Col. Datus E. Coon.

Artillery. 1st Ill. Battery I.

SIXTH DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. RICHARD W. JOHNSON.

Brigades. 1st, Col. Thomas J. Harrison.

2d, Col. James Biddle.

Artillery. 4th U. S. Battery I.

SEVENTH DIVISION.

BRIG.-GEN. JOSEPH F. KNIFE.

Brigades. 1st, Col. J. H. Hammond.

2d, Col. G. M. L. Johnson.

Artillery. 14th Ohio Battery.

INDEX TO CITATIONS

NOTE: I have consulted and drawn very liberally from Van Horne's *Army of the Cumberland*, Cist's *Army of the Cumberland*, Cox's *Atlanta Campaign* and Fox's *Regimental Losses*. I make this general acknowledgment in lieu of a multitude of citations from them.

American State Papers. <i>Military Affairs</i> ,	342
Appleton. <i>Annual Cyclopaedia for 1863</i> ,	272, 293
Atlantic Monthly,	324
Badeau, Adam. <i>Military Life of U. S. Grant</i> ,	328
Bancroft, George. <i>Hist. U. States</i> ,	343
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,	
19, 24, 208, 216, 240, 309, 316, 317, 336, 337, 366	24
Blaine, James G. <i>Twenty Years of Congress</i> ,	24
Boynton, Gen. Henry V. <i>Chickamauga National Military</i>	
<i>Park</i> ,	163, 208, 210, 235, 358
Boynton, Gen. Henry V. Continuation of Piatt's <i>George</i>	
<i>H. Thomas</i> . See Piatt.	
Brock, Francena Howe. <i>Campbell Hospital</i> ,	67
Carrington, Gen. Henry B. <i>Battles of the American Revolution</i> ,	343
Century Magazine,	89, 289
Cheatham, Gen. Benj. F. Article on <i>General Cheatham at</i>	
<i>Spring Hill (Battles and Leaders)</i> ,	317
Cist, Gen. Henry M. <i>Army of the Cumberland</i> ,	
99, 102, 121, 163, 210, 233, 240	
Cleland, John E. <i>The Second March to the Ohio (Indiana</i>	
<i>Loyal Legion; War Papers)</i> ,	313
Committee on Conduct of the War. <i>Report on Rose-</i>	
<i>crans's Campaign</i> ,	161
Coppee, Henry. <i>General Thomas</i> ,	321, 323
Cox, Gen. Jacob D. <i>Atlanta</i> ,	87, 355
Cox, Gen. Jacob D. <i>Military Reminiscences</i> ,	157, 160
Cox, Gen. Jacob D. <i>War Preparations in the North</i>	
<i>(Battles and Leaders)</i> ,	19
Dana, Charles A. <i>Recollections of the Civil War</i> ,	352
Davie, Gen. Henry E. <i>Biography of Gen. Sheridan</i> ,	200

- Davis, Jefferson. *Rise and Fall of the Confederate States*, 269, 278, 280
- Dawson, Henry B. *Battles of U. States*, 343
- Foulke, William Dudley. *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, 15, 51, 53
- Fox, Lt.-Col. Wm. F. *Regimental Losses*, 54, 81, 89, 122, 235, 272, 300, 301, 336, 337, 338, 340, 350
- Fox, Lt.-Col. Wm. F. *The Chance of Being Hit in Battle (Century Magazine)*, 89
- Fullerton, Gen. Joseph S. *The Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga (Battles and Leaders, vol. 3, p. 725)*, 240
- Gordon, A. C. *Hard Times in the Confederacy (Century Magazine)*, 289
- Grant, Gen. Ulysses S. *Memoirs*, 26, 28, 29, 33, 225, 231, 239
- Greeley, Horace. *American Conflict*, 128
- Harper's Weekly, 3, 123, 241
- History of 86th Indiana, 95
- Holt, Joseph (Judge Adv. Gen.). *Report to Secy. of War on the Order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty, etc.*, 130
- Hood, Gen. John B. Article on *The Invasion of Tennessee (Battles and Leaders)*, 309, 316
- Humphreys, Gen. Andrew J. *Virginia Campaign*, 304, 355
- Indiana Adjutant General's Reports, 336
- Indiana Brevier Legislative Reports, 133
- Indiana Commandery Loyal Legion. *War Papers*, 313
- Indiana House Journal, 133
- Indiana Senate Journal, 133, 135
- Irwin, Lt.-Col. Richard B. *Ball's Bluff, etc. (Battles and Leaders)*, 24
- Jones, J. B. *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, 280, 281, 287
- Livermore, Col. Thomas L. *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, 122, 208, 336, 337, 341, 343, 347, 351
- Lossing, Benson J. *Field Book of the Revolution*, 343
- Military Historical Society of Mass. *Some Federal and Confederate Commanders*, 324
- McClellan, Gen. George B. *McClellan's Own Story*, 30, 34, 36, 37, 42
- McClure, Alexander K. *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, 28, 49
- McPherson, Edward. *History of the Rebellion*, 276, 280
- New York. *Assembly Documents*, 133
- Nicolay and Hay. *Abraham Lincoln*, 23, 217
- Phisterer, Capt. Frederick. *Statistical Record of the Armies of the U. States*, 336
- Piatt, Dom. *General George H. Thomas (with a continuation by Gen. Henry V. Boynton)*, 81, 163, 240
- Pitman, Benn. *Indiana Treason Cases*, 131
- Pollard, E. A. *The Lost Cause*, 39, 40, 182, 280, 281
- Pollard, E. A. *Southern History of the War*, 285

- Proceedings of the Officers and Soldiers of the Indiana
 Regiments, 134
 Rebellion Records,
 32, 48, 127, 160, 163, 186, 187, 194, 203, 204, 210, 212, 218, 225,
 233, 234, 276, 294, 295, 335.
 Reid, Whitelaw. *Ohio in the War*, 18, 19, 28
 Richmond Enquirer. Editorial on *Arming the Slaves*, 276
 Ropes, John C. *The Army under Pope*, 44
 Ropes, John C. *Story of the Civil War*, 103
 Ropes, John C. Article on *General Sherman (Atlantic
 Monthly, and Some Federal and Confederate Commanders)*, 324
 Schofield, Gen. John M. *Forty-Six Years in the Army*, 83, 87
 Schwab, Prof. John C. *The Confederate States of America*, 288
 Sheridan, Gen. Phil H. *Memoirs*, 80, 200
 Sherman, Gen. Wm. T. *Memoirs*, 233
 Smith, Gen. Wm. F. Comments on General Grant's "*Chat-
 tanooga*" (*Battles and Leaders*), 216
 Spofford, Ainsworth R. *American Almanac*, 341, 342
 Stephens, Alexander. *The War between the States*, 290
 Stone, Col. Henry. *Repelling Hood's Invasion of Ten-
 nessee (Battles and Leaders)*, 316
 Swinton, William. *Campaigns of the Army of the Poto-
 mac*, 25, 31
 Terrell, Adj.-Gen. Wm. H. H. *Reports*, 336
 Townsend, Malcom. *U. S. Curious Facts, etc.*, 343
 Turchin, Gen. John H. *Battle of Chickamauga*, 163, 190, 204, 206
 Van Horne, Thomas B. *Army of the Cumberland*,
 103, 163, 190, 202, 207, 210, 234, 240, 303
 Van Horne, Thomas B. *Life of George H. Thomas*,
 164, 180, 217, 329
 Webb, Gen. Alex. S. *Through the Wilderness (Battles
 and Leaders)*, 337
 Wilson, Henry. *The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power*, 272

GENERAL INDEX

- Ackworth* (Ga.): 305.
Acquia Creek (Va.): 43.
Adams, John: 40.
Alabama, state: 165, 313, 362.
Alexander's bridge (Chickamauga): 171.
Allotment rolls: 63, 148.
Alpine (Ga.): 164, 165, 167.
Amenities of war: 93-96.
American Knights: 130-132.
American Reform Society: 146.
Amusements in Army: 66.
Anderson, Gen. Patton: 275.
Anderson, Mr. —: 254.
Andrew, Gov. John A.: 271.
Antietam, battle of: 35, 297; numbers and losses, 348.
Appomattox Court House: surrender at, 367.
Armed neutrality: of Kentucky, 5.
Army of the Cumberland: organization in 1862, 101; Gen. Rosecrans appointed to command of, 101; organized into Center, Right Wing, and Left Wing, 101; in camp at Nashville, Tenn., 104-5; reorganization Nov. 7, 1862, 106; in camp at Murfreesboro, Tenn., 123-155; composed mainly of men from Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, 127; Democrats in, 127; desertions from in 1863, 127, 137; protests of Indiana regiments in to Indiana legislature, in 1863, 134; consolidation of 20th and 21st corps into 4th, 214; Thomas succeeds Rosecrans in command of, 214; kindly feeling of soldiers for Rosecrans, 214; Grant underestimates soldierly qualities of men, 233; reorganization prior to Atlanta campaign, 298; affection of soldiers for Gen. Thomas, 326, 328; see also titles of battles and campaigns in which the army participated.
Army of the James: losses in Richmond campaign, 352.
Army of Northern Virginia (Confederate): 24, 45, 304, 365; its last stand, 365.
Army of the Ohio: 99, 103, 298.
Army of the Potomac: 24, 26, 31, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 93, 124, 126, 150, 152, 159, 272, 304, 365; organization, 20, 35; Gen. McClellan appointed to command of, 35; Burnside supersedes McClellan in command of, 124; Hooker supersedes Burnside, 124; desertions from in 1863, 127; Meade supersedes Hooker, 125; losses in Richmond campaign, 352.
Army of the Tennessee (Federal): 298.
Army of the Tennessee (Confederate): Gen. Bragg ap-

- pointed to command of, 47;
 Gen. Johnston supersedes
 Bragg, 297; Gen. Hood su-
 persedes Johnston, 304; vir-
 tually destroyed at battle of
 Nashville, 324; Hood relin-
 quishes command of, 324.
 See the titles of the various
 battles and campaigns in
 which it participated.
- Army of Virginia: organiza-
 tion, 44; demolition of, 45.*
- Army Organizations (Fed-
 eral):*
- Corps (Infantry):*
- Crittenden, Thomas L.: 99,
 106. See 21st Army
 Corps.
- Gilbert, Charles C.: 99.
- McCook, Alexander McD.:
 99, 100, 106, 109. See
 20th Army Corps.
- Thomas, George H.: 106.
 See 14th Army Corps.
- Fourth: 214, 219, 220, 223,
 226, 242, 265, 298, 309,
 312, 314, 315, 318.
- Eleventh: 214, 223, 265,
 298. See 20th Army
 Corps.
- Twelfth: 214, 224, 265,
 298. See 20th Army
 Corps.
- Fourteenth (old): 101.
- Fourteenth (new): 158,
 164, 169, 170, 171, 172,
 174, 175, 178, 179, 199,
 201, 202, 204, 219, 223,
 226, 242, 298.
- Fifteenth: 216, 223, 224,
 242, 298.
- Sixteenth: 298, 306, 312,
 320.
- Seventeenth: 216, 223, 298.
- Twentieth (old): 109, 157,
 167, 171, 172, 179, 199,
 201, 202, 204, 214. See
 4th Army Corps.
- Twentieth (new): 265,
 298. See 11th and 12th
 Army Corps.
- Twenty-first: 106, 158,
 161, 168, 169, 170, 171,
 172, 173, 174, 179, 199,
 201, 202, 204, 214. See
 4th Army Corps.
- Twenty-third: 258, 298,
 309, 312, 314, 315.
- Corps (Cavalry):*
- Elliott, Washington L.:
 298.
- Kilpatrick, Judson: 311.
- Mitchell, Robert B.: 205.
- Wilson, James H.: 313,
 314, 315.
- Corps (Reserve):*
- Granger, Gordon: 158, 173,
 178, 179, 192, 193, 201,
 202, 205.
- Divisions:*
- Baird, Absalom: 172, 177,
 178, 204, 219, 223, 224,
 225, 226.
- Brannan, John M.: 172,
 173, 174, 177, 178, 182,
 183, 184, 185, 186, 189,
 191, 193, 202, 204, 209.
- Cox, Jacob D.: 315.
- Crook, George (Cav.):
 205.
- Cruft, Charles: 220, 224.
- Davis, Jefferson C.: 108,
 111, 116, 172, 176, 179,
 183, 184, 185, 198, 201,
 204, 206, 219, 242.
- Ewing, Hugh: 223.
- Geary, John W.: 220, 224.
- Johnson, Richard W.:
 108, 110, 111, 172, 175,
 176, 177, 178, 201, 202,
 204, 219, 223, 224, 225.
- Kimball, Nathan: 315.
- Mitchell, Robert B.:
 (Cav.) 205.
- Morgan, James: 193, 205.

- McCook, Edward M.
 (Cav.): 205.
 Neglev, James H.: 108,
 111, 112, 113, 116, 119,
 120, 165, 168, 169, 172,
 177, 179, 185, 189, 202,
 204.
 Newton, John: 301.
 Osterhaus, Peter J.: 219,
 220, 224.
 Palmer, John M.: 108,
 113, 116, 119, 172, 175,
 176, 178, 201, 202, 204,
 214.
 Reynolds, Joseph J.: 172,
 175, 176, 178, 183, 202,
 204.
 Rousseau, Lovell H.: 108,
 112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
 122.
 Ruger, Thomas H.: 315.
 Schurz, Carl: 223.
 Sheridan, Phil. H.: 108,
 111, 112, 116, 117, 172,
 176, 178, 179, 184, 185,
 201, 204, 206, 214, 218,
 219, 223, 224, 226, 235,
 236, 242, 266.
 Smith, John E.: 223.
 Smith, Morgan L.: 223,
 302.
 Stanley, David S.: 120,
 267, 302.
 Steedman, James B.: 193,
 205, 209.
 Steinwehr, Adolph V.:
 223.
 Van Cleve, Horatio P.:
 106, 108, 109, 110, 114,
 116, 117, 119, 120, 136,
 155, 162, 172, 175, 176,
 177, 179, 180, 183, 184,
 185, 189, 198, 201, 202,
 204, 206.
 Wagner, George D.: 315,
 318.
 Wood, Thomas J.: 55, 95,
 108, 110, 116, 117, 172,
 176, 179, 180, 183, 184,
 189, 201, 204, 214, 218,
 219, 223, 224, 226, 228,
 229, 235, 236, 240, 242,
 249, 257, 259, 265, 315,
 330.
 Brigades:
 Barnes, Sidney M.: 176,
 180, 183, 201, 202.
 Beatty, Samuel: 100, 106,
 114, 115, 119, 162, 175,
 180, 184, 189, 201, 202,
 206, 214, 254, 267.
 Bradley, Luther P.: 206.
 Buell, George P.: 206.
 Carlin, William P.: 176,
 206, 223.
 Connell, John M.: 186.
 Croxton, John T.: 174.
 Dick, George F.: 175,
 180, 184, 189, 201, 206.
 Dodge, Joseph B.: 206.
 Fyffe, James P.: 114, 119.
 Grose, William: 119, 220,
 224.
 Harker, Charles G.: 114,
 117.
 Hascall, Milo S.: 108.
 Hazen, Wm. B.: 265.
 Heg, Hans C.: 176, 206.
 King, Edward A.: 206.
 Kirk, Edward N.: 109,
 111.
 Laiboldt, Bernard: 206.
 Lytle, Wm. F.: 206.
 Miller, John F.: 113, 120.
 Minty, Robert H. G.: 161,
 172.
 Mitchell, John G.: 187,
 193, 364.
 Moore, Marshall F.: 223.
 Opdycke, Emerson: 318.
 Price, James P.: 114, 118.
 Shepherd, Oliver L.: 117,
 122.

- Stanley, Timothy R.: 113, 120.
 Starkweather, John C.: 223.
 Van Derveer, Ferdinand: 182, 193, 206, 209.
 Whitaker, Walter C.: 187, 193, 206, 220, 224, 364.
 Wilder, John T.: 161, 169, 172, 176, 178, 202, 361.
 Willich, August: 108, 109, 110, 111, 254, 265.
 Pioneer Brigade: 110.
 Regimental and other organizations:
 United States: 33d U. S. Col. Inf., 271; 79th U. S. Col. Inf., 271.
 Illinois: 21st Inf., 154.
 Indiana: 4th Cav., 252; 6th Inf., 135, 139; 7th Inf., 10; 15th Inf., 135; 17th Inf., 135; 22d Inf., 135; 29th Inf., 135; 32d Inf., 135; 34th Inf., 135; 37th Inf., 135; 38th Inf., 135; 39th Inf., 135; 40th Inf., 135; 42d Inf., 135; 44th Inf., 135, 189; 51st Inf., 135; 57th Inf., 135; 58th Inf., 135; 72d Inf., 135; 73d Inf., 135; 75th Inf., 135; 79th Inf., 53, 54, 57, 58, 73, 76, 81, 94, 97, 99, 104, 105, 115, 122, 135, 136, 137, 149, 162, 175, 182, 185, 189, 192, 195, 228, 240, 242, 244, 250, 254, 257, 300, 317, 331, 361, 363; 79th Inf., Co. E, 139, 140; 79th Inf., Co. I, 54, 55, 105, 115, 149, 339, 353-4; 81st Inf., 53; 82d Inf., 53, 135; 86th Inf., 95, 135, 189, 228; 87th Inf., 53; 88th Inf., 53; 89th Inf., 53; 101st Inf., 135.
 Kansas: 1st Kans. Col. Inf., 271.
 Kentucky: 5th Inf., 139; 9th Inf., 99, 115, 189; 11th Inf., 99, 115; 17th Inf., 189; Louisville Legion, 139.
 Louisiana: 1st Louis. Native Guard (Col.), 271.
 Maine: 1st Me. Heavy Art., 350.
 Massachusetts: 54th Inf. (Col.), 271.
 Michigan: 22d Inf., 196.
 Minnesota: 1st Inf., 350.
 New Hampshire: 5th Inf., 350.
 Ohio: 19th Inf., 99, 115, 149, 189, 251, 252; 21st Inf., 196; 35th Inf., 356; 89th Inf., 196.
 Pennsylvania: 141st Inf., 350.
 South Carolina: 1st Inf. (Col.), 271.
 Tennessee: 1st Tenn. Battalion, 252; 3d East Tenn. Cav., 254.
 Army Organizations (Confederate):
 Corps (Infantry):
 Buckner, Simon B.: 160, 167, 170, 173, 195.
 Cheatham, Benj. F.: 207, 315.
 Hardee, Wm. J.: 107, 110.
 Hill, Daniel H.: 173, 207.
 Hood, John B.: 173, 176.
 Lee, Stephen D.: 315.
 Longstreet, James: 39, 166, 170, 173, 178, 179, 207.
 Polk, Leonidas: 173, 179, 207.
 Stewart, Alexander P.: 315.
 Walker, William H. T.: 173.
 Corps (Cavalry):
 Forrest, Nathan B.: 47, 157, 173, 174, 179, 200, 310, 314, 315.

- Morgan, John: 47.
 Wheeler, Joseph: 169, 173,
 207, 211, 266.
- Divisions:
 Anderson, Patton: 195,
 209, 224.
 Armstrong, Frank C.
 (Cav.): 173.
 Bate, William B.: 224.
 Breckinridge, John C.:
 76, 107, 109, 110, 114,
 119, 120, 122, 173, 178,
 179, 182, 207, 209.
 Cheatham, Benj. F.: 108,
 111, 122, 173, 175, 177,
 179, 207, 209, 224.
 Cleburne, Patrick R.: 107,
 110, 111, 173, 177, 179,
 207, 209, 223.
 Gist, S. R.: 173, 179.
 Hindman, Thomas C.:
 173, 178, 179, 181, 184,
 185, 187, 188, 194, 207.
 Hood, John B.: 173, 207.
 Johnson, Bushrod R.: 173,
 176, 179, 181, 184, 185,
 188, 207, 209.
 Johnson, Edward: 315.
 Kershaw, Joseph B.: 179,
 181, 184, 195.
 Law, Evander McIver:
 173, 176, 179, 181, 184.
 Liddell, St. John R.: 173,
 179, 207.
 Martin, William T. (Cav.):
 173.
 McCown, John P.: 107,
 110, 111.
 McLaws, Lafayette: 173,
 178, 179, 207.
 Pegram, John (Cav.): 173.
 Pickett, George E.: 120,
 350.
 Preston, William: 173,
 178, 179, 195, 207, 209.
 Stevenson, Carter L.: 223.
 Stewart, Alexander P.:
 173, 175, 179, 207, 209,
 224.
 Walker, William H. T.:
 173, 175, 179, 207, 223.
 Wharton, John A. (Cav.):
 173.
 Withers, Jones M.: 107,
 111.
- Brigades:
 Adams, Daniel W.: 316.
 Anderson, James: 195.
 Anderson, Patton: 209.
 Bate, William B.: 209.
 Brown, John C.: 223.
 Cockrell, Francis M.: 316.
 Cumming, Alfred: 223.
 Deas, Zach C.: 194, 195.
 Donelson, Daniel S.: 122.
 Govan, Daniel C.: 223.
 Gracie, Archibald: 195,
 209.
 Kelly, John H.: 195.
 Lowrey, Mark P.: 223.
 Maney, George: 223, 316.
 Scott, John S. (Cav.):
 208.
 Smith, J. A.: 223.
 Trigg, Robert C.: 195.
 Wise, Henry A.: 278.
 Wright, Marcus J.: 175.
- Regiments, Artillery, Cav-
 alry, etc.:
 Georgia: 21st Inf., 350.
 North Carolina: 26th Inf.,
 350.
 Tennessee: 8th Inf., 122;
 16th Inf., 122.
 Texas: 1st Inf., 350.
 Carnes's Battery: 175, 364.
 Dent's Battery: 195.
 Garrity's Battery: 195.
 Washington Light Artil-
 lery: 120.
- Athens* (Tenn.): 266.
Atlanta (Ga.): 39, 40, 84, 299,
 300, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308.
Atlanta: battles of, 300; num-
 bers and losses, 349.

- Atlanta Campaign, The*: Chap. XI, pp. 283-304; character of country traversed, 77, 84; breastworks and fortifications encountered, 79, 85; courtesies shown each other by combatants, 94-6; condition of Confederacy at beginning of, 284-296; Sherman appointed to command of Military Division of Mississippi, 297; gathering of troops and supplies at Chattanooga, 297-8; strength of Sherman's army, 298; strength of Johnston's army, 298; Johnston's tactics, 298; Sherman's tactics, 299; no one great battle fought, 299; but many smaller ones, 299; troops constantly under fire, 300; Federal losses in campaign, 301, 351; Confederate losses, 301; losses of Army of the Cumberland, 301; campaign showed futility of assaulting fortified lines, 301; assault of Kennesaw Mountain, 301-2; campaign exhausting to vitality of troops, 303; illustration of severity of fighting on the skirmish line, 331-2.
- Augusta, siege of*: numbers and losses, 346.
- Avery, Capt. William L.*: 238.
- Badeau, Gen. Adam*: injustice to Gen. Thomas, 328-9.
- Baird, Gen. Absalom*: 239.
- Baker, Wat.*: 96.
- Balaklava*: charge at, 350.
- Baldwin, Col. Philemon P.*: 111.
- Ball's Bluff*: battle of, 16, 21, 23.
- Banks, Gen. Nathaniel P.*: 44, 125, 297.
- Bareford, Mr.* ———: 254.
- Barksdale, E.*: 278.
- Battle*: how it appeared to a soldier, 76; difficulty of seeing all the combatants, 76; maneuvering for position, 77; developing the enemy, 77; surprises, 77; night attacks, 77; flanking, 78; private soldier's preparation for battle, 78; the skirmishers, 78; charging a battery, 79; lying charging a battery 79; lying still under artillery fire, 80; bayonet charges, 81-2; position of officers, 82; those specially aimed at, 82; difference between shooting of veteran and recruit, 83; sensation of being specially aimed at, 83-4; radical changes in methods of fighting in last year of war, 84; the fortifications encountered in last year of war, 85; futility of attacking by direct assault, 86; how advance on fortifications made, 88; intrenching under fire, 88; danger in battle of being hit by cannon balls, 89; danger from musket balls, 89; mine explosions, 89; the inspiring motives in battle, 89-92; a battery in action, 91; skulkers and cowards, 92-3; amenities of war, 93-96.
- Battles of Civil War*: numbers and losses, 348-9.
- Battles of Mexican War*: numbers and losses, 341.
- Battles of Revolutionary War*: numbers and losses, 343-7.
- Battles of War of 1812*: numbers and losses, 342.
- Bayonet charges*: 81.
- Bean's Station (Tenn.)*: 245.

- Beatty*, Gen. Samuel: 118, 202, 267.
- Beaufort*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Beauregard*, Gen. P. G. T.: 46, 305, 308, 309.
- Bell*, John: 50.
- Bellaire* (Oh.): 10, 13.
- Bemis Heights*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Benjamin*, Judah P.: 282.
- Bennington*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Big Shanty* (Ga.): 305, 330, 333.
- Blackford Co.* (Ind.): 132.
- Blackstocks*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Blair*, Gen. Frank P.: 298.
- Blücher*, Gen.: 171.
- Blue Bird Gap* (Ga.): 168.
- Boston* (Mass.): 22.
- Boydton Plank Road*, battle of: numbers and losses, 349.
- Boynton*, Gen. Henry V.: 356, 357, 358.
- Bragg*, Gen. Braxton: appointed to command of Confederate Army of the Tennessee, 47; his invasion of and retreat from Kentucky, 52, 98, 100; his controversy with Gen. Breckinridge, 122; superseded by Gen. Johnston, 297; his subsequent unpopularity in the South, 292. See Army of Tennessee and its Battles and Campaigns.
- Brandywine*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Brannan*, Gen. John M.: 183.
- Breastworks*: 79, 85-6. See Fortified Lines.
- Breckinridge*, Gen. John C.: 50, 51, 122.
- Bridgeport* (Ala.): 158, 161, 162, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 313.
- Brier Creek*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Brock*, Francena Howe: 67.
- Brotherton field* (Chickamauga): 178.
- Brotherton house* (Chickamauga): 175, 360, 363.
- Brown*, Albert G.: 278.
- Brown*, Gov. Joseph: 293.
- Brown*, Orderly —: 149.
- Brown Co.* (Ind.): 54, 132.
- Buchanan*, Pres. James: 27, 101.
- Buckner*, Gen. Simon B.: 169, 188.
- Buell*, Gen. Don Carlos: his department merged into Department of the Mississippi, 45; appointed to command of left wing of Halleck's army, 45; his advance to east Tennessee, 46; distrust of in the North, 47; reorganizes army at Louisville, 99; marches in pursuit of Bragg, 100; superseded by Rosecrans, 101; value of his discipline, 102; hostility of Halleck to, 102; criticisms of his military abilities, 102-3; his timely arrival at Shiloh, 103. See Army of the Cumberland; Battles of Perryville and Shiloh.
- Bull Gap* (Tenn.): 257.
- Bull Run*: first battle of, 13, 15, 16, 31, 35.
- Bull Run*: second battle of, 45.
- Bunker Hill*, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
- Burnside*, Gen. Ambrose E.: supersedes McClellan in command of Army of the Potomac, 124; is superseded by Hooker, 124; his controversy with Halleck, 160. See Battles of Fredericksburg,

- Roanoke Island; Knoxville, siege of.
- Butler*, Gen. Benjamin F.: 271.
- "*Butternuts*" of Indiana and Ohio: 130, 136.
- Calhoun* (Tenn.): 266.
- Camden*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Cameron*, Simon: 15, 16, 25.
- Camp* fires: 75.
- Camp* guards: 62.
- Camp*, life in: laying out camp, 56; tents, 56-7; dog-tents, 57; shebangs, 57; daily routine of camp life, 58; roll-call, 58; rations, 58; cooking, 59, 60; exchanges at picket stations, 59; drills and inspections, 61; dress parade, 61; close of day duties, 61; camp guard, 62; picket, 62; pay day, 63; mail, 64; newspapers in the army, 65; literature in the army, 65; the sutler, 66; amusements, 66; gambling, 66; drunkenness, 67; hospitals, 67; contrabands, 69.
- Camp*, March and Battle: Chap. III, pp. 56-96.
- Campbell* Hospital: 67.
- Campbell's* Station (Tenn.): 266.
- Canby*, Gen. Edward R.: 311.
- Cannon* balls: danger of being hit by, 89.
- Carrick's* Ford: battle of, 13.
- Catholic* Sisters of Mercy: 68.
- Catlett's* Gap (Ga.): 168.
- Catoosa* Springs (Ga.): 300.
- Cedar Creek*, battle of: numbers and losses, 349.
- Champion* Hill, battle of: numbers and losses, 348.
- Chancellorsville*, battle of: 126, 366; numbers and losses, 348.
- Chandler*, Matthew: 265, 332.
- Chandler*, Senator Zachariah: 16.
- Chantilly*, battle of: numbers and losses, 348.
- Charging* a battery: 79.
- Charging* breastworks: 79.
- Charleston*, siege of (in Rev.): numbers and losses, 345.
- Charlestown* (Tenn.): 266, 267.
- Charlotte*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Chase*, Salmon P.: 18, 42, 43.
- Chattahoochee* river: 305.
- Chattanooga* (Tenn.): 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 170, 174, 186, 197, 198, 203, 204, 212, 213, 242, 243, 244, 250, 251, 256, 267, 296, 297, 298, 308, 313, 333, 364; revisited in 1899, 361.
- Chattanooga*, Campaign and the Battle of Chickamauga: Chap. VII, pp. 156-209. See *Chattanooga*, Siege and Battles of.
- Chattanooga*, battles of: numbers and losses, 348. See *Chattanooga*, Siege and Battles of.
- Chattanooga* creek (Tenn.): 223.
- Chattanooga*, Siege and Battles of: Chap. VIII, pp. 210-241; establishment of Federal lines and fortifications after battle of Chickamauga, 210; surrounding of town by Bragg's army, 211; difficulty of getting supplies, 211; short rations, 212; visit of Jefferson Davis, 212; critical situation of Federal army, 212; Gen. Thomas's reply to Grant's message, 213; Federal garrison harassed by Confederate batteries and sharpshooters, 213; playing

of "Dixie," 213; coming of Gen. Hooker, 214; Gen. Rosecrans superseded by Gen. Thomas, 214; arrival of Gen. Grant, 215; preparations for Federal advance, 215-16; Bragg sends Longstreet to East Tennessee, 216; Grant's order to Thomas to attack Missionary Ridge issued and recalled, 216; arrival of Gen. Sherman, 217; Grant's proposed plan of battle, 217; capture of Orchard Knob, 218; Sherman's attack on north end of Missionary Ridge, 219; Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, 220; repulse of Sherman, 221; Grant's orders for simultaneous advance on Nov. 25 of troops of Sherman, Thomas and Hooker, 221-2; Federal and Confederate movements during forenoon of Nov. 25, 222; comparative strength of opposing armies, 223-4; character of Missionary Ridge and its defenses, 224; critical situation of Gen. Sherman, 225; Grant orders assault of ridge by Thomas's troops, 225; only a demonstration to relieve Sherman intended, 226; assault by the troops of Army of the Cumberland begun, 227; rifle pits at base of ridge taken, 227; without further orders troops begin ascent of the ridge, 228; the crest of the ridge taken, 230; Bragg's retreat, 230; erroneous explanations of supposed small Federal losses, 231-2; desperate and heroic fighting of assaulting troops, 232; modifications of

Grant's original plan of battle, 233; Grant underestimated Thomas and Army of the Cumberland, 233; numbers and losses, 234-6; controversy as to whether Grant's order for the assault contemplated the storming of the ridge or only the taking of the rifle pits at the base, 236-240; the part taken by Wood's division and the 79th Ind., 240; present appearance of battle-fields about Chattanooga, 358-9, 361-3.

Chattanooga National Cemetery: 361.

Chattanooga Valley (Tenn.): 217.

Cheat river (W. Va.): 13.

Cheatham, Gen. Benjamin F.: 316.

Chemung (N. Y.), battle of: numbers and losses, 345.

Cherry Valley massacre: numbers and losses, 345.

Chicago (Ills.): 283.

Chickamauga, battle of: difficulties preceding, 156, 157, 158; the advance to Tullahoma, 157; movements preceding occupation of Chattanooga, 158-159; vain appeals of Rosecrans to Washington authorities for aid, 159-161; advance from Tullahoma to Chattanooga, 161; evacuation of Chattanooga by Bragg, 162; historical accounts of the battle, 163; movements of Federal army after evacuation of Chattanooga, 164; Halleck's plans, 165; the danger discovered by Halleck and Rosecrans, 165-6; Bragg's situation and plans, 166-7; critical situation of Army of the Cumberland,

167-8; how Bragg and his subordinates neglected their opportunity, 168-170; Bragg's attempt to cut off Rosecrans from retreat to Chattanooga, 170-1; Bragg's re-enforcements, 170; efforts of Rosecrans to concentrate his army, 171-2; position of Federal and Confederate troops on morning of Sept. 19, 172-4; each commander ignorant of position of the other, 173-4; opening of the battle, 174-5; the fighting on the 19th, 175-7; the position of the Federal and Confederate troops on morning of the 20th, 178-9; stripping the right of the Federal army to reinforce the left, 179-80; position and danger of Federal right, 180-1; opening of battle on morning of 20th, 181; attack on Federal left, 181-2; the break in the Federal right and how it was caused, 183-6; Rosecrans narrowly escapes capture, goes to Chattanooga and orders Thomas to assume command, 185-6; narrow escape of Federal army from annihilation, 186-7; the Confederate attack on Snodgrass Hill and its repulse, 188-91; Confederates gain position in rear of the hill, 191; the coming of Gen. Granger, 192; charge of Whitaker and Mitchell's brigades, 193; continued Confederate assaults on Snodgrass Hill and their repulse, 193-5; Federal army retires to Rossville, 196; causes of the disaster to the Federal army, 197-200; vindication of men of 20th and

21st corps, 201-2; numbers and losses, 204-9, 348, 352; present appearance of battle-field, 359-361; 363-4.
Chickamauga creek (Ga.): 173, 174, 179, 217, 221.
Chickamauga Memorial Association: 357.
Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park: origin of plan of, 356; Federal legislation for, 357; dimensions of park, 357-8; present appearance of old battle-fields, 358-9; monuments and markers, 360-1.
Christian Commission: 67.
Christmas in the army: 252.
Cincinnati (O.): 98.
Cincinnati Commercial: 65, 252.
Cincinnati Gazette: 65.
Clay, Henry: 5.
Cleburne, Gen. Patrick R.: 273, 275, 316, 319; memorial on arming negroes, 273, 280; his death, 316.
Cleveland (Tenn.): 249, 250, 265, 267.
Cloud house (*Chickamauga*): 179, 200.
Coffee: as medium of exchange, 64.
Colclaser, O. M.: 260.
Cold Harbor, battle of: 86; numbers and losses, 348.
Columbia (Tenn.): 156, 314, 317.
Committee on Conduct of the War: 22, 23, 26.
Concord, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
Confederacy, southern: See South, The.
Confederate money: 64.
Confederate "yell": 91.
Contrabands: 69.
Cooking in the army: 59, 60.

- Cooper*, Maj. George E.: 303.
Corinth (Miss.): capture of, 46.
Cowards, constitutional: 93.
Cowpens, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Crab Orchard (Ky.): 100.
Crawfish Spring (Chickamauga): 172, 173, 360, 363.
Crawfish Spring road (Chickamauga): 188.
Crittenden, John J.: 52.
Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L.: 99, 101, 109, 164, 165, 186, 198, 214.
Cromwell, Oliver: 27.
Cumberland, Army of: See Army of the Cumberland.
Cumberland, Department of: 214, 259.
Cumberland Gap (Tenn.): 47, 102, 243, 245.
Cumberland mountains: 158, 161, 162.
Cumberland river: 100, 135.
Curtis, Gen. S. R.: 41.
Dalton (Ga.): 164, 165, 273, 305.
Dana, Charles A.: 187, 239.
Danbury, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
Dandridge (Tenn.): 246, 258.
Dangers in battle: 89.
Davis, Jefferson: 32, 132, 212, 253, 276, 304, 305, 309; his egotism, 38; his propensity to boast, 38; divulging Confederate plans in his speeches, 38-9; visit to Gen. Hood, 39; visit to Bragg during siege of Chattanooga, 212; views on question of arming negroes, 277; flees from Richmond, 282; his financial theories, 286-7; becomes unpopular in the South, 292.
Davis, Gen. Jefferson C.: 98, 186.
Davis, Theodore R.: 241.
Decatur (Ala.): 307, 309.
Democrats in army: 51, 127; Douglas Democrats, 51.
Dennison, Gov. William: 19.
Deserters: frequency of desertions in 1863, 127, 131, 132, 137, 141; how protected in North, 131-2; letters to soldiers encouraging, 131; execution of a deserter, 137; proportion of regulars and volunteers, 340; many wrongfully so reported, 340.
Developing the enemy: 77.
Diary: extracts from, 139-155; 250-267.
Dick, Col. George: 95.
Diogenes: 262.
Disease in army: 68, 105, 137, 141; what diseases most prevalent, 339; total deaths from, 339; deaths from in Co. I, 79th Ind., 339.
Dodge, Gen. Granville M.: 298.
Dog-tents: 57, 145, 148.
Douglas, Stephen A.: 50; loyalty of him and his followers, 51.
Draft: opposition to in North, 131; number of drafted men in actual service, 340.
Dress parade: 61.
Drills: 61.
Drunkenness in army: 67.
Dry Creek valley (Ga.): 199.
Duck river: 156, 158, 314, 315.
Dug Gap (Ga.): 168.
Dumont, Col. Ebenezer: 10.
Dyer field (Chickamauga): 185, 186, 187, 188.
East Tennessee: 54, 58, 72, 102, 159, 167, 192, 243, 245, 246, 247, 249, 258, 259; character of country, 243, 266;

- primitive character of people, 245.
- East Tennessee Campaign*, The: Chap. IX, pp. 242-267; beginning, 242; hardships, 242-4; scarcity of clothing, 243; difficulty of getting provisions, 243; continual marching, 245; a little side campaign, 246-9.
- Eaton*, John: 149.
- Edinburg* (Ind.): 132.
- Elliott*, Gen. Washington L.: 298.
- Ellis*, Capt. William B.: 262.
- Emancipation* proclamation: foreshadowed in September, 1862, 128; issued January 1, 1863, 128; hostility to in North, 127; hostility to of soldiers in Federal armies, 127; change of attitude in North and South, 268; proclamation for logical war measure, 269.
- End of an Unimportant Military Career*: Chap. XIII, pp. 330-334.
- England*: excitement over Trent affair, 22.
- Eutaw Springs*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Evansville* (Ind.): 52.
- Fair Oaks*, battle of: numbers and losses, 348.
- Falmouth* (Va.): 151.
- Farragut*, Admiral David G.: 41.
- Fishing Creek*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Fitz-Jerrold*, Mrs.: 252.
- Five Forks*, battle of: 365.
- Flanking*: 78, 88.
- Flat Creek valley* (Tenn.): 245.
- Florence* (Ala.): 310, 311.
- Foote*, Commodore Andrew H.: 41.
- Foraging*: 74.
- Forrest*, Gen. Nathan B.: 47, 310, 311, 314.
- Fort Boone*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Fort Clinton*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Fort Donelson*, capture of: 31, 41, 48.
- Fort Griswold*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Fort Henry*, capture of: 41.
- Fort Lafayette*: 23.
- Fort Mercer*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Fort Mifflin*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Fort Ninety-Six*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Fort Schuyler*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Fort Sumter*: firing on, 2, 3, 251.
- Fort Warren*: 22.
- Fort Washington*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Fort Wood*: 218, 219, 358.
- Fortified* lines: advancing against, 88; futility of attacking by direct assault, 86, 301. See Breastworks.
- Fortress Monroe*: 33.
- Fout*, Fred: 254.
- Fox*, Lt.-Col. William F.: 208, 343, 351.
- Frankfort* (Ky.): 100.
- Franklin*, Gen. William B.: 25.
- Franklin* (Ind.): 2, 8, 54, 132, 334; raising first company in, 8-9.
- Franklin* (Tenn.): 314, 315, 317.
- Franklin*, battle of: 54, 312, 318-19; numbers and losses, 349.

- Franklin road (Stone's River)*: 107.
"Franklin Tigers": 9.
Fredericksburg, battle of: 124, 126, 154, 305; numbers and losses, 348.
Fremont, Gen. John C.: 44.
Further Development of the Great Conflict: Chap. II, pp. 15-55.
Gadsden (Ala.): 305.
Gaines's Mill, battle of: numbers and losses, 348.
Gallatin (Tenn.): 100.
Gambling in army: 66.
Garesche, Lt. Col. Julius P.: 115.
Garnett, Gen. Robert S.: 13.
Gaylesville (Ala.): 305.
Georgia, state: 40, 87, 165, 166, 170, 292, 307, 308, 309, 313, 361, 362.
Germantown, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
Gettysburg, battle of: charge of Pickett's division, 120, 350; effect of in North and South, 283; numbers and losses, 348, 350, 353.
Gilbert, Gen. Charles C.: 99.
Glasgow, (Ky.): 100.
Glass's Mill (Chickamauga): 172.
Glenn, widow, house (Chickamauga): 172, 177, 178, 360.
Gordon, Gen. John B.: 94.
Gosney, Richard M.: 267.
Goldsborough (N. C.): 32.
Goldsborough, Commodore Louis M.: 41.
Grand reviews at Louisville: 97, 105.
Granger, Gen. Gordon: 199, 226, 236, 237, 238, 242; at battles of Chickamauga, 192-3; appointed to command of 4th corps, formed by consolidation of 20th and 21st corps, 214; superseded by Gen. Howard, 208.
Grant, Gen. Ulysses S.: listens to Lincoln's military plans, 26; his opinion of Stanton, 28-9; ill treatment by Halleck, 31; capture of Fort Henry, 41; of Fort Donelson, 41; temporarily shelved by Halleck, 45; dissatisfaction with in North after battle of Shiloh, 48; begins to be famous, 48; Lincoln's friendship for, 49; regret for assault at Cold Harbor, 86; incurs displeasure of Halleck, 126; appointed to command of Military Division of the Mississippi, 214; underestimates Thomas and Army of the Cumberland, 233; appointed Lieut.-General, 297; appointed general-in-chief, 297; first views of Sherman's proposed march to the sea, 307-8; dissatisfaction with Thomas at Nashville, 321-2; strength of his army in Richmond campaign, 337-8. See *Army of the Potomac*; *Richmond Campaign*; *Shiloh*; *Siege and Battles of Chattanooga*.
Greeley, Horace: at first favored peaceable secession, 2; correspondence with Lincoln on emancipation proclamation, 128.
Greenbacks: during the war, 64.
Green Spring, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Grider, Col. Benjamin C.: 119.
Guilford, Ct. H., battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Gulf of Mexico: 306.

- Halleck*, Gen. Henry W.: appointed general-in-chief, 27; estimate of his character, 30-34; McClellan's opinion of, 30; his ill treatment of Grant, 31; of Sherman, 32; appointed to command of Department of Virginia, 32; of Department of the Mississippi, 45; his advance on Corinth, 46; his orders to Pope, 46; hostility to Buell, 102; outwitted by Grant, 125; hostility to Rosecrans, 126; seeks to shift blame for Rosecrans's defeat at Chickamauga on Burnside, 160; answer to Rosecrans's appeal for aid in Chattanooga campaign, 160-1; his plans prior to battle of Chickamauga, 165; discovers perilous situation of Army of the Cumberland, 166; his ignorance of the battle of Chickamauga, 203; is instrumental in withholding Grant's order for removal of Thomas, 322.
- Hall's Ford* (Chickamauga): 360.
- Hampton Roads*: 41.
- Hancock*, Columbus: 254, 265.
- Hanging Rock* (S. C.), battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Hanna*, Bayless W.: 132.
- Hardee*, Gen. Wm. J.: 107, 110, 273.
- Harlem Plains*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Harper's Weekly*: 241; its influence in the war, 3-4; predictions as to coming generals, 123.
- Harpeth river*: 318, 319.
- Harrison's Landing*: 43.
- Hendricks*, Thomas A.: 51.
- Hermitage* (Tenn.): 101.
- Herriot*, Capt. George: 149.
- Hiawassee river*: 251, 266.
- Higginson*, Col. T. W.: 271.
- Hill*, Gen. Daniel H.: 161, 168, 169.
- Hilton Head* (S. C.): 270.
- Hindman*, Gen. Thomas C.: 168, 169, 187, 188, 194.
- Hobkirk's Hill*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Holt*, Joseph (Judge Adv. Gen.): 130.
- Homesickness* in army: 68.
- Hood*, Gen. John B.: superseded Johnston in command of Army of the Tennessee, 304; relieved of command of that army, 324. See Hood's Invasion of Tennessee; Atlanta Campaign.
- Hood's Invasion of Tennessee*: Chap. XII, pp. 305-329. Jefferson Davis visits Hood, 305; Hood's movements after surrender of Atlanta, 305; Sherman's plan of marching to the sea, 305-6; Grant's view of it, 307-8; Thomas left to take care of Hood, 309; Hood's plans, 309-10; the troops left for Thomas, 311-13; Schofield given command of troops in front, 314; Hood's attempt to cut off Schofield's retreat to Nashville, 314; narrow escape of Schofield's troops at Spring Hill, 315-17; battle of Franklin, 318-19; Schofield's army arrives at Nashville, 319; Hood's army also arrives, 319; authorities at Washington alarmed, 319; Grant urges Thomas to give battle at once, 320; impossibility of doing so, 320; the pressure brought to bear on Thomas, 321-2; his firmness of purpose, 321; orders given to re-

- lieve Thomas of command, 322; the battle of Nashville, 323-4; fortunate results of victory, 326; estimate of Thomas's character, 326-8; Badeau's aspersions on Thomas, 328.
- Hooker*, Gen. Joseph: 86, 127, 150, 151, 152, 153, 215, 219, 222, 224, 226, 236, 265; supersedes Burnside in command of Army of the Potomac, 124; is superseded by Meade, 125; joins Army of the Cumberland in command of 11th and 12th army corps, 214; the "battle among the clouds," 220; takes command of 20th corps formed by consolidation of 11th and 12th corps, 208. See battles of Chattanooga and Chancellorsville.
- Hospitals*: general, 67, 68; field, 68, 332.
- House Mountain* (Tenn.): 244.
- Howard*, Gen. Oliver O.: 86, 242; supersedes Granger in command of 4th army corps, 265, 298.
- Howe*, Capt. Eliakim: 1.
- Howe*, Capt. Nathan: 1.
- Howe*, Otis: 1.
- Howe*, Col. Thomas: 1.
- Hubbardton*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Hunter*, Andrew: 277, 279.
- Hunter*, Gen. David: 45, 271.
- Hunter*, Walter: 140.
- Huntsinger*, Lieut. Wm. H.: 317.
- Hurlbut*, Gen. Stephen A.: 166.
- Illinois*, state: 65, 127, 129; treasonable political orders there in 1863, 130; condition in 1863, 130; 100-day men tendered by, 284.
- Indiana Sanitary Commission*: 7.
- Indiana*, state: 5, 6, 50, 53, 65, 98, 127, 129, 136, 260, 336; early opposition in to Lincoln, 1; troops furnished in Civil War, 6; effect of Lincoln's first call for troops, 8; per cent. of fighting population in Federal armies, 8; lack of preparation for war, 20; situation there in 1862, 50; vote of Presidential election in 1860, 50; early hostility there to prosecution of war, 51; Confederate invasion of in 1862, 52; disloyal political orders there, 130-2; legislature of refuses to receive Gov. Morton's message and thanks Gov. Seymour for his, 132; protests of Indiana soldiers in the field to legislature in 1863, 134; raided by Gen. John Morgan, 135; Indiana "Butternuts," 136; condition in 1863, 141; public sentiment there in 1864, 283; 100-day troops tendered by, 284; muster rolls published by, 336.
- Indianapolis* (Ind.): 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 51, 52, 53, 54, 97, 283.
- Iowa*, state: tender of 100-day men by, 284.
- Israel*, John: 265.
- Jackson*, President Andrew: 101.
- Jacobs*, William: 155.
- James river*: 43.
- Jamestown Ford*, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
- Jays Mill* (Chickamauga): 173, 360.
- Jeffer*, Frank: 149.

- Johnson*, Gen. Richard W.: 245, 250, 251, 254, 255, 257, 265, 266, 267.
Johnson, Dr. Samuel: 261.
Johnson Co. (Ind.): 2, 54, 132.
Johnson, Gen. Albert Sidney: 41.
Johnston, Gen. Joseph E.: 24, 32, 43, 79, 84, 167, 170, 273, 276, 297, 298; supersedes Bragg in command of Army of Tennessee, 297; is superseded by Hood, 304. See *Atlanta Campaign*.
Kansas, state: 271.
Kelly, Col. Benjamin F.: 10.
Kelly field (Chickamauga): 172, 179.
Kelly house (Chickamauga): 178, 360.
Kenesaw Mountain (Ga.): 55, 330.
Kenesaw Mountain, battle of: 86, 95, 299, 301, 333; numbers and losses, 302.
Kentucky, state: 4, 40, 47, 50, 53, 100, 101, 104, 105, 243, 310, 319, 362; invasion of by Bragg, 52; situation there in 1862, 52; military operations there in 1862, 98; march through in 1862, 104; disloyal political orders there in 1863, 130.
Kettle Creek, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
Kilpatrick, Gen. Judson: 311.
King, Col.: 19.
Kings Mountain, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Kirk, Gen. Edward N.: 111, 117.
Knefler, Col. Frederick: 54, 97, 115, 182, 185, 228, 229.
Knights of the Golden Circle: 130, 132.
Knoxville (Tenn.): 160, 242, 245, 250, 251, 254, 255, 257, 265, 266, 267.
Knoxville, siege of: 242.
Knoxville Whig: 251.
Lafayette (Ga.): 165, 166, 178, 305, 309.
Lafayette road (Chickamauga): 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 181.
Lander, Col. Frederick W.: 10.
Laverne (Tenn.): 106, 117, 122, 142.
Lawrence, Henry C.: 241.
Lee, Maj. Pollok B.: 181, 182.
Lee, Gen. Robert E.: 84, 124, 125, 129, 159, 166, 168, 283, 304, 365, 367; views on question of arming negroes, 277, 278, 280.
Lee and Gordon's Mill (Chickamauga): 169, 172, 174, 360, 363.
Lenoir Station (Tenn.): 266.
Lexington, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
Light Brigade: percentage of losses in charge at Balaklava, 350.
Lincoln, President Abraham: election as President, 1; passes through Indianapolis, 2; calls for troops, 2, 52; Gov. Magoffin's response to call on Kentucky, 4; efforts to familiarize himself with military movements, 25; Stanton's early opinions of and subsequent relations to, 27, 29; McClellan's letter to, 36; issues proclamation for special Thanksgiving in 1862, 42; clings to McClellan, 43; his friendship for Grant, 49; his letter to Horace Greeley, 128; issue of emancipation proclamation, 128, 129; opposition to of radical ele-

- ment in Republican party, 128; opposition majorities against in fall of 1862, 129; writes Rosecrans a kind letter, 160.
- Literature in the army*: 65, 253, 259, 263, 264.
- Little river*: 250.
- Little Tennessee river*: 246, 247, 249, 250.
- Logan, Gen. John A.*: 298, 301, 322, 326.
- Long Island, battle of*: numbers and losses, 344.
- Long roll*: effect of on army, 11.
- Longstreet, Gen. James*: 39, 76, 179, 181, 188, 193, 199, 209, 216, 242, 243, 246, 258, 266, 364.
- Lookout Creek (Tenn.)*: 220.
- Lookout Mountain (Tenn.)*: 158, 162, 168, 210, 211, 212, 213, 220, 221, 222, 225, 333, 356, 357; appearance in 1899, 358, 361, 362.
- Lookout Mountain, battle of*: See Chattanooga, Siege and Battles of.
- Lookout Valley (Tenn.)*: 212, 216.
- Loomis, ———*: 252.
- Loudon (Tenn.)*: 265, 266.
- Louisville (Ky.)*: 47, 52, 53, 64, 67, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 137, 141, 158.
- Lying still under artillery fire*: 80-1.
- Lytle station (Chickamauga)*: 363.
- Macon (Ga.)*: 40.
- Magoffin, Gov. Beriah*: 4, 50.
- Malingering in army*: 69.
- Manassas, battle of*: numbers and losses, 348.
- Marlborough (Mass.)*: 1.
- Mail, receiving in army*: 64.
- March, the*: breaking camp, 69; baggage, 70; what the soldiers carried, 70; the start, 71; picturesque appearance of marching column, 71; distance traveled per day, 71; discomforts on, 72; swearing mule-drivers, 72; how monotony of march relieved, 73; foraging, 73-4; going into camp at night, 75; camp-fires, 75; camping in enemy's country, 104.
- Maryland, state*: 40.
- Maryville (Tenn.)*: 246, 254, 255, 256.
- Mason, James M.*: seizure of, 22.
- Massachusetts, state*: 271.
- Meade, Gen. George*: 125.
- Memminger, Christopher G.*: 287.
- Memphis and Charleston railroad*: 47.
- Merrimac*: destruction of by Monitor, 41.
- Mexican War*: numbers and losses, 341.
- Militia*: in the North prior to war, 18.
- Mill Spring*: battle of, 41, 104.
- Miller, Col. John F.*: 120.
- Mine explosions*: 89.
- Mine Run, battle of*: numbers and losses, 348.
- Minix, William*: 155.
- Minty, Gen. Robert H. G.*: 172.
- Missionary Ridge*: 159, 210, 211, 212, 213, 217, 219, 221, 222, 226, 227, 228, 233, 234, 356, 357, 358, 361.
- Missionary Ridge, battle of*. See Chattanooga, Siege and Battles of.
- Mississippi, Department of*: creation of, 45.

- Mississippi*, Military Division of: 214, 297.
Mississippi river: 41, 310.
Mississippi Valley: 50.
Missouri river: 312.
Missouri, state: 40, 271, 306, 308, 312: disloyal political orders there in 1863, 130.
Mobile (Ala.): 160, 297.
Money during the war: greenbacks, 64; Confederate, 64; coffee as medium of exchange, 64.
Monitor: destruction by of the Merrimac, 41.
Monmouth: battle of, 344.
Montreal, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
Moore's Creek, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
Morgan, Gen. John: 6, 47, 135, 136, 160. See *Morgan* Raid.
Morgan Raid in Indiana and Ohio: 6, 135, 283.
Morgantown (Tenn.): 250.
Morristown (Tenn.): 245, 258.
Morton, Gov. Oliver P.: 16, 18, 42; governor of Indiana at outbreak of war, his sagacity and energy, 5; power as a political speaker, 6; care for Indiana soldiers, 7; kindness to Confederate prisoners, 7; his vigilance, 7; response to first call for troops, 8; raising and forwarding troops in 1862, 53; legislature of 1863 refuses to receive his message, 132; passes bill to strip Morton of military power, 134.
Mossy Creek Station (Tenn.): 257, 260.
Mount Vernon (Ky.): 100.
Munfordsville (Ky.): 98.
Murfreesboro (Tenn.): 101, 106, 107, 109, 110, 117, 121, 125, 136, 137, 138, 139, 156, 313; camp life there in 1863, 123-155.
Musgroves Mills, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Musket balls: danger of being hit by in battle, 89.
McAfee Church (Chickamauga): 173, 179, 192.
McClellan, Gen. George B.: succeeds Gen. Scott as general-in-chief, 16; takes charge of defenses at Washington, 15; his inspection of Ohio state arsenal, 19; work of organizing the Army of the Potomac, 20, 35; deprived of authority as general-in-chief, 26; his despatch to Stanton, 35; his letter to Lincoln, 36; estimate of his character, 34-7; hostility of Stanton and Chase, 43; Lincoln clings to, 43; the Peninsular campaign, 43-4; again takes charge of defenses at Washington, 45; distrusted by the North, 47; superseded in command of Army of the Potomac by Burnside, 124.
McClernand, Gen. John A.: 45.
McClure, Alexander K.: 49.
McCook, Gen. Alexander McD.: 99, 109, 110, 164, 165, 171, 183, 186, 198.
McCullagh, J. B.: 65.
McDowell, Gen. Irvin: 25, 44.
McFarland's Gap (Tenn.): 196, 210.
McGee's Ford (Tenn.): 246; foraging expedition to, 246-9.
McLemore's Cove (Ga.): 166, 172, 174.
McMinnville (Tenn.): 59, 156, 158.
McPheeters, Surgeon J. G.: 334.
McPherson, Gen. James B.: 298, 301.

- Nashville* (Tenn.): 31, 67, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 117, 118, 142, 156, 157, 158, 211, 214, 252, 307, 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 319, 320, 322; camp life there, 104, 105; mortality there, 105.
- Nashville*, battle of: 322-4; importance of victory, 326; numbers and losses, 324, 349.
- Nashville* turnpike (Stone's River): 107, 108, 109, 112.
- Negley*, Gen. James S.: 186, 200.
- Negro* Soldiers in the Civil War: Chap. X, pp. 268-282; changes of sentiment in North and South on questions of emancipation and arming of slaves, 268; value of slave labor to Confederacy, 269; emancipation proclamation, 269; opposition in North to enrolling negroes in Federal armies, 270; enrollment of negro soldiers in northern armies, 270-1; Federal legislation on subject, 272; early opposition in Federal armies to arming the negroes, 272; vindictive feeling in South against Federal enlistment of negro troops, 272; change of sentiment in the South on question of arming negroes, 273; proceedings of Confederate Army of Tennessee in 1864 on Cleburne's memorial, 273; objects set forth in the memorial, 274-5; the memorial suppressed by Confederate authorities, 276; continued agitation in the South of question of arming the negroes, 276; Jefferson Davis and Gen. Lee finally become converted to the idea, 277; Confederate legislation on subject, 278-280; defects in legislation, 280-1; legislation too late, 281; failure to get negro volunteers and draft ordered, 282; collapse of Confederacy stops the draft, 282.
- Negroes*: in camp, 69; as soldiers, 265. See Contrabands; Negro Soldiers.
- Nelson*, Gen. William: 98.
- New England*: 51.
- New Haven*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- New Hope* Church: battle of, 86, 88, 299.
- New York* City: draft riots there in 1863, 129.
- New York*, state: 129.
- New York Tribune*: 65.
- New Orleans* (La.): 41, 271; capture of, 41.
- Newburg* (Ind.): sacking of by Confederates, 52.
- Newmarket* (Tenn.): 245, 257, 258, 260.
- Newtown*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Newspapers* in the army: 65, 260.
- Nickajack* Trace (Tenn.): 162.
- Night* attacks: 77.
- Noddles* Island, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
- Norfolk* (Va.): 166.
- North*, The: election of Lincoln, 1; effect of firing on Fort Sumter, 2; public sentiment in at beginning of war, 3-4; effect of Bull Run defeat, 15; the cry of "On to Richmond," 16; apparent that war would not blow over in sixty days, 16; Federal government forced to rely on volunteer armies, 17; call for 500,000 volunteers,

- 17; difficulty of equipping men, 18; lack of munitions of war, 18, 20; magnitude of work of organizing armies, 20; value of McClellan's services in organizing, 20; finding generals for the armies, 21; West Point officers, 21; seizure of Mason and Slidell, 22; Seward's diplomacy, 22; investigation of Ball's Bluff disaster, 23, 24; inactivity of Army of the Potomac, 24; resignation of Cameron and appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War, 25; Lincoln as commander-in-chief, 25; want of competent head of armies, 26; character and influence of Stanton, Halleck and McClellan, 27-36; great success of northern armies in early part of 1862, 40-1; order discontinuing recruiting, 42; subsequent disasters in that year, 43-45; North becomes distrustful of McClellan and Buell, 47; hostility in North to Grant, 48; Sherman thought to be crazy, 48, 50; situation in Kentucky, 50; situation in Indiana, 50-1; President Lincoln's call in 1862 for 300,000 volunteers, 52; Gov. Morton's efforts to raise Indiana's quota, 53; darkest period in the war, 123; dissatisfaction in 1863, 126-7; opposition to emancipation and draft, 128; dissatisfaction of radical element in Republican party, 128; slavery question in, 128; opposition majorities in fall of 1862, 129; organization of disloyal political orders, 130-1; change of attitude of North on question of emancipation and arming negroes, 268-9; the emancipation proclamation, 269; early opposition in North to enrolling negroes in Federal armies, 270; Federal legislation on subject, 271-2; organization of Federal negro regiments, 271-2; number of men in northern armies in 1864, 284; tender of 100-day men by governors of northern states, 284; public sentiment and resources of the North at beginning of 1864, 284.
- North Carolina*, state: 41, 165, 292, 293, 336, 362; Confederate muster rolls published by, 336.
- Northwestern* Confederacy: scheme for, 51.
- Numbers and Losses*: in Revolutionary War, 343-7; in War of 1812, 342; in Mexican War, 341; in Civil War, 348-9. See Statistics. For losses in particular battles, see these titles.
- Officers in battle*: 82.
- Ohio*, army of. See Army, etc.
- Ohio*, Department of: 214.
- Ohio river*: 50, 52, 98, 135, 306, 309, 310, 319.
- Ohio*, state: 52, 65, 127, 129, 136; lack of preparation for war, 18-20; organization of disloyal political orders, 130; raided by Gen. John Morgan, 135; public sentiment in 1864, 283; 100-day men tendered by, 284.
- Opdycke*, Col. Emerson: 318.
- Orchard Knob* (Chattanooga): 218, 219, 221, 223, 226, 357, 361, 362.

- Oriskany*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Oyler*, Lt.-Col. Samuel P.: 9, 10, 53, 54, 81, 97, 140, 195, 260.
- Packard*, Marcus A. O.: 133.
- Palmer*, Gen. John M.: 214, 298.
- Paoli*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Parker*, Maj. George W.: 259.
- Paulus Hook* (N. J.), battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Pay Day* in army: 63.
- Pea Ridge*, battle of: 41.
- Peace at any price* platform at Chicago in 1864: 37, 283.
- Pearson*, Judge Richard M.: 293.
- Pemberton*, Gen. John C.: 125.
- Peninsular Campaign*: 30, 43.
- Pennsylvania*, state: 49, 129; invasion of by Gen. Lee, 125.
- Perkins*, Samuel E.: 2.
- Perryville*: battle of, 100; numbers and losses, 348.
- Petersburg* (Va.): 166.
- Petersburg*: battles of, 89; numbers and losses, 349.
- Philippi* (Va.): 10, 11, 12.
- Philippi*, battle of: 10.
- Picket duty*: 11, 150; exchanges at picket stations, 59; responsibility and dangers of, 62-3; courtesies between Federal and Confederate pickets, 94-5.
- Pickett's Mill*, battle of: 86, 95, 299.
- Pigeon Mountain* (Ga.): 167, 168.
- Pikeville* (Tenn.): 60.
- Pittsburg Landing*. See *Shiloh*.
- Poe field* (Chickamauga): 178, 179.
- Poe house* (Chickamauga): 360.
- Polk*, Gen. Leonidas: 107, 169, 170, 179, 181, 182, 275.
- Pope*, Gen. John: appointed to command of Army of Virginia, 44; his extraordinary address to, 44; appointed to command of center of Halleck's army, 45; his pursuit of Beauregard, 46. See *Army of Virginia*; *Bull Run*, second battle.
- Poor Man's Valley* (Tenn.): 245.
- Port Hudson*: 125.
- Port Royal*, battle of; numbers and losses, 345.
- Porter*, Gen. Fitz-John: 37.
- Potomac*, Army of: See *Army*, etc.
- Potomac river*: 15, 42.
- Price*, Gen. Sterling: 41.
- Prices in Confederacy*: 287.
- Princeton*, battle of; numbers and losses, 344.
- Pulaski* (Tenn.): 314.
- Pulaski Co.* (Ky.): 104.
- Putnam*, Gen. Israel: 10.
- Quaker Hill*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Quebec*, battle of; numbers and losses, 343.
- Raccoon Mountain* (Ga.): 158.
- Ransom*, Capt. J. S.: 238.
- Rapidan river*: 338.
- Rappahannock river*: 124, 125, 151.
- Rations in the army*: 58.
- Rawlins*, Gen. John A.: 320.
- Ray*, Martin M.: 52.
- Rebellion*: first outbreak. See *Further Development of the Great Conflict*.
- Rebellion records*: method of citation, 335.

- Reconnaissance* in force: 77.
Recruiting, order discontinued in 1862: 42.
Reed's bridge (Chickamauga): 171.
Reid, Whitelaw: 65.
Republican party: distrust of McClellan, 37; opposition of radical element to Lincoln, 128.
Resaca, battle of: 299.
Revisiting Chattanooga and Chickamauga, Chap. XV, pp. 356-367.
Revolutionary War: numbers and losses in battles of, 343-7.
Rich Man's Valley (Tenn.): 245.
Richmond (Ky.): battle of, 98.
Richmond (Va.): 16, 32, 33, 39, 43, 84, 159, 282, 295, 297, 338; evacuation of, 282; prices there during the war, 287.
Richmond Campaign: character of country traversed, 84; losses in, 352. See Virginia campaign.
Ringgold (Ga.): 165.
Ritter, Capt. Eli F.: 361, 362, 363.
Roanoke Island: battle of, 41.
Robinson, Lieut. James I.: 143.
Rocky Face Ridge, battle of: 84, 94, 299.
Rocky Mount (S. C.), battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Rome (Ga.): 164.
Rosecrans, Gen. William S.: appointed to command of Department of the Cumberland, 101; popularity with his soldiers, 103; incurs displeasure of Halleck, 126; vain appeals to Washington authorities for aid in Chattanooga campaign, 159; answers of Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck, 160; superseded by Gen. Thomas, 214; kindly feeling of soldiers of Army of the Cumberland, 214; estimate of his character, 215. See battles and campaigns of Army of the Cumberland.
Rossville (Ga.): 173, 196, 199, 200, 202, 210, 222, 225, 362.
Rousseau, Gen. Lovell H.: 160.
Rutherford Creek (Tenn.): 315.
Rutledge (Tenn.): 245, 262.
Sanitary Commission: 67.
San Jacinto (war vessel): 22.
Saratoga, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
Savannah (Ga.): 33.
Savannah, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
Savannah, siege of (in Rev.): 345.
Saxton, Gen. Rufus: 270.
Schofield, Gen. John M.: 257, 258, 259, 265, 298, 310, 314, 315, 317, 322.
Scotland: 261.
Scott, Gen. Winfield: 15, 16, 30.
Scottsville (Ky.): 100.
Secret disloyal orders in the North: 130-1.
Seddon, James A.: 276.
Seeing Real War: Chap. IV, pp. 97-105.
Selma (Ala.): 309.
Sequatchie Valley (Tenn.): 161, 162, 211.
Seven Days' Battles: 43; numbers and losses, 348.
Sevierville (Tenn.): 254.
Seward, William H.: 10, 22.
Seymour, Gov. Horatio: 129, 130, 133.
Shebangs: 57.
Shelbyville (Tenn.): 156.

- Sheppard*, Wesley T.: 191, 192, 193.
- Sheridan*, Gen. Phil. H.: 90, 116, 117, 185, 186, 199, 200, 214, 228, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 365.
- Sherman*, Gen. William T.: definition of war, 14; Halleck's insulting treatment of, 32-3; early prediction of number of soldiers required, 50; his tactics in Atlanta campaign, 88, 300; appointed to command of Military Division of the Mississippi, 297; plan for march to the sea, 305-6; correspondence on subject with Grant, 307-8; starts on the march, 309. See Atlanta Campaign; Battles of Chattanooga; Hood's Invasion of Tennessee; Shiloh.
- Shiloh*, battle of: 41, 103; numbers and losses, 348.
- Sill*, Gen. Joshua W.: 117.
- Silver Springs* (Tenn.): 101.
- Six months in Camp at Murfreesboro*: Chap. VI, pp. 123-155.
- Skirmishers* in battle: 78.
- Skulkers*: 75, 92.
- Slavery* question: in the North, 16, 128; views of soldiers on, 146.
- Slidell*, John: seizure of, 22.
- Smith*, Gen. Andrew J.: 45, 306, 310, 320.
- Smith*, Gen. Charles F.: 31.
- Smith*, Gen. Kirby: 47, 98.
- Snodgrass Hill* (Chickamauga): 76, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 199, 201, 364.
- Snodgrass house* (Chickamauga): 187, 192, 360.
- Soldiers*: private soldier's preparation for battle, 78; fraternal feeling between Federal and Confederate soldiers during the war, 94-6, 366; dissatisfaction of northern with slow prosecution of war, 126, 156; sacrifices of southern, 291; development of efficiency of both Federal and Confederate, 355; bravery of those on both sides, 365, 366; early reconciliation between those of North and South, 366.
- Somerset* (Ky.): 100, 104.
- Sons of Liberty*: 130, 136, 284.
- South*, The: inferiority to North in men and resources, 38; great yield of political generals, 38; meddlesome interference of Jefferson Davis with Confederate generals, 38; change of attitude of South on question of emancipation and arming the negroes, 268, 273; vindictive feeling inspired by enrolling negroes in Federal armies, 272; agitation and legislation on enrolling negroes in Confederate armies, 272-282; beginning of decline of Confederacy, 283; condition at beginning of 1864, 284; Confederate financial system, 284-8; prices in the South in 1864, 287; the funding act, 288; Confederate currency, 288; condition of agricultural regions, 288-9; destitution in South in 1864, 289; difficulty of raising recruits for armies, 290; sweeping conscription acts, 290, 292; difficulty of providing supplies for armies, 291; destructive tendency of doctrine of secession, 291; opposition in South to martial law and impressment laws, 292-3; com-

- complaints of military despotism, 293-4; Confederate armies in 1864, 296.
South Carolina, state: 40, 270, 362.
Spence, ———: 140.
Spottsylvania, battle of: numbers and losses, 348, 351.
Springfield, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
Spring Hill (Tenn.): 156, 310, 314, 315, 316; narrow escape of Schofield's army at, 310, 317.
St. Louis (Mo.): 16, 312, 320.
Standing in line of battle: 137.
Stanley, Gen. David S.: 315, 318.
Stanton, Edwin M.: succeeds Cameron as Secretary of War, 25; his influence in conduct of the war, 26; estimate of his character, 27-30; Grant's opinion of, 28-9; his treatment of Sherman, 32-3; his hostility to McClellan, 35, 43; hostility to Rosecrans, 126; answer to Rosecrans's appeal for aid, 160; his dispatch to Grant concerning Gen. Thomas, 320.
Statistics: The Story Told by The, Chap. XIV, pp. 335-355.
Statistics of War: sources of information, 335-6; number enlisted in Federal armies, 337; number enlisted in Confederate armies, 337; dimensions of an army of 100,000, 337; numbers killed in battle in Federal and Confederate armies, 338; numbers died of disease in Federal and Confederate armies, 339; numbers of drafted men in service, 340; proportion of regulars to volunteers, 340; de-
- ssertions, 340; losses in Revolutionary War, 343-7; losses in Mexican War, 341; greatest loss of general officers at battle of Franklin, 349; remarkable percentage of losses in Civil War, 350-1; average percentage of losses in killed and died of wounds, 351; statistics of Co. I, 79th Ind., 353-4.
Steedman, Gen. James B.: 193.
Stephens, Alexander: 293.
Stevens's Gap (Ga.): 168, 169.
Stevenson (Ala.): 159, 213.
Stewart, Gen. Alexander P.: 273.
Stillwater, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
Stinnett, Lindsay: 188.
Stone, Gen. Charles P.: 23, 24.
Stone's river: 107, 108, 109, 110, 116, 118, 148.
Stone's River, Battle of: Chap. V, pp. 106-122; 76, 77, 80; the advance from Nashville, 106; Bragg makes stand at Murfreesboro, 106; description of the battle-field, 106-7; position of opposing lines, 107-8; Rosecrans's and Bragg's plans of battle, 108-9; faulty position of McCook's lines, 109; movements of Federal army on morning of Dec. 31, 109-10; Bragg opens battle, 110; Johnson's division surprised and routed, 110; Confederate attack on Davis's, Sheridan's and Negley's divisions, 111; new Federal line of battle formed, 112-13; desperate fighting of Rousseau's, Negley's and Palmer's divisions, 113; Confederate assaults on the temporary new line, 113-14; Beatty's brigade becomes


- Federal right, 114; Rosecrans's coolness in battle, 115; the battle in the cedar thickets, 116; formation of permanent new line, and Confederate assaults upon it, 116-17; results of first day's fighting, 117; the New Year's eve council of war and Gen. Thomas's answer, 118; movements on Jan. 1, 118; formation of Federal lines on Jan. 2, 118-19; Breckinridge's assault and repulse on that day, 119-120; retreat of Bragg and Federal occupation of Murfreesboro, 120; striking features of battle, 121; numbers and losses, 121-2, 348.
- Stoneman*, Gen. George D.: 151, 298.
- Stono Ferry*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Stony Point*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Stragglers* in army: 74-5.
- Strawberry Plains* (Tenn.): 244, 245, 249, 251, 253.
- Sullivan's Island*, battle of: numbers and losses, 343.
- Summerville* (Ga.): 164, 165.
- Sunbury* (Ga.), battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Surprises* by hostile army: 77.
- Sutlers* in army: 59, 66.
- Sweetwater* (Tenn.): 250.
- Tappan*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Taylor*, Gen. Richard: 125.
- Taylor*, Lieut. —: 154.
- Tennessee*, Army of. See Army, etc.
- Tennessee*, Department of: 214.
- Tennessee river*: 157, 158, 162, 211, 212, 217, 309, 310, 311.
- Tennessee*, state: 39, 47, 100, 252, 260, 307, 310, 313, 362. See East Tennessee.
- Tennessee Valley*: 161, 362.
- Tents*: shape and construction, 56-7.
- Terrell*, Adj.-Gen. William H. H.: 336.
- Thomas*, Gen. George H.: appointed to command of right wing of Halleck's army, 45; declines appointment as successor to Buell, 99; appointed to command of center of Army of the Cumberland, 101; his familiarity with details, 103; succeeds Rosecrans in command of Army of the Cumberland, 214; takes command of troops in Military Division of the Mississippi in Sherman's absence, 309; how harassed by Grant and Washington authorities prior to battle of Nashville, 320-2; orders directing Generals Schofield and Logan to relieve him of command, 322; his generosity to Grant, 327; estimate of his character, 327-8; affection for him of soldiers of Army of the Cumberland, 328; Badeau's aspersions on his character, 328. See Battles and Campaigns of Army of the Cumberland; Battles of Mill Spring and Nashville; Hood's Invasion of Tennessee.
- Three Months' Picnic*, The: Chap. I, pp. 1-14.
- Three Months' Service*: excitement consequent on election of Lincoln, 1; rumors of secession, 1; feeling in Indiana, 1; Lincoln stops at Indianapolis on his way to Washington, 2; firing on

- Fort Sumter and its effect on the North, 2; Gov. Morton of Indiana, 5; his efforts in behalf of the Union cause, 5-8; the call to arms in Indiana, 8; raising of the first company in Franklin, Ind., 9-10; organization of 7th Ind. Inf., 10; regiment goes to West Virginia, 10; the battle of Philippi, 10; incidents of three months' service, 11-12; battle of Carrick's Ford, 13; the disaster at Bull Run and its effect on the North, 13; benefit of experience gained in the three months' service, 14.
- Thruston*, Col. Gates P.: 199.
- Treason* trials at Indianapolis, Ind.: 283.
- Trent* affair: 22.
- Trenton*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Tullahoma* (Tenn.): 156, 157, 162.
- Tullahoma* campaign: 157.
- Turchin*, Gen. John B.: 239.
- Turenne*, Marshal: 21.
- Tuscumbia* (Ala.): 305.
- "*Uncle John*": 73.
- Under fire*: sensation of being, 83.
- Vance*, Gov. Zebulon B.: 293.
- Van Cleve*, Gen. Horatio P.: 118, 198.
- Vicksburg* (Miss.): 41, 48, 123, 125, 126, 145, 154, 159, 283.
- Vicksburg*, assault on: numbers and losses, 348.
- Viniard* field (Chickamauga): 176.
- Virginia*, Army of: 44, 45.
- Virginia* Campaign: 88, 89.
See Richmond Campaign.
- Virginia*, Department of: 32.
- Virginia*, state: 1, 44, 165, 246, 258, 276, 279, 280, 362.
- Volunteer* armies: government forced to depend on, 17.
- Wade*, Senator Benjamin: appointed chairman of Committee on Conduct of the War, 22; early opposition to Grant, 48.
- Walden* Ridge: 158, 161, 213.
- Walker*, Gen. William H. T.: 273.
- War* of 1812: numbers and losses, 342.
- Wartrace* (Tenn.): 156.
- Washburne*, Elihu B.: friendship for Grant, 49.
- Washington*, D. C.: 2, 12, 15, 20, 24, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, 67, 101, 125, 157, 159, 164, 165, 214, 296, 319, 320, 322.
- Washington*, George: 40.
- Wauhatchie* (Tenn.): 216.
- Waxhaws*, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
- Webster* (Va.): 10, 11.
- Wellington*, Duke of: 171.
- West Virginia*, state: 10, 40, 65.
- White Plains*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Whitemarsh*, battle of: numbers and losses, 344.
- Wildcat* (Ky.): 100, 104.
- Wilder*, Gen. John T.: 171.
- Wilderness*, battle of: numbers and losses, 348.
- Wilkes*, Capt. Charles: 22.
- Wilkinson* turnpike (Stone's river): 107, 108.
- Williamsburg*, battle of: numbers and losses, 348.
- Willich*, Gen. August: 110, 111, 117, 246.

- Wilson*, Gen. James F.: 32, 33, 308, 313, 314, 315, 320.
Winchester (Tenn.): 157, 158.
Winchester, battle of: 90, 185; numbers and losses, 349.
Wisconsin, state: tender of 100-day men by, 284.
Wise, Gen. Henry A.: 278.
Wood, Gen. Thomas J.: 183, 184, 214, 226, 237, 238, 239.
Wyoming Massacre: numbers and losses, 345.
Yorktown, battle of: numbers and losses, 346.
Youngs House, battle of: numbers and losses, 345.
Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K.: 41.







Wilberforce Eames, Librarian,
New York Public Library,

My Dear Sir:-

In compliance with your letter in presenting the New York Public Library a copy of Civil War Times--which I send by to-day's express

It is not a pretentious volume and I hope to be so extensively and favorably received as it has been very favorably noticed by the leading New York, Chicago, and some other northern papers. I have also by its favorable reception in the South, the Sun, the New Orleans Picayune, and other southern papers, generous and complimentary. I have some clippings from a Henry Romeike clipping agency, but no duplicates.

But after all the book must speak for itself. It may prove of some interest to those of the South in the conflict and their children.

